







 EXPLAINING BRAINS BY SIMULATION 
 
 

























































I would like to thank all who know that I am grateful for their help. 
 
This work was supported by grants from  
 
University Network For MultiMedia of the State Government NRW, Germany 
 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Germany 
 
Printed on aging resistant paper in conformance with DIN ISO 9706 
Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier nach DIN ISO 9706 
INDEX 




1. BRAINS 11 
 
1.1. An explanatory framework 11 
1.1.1. Subject 12 
1.1.2. Phenomena 13 
1.1.3. Domains 14 
1.1.3.1. In between neural, cognitive and computational 16 
1.1.4. Disciplines 18 
1.1.5. Levels of organization 19 
1.1.5.1. Explanation and the levels of organization: examples 21 
1.1.6. Dynamics and complexity 24 
1.1.7. Mechanisms 27 
1.1.8. Levels of explanation 29 
1.1.9. Methodology 30 
1.1.10. Control 33 
1.1.11. Simulation 34 
1.1.12. Summary and conclusion 36 
 
1.2. Explanations of brain phenomena 39 
1.2.1. Introduction 39 
1.2.2. Responsiveness 40 
1.2.2.1. Binary neuron 42 
1.2.2.2. Electric activity 42 
1.2.2.3. Molecules and electric activity 46 
1.2.2.4. Temporal change and responsiveness 49 
1.2.2.5. Conduction: Spatiotemporal change and responsiveness 51 
1.2.2.6. Beyond responsiveness 54 
1.2.3. Spikes 55 
1.2.3.1. Spikes as electric activity 57 
1.2.3.2. Spikes as membrane events 58 
1.2.3.3. Spikes as a formal event 60 
1.2.3.4. Propagation of spikes 62 
1.2.4. The classical neuron 63 
1.2.5. Synapse 68 
1.2.6. Networks 77 
1.2.6.1. An example: Motion detection 78 
1.2.7. Behavior 84 
1.2.7.1. An example: Phototaxis 86 
1.2.7.2. Further behavioral issues 89 
1.2.8. Learning 91 
1.2.8.1. Conditioning 91 
1.2.8.2. Formal explanation of learning 93 
INDEX 
 
1.2.8.3. Neural explanation of learning 94 
1.2.9. Summary and conclusion 97 
 
1.3. “Where to put information on brains!?”  101 
1.3.1. Introduction 101 
1.3.2. A sketch of the brain sciences 103 
1.3.3. Classification methods 105 
1.3.4. Knowledge bases for brains 110 
1.3.4.1. Universal indexing 110 
1.3.4.2. Thesauri 111 
1.3.4.3. Glossaries 113 
1.3.4.4. Evaluation of resources 114 
1.3.5. Conceptual frameworks for brains 116 
1.3.5.1. Textbooks 117 
1.3.6. A common scheme for the brain sciences 126 
1.3.6.1. Applying the common scheme 129 
1.3.6.2. Problems 131 
1.3.7. Outlook 134 
1.3.8. Conclusion 136 
 
2. SIMULATION 139 
 
2.1. Simulations as media 139 
2.1.1. Introduction 139 
2.1.2. Impediments for simulation standards 141 
2.1.2.1.  Conceptual difficulty 142 
2.1.2.2.  Semantic variety 145 
2.1.2.3.  Complicated content 147 
2.1.3. Towards the core of simulation 148 
2.1.3.1.  Simulation and media 148 
2.1.3.2.  Standardizing humans?  150 
2.1.3.3.  A theory of cognitive simulation 152 
2.1.4. Practical implications 153 
2.1.4.1. Intervention features 154 
2.1.4.2.  System features 155 
2.1.4.3.  Combined features 156 
2.1.4.4.  Things left aside 156 
2.1.5. Summary and conclusion 157 
 
2.2. Simulation in Science 159 
2.2.1. Scientific work 159 
2.2.1.1. A scien ific workflow.  159 t
c
2.2.1.2. Modeling and simulation 161 
2.2.1.3. Mental simulation in s ientific work 166 
2.2.2. Domains of scientific work 169 
2.2.2.1. From natural situations to natural preparations 174 
INDEX 
2.2.2.2. From natural to artificial 177 
2.2.2.3. Generating the artificial 180 
2.2.3. A generic simulation scheme 181 
2.2.4. Strong and weak Simulation 187 
2.2.5. Summary 189 
2.2.6. Implications: “Simulation, media and explanation”  191 
 
 
3. EXPLANATION 195 
 
3.1. Simulation as cognition 196 
3.1.1. Cognitive theories 198 
3.1.1.1. Knowledge 198 
3.1.1.2. Learning 198 
3.1.2. Mental models 202 
3.1.3. Mental simulation 206 
3.1.3.1. Representation 207 
3.1.3.2. A conceptual system 209 
3.1.4. Simulation in action 214 
3.1.5. Summary and conclusion 218 
 
3.2. Explaining brains by simulation: Design for a case study 221 
3.2.1. Introduction 222 
3.2.1.1. General task 223 
3.2.1.2. Learning strategies 226 
3.2.1.3. The model 227 
3.2.1.4. Learning the vehicle 229 
3.2.1.5. Error correction 229 
3.2.1.6. Distinguishing strategies 230 
3.2.2. Material and methods 235 
3.2.2.1. Experimental procedure 235 
3.2.2.2. Model implementation  240 
3.2.2.3. Propulsion of the vehicle.  240 
3.2.2.4. Model simulation 242 
3.2.2.5. Selection of the vehicle configurations 243 
3.2.2.6. Data analysis 244 
3.2.3. Discussion 246 
3.2.3.1. From performance to mental processes 246 
3.2.3.2. Efficiency of mental simulation 248 
3.2.3.3. Outlook 251 
 

















fig. 2: Experimental setups.  41 
fig. 3: RC-ci cuits.  43 
fig. 4: “The container situation”.  46 
fig. 5: Molecular aspects of membranes.  48 
fig. 6: Spike.  57 
fig. 7: Outline of the ‘classical’ neuron.  64 
fig. 8: Plasticity in Aplysia.  74 
fig. 9: Motion Detector 79 
fig. 10: Eye-Blink Circuit 96 
fig. 11: A sketch of the brain sciences.  105 
fig. 12: Typical architectures of neural networks.  122 
fig. 13: A sketch of the Information Processing Approach.  123 
fig. 14: ‘Levels of organization’ as extractable from textbooks of the Neuro iences.  125 
fig. 15: A common scheme in the neural-cognitive-computational domain.  128 
fig. 16: Categorization into the common scheme.  130 
fig. 17: The concept of simulation.  142 
ig. 18: Simulation cycle as human-computer interaction.  151 
fig. 19: Characteristic of a model neuron.  161 
fig. 20: Domains of scientific work.  172 
fig. 21: The modeling relation.  182 
fig. 22: The modeling relations in scientific work.  186 
fig. 23: Concepts on molar knowledge structures.  199 
fig. 24: The task.  225 
fig. 25: Model of the vehicle.  227 
fig. 26: Behavior of a spe ific vehicle configuration (overview).  242 
fig. 27: Distribution of errors for a given vehicle configuration.  243 




table 1: A collection of disciplines around the brain 104 
able 2. Structure of dif erent approaches to classification. 106 
table 3: Concept positions in multiple directories. 108 
table 4. Aptitude of several resources to represent ... 114 
table 5. Summaries of the analyzed textbooks. 119 
table 6. Summary of the analysis of textbooks. 121 
table 7: Examples of criteria characterizing simulations. 154 
table 8: S hematic overview of the task. 237 
table 9: Overview o  the hosen vehicle . 244 
 
PREFACE 




This study examines the role of simulation in explaining brain phenomena. 
Consider a teacher in a biology class explaining color vision in bees to 
students. The role of simulation in this concrete situation can be manifold: 
The teacher can use an educational computer simulation to demonstrate, 
say, different stages of image processing of color vision. Long before the 
teacher stands in the classroom, brain scientists might have already applied 
scientific computer simulations in order to find the explanation that the 
teacher uses. And in the next exam, the students in the class should be able 
to mentally simulate color vision in order to answer the question the teacher 
posed. These cases indicate that the roles of simulation can be very different 
from each other and the notions of simulation underlying these roles are 
apparently diverse. The objective of this study is, thus, to describe the 
various roles of simulation in explanations of brain phenomena and to ask 
whether there is one generic notion of simulation that reconcile the various 
roles. 
 
Which line of approach is best suited to find such a generic simulation 
scheme? First, as a kind of demand analysis, we need to know what is so 
special about brains that investigations and explanations of brains have to be 
based on simulation. This is provided in the first chapter ‘Brains’. It will be 
argued that dynamics and complexity of brains are the most challenging task 
of explaining brains and that simulations are a key to unlock dynamics and 
complexity. Then, with a general understanding of the need of simulations 
for explaining brains, different forms of simulation can be analyzed. This is 
done as a kind of task analysis at the beginning of the second chapter 
(‘Simulation’) that focuses on scientific work as a good practice scenario for 
explanations that are based on simulation. By comparing different forms of 
simulation in science, the issue of simulation will be finally narrowed down to 
a generic simulation scheme that is proposed to be prevalent in all notions of 
simulation. This is provided at the end of the second chapter. When we know 
why we need simulation for explaining brains (chapter 1) and how the 
mechanism of simulation works (chapter 2), it is still unclear how to assess 
the role of simulation for explanations? Therefore explanation will be 
approached as a cognitive phenomenon involving perception, reasoning, 
 7
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learning etc. Simulation will be described as a mechanism that directs 
cognitive processes in order to generate an explanation. This approach to 
simulation allows a general assessment of the proposed simulation scheme 
with respect to major theoretical frameworks in cognitive science. This 
theoretical localization of simulation as an explanatory tool is done at the 
beginning of the third chapter ('Explanation'). At the end of the third chapter, 
it will be demonstrated that the conception of simulation as a cognitive 
phenomenon even makes possible to track the explanatory value of 
simulation experimentally. 
 
Altogether, it will become clear that – contrary to the common notion that 
simulation is somewhere outside in a computer or some other device – most 





This text is definitely “in between” – between theory and praxis, science and humanities, brain and 
behavior, content and method, nature and model … So, who can read this text? The main g oups I had r
in mind while w iting were people interested in 'brains', e.g. affiliates of neuroscience, behavioral r
science and cognitive science, people interested in 'explanation', e.g. philosophe s of science, but also   r
teache s or journalists and, finally, people interested in ‘simulations’, e.g. compute  scientists as well r  r
as theorists and practitioners from the educational domain. Meeting the needs of each group is a 
balancing act between being trivial and being unintelligible. So, I would like to please in advance to  
show some leniency towards sections that slip off in the one or the other direction. The reade  is  r
invited to autonomously adjust the appropriate reading focus due to prior knowledge. However, it is a 
particular conce n of this study to satisfy the needs of different g oups of reade s. There ore, I will r r r f  
explain the pu pose of the major sections in the Reading Advice pa agraphs that p ecede the sections. r r r
 
Fo matching the needs of different reader groups, the general sections are supplemented with four r  
‘Specials’ that analyze specific questions in depth: two are a “Brain-Spe ial” one is a “Simulation-c
Special” and one is an “Explanation-Spe ial”. ‘Specials’ can be read as solitary sections that do not c
depend crucially on the other sections. Whether or not a ‘Special’ is important to a reader depends on 
the specific interests and the prior knowledge. The shortest trajectory through the text – recommended 
only for experts of simulation and brains – leaves out all ‘Specials’. Novices in the brain sciences are 
recommended to read the first Brain-Special because it can be seen as an introduction to brain 
sciences. For brain experts it has predominantly repetitive character. The second Brain-Special 
assesses the state of theoretical integ ation within the different disciplines contributing to the brain r
sciences by analyzing existing resources of information on brains such as databases, thesauri or 
textbooks. It p ovides all reader group  with a deeper understanding of speci ic s rategies and r s f t
problems of explaining brains. The Simulation-Spe ial provides an introduction and critical discussion c
of common notions of simulation, also with respect to technical conceptions. Thus, it is interesting to  
novices in the field of simulation as an introduction – and also for all those simulation experts who 
sense that the concept of simulation is somewhat fuzzy. The Explanation-Special is a demonstration of 
how the notion of simulation proposed in the p eceding sections can be as es ed experimentally. The r  s s
following table provides an overview of how a section applies to a specific reade  g oup. Whether or    r r
not a section is actually to be read can best be decided directly before the respe tive section where the  c
specific Reading Advice is provided. 
 
        
 
Section page Type Brain  Computer  Cognitive 
   Scientist Scientist  Scientist 
        
1. Brains 
1.1 An explanatory framework 11 General - -  - 
1.2 Explanations of brain phenomena 39 Brain-Special repetition introduction introduction 
1.3 Where to put information on brains!? 101 Brain-Special deepening deepening  deepening 
2. Simulation 
2.1 Simulations as media 139 Simulation-Spec. introduction deepening  introduction 
2.2 Simulation in science 159 General - -  - 
3. Explanation 
3.1 Simulation as cognition 196 General - -  - 
3.2 Case study 221 Explanation-Spec. introduction deepening deepening 






















1.1. An explanatory framework  
1. BRAINS 
 
The term ‘Brains’ stands for the subject, the phenomenon to be explained. Of 
course, the term has a metaphorical meaning and comprises the complete 
nervous system. The plural ‘Brains’ indicates that there is not only one brain, 
i.e. the human brain to be explained, but that simpler nervous systems 
equally contribute to an understanding of brain function. ‘Neuroscience’, as 
an alternative term for naming the subject, bears a notion far too restricted 
to describe the respective scientific field since, for instance, Cybernetics, 
Neuroinformatics, Artificial Intelligence or Cognitive Psychology each play a 
considerable role in brain studies. However, ‘Neuroscience’ is the term most 
often used to denote the scientific field and I will do so as well when I speak 
of the scientific field (not the subject!) – keeping in mind that other 
disciplines, otherwise deserving their own credits, are implied. 
 
Reading Advice 
From the various possibilities of introducing brains, I chose an approach that will provide reade s newr  
to the brains sciences with a solid knowledge base for the following chapters “Simulation” and 
“Explanation”. But, at the same time, this approach should unveil some implicit assumptions of brain 
s iences that might be even new to b ain expe ts. In order to understand this approach it might help to c r r
think of a naïve observer who has attended many oral exams on neuroscience, now trying to sum up 
what candidates and examiners were talking about. The chapter ‘Brains’ contains three large sections. 
First, an explanatory framework in the form of basic concepts and terms will be provided. This is 
important to all readers because terminological conventions are provided that help to be clear 
throughout the text about what is actually at issue. Specific explanations of brain phenomena, mainly 
for non-experts in the brains sciences, will be presented in the follow-up section. 
 
1.1. An explanatory framework 
 
Behavior and cognition in animals and humans are thought to be controlled, 
realized and, thus, explainable by way of brain mechanisms. But brains are 
no easy things to explain. Complexity and dynamics of brain mechanisms 
encrypt them to a hardly readable book. However, the difficulties of 
explaining brains are unlikely to be caused by some magic properties of the 
brain. Rather, they might result from a lacking skill of understanding 
dynamics and complexity as such. If so, strategies to cope with dynamics and 
complexity should help to better understand brain phenomena. Dynamics 
can be controlled, for example, by defining discrete phases (serialization) 
and complexity can be broken down to constituent elements 
(decomposition). Such systematic procedures applied to brain phenomena 





Brains are involved in and involve a variety of phenomena: anatomical, 
electric, chemical, behavioral, cognitive, computational etc. Accordingly, 
various approaches exist to explain brains. Their treatment would be an 
effort far beyond the scope of this study. Thus, in order to limit the scope, 
this text will not pose the (ontological) question: “What is the brain as such?” 
but only the (epistemological) question “What contributes to explanations of 
brains?” An appropriate situation that reflects the approach taken in this 
section is that of a neutral third person visiting an oral exam on a 
neuroscience course in order to find formulations of the criteria by which the 
examiner assesses the consistency of the candidate’s utterances. 
 
So, what is to be explained? A general explanatory target of brain studies is 
the question how a certain function is realized by the brain, e.g. color vision, 
temperature sensation, spatial memory etc. Functions as such often are not 
directly observable, but become overt as a means for explaining a behavior 
of a given system: a frog flicking a fly, a bee’s preference for, say, a blue 
flower, an iguana looking for a sunny rock, a rat’s improved orientation in a 
formerly unknown maze etc. Behavior usually relates to an environment in a 
functional (often called “adaptive”) manner. Here, for the time being, the 
scope of the brain studies end: Brain studies seek to explain how brain 
phenomena make possible adaptive behavior. Unfortunately, the whole story 
is not that simple: the system showing the behavior and its environment is 
not always very concrete as in the case of a frog flicking a fly. On the 
contrary, the factors determining function are frequently far from the actual 
animal behavior, e.g. a gene’s expression probability in a synapse, a 
neuron’s electric activity in an isolated brain slice, the performance of a 
human in a reaction time task or a trait of a brain-like artifact such as a 
simulation or a robot. These examples illustrate that principally any low-level 
(micro-) phenomenon potentially contributing to valid explanations of brains 
might be taken as a building block of an explanation. Thus, one difficulty in 
explaining brains is to arrange low-level phenomena in a way that produces 
a sound explanation of the global, high-level phenomenon (e.g. behavior). 
Additionally, low-level phenomena are themselves typically not exclusively 
hosted in a single explanation. Synaptic transmission, for example, is a low-
level phenomenon that plays a role in many explanations of behavior. Not a 
general process of synaptic transmission is applicable in any explanation, but 
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the specific ‘configuration’ of synaptic transmission has to be found. Thus, 
another prevalent difficulty in explaining brains is to specify the concrete 
instance of a mechanism in order to explain the global phenomenon. In sum, 
relating low-level phenomena to adaptive behavior is a general explanatory 




What do brain scientists observe? When brains are freed from their bodily 
shell, the first thing observed are anatomical phenomena, i.e. the size, form, 
color etc. Since the naked eye does not reveal enough detail, often additional 
methods such as manual isolation of brain structures and section techniques 
are applied. Brain tissue does not provide sufficient contrast and is, 
therefore, most of the time artificially stained with histological methods. The 
final brain preparation yields expressive pictures of microstructures, such as 
cells, assemblies, areas, regions etc. Anatomical techniques were 
systematically developed and improved since major breakthroughs of 
histological staining during the turn to the past century (see Ramón y Cajal 
1906; Golgi 1906). Today, sometimes even more instructive pictures can be 
taken without opening the body, e.g. with fMRI (functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging) techniques (see fMRI Data Center 2003). Anatomical 
phenomena relate to the detailed spatial organization of brains. Gross 
physical phenomena such as density, weight etc. are descriptive, but seldom 
contribute to explanations of brain function. 
 
Electric phenomena were discovered very early (see Galvani 1791) and, unlike 
gross physical phenomena, they yielded powerful approaches to explanations 
of brain function ever since. At the beginning, muscles were stimulated 
electrically and contractions could be observed. Today, even electric 
phenomena relating to abstract concepts such as ‘decisions’ can be observed 
by imaging techniques and can be stimulated by micro-electrodes (see e.g. 
Platt 2002). Electric phenomena are considered to be most closely coupled to 
functions of the brain, i.e. it is thought that the functional organization can 
adequately be explained by studying electric phenomena. 
 
It was shown that electric phenomena can also be understood as chemical 
phenomena (see e.g. Nernst 1888). The responsiveness of single neurons is 
frequently termed an electrochemical phenomenon since a given electric 
 13
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activity is determined by the relative concentrations of ions solved inside and 
outside of the cell. The deeper understanding of electrochemical coupling 
also yielded new insights in a very special phenomenon – the action 
potential, often called spike (see Hodgkin & Huxley 1952). This is noteworthy 
since spikes are impulses that are actively generated by neurons and allow 
brains to encode a continuously modulating signal (e.g. a pure tone 
registered by sensory cells in the ear) into a series of discrete events. Such a 
translation process is a basic computational phenomenon. Spikes are 
important for understanding neural codes. 
 
The computational perspective on brains (see e.g. Churchland & Sejnowski 
1992) yields outstanding explanations of complex and dynamic phenomena 
such as humans extracting a single faint voice from the noisy babble on a 
cocktail party (see von der Malsburg & Schneider 1986) or desert ants finding 
their way home after an excursion by utilizing sun-position (see Wehner 
1994; Lambrinos et al. 2000). Computational phenomena are abstract in 
nature, but make sense immediately if seen in a behavioral context. 
 
Explaining behavioral phenomena – in the sense of the behavior of a frog or 
a fly – necessitates an integration of most phenomena described before. 
Explaining behavior, therefore, represents one of the most ultimate tasks in 
the venture of explaining brains. A specific sub-domain of behavioral 
phenomena are cognitive phenomena for which integrative explanations 
more and more succeed (see e.g. Gazzaniga 2002 for a general account). The 
task of explaining cognitive phenomena as brain phenomena suffers from 
the complexity that unfolds when trying to break them down to brain 
mechanisms. They comprise a vast amount of constitutive brain functions. 
Therefore, cognitive phenomena call for an ambitious integration of the 
different phenomena over space, time and complexity. 
 
In sum, an explanation of a functional brain can involve anatomical, 





Classes of phenomena form domains. Differentiating between all different 
phenomena in any instance of explanations is demanding and sometimes not 
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necessary. But some differences are striking! For example, the brain is most 
often conceived as a biological, ‘wet’ matter and less often as a computer or 
a cognition carrier. The ‘wet’ notion resides in the neural domain of brain 
studies. The neural domain subsumes all phenomena that are typically 
studied by (natural) sciences, i.e. physics, chemistry and biology. They form a 
coherent domain since it is widely assumed that explanations for one 
phenomenon are translatable in terms of explanations of another 
phenomenon, for instance as electric activity in a neuron is explainable in 
terms of ionic changes at the neuronal membrane. 
 
As already indicated above, those phenomena that somehow fall out of the 
neural domain are computational and cognitive phenomena. Cognitive 
phenomena are thought to rely on brains, but the concrete mechanisms are 
difficult to tackle. Cognitive phenomena, e.g. traced by reaction-time 
experiments (a behavioral phenomenon!) are typically explained in cognitive 
terms (self contained in psychological theories) that are not directly 
translatable in neural terms. Yet, in single cases or to varying degrees such 
translations succeed. Beyond this problem of theoretical integration, the 
adequacy of a neural description of cognitive phenomena may vary from case 
to case and is still an unresolved issue (see also 1.2.7.2). In general, 
explaining cognitive phenomena might be conceived as a benchmark test for 
integrative studies on brain function. 
 
Computational phenomena play a special role in brain studies. It is implicitly 
assumed (and very often explicitly demonstrated) that brain functions can 
also be realized in computer programs or machines. This characteristic 
decouples computational phenomena from the neural domain by definition. 
This does not imply that computational phenomena are not translatable in 
neural terms. But it implies that neural implementation is not a necessary 
condition for a computational phenomenon to be observed. Contrary to the 
translation of electric in chemical phenomena – where electric phenomena 
and chemical phenomena are mutually conditional – computational 
phenomena and neural phenomena might be observed solitarily and 
consequently form separate domains. Computational phenomena are remote 
from the neural domain, for the basic notion is that computational 
phenomena are independent from the concrete form of implementation.  
 15
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In summary, we arrive at a tri-part distinction of domains in brain studies in 
which mechanisms explaining adaptive behavior can reside in: a neural, a 
cognitive and a computational domain. 
 
1.1.3.1. In between neural, cognitive and computational 
 
The relation between the neural, cognitive and computational domain, 
however, has been subject of many philosophical discussions that shall not 
be neglected completely here. The discussion on the relation between the 
neural and the cognitive (‘mental’) has often been caused by the subject of 
reduction. What is this problem about? It is widely accepted that mental 
processes rest on neural processes. Why then should we distinguish a mental 
domain from a neural domain if we can reduce all mental phenomena to 
neural phenomena? A polarizing account is put forward as “eliminative 
materialism” (see Churchland 1981; Churchland 1986) that predicts a total 
disappearance of explanations involving mental phenomena since they will 
all finally be ‘translated’ into more basic neural (‘material’) phenomena. 
However, such reduction of (explanations of) mental processes to neural 
processes is itself challenged by the view that coexistence and division of 
scientific labor in the respective disciplines are valuable alternatives. For 
example, Bechtel et. al. (2001a) propose that different disciplines concern 
different phenomena on different levels on the natural hierarchy. A 
supporting argument for this view can be developed if a concrete final form 
of such reductionist explanations is envisaged: for reducing high level 
phenomena to low-level phenomena, considerably more mechanistic 
explanations have to be taken into account. Each mechanism comprises 
further elements, activities and certain causal organizations. The principle of 
reduction can be applied virtually endlessly to arbitrary low-level domains. At 
a certain point of reduction, the consideration of more and more low-level 
mechanisms renders the whole venture uneconomical. This point is reached, 
for example, when the purpose of the venture does not profit anymore from 
the consideration of low-level explanations and, at the same time, high-level 
explanations provide the same functionality. For example, if spatial attention 
(the high level phenomenon) was the explanandum, an explanans might be 
based on cable theory (a low-level approach based on biophysical properties 
of single neurons, see also 1.2.2). But the explanans might also be based on 
a purely functional, phenomenological model without any reference to low-
level phenomena. The aptitude of the explanans is determined by the 
 16 
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application context. Consider a robot as the target platform for the spatial 
attention mechanism: the mechanism in the robot can be based on both low-
level cable model and high-level functional model. The aptitude of the model 
would then be assessed by the criterion whether or not the model eventually 
realizes the desired behavior of the robot. If the behavior can be realized 
with both models equally well, the more economical model will be preferred. 
Since high-level models are usually more parsimonious (e.g. in terms of 
participating elements), they will usually compete low-level models. Thus, 
reductive low-level (e.g. neural) explanations are not generally superior – 
depending on the application context, functional high-level (e.g. cognitive) 
explanations might be superior in terms of economy. However, theorists 
could object that, even though economical constraints work in science, they 
usually (and fortunately) do not completely determine scientific inquiry. 
Therefore, the call for a unified account of a given phenomenon (such as 
spatial attention) would presumably not fall silent until all possible 
reductions are made. 
 
The economical argument might be too weak too lastingly satisfy deeply 
theoretical issues, but low-level explanations might also be inferior for 
another reason: explanations involving mental processes might be more 
appropriate because neural explanations might show to be so complex that 
they exceed the cognitive capacity of scientists and recipients. Cruse (2001) 
puts forward a closely related argument. He compares the levels of 
description in the Neurosciences (e.g. molecular or behavioral) to different 
programming languages (e.g. object-oriented vs. assembled) and concludes 
that a choice between them is not a question of truth but a question of 
aptitude. This choice goes along with the limited perceptual abilities that 
hinder the experience of the complete reality of a system. 
 
Similar to the problematic relation between the neural domain and the 
cognitive domain, the neural domain and computational domain also have 
border disputes. On the one hand, there are well-founded programmatic 
accounts of what computational neuroscience should be about (see e.g. 
Schwartz 1990; Churchland & Sejnowski 1992). On the other hand, critical 
accounts put forward that the computational domain is not related in a useful 
manner to the neural domain. Grush (see 1997) provides an analytical 
account of the relation between algorithm and environment, computation 
and representation and suspects a ‘semantic challenge’ to computational 
 17
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neuroscience. He assumes that there is a principal difficulty in showing that 
computations in the brain do something meaningful, analogous to the 
problems of integrating semantics in information theory. However, with 
‘informational semantics’ (Dretske 1981) or ‘biosemantics’ (Millikan 1984; 
1989) constructive attempts can also be found. Another critical argument 
against computation is put forward by Daugman (1990). Within the different 
approaches of explaining brains with metaphors (i.e. hydraulic, electric, 
computational etc.) he makes out computation as one of the weakest 
metaphors because evidence for brains carrying out logical operations is 
scarce. However, most opponents of computational neuroscience presume 
that computational neuroscientists seek for computations as the brain’s 
central purpose. Even though this might be true in some cases, one might 
concede other computational neuroscientists that they see computations just 
as operations necessary to achieve meaningful representations – not as the 
representations as such. In this sense, computations describe the transfer 
functions that lead to meaningful representations and computational 
neuroscience provides an exact language and methodological framework for 
this. 
 
In spite of the problems indicated above, it seems helpful to differentiate 
between the neural, the cognitive and the computational domain in order to 




The different phenomena and domains in brain studies are object of a variety 
of scientific disciplines. Beside the ‘classic’ disciplines, i.e. physics, chemistry 
and biology, the younger disciplines psychology and computer science are 
most relevant for brain studies. Beyond these, numerous small special 
disciplines emerged within the last decades. Each special discipline is 
focused differentially on the neural, cognitive or computational domain. 
However, as special disciplines (e.g. cognitive neuroscience) have successors 
in ‘special-special’ disciplines (e.g. cognitive neuropharmacology), the 
relevance of special disciplines increasingly becomes a matter of taste. Thus, 
special disciplines shall not be reviewed in detail here. A short, subjective 
sketch of disciplines in the brain sciences and their orientation in the neural, 
cognitive and computational domain is given later (see also 1.3.2 and fig. 
11). 
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1.1.5. Levels of organization 
 
Brain phenomena can be located at various levels: spikes at the neuronal 
level, synaptic noise at the sub-cellular level, memory on the systems level 
etc. The notion of levels is very common in brain studies and important to 
understand and to explain brain phenomena (see e.g. Churchland & 
Sejnowski 1992). Moving from one level to the next (e.g. from sub-cellular to 
cellular) means moving from a lower level to a higher level. Thus, the notion 
of levels entails that the brain’s organization is hierarchical in nature. How 
can this hierarchical organization be described? The simplest form of 
hierarchical organization is anatomical, i.e. refers to the spatial organization. 
A ‘zoom’ through a spatial organization can firmly be anchored at the 
cellular (neuronal) level. The neuronal level contains, for instance, 
membranes and synapses. Zooming inward (getting smaller, moving 
downward the hierarchy) opens the sub-cellular level with ion channels in 
membranes and vesicles in synapses. Below unfolds the molecular level with 
membrane channels being proteins and vesicles containing transmitters. The 
electric level, then, refers to ions moving through membrane proteins or 
electric interactions causing conformation changes of proteins during 
transmitter binding. Lower levels than the electric level, e.g. interactions of 
electromagnetic fields should not be neglected, but are scarcely considered 
in this study. It should also be noted that there is no distinct chemical level 
of organization in this study. The reason is that, although chemical 
phenomena play a crucial role in low-level mechanisms, they are readily 
contained by the electric and the molecular level of organization. 
 
Zooming outward from the neuronal level (getting larger, moving upward in 
the hierarchy) reveals a variety of networks: Small networks (circuits), 
constituted by few neurons, can build a reflex arc or act as an ensemble. 
Large networks (modules) can build a functional column in the human cortex, 
a ganglion in an arthropod or regions such as a retina. ‘Systems’ denote the 
intermediate level between networks and behavior, but the term ‘system’ is 
not well defined. It relates to such different issues as sensory systems (e.g. 
visual, auditory), motor, memory or transmitter systems. However, systems 
(as a collective term for intermediate levels of organization) denote the last 
level before the neural level – and therewith the brain and the whole nervous 
system – is left behind. Passing the organismic level, finally, reveals the view 
on the (behaving) individual in its environment. 
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The spatial levels described so far largely correspond to the different 
phenomena introduced above – especially the phenomena subsumed in the 
neural domain (see also 1.1.2). However, space is just one dimension. The 
intuitive appeal of the spatial dimension often distracts from another basic 
dimension, namely time. The temporal dimension is usually less intelligible 
because it does not provide clear-cut categories: categories cannot be 
formed as they can be formed in the spatial dimension because time is 
usually not ‘contained’ in a way brains contain neurons and a synapses 
contain vesicles. The temporal domain extends on a continuous scale. Only a 
coarse differentiation between ‘timescales’ therefore is common practice, for 
example neural time around milliseconds, ‘real-time’ (behavioral) around 
seconds, lifetime around days and years and evolutionary time above that. 
Commonly, descriptions in the temporal domain are relative, i.e. simply 
achieved by a distinction between before and after a given event, for 
example, a presynaptic event at time x(t) vs. a postsynaptic event at time 
x(t+1). This event-relative thinking reveals ‘changes’ of phenomena, e.g. a 
change from a large presynaptic to a small postsynaptic signal. A pure 
temporal analysis of these changes yields a phenomenological description of 
the relation y = x(t) − x(t+1), e.g. a value for the difference between before 
and after. However, the purely relational temporal analysis does not give any 
clue why something changed. This represents a fundamental difference 
between the relational notion of the temporal domain and the hierarchical 
notion of the spatial domain. Concerning the spatial dimension, a simple 
answer for the question “Why do you think is N larger than x?” can be 
offered, namely “Because N contains x!”. The hierarchical notion of the spatial 
domain is, literally, self-contained (such as a card house). This does not hold 
for the temporal domain. If it is asked “Why do you think is t later than t+1?” 
the corresponding answer “Because t relates to t+1” doesn’t make sense. A 
relation as such has no causal implication, while containment as such 
suffices to explain a difference in size! Explaining temporal changes requires 
hypotheses on cause and effect that determine the respective event. Thus, 
the focus on the temporal domain almost inevitably introduces causality. 
 
Explaining the difference between the postsynaptic and the presynaptic 
signal can take several forms that involve temporal and spatial aspects to 
varying degrees. A pure temporal-relational answer would be “the signal 
before synaptic transmission is larger than the signal after synaptic 
transmission”. Purely computational answers are also phenomenological “the 
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postsynaptic signal was damped (by factor of x)”. An abstract causal-
temporal answer would be “the postsynaptic signal is damped by a 
resistance”. Causal answers would imply a mechanism for the abstract cause 
“the postsynaptic signal is damped by a synaptic resistance”. A causal 
explanation would imply mechanisms on different hierarchical levels, i.e. in 
terms of the amount of released transmitter, receptor bindings etc. This shift 
from the temporal dimension to the spatial dimension becomes necessary 
because the temporal dimension alone only allows relational or 
phenomenological statements. The combination of spatial with temporal 
aspects introduces causal considerations. Space, time and causality, then, 
make up the explanatory framework for brain studies: the levels of 
organization (see also 1.3.2 and fig. 14). 
 
1.1.5.1. Explanation and the levels of organization: examples 
 
The levels of organization are the common explanatory framework for brain 
studies. The general idea is straightforward: Elements have spatial and 
temporal properties and are organized by causal relations. Spatial properties 
are hierarchically organized (…, sub-cellular, cellular, network, …) and 
temporal properties typically show a before-after relation. If this were all, 
explaining brains would be a fairly simple matter. Whether this turns out to 
be true, shall be discussed on a concrete case. 
 
Consider the example of the resting potential that is the voltage difference of 
the neuron’s inside relative to its outside. A popular starting point for 
explanations of the resting potential is this: Ions playing a role for the resting 
potential are distributed unequally on both sides of the membrane, i.e. on 
one side of the neuronal membrane are more ions of a given species per unit 
volume of water than on the other side, say A+B− dominate inside and X+Y− 
outside. Concentration gradients tend to level out by way of ions moving 
from the less concentrated side to the more concentrated side. However, if 
there is no way for the ions to pass the membrane there will be no ionic 
current. These concentration gradients, by itself, have no effect on the 
charge of the membrane as long as positively and negatively charged ions 
are equally distributed (as many A+ as B− inside and as many X+ as Y− 
outside), i.e. there is no surplus of positive or negative charges on either side 
of the membrane. But the neuronal membrane is selectively leaky 
(permeable): only (small) ions of one charge type (say A+) can pass, while the 
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(large) ions of the other charge type (say B−) are prevented to pass by the 
limited size of the openings of the membrane (channels). As a consequence, 
all ion species not permeating through the membrane can be ignored (only 
A+ has to be considered). Now, the permeating ion species tends to move 
towards the lesser-concentrated side. As it moves, a charge is transported to 
the other side: the membrane is charged. (When A+ moves outside the 
outside is more positive than the inside, or, put in another way, the inside is 
charged negatively relative to the outside because A+ left a negative 
counterpart B− behind.) The emerging charge prevents the concentrations 
from leveling out. Why that? The more ions move to the other side, the more 
the membrane is charged. Charges tend to level out as concentration 
gradients do. So, the ions are driven in the opposite direction of the 
concentration gradient (A+ is needed inside for making the inside more 
positive again). Two forces, an electric and a chemical, act against each 
other. In the resulting situation, some ions move through some channels 
outside in order to level out concentration, while others move inside in order 
to level out the electric potential. The resting potential, then, is the dynamic 
equilibrium that turns up when driving forces of the concentration gradient 
and the electric potential are equal. 
 
In this explanation of the resting potential, only two organizational levels are 
directly involved: the sub-cellular (the membrane) and the electric (charged 
ions). The organizational levels are distinct with respect to their temporal and 
spatial properties: the membrane is larger and less dynamic in space than 
ions. Accordingly, the organizational levels are distinct with respect to their 
causal organization: the behavior of charged ions can be explained with 
concepts like electromagnetic interactions, Brownian motion etc., i.e. 
concepts that are to be found in a physics textbook. The membrane is only 
explainable by referring to classes of macromolecules (not to be found in 
physics textbooks but in textbooks on organic chemistry or molecular 
biology). But, although only the electric and the sub-cellular level are directly 
involved in the explanation, all other levels are implicitly assumed as 
premises of the levels of organizations framework. For instance, the cell 
must be closed because a patch of membrane swimming isolated in a 
solution would not cause gradients and, therewith, significant ion fluxes. 
This sounds trivial, but is an essential premise at the cellular level. A premise 
at the molecular level is, for example, that the membrane’s property of being 
semi-permeable is somehow brought about at some other level. Explicating 
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all premises on all levels (and all level transitions) is not necessary to explain 
a phenomenon (i.e. the resting potential). But the explanation of the actual 
phenomenon is leaned against the backdrop of the levels-of-organization 
framework by taking for granted that all explanatory ‘snippets’ fit together, 
and that all levels are interconnected. It is assumed that everything belongs 
to the same organization1.  
 
This situation entails the possibility to extend explanations through various 
levels. For example, the membrane’s property of being semi-permeable is 
realized by channels as protein-based structures having certain electrically 
determined conformational states that allow a selective permeation of ions. 
The gaze can wander through the levels of organization with various degrees 
of freedom. Which level is to be considered and which level is left aside is 
primarily determined by the actual question posed. There are no straight 
rules for designing an answer to the question posed. In the case of the 
resting potential considered above, the phenomenon is largely explained by 
the interactions of activities on two hierarchical levels that are not directly 
connected in the hierarchy, namely the electric level (ions) and the sub-
cellular level (membrane). In a perfectly systematic explanation that applies a 
straight spatiotemporal framework, the molecular level should be in between 
the electric and sub-cellular level. Yet, such explanations are functional. This 
indicates the “forgiving” character of the levels of organization as an 
explanatory framework. Moreover, spatial, temporal, computational or causal 
aspects are ‘blended’ in explanations on brain phenomena. Consider the 
following sentence: An action potential elicited by an air puff is synaptically 
                                                 
1 It should be noted, though, that there are flaws and pitfalls in the idea about the levels of organization. If not 
applied thoughtfully, the levels of organization will do more harm than good. The intuitive power enables authors to 
allege relations that are neither evidenced nor explained. For example, the maintenance of the electrochemical 
equilibrium at the neuronal membrane (‘resting potential’) is typically explained by the sodium-potassium pump – 
an exchange mechanism of charges across the membrane. When charges move across the membrane, say, as a 
result of synaptic transmission, students frequently assume that the pump has to bring these charges immediately 
back to where they came from because the cell would otherwise run quickly out of charges. They do not realize that 
the overall concentrations are only marginally affected by displacement of only few charges, while the actual 
membrane potential is significantly changed. Textbook accounts frequently appeal to the organizational principles 
(i.e. ‘potential maintained by pump’) and neglect the concrete spatiotemporal parameters, which would give an idea 
about the actual quantities. These incautious analogies and the resulting categorical errors have a considerable 
probability of occurrence in this explanatory framework. It is generally assumed that high level phenomena (e.g. 
resting potential) are reducible to low-level phenomena (e.g. moving charges), and, hence, rules governing the low-
level will also be present in the high level – disregarding the possibility that the level transition itself will render 
low-level rules invalid. It will not be claimed here, though, that authors should give a full account of all the 
phenomena on a higher level in terms of the lower level. This would make many neuroscientific notions 
unintelligible. Rather, it shall be made clear that the idea about the levels of organization is not an exact theoretical 
framework but an optimistic and fruitful rationale. 
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transmitted from the sensory cell to the next neuron. This simple sentence 
reveals any of the explanatory aspects introduced so far: spatial (next 
neuron) temporal (first air puff, then action potential, then synaptic 
transmission) computational (transmitted), causal (elicited by an air puff). 
These examples shall illustrate that there is no strict prescription for 
explanations in the levels of organization. Usually, the elements and 
activities necessary to explain a phenomenon are not explained level by level 
and step by step, but constructed situatively according to the question 
posed. However, there is a general assumption in the background that it is 
conceivable and it is in general possible to explain each phenomenon level by 
level and step by step. Thus, it might be naïve to believe that explaining 
brains in the levels-of-organization framework is a fairly simple matter, but 
the framework definitely helps to simplify explanations by providing a 
conceptual (and lingual) ‘stage’ for brain phenomena. 
 
1.1.6. Dynamics and complexity 
 
Fairly simple explanations on brain phenomena can be developed in the 
levels-of-organization framework. But sometimes, if not often, explanations 
of brain phenomena are not at all thought to be easy. Given that these 
difficulties are not a result of the wrong explanatory strategy, what then? 
Brain phenomena are difficult to understand because they are dynamic and 
complex. For representing dynamics and complexity in explanations they 
must be also conceivable as intrinsic properties of the levels-of-organization 
framework. Consequently, a descriptive account of how dynamics and 
complexity are conceivable in the terms introduced so far shall be provided. 
 
A subjective notion of complexity becomes immediately evident when the 
various levels of organization, the elements and activities and the possible 
causal relations are tried to be conceived altogether. It is simply not possible, 
because the capacity of mental processing is limited to a few elements and 
activities at a time (see also 2.2.2). This subjective notion already implies that 
complexity results from a specific property of the levels of organization, 
namely to be compositional. This means that an element can be composed of 
other elements and can itself be part of a composition. Compositionality 
refers primarily to the spatial organization. For example, a neuron is 
composed of sub-cellular compartments and composes networks. 
Additionally, changes in time, i.e. activities are to be considered. Activities 
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relate to temporal organization and make possible that elements can also be 
dislocated and, thus, spatial levels can be transcended. For example, ions 
moving through channels can transcend sub-cellular, cellular and networks 
levels. Change in time and space make out the spatiotemporal organization. 
Finally, elements and activities are causally related. Ions move from this to 
that side of the membrane because other ions are on this or that side of the 
membrane etc. Causal organization allows us to relate elements and 
activities to almost any other element and activity. As long as the systems 
under scrutiny have a small number of elements, activities and causal 
relations, all possible relations might be traceable. But the brain is not small. 
The large number of possible relations between elements, activities and 
causal relations – the combinatorial power – is the third ingredient of 
complexity. 
 
Complexity is determined by change, compositionality and combinatorial 
power of constitutive elements. There are numerous accounts for a formal 
and quantitative description of complexity (see e.g. Gell-Mann 1995). But for 
assessing the difficulties complexity causes in understanding brain 
phenomena, these accounts are not immediately relevant. Most important in 
the present context is that complexity can cause difficulties in understanding 
brain phenomena since it makes the (possible) explanation exceed the 
limited capacity of observers. 
 
Brain phenomena are typically dynamic – they change while they change2. 
How can dynamics be described in the levels-of-organization framework? In 
the above description of complexity it was stated that for small systems it 
could be true that all relations between elements, activities and causal 
relations are traceable. Then, the state of the system at a specific instance of 
time t can be described completely. The same shall be true for the next 
instance of time t1 and all the following states until the final state ti where 
the analysis ends. In an overall view, the trajectory through the state space of 
the system can have a specific form that can be described by a rule. For 
example, the trajectory of a frog’s tongue towards a specific point (e.g. at a 
tree trunk) could be characterized by a function that depends exclusively on 
the final coordinates of the tongue tip. Expressed verbally, the rule that 
specifies the trajectory is just: “Propel with a velocity v to point ABC”. There is 
                                                 
2 The notion of dynamics meant here is temporal. There is, however, a notion of dynamics prevalent in physics that 
refers to force and kinetics. This notion is not meant, here. 
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no need to consider an intermediate state of the system in the specification 
of the trajectory between the state at t1 and the state at ti. This is a temporal 
change – but it is not dynamics. Now consider a fly escaping the frog’s 
tongue! (The motion control system of the fly is assumed here to be so 
simple that it is completely describable.) First, consider the frog’s tongue tip 
to be fixed on a given position (e.g. because it froze on a iced tree trunk 
after propulsion). The motion control system of the fly could specify the 
maneuver prior to the actual execution. This would equal an application of a 
rule, again. However, another (and evidently biologically more plausible) 
alternative is that the trajectory of the fly is specified continuously during the 
flight. A given sensory input at t1 depends on the position of the tongue at t1 
(how large the frog’s tongue is on the retina) and specifies the motor output 
at t1 that determines the position at t2 that determines the sensory input at t2 
that determines… Each state of the system includes a response that in turn 
influences the next state. Such a phenomenon of motion control is dynamic. 
 
Everybody has an intuitive understanding of dynamics as a temporal 
phenomenon. Watching a film, for instance, is a dynamic process. But, 
though intuitive, it is not trivial as analytical accounts demonstrate. For 
example, why do we see a helicopter moving on the screen when we follow it 
with our eyes and the retinal position stays the same, whereas we see a 
coffee cup standing still when we move our eyes and the retinal position 
changes? (A simple answer is that humans process retinal images inside a 
general, spatial reference frame that ‘subtracts’ and compensates eye 
movements.) This example illustrates that accepting and handling dynamics 
is something else than understanding dynamics. Dynamics are more difficult 
to trace when the dynamic processes (such as the continuously processing 
motion control system of the fly) interacts with other changes (such as a 
straight moving frog’s tongue) or other dynamic processes (such as an 
elastically fluttering frog’s tongue). Dynamics can be made even more 
difficult by regarding two inter-dependent dynamic systems, for example, if 
the frog could adjust its tongue trajectory during propulsion in relation to an 
observed escape maneuver of the fly that can adjust its maneuver with 
relation to the new tongue trajectory etc. 
 
A concrete problem in understanding dynamics is, as already indicated 
above, that no simple rule can be applied to the participating elements. The 
rule itself must contain change, e.g. the enlargement of the tongue in the 
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retinal image of the fly. The change can have a qualitative character 
(“becomes larger” or “becomes smaller”), but often also quantitative 
measures are necessary (“becomes larger with an extension of x”). Thus, 
dynamics frequently call for quantitative thinking. But beside the specific 
comprehension problems introduced by quantitative estimates (see e.g. 
Ploetzner & Van Lehn 1997) the difficulty of understanding dynamics is 
comparable to that of understanding complexity: the capacity for processing 
is too limited for taking into account all the case differentiations that would 
be necessary to assess dynamics. Since each state determines the next state, 
dynamics enforce a consideration of multiple intermediate states of the 
system (as opposed to a merely ‘changing’ system that can be understood by 
comparing the initial and the final state). Causally relating elements and 
activities in an earlier phase to elements and activities in later phases might 
fail because the mental system was meanwhile loaded with intermediate 
states so that the earlier state is simply not present anymore for comparison 
(‘forgotten’). Thus, particularly the capacity of relating elements in a 
temporal context might cause problems in understanding. Dynamics point at 
the limited temporal extension of representational capacity as an impediment 
for understanding brain phenomena. 
 
Dynamics and complexity are interrelated. Both rest on change and both 
push understanding to the limit by the cognitive load they cause. That these 
interrelations may amplify each other in causing comprehension problems 
should be evident. And both are characteristic properties of brain 
phenomena. So, there is no way out of tackling the comprehension problems 
caused by dynamics and complexity if we want to understand brains. Since 
they both are limited by capacity, a promising strategy to handle them 
should be reduction. Chopping of large systems in smaller systems 
(decomposition) and chopping of large processes in phases (serialization) 
seems the most valuable way. Orientation inside the resulting explanatory 
chops can be backed by the levels-of-organization framework that should 
help to put them together again. In this sense, complexity and dynamics of a 
given system might not be fully explained (and experienced) in one instance 




Explanations of brain phenomena must be consistent in order to serve their 
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purpose. What are the characteristics of a consistent explanation for a brain 
phenomenon? A typical consistent explanation of brain phenomena involves 
a ‘mechanism’ (see Machamer et al. 2001). For example, the question: “How 
do I detect a air puff?” calls for a mechanism to be answered. A possible 
answer is: “Your skin contains mechanoreceptors. The wind deflects a hair 
(upper part) on the skin relative to the base (lower part) that is anchored in 
the skin and stretches the neuronal membrane. This opens channels for 
charged substances (ions) that can now pass the membrane. The resulting 
electric potential is processed from that moment on as a representation of 
the onset of the air puff.” The mechanism is composed of nested elements 
and activities (curled brackets indicate beginning or end of another element): 
 
{air puff | you {skin {mechanoreceptor {upper part | lower part {membrane {channels {ions}}}}}}}. 
 
Causal relations, according to which elements and activities behave, are 
added, e.g. causal relations about mechanical deflection, membrane 
potential, diffusing ions etc. In this way it is determined how elements and 
activities are temporally and causally related to each other and, therewith, 
how changes (i.e. an air puff) cascade through the elements and activities 
(the mechanoreceptor, membrane, ionic currents etc.). The result of the 
cascade is the global causal relation (e.g. between you and the air puff) and 
serves as an answer to the question posed (e.g. mechanism of air puff 
detection). 
 
How exactly does a mechanism ‘connect’ elements, activities and causal 
relations over several levels of organization? For example, (chemical) synaptic 
transmission is the mechanism by which a given signal can be transmitted 
from one cell to another cell. Synaptic transmission is much too complex to 
be explained completely here, but the principle is that the spatial gap 
between neurons cannot be easily overcome by electric signals So the electric 
signal is transformed into a chemical signal, namely a ‘cloud’ of transmitter 
molecules that is released as a consequence of the incoming electric activity 
at the presynaptic membrane and moves along its concentration gradient 
towards the postsynaptic membrane. Here it is translated back to an electric 
activity. Many elements, activities and causal relations are present in this 
excerpt of an explanation of synaptic transmission. On the cellular level of 
organization are the two cells, on the sub-cellular the two membranes, on 
the molecular the transmitter, on the electric the electric signal. The 
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elements are predominantly bound to each other by causal relations. The 
cause that makes the transmitter move, for example, is the concentration 
gradient (diffusion). The cause ‘diffusion’ transcends a single spatial level in 
that it arranges elements from different levels of organization, namely 
electric activity, transmitter, membrane, cell in a common framework – just 
as a stage direction for actors and requisites in a screenplay. In this sense, a 
mechanism is a script that produces an explanation. Mechanisms are specific 
configurations of elements, activities and causal relations at different levels 
of organization. But a mechanism not only describes one state of a system – 
it also implies the rules that specify the succession of (at least) two states. 
Usually, mechanisms have a larger scope than just two states of a specific 
system, but are general causal patterns. This is why they are discussed to 
take over the role that natural laws have in physical explanations in biological 
explanations (see e.g. Sober 1997). Mechanisms are concrete explanatory 
strategies for brain phenomena. Because of their ability to align state 
transitions, they can help to handle dynamics and complexity. 
 
1.1.8. Levels of explanation 
 
Beside the levels of organization that represent the natural hierarchy or 
ontology used in neuroscientific explanations, there are also levels of 
explanation that can be distinguished (see Machamer et al. 2001). Three 
levels appear most relevant for answering a question or for explaining a 
phenomenon. The purely mechanistic explanation refers to the isolated 
question or phenomenon (level 0), e.g. detection in the wind-puff example. 
The mechanism can be put in a broader context, e.g. adaptivity of wind 
detection in terms of detecting falling trunks. This contextual aspect of the 
explanation yields a function of the mechanism and is accompanied by a 
shift of the focus on a higher level (level +1). Finally, the constitutive 
(reductive) aspect of explanation finally refers to further mechanisms the 
actual mechanism is grounded on (level –1), e.g. explanations on how the air 
particles hit the surface of the hair, how the density of the lipid layer of the 
membrane is influenced by the deflection etc. It should be noted that the 
actual mechanism (the explanandum) is distributed over several levels of 
organization and can imply several other mechanisms that themselves can be 
distributed over several levels of organization. This implies that the relation 
of the levels of organization and the levels of explanation (isolated, 
contextual and constitutive) is not straightforward. The levels of explanation 
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represent the actual focus of an explainer in the levels of organization. As 
explained above, an explanatory focus involves elements and activities from 
various levels of organization (e.g. electric and sub-cellular). Moving down 
one level of explanation does not necessarily mean to move down one level 
of organization – it might be none or more than one. For example, it might 
be a detail on an intermediate level of organization that is additionally 
considered (e.g. the role of calcium for the electrochemical coupling in 
synaptic transmission). It is improbable however, that the level of explanation 
increases as the level of organization decreases and vice versa. 
 
Since there are already enough levels to keep track of, it might prove helpful 
to use the terms mechanistic, functional and reductive modes of explanation 
for isolated (level 0), contextual (level +1) and constitutive (level –1) 
explanation, respectively. But it is important to keep the difference between 
the mode of explanation and levels of organization in mind because they 
explain why the levels of organization sometimes are not applied 
systematically, i.e. why certain levels are considered relevant for a 




Brain scientists apply a specific explanatory framework: brain studies reveal 
anatomical, electrical, chemical, molecular, behavioral, computational and 
cognitive phenomena. A phenomenon is typically explained in terms of a 
mechanism that relates elements and activities by causal relations. The 
phenomenon resides in a natural ontology (the levels of organization) that is 
determined by spatial, temporal and causal dimensions. The levels of 
organization most relevant for explaining brain phenomena are electric, 
molecular, sub-cellular, cellular, network, systems, organismic, 
environmental. The mechanical, functional and reductive modes of 
explanation determine the actual focus set on a phenomenon. 
 
This explanatory framework is operationalized by way of experimental 
procedures. The phenomena that stand at the beginning of an explanation 
are basically observations that a scientist makes by applying a certain 
method, e.g. anatomical (surgical and histological), electrophysiological, 
imaging techniques etc. These methods yield specifications of the elements 
and activities that are thought to play a role for the explanation of the 
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phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon is decomposed into elements and 
activities and localized (cf. Bechtel & Richardson 1993) at the levels of 
organization. Consider a scientist – for the sake of simple language the 
scientist is defined to be female – developing a hypothesis about a neural 
circuit that determines the spatial and temporal coordinates of the frog’s 
tongue so that it hits the fly. She tries to find out how elements and activities 
are causally related for participating functionally inside a mechanism. 
(Usually, hypotheses refer to a single causal relation between two elements 
or activities, whereas mechanisms comprise a number of causal relations 
between several elements or activities.) The hypothesis is used to make a 
prediction about the acting of the elements. The prediction is tested in the 
experiment. Therefore, the scientist has to specify an experimental design 
that shall operate the mechanism in such a way that the action of a single 
causal relation is revealed. For example, if the hypothesis is that the frog’s 
catching mechanism works most precisely for stimuli with a velocity of 1m/s, 
she designs artificial stimuli that trigger a propulsion of the frog’s tongue 
and varies systematically parameters of the movement (velocity, direction, 
distance) during presentation. She measures the precision of the frog’s 
tongue propulsion (e.g. the hit rate). For corroborating her hypothesis, she 
has not only to show that there is an optimum for 1m/s, but also that it is 
actually the velocity and not the direction or distance that determines the 
optimum. The experiment confirms or falsifies the prediction and, therewith, 
the hypothesis. This is the basic hypothesis-design-experiment-evaluation 
cycle (see also 2.2.1). 
 
In practice, evaluation (confirmation and falsification) implies complicated 
procedures. The experimental method provides data. Since a single data item 
(e.g. one hit) can be pure chance further data items are collected. 
Comparison of these data items usually reveals certain differences (variance 
effects). Since these differences may jeopardize the validity of the statement 
to be made, many data items are collected that quantify the differences. 
Unless it is shown that variance effects are not the result of an additional 
causal relation (that was supposed to be ruled out by design) the data will 
not yield reliable results. For example, if it turned out that the hit rates of the 
frog’s tongue are additionally systematically dependent on temperature (and 
the temperature was not controlled in the experiments), temperature 
contributes to variance and the results are less reliable than results that 
would be obtained with a controlled temperature. In order to assess 
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reliability, data items are statistically analyzed. The analysis finally yields the 
confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis. Applying the knowledge 
gained in this experiment, subsequent studies can inform about the correct 
causal relation (in the case of falsification) or reveal further causal relations 
(in the case of confirmation). The result of the experiment is an evidence, i.e. 
a very specific causal relation that was tested with a very specific 
experimental procedure. The evidence has to be evaluated conceptually, i.e. 
interpreted in terms of its significance for a broader context (contextual, 
functional explanation). 
 
It should be noted that the experiment described above referred to a single 
causal relation as opposed to a mechanism that usually implies multiple 
causal relations acting on multiple levels of organization (see also 1.1.5). (In 
the frog’s tongue example, only the stimulus parameters were used to 
characterize the overall performance of the system. Imagine the neural levels 
that have to be taken into account for a mechanistic analysis…) Since each 
causal relation can influence any other casual relation present in the 
mechanism, the expense necessary to reveal a single causal relation in an 
experimental procedure would be intensified dramatically if a complete 
mechanism is considered. Each interaction has to be testable (statistically) 
with data gathered under a separate condition where only one factor is 
varied, while all others are kept constant (ceteris paribus). 
 
Consider the example of the three stimulus qualities velocity, direction, 
distance being a, b, c (‘¬’ means logical ‘not’ and ‘v’ means logical ‘and’). 
With only one factor a single condition is needed (control condition omitted), 
for two factors at least two conditions are needed: (a v ¬b), (¬a v b). For 
three factors, the single factors have to be isolated: (a v ¬b v ¬c), 
(¬a v b v ¬c), (¬a v ¬b v c). But also combinations have to be tested in order 
to determine the type of interaction: (a v b v ¬c), (¬a v b v c), (a v ¬b v c), 
(a v b v c). These constraints of experimental work are present in any science 
and are no major problem for experimentally well feasible systems. But in 
brain studies, the combinatorial effects of multiple factors constrain the 
operability of experiments substantially: Frequently, the experimental 
expense in brain studies for examining a single causal relation is pushing the 
limit and most of the time it is hard enough to isolate that very one causal 
relation in order to collect sufficient data for a neat statistical analysis. In the 
frog’s tongue example, a neural analysis could involve electrophysiological 
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recordings that imply a technically highly demanding experimental setup. 
Instead of explaining this demand in detail, just some time ranges shall be 
provided for illustration: developing and tuning the setup might take 
months, obtaining data of a single cell for a single condition might take a day 
or more. Each condition should include, say 20 trials. For a reliable statistical 
analysis minimally five cells of the same type in different frogs have to be 
tested. Taken together, examining three factors systematically could take 
several months. These are serious practical (and economical) constraints for 
a brain study. But even worse cases can occur: the experiment can fail 
altogether because every propulsion of the frog’s tongue causes vibrations in 
the frog that cause the microelectrodes to slip out of the cell the activity of 
which was to be measured. Thus, for lack of ways isolating a causal relation 
or controlling the mechanism adequately or for lack of an appropriate 




Experimental feasibility is a chronic limiting factor of brain studies. This 
circumstance results from problems controlling either the experimental 
techniques or the experimental preparation (e.g. the brain), taken together 
the experimental setup. These control problems arise from the general 
sensitivity of the setup that causes variance effects in the data. Where to 
draw the line between experimental techniques and experimental 
preparation? As already explicated above, the position of a microelectrode 
(depth, angle etc.) may vary over experimental trials and influences recording 
quality that might eventually determine measured signal amplitudes. Thus, 
sensitivity of the experimental techniques can manifest itself as artifacts in 
the data. Unless such variance effects are excluded, uncertainty about the 
validity of the data will persist. Therefore brain scientists have to monitor 
and quantify these effects. Control problems are introduced also by the 
experimental preparation. The sensitivity of the experimental techniques has 
its correspondence in the sensitivity of the preparation. For example, electric 
signals in brains are usually small (low energy consumption is usually 
advantageous for biological systems) and, therefore, always prone to 
interferences: ‘noise’ is a permanent troublemaker for experimenters in the 
brain sciences. Moreover, the more complex (and the more dynamic…) the 
underlying mechanism is, the more sensitive to variance effects it becomes 
and the more difficult it is to design the experiment and its procedures so 
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that it isolates a single causal relation (see above). The reason is, again, the 
complicated task of predicting outcomes of multiple causal interactions that 




The methodology of brain studies is afflicted with control problems. 
Simulation (in the following paragraphs only computer simulation is 
addressed) is integrated in the methodology of brain studies in order to solve 
or handle control problems. How is this conceivable? Simulations are an 
“imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process by 
means of the functioning of another” (Merriam-Webster 2003). Put in slightly 
other words, simulations are an inherently functional representation (“a 
running model”) of a mechanism. As already explained, a mechanism is 
considered here as a specific configuration of causal relations between 
elements and activities that can be studied in an experiment. Simulations 
usually shall help to solve or handle problems of both the experimental 
techniques and experimental design. In the example of the frog’s tongue 
propulsion a scientist might want to simulate a model of the neural circuit 
that determines the spatiotemporal coordinates of the tongue tip because 
the scientist wants to test stimuli for the experimental design in the 
simulation before the much more costly electrophysiological experiments 
with the natural preparation (the frog) can be performed. A simulation 
represents the strategy to operate a mechanism in a way that informs the 
scientist evidently about a causal relation by revealing an observable 
(measurable) behavior of constituent elements (see also 1.1.7). 
 
The reasons for carrying out simulations are to be found in the desiderative 
understanding of the mechanism that demands a ‘better’ (more controllable) 
form of representation. Since it mimics the natural preparation in the 
experimental setup, it can be called an artificial preparation. For this artificial 
preparation to work, the simulation must contain the elements and causal 
relations that are considered relevant for the mechanism. But contrary to the 
experimental setup, the simulation is substantially reduced. Only those 
elements and causal relations are considered that are assumed to be 
indispensable for the mechanism to work. This reduction of complexity 
allows a systematic testing of single causal relations, while additional 
‘distracting’ causal relations can be ruled out. This systematic testing is often 
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not possible in the experimental setup since the elements and casual 
relations cannot be arbitrarily knocked out in brain preparations. Thus, 
reduction of complexity is one of the main strengths of simulations as 
opposed to experimental setups with natural preparations. 
 
However, not only the mechanism itself is reduced, but also the experimental 
techniques and procedures that are applied to operate the mechanism. The 
control problem introduced by the experimental technique has a simple 
solution: all measuring techniques are substituted by simulation techniques 
and the natural preparation is substituted by the simulation. In this way, the 
experimental situation is streamlined towards a direct confrontation of 
scientist and mechanism. Cognitive experimental procedures supersede 
physical (hardware) experimental procedures. Whether this substitution 
effectively pays off, requires a case-to-case evaluation since computers and 
software themselves introduce new problems and novelty effects that could 
render the whole venture of simulation uneconomic. 
 
Simulations allow systematic testing of the effects of a single causal relation. 
But simulation is no end in itself. Simulation happens against the background 
of solving and handling control problems that come up when the effects of a 
given causal relation cannot (or only under disproportional great expenses) 
be evaluated in an experiment with a natural preparation. Simulation is a 
kind of hypothesis testing. Within the hypothesis-design-prediction-testing 
cycle (see also 2.2.1) simulations serve several functions: they allow for a 
better evaluation of the hypothesis, i.e. an assessment of the role a single 
causal relation plays inside a mechanism (e.g. velocity sensitivity of the 
neural circuit determining the spatiotemporal coordinates of the frog’s 
tongue propulsion). This is particularly important for a hypothesis that 
implies multiple, mutually interdependent causal relations (e.g. isolating 
velocity from direction). By eliciting a formerly not considered crucial factor 
(e.g. angular velocity), simulations can help to find new experimental 
designs, i.e. innovative ways of driving the underlying mechanism adequately 
so that it unveils its principles. On this view, the function of simulation in 
brain studies is primarily to improve the scientist’s understanding of a given 
brain phenomenon that was formerly locked in complexity, i.e. not accessible 
for the different reasons mentioned above. An improved understanding, 




In brain studies, simulations play an important role in explaining complex 
and dynamic brain phenomena that are hardly accessible in experimental 
setups with natural (biological) preparations. But the function of simulations 
goes beyond this role as a scientific tool. The computer programs 
simulations are based on can be applied in several other contexts. A 
prominent example is their application in robots: typically, simulations 
control the behavior in the robot, e.g. as a brain surrogate or a local control 
structure. Sometimes it is even argued that pure simulations (without 
hardware implementation) do not generate proper knowledge about brains 
because the constraints of the real (physical, mechanical) world cannot work 
in the simulation. Another field of application is found in bionics. Here, 
simulations that control signal processing are implemented in chips that are 
to be implanted in damaged organs such as the retina or the parts of the ear. 
Very successful, but more remote from the brain are applications originating 
from the field of mathematics and computer science. This research tradition, 
usually termed artificial neural networks or Neuroinformatics, has developed 
a method of computation that is inspired by brain function in that it makes 
use of formal ‘neurons’ that process information in a parallel and distributed 
fashion. This approach is well suited for setting up simulations of brain 
phenomena. However, a largely independent research tradition emerged 
because it was found that this approach to modeling was suitable to solve 
principally any formal problem and, additionally has specific strengths: 
beside their forgiving character (fault tolerance), artificial neural networks are 
primarily characterized by their ability to learn in which they outperform 
most other simulation approaches. Thus, it is no wonder that artificial neural 
networks are applied not only theoretically in science but also practically on a 
large scale in various contexts such as fingerprint detection or stock 
prediction. 
 
1.1.12. Summary and conclusion 
 
The brain, as a subject of explanations, serves as a kind of metaphorical 
center for all the functionality that is needed to understand adaptive behavior 
of animals. The analysis of brains reveals a variety of phenomena ranging 
from anatomic, electric and molecular to behavioral and environmental. Most 
of the phenomena belong to the neural domain, but some are better 
classified to reside in a computational domain or a cognitive domain. The 
organization behind the brain phenomena is determined by spatial, temporal 
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and causal characteristics. It is in principle hierarchical so that phenomena 
on a higher level are thought to be dependent on phenomena on a lower 
level. Though principally continuous, the organization is frequently 
partitioned into levels that represent functional units themselves organized 
by specific causal contexts (e.g. electric, molecular, cellular etc.) and, 
consequently, referred to as the “levels of organization”. The spatial, 
temporal and causal interrelation between elements and activities in the 
organization is characterized by dynamics and complexity. An explanatory 
strategy that can be applied for the levels of organization and the inherent 
dynamics and complexity are mechanisms. Mechanisms ‘put to stage’ 
elements, activities and causal relations participating in the phenomenon in a 
directed manner and produce consistent explanations. Explanations can be in 
a mechanistic, functional or reductive mode depending on whether they seek 
to explain a phenomenon in isolation (level 0), in a context (level +1) or 
constitutively (level –1), respectively. The methods of producing evidence are 
manifold. Due to the complex and dynamic character in natural preparations 
of the brain, experiments are afflicted with control problems. As a specific 
methodological approach, simulations with artificial preparations yield 




The previous section introduced generally how brains are explained and provided a first idea 
of the role simulations plays in explaining brains: namely helping to control dynamics and 
complexity. For the (hurried) brain expert this might be enough to proceed directly with the 
second chapter on simulation. Other reader groups might have received only a rather 
abstract impression of what it means to explain brains and why we need simulation. 
Therefore, the next two sections are “Brain-Specials” that extend the presentation of brains –
the next presuming a consensus on explanations of brains and the next but one starting   
with the variety of approaches to brains. In the next section, the first Brain-Special 
“Explanations of brain phenomena” provides concrete explanations of brain phenomena 
moving from low levels to high levels of organization. The focus will be on explanations on 
lower (cellular) levels because the consensus is by far greater than on higher levels. (Brain 
experts will therefore rather repeat than deepen their knowledge. They can, however, deepen 
their ‘meta-cognition’ on brains by focusing on explanatory strategies.) In the next but one 
section, the second Brain-Special “Where to put information on brains!?” starts with the 
variety of disciplinary approaches to brains and searches the commonalities between them. 
This is done by analyzing existing information resources such as databases, thesauri and 
extbooks in order to find a common ‘ontology’. As a result, the state of theoretical 
integration in the brain sciences can be assessed.  
t
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Brain studies seek to explain how brain phenomena realize adaptive behavior 
(see also 1.1.1). Ultimately, they explain a behavior of an organism in its 
environment, e.g. how a fly prevents collision with a frog’s tongue (see fig. 
1). Now, how exactly are explanations of brains designed? By applying a 
general explanatory framework (see also 1.1) to concrete brain phenomena 
such as ‘spike’, ‘synapse’ etc. specific explanations of brain phenomena are 
developed. The objective is not to explain each phenomenon thoroughly – 
rather each phenomenon introduces building blocks for explanations of 
brains that are to be applied in subsequent explanations of more complex 
phenomena. Thus, it will be demonstrated that explanatory building blocks 
can be applied as if there were an “explanatory construction kit” for brains. 
Since lower level phenomena are likely to be contained by higher level 
phenomena and, thus, are often presupposed in higher level phenomena, the 
focus will clearly be set to electric, molecular and cellular phenomena. 
Higher-level phenomena such as behavior, learning etc. will be discussed 
only briefly along the lines of exemplary cases. 
 
 
fig. 1: F og and fly. © 2003 State of California (license permissive for reprint). r
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1.2.2. Responsiveness 
 
Consider a fly flying over a pond. A frog sitting on the pond’s edge detects 
the fly coming within reach of its tongue. The critical situation for the fly is 
given as the frog just flicks its tongue. What does the fly need to manage a 
successful escape maneuver? It needs receptors that can detect visual 
stimuli, a brain that can process the detection and compute the correct 
parameters for a behavior. Finally it needs a motor system that can realize 
the behavior. Nerve cells are able to represent specific aspects of the 
situation and process these representations in order to find the correct 
parameters of behavior. The ability of neurons to represent and process 
something is based on their responsiveness. The property of showing 
responses usually refers to the neuron as a whole and is thought to be the 
result of mechanisms acting on the neuronal membrane. (In the following, it 
will usually be attributed to the neuron – a neuronal state can equally well be 
attributed to a patch of membrane or to a neuronal circuit, though). 
 
Responsiveness is such a basic property of neurons that it is easily passed 
over in silence. Therefore it shall be explained explicitly: a typical 
experimental setup for the observation of responsiveness is a neuron 
penetrated by a microelectrode that measures electric changes (potentials or 
currents) monitored on an oscilloscope (see fig. 2). Given that the 
experimental setup is tuned appropriately, the observations will be restricted 
to a straight line that represents the electric state of the neuron. The straight 
line as such, obviously, is no evidence for the ability to represent. For 
something to be observed that evidently reveals responsiveness, changes 
must be imposed. In a natural situation (i.e. the frog an the fly), these can be 
sensory stimuli (i.e. the frog’s tongue). But here, for the sake of simplicity, 
assume that electric pulses are applied through a second, stimulating 
microelectrode. A change in the electric activity of the neuron should be 
observed as a deviation from a straight line. This effect of an applied pulse 
reveals evidence for the ability of the neuron to respond to externally 
imposed changes. Of course, this property is so basic that it can also be 
found in a liver cell, for instance, since most animal cells also show this 
simple form of electric activity. (The more advanced characteristics of 
neurons will be introduced later.) Nevertheless, this simple example indicates 
that the principle of representation by responsiveness usually presumes a 
specific change in the environment of the neuron (an electric pulse or the 
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frog’s tongue) that can be detected and represented by the neuron by 
changing from one state of activation to another state of activation. 
 
Additionally, something to be activated generally implies that an element has 
to undergo a transition from one state to another state. Activation implies a 
notion of change, of before and after or, more generally, of cause and effect. 
The ability to represent refers to the property of the neuron to show an 
activity that corresponds (causally, temporally and spatially) to another 
activity. Of course, this description is so abstract that it hardly bears any 
meaning. But it should be noted that it enables the neuron to be conceived as 
an information or signal processor, as a representative unit. It is generally 
assumed in brain studies that a neuron is able to ‘take up’ changes of its 
environment by changing its state of activation and ‘hold’ these changes in 
that state, i.e. it is assumed that an external affair is represented as long as 
activation is present. If the activity of the neuron (or of a part of the neuronal 
membrane) in turn causes changes at a spatiotemporal neighbored neuron 
(or part of the membrane) the change is additionally processed. In a broader 
sense, changes in the environment (e.g. about a frog’s tongue) can be 
transported through the nervous system (e.g. the fly’s brain), can be 




fig. 2: Experimental setups. On the left side, a schematic representation o  a simple 
experimental situation is shown. F om left to right a neuron’s electric activity is registered 
with a microelectrode, processed through metrology and visualized on an oscilloscope. 
© 2000 rubin, (permit ed reprint). The photograph of met ology used in brain studies on the 
right side illustrates that laboratory setups are usually much more complicated than 
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1.2.2.1. Binary neuron 
 
In the following, the notion of responsiveness is developed from very 
abstract descriptions to concrete, neuroscientific descriptions. An abstract 
notion of a neuron as a representational unit becomes possible just by 
assuming that neurons show responsiveness – and not by assuming 
underlying mechanisms. It should be noted that pure ‘computationalists’ 
(proponents of a computational approach) who do not bother about 
biological realization could enter at this point with their explanations of brain 
phenomena. Computationalists merely need a function to explain brain 
phenomena. The most simple form of describing responsiveness is a binary 
neuron, i.e. a neuron n switches between the activity states 0 and 1 
depending on an activity of stimulus s: n(s); {0|1}. 
 
1.2.2.2. Electric activity 
 
Of course, neuroscientists seek to explain brain phenomena by taking into 
account the underlying mechanisms. So, what are underlying mechanisms of 
responsiveness? A common explanatory strategy coming into place is one 
that focuses on the smallest level of organization introduced above, namely 
the electric level. The neuron is conceived as an electric circuit. For 
describing the simple form of electric activity, as it was observable in the 
simple experimental setup, the circuit consists of a resistance and a 
capacitor (see fig. 3a). The neuron’s state of activity is represented by the 
membrane potential V. As long as nothing else happens it stays constant. 
(This explains the straight line observable on the oscilloscope.) This property 
of the neuron can be conceived as a capacitor because it has the general 
ability (capacitance C) to separate positive and negative charges. 
 
If charged particles were added by some electric source (be it a 
microelectrode fed by a power supply or a biological antiporter such as the 
sodium-potassium pump) to either side of the membrane, the charge is not 
immediately leveled out, but persists on that side of the membrane. 
Consequently, the inside is charged to an amount of Q relative to the outside 
of the neuron. The capacitor is charged. But the capacitive properties of the 
neuron are not perfect. The charge can leave the capacitor as a current of 
charges I – but only to the degree the neuron can conduct charges. The 
conductance g is given by the reverse of the resistance R of the neuron 
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g=1/R. The resistance R hinders the current to flow straight from one side to 
the other. This is why discharging the capacitor does not happen 
instantaneously but delayed. The moving charges change the overall state of 
the neuron: the membrane potential V. As long as the capacitor discharges, 
the membrane potential changes. When the capacitor is discharged the 
‘dislocated’ charges return to the other side in order to restore the electric 
equilibrium: the membrane potential returns to its initial value. These 
processes explain the delayed deviation from a straight line as a response to 
a current pulse. In this way, it is possible to explain responsiveness in an 
electronic circuit or, more concrete, in an electronic device consisting of 
building blocks such as resistors and power sources in a construction kit for 
kids. Up to this point, no further assumptions about underlying mechanisms 
have been made. The pure mathematical framework n(s); {0|1} that was 
applied in the case of functional description is merely exchanged with 
another framework, namely electricity. Again, the neuron as such is not taken 
into account. As might already have become clear from the very abstract 
character of the description, the electric framework raises concrete 
conceptual questions: What is resistance, what is current etc.? 
 
 
fig. 3: RC-circuits. (a) Simple RC-Circuit. A hypothetical power supply provides current I. The 
potential V over the circuit changes as the current pulse I charges capacitance C and flows 
through resistance R. This electrical equivalent circuit is a simple model for electric 
phenomena at the neural membrane. (b) RC-circuit for spikes. Elaboration of the general 
form of the RC-circuit that can be used to explain spikes on the electric level of 
organization. The situation for each ion (potassium, sodium and chloride) is shown as a 
combination of a battery that corresponds to the electric gradient and a variable resistor
(varistor) that corresponds to voltage dependent channels, respectively. (c) RC-circuit for 
passive spread o  electric activity. Variation of the general form of the RC-Circuit that can be 
used to explain passive spread o  electric activity. Form one point in space to another point. 






cyto is introduced to account for the c toplasmatic resistance that has to be 
o ercome by electric activity in the lateral direction (along the membrane). 
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A common further step in the explanatory strategy is to provide exactly these 
concepts. Consider the neuron as one side of a container filled with water 
that is separated by a membrane from the other side of the container (‘the 
external world’) that is also filled with water (see fig. 4). Now, soluble 
substances (salts) are put into the water. (As the salt dissolves in the water, it 
separates in positive and negative counterparts (ions). For the moment, it is 
only important to consider the net amounts of the substance – the solution is 
electrically neutral.) If the amount of these substances differs on either side, 
a difference of concentration results in the solution. This difference in 
concentration represents a chemical potential. Since the concentration 
differences tend to level out (‘diffusion’ resulting from the different 
electrostatic interactions of water and substances on both sides), the 
substances would tend to move towards the lesser-concentrated side, if the 
membrane were permeable for the substances. If the membrane were 
impermeable for the substance (but permeable for water), a chemical 
potential would arise that would cause water to pour through the membrane 
and level out the concentration difference (diffusion and osmosis). Now, 
consider the membrane to be permeable only for positive elements (ions). 
Since the concentration difference can be partly leveled out by positive 
elements, they move to the side of lesser concentration leaving their negative 
counterparts behind. The membrane begins to charge. At this point, an 
electric potential arises. Now, two forces act against each other: a chemical 
force pressing positive ions outward and an electric force dragging them to 
the inside. The positive ions will stop moving through the membrane when 
electric and chemical forces are equal – equilibrium potential is reached. This 
explains why the resting potential (the straight line observed on the 
oscilloscope in the simple experimental setup introduced above) is actually 
different from zero (negative). If there is only one substance involved, the 
membrane potential is the same as the equilibrium potential for that 
substance and is given as 
 
E = (−R·T / z·F)·ln [SUBSTANCEoutside] / [SUBSTANCEinside] 
 
This is the Nernst equation that relates the electric forces to the chemical 
forces. R and F are physical constants (the Molar Gas Constant 
8.314472 J / K·mol and the Faraday Constant 9.64853415·104 C / mol, 
respectively). T is the absolute temperate (measured in degrees Kelvin) and z 
is the valence of the ions, i.e. if it is negative or positive and if it bears one or 
 44 
1st Brain-Special  1.2. Explanations of brain phenomena 
more charges. The Nernst equation was originally determined in experiments 
with batteries (Nernst 1888). 
 
The container situation allows to develop a simple electrochemical account of 
the premises of responsiveness with an electrochemical construction kit for 
kids. But the simple electrochemistry introduced so far has to be completed 
by a description that represents the situation in natural neurons more 
adequately: not only one substance (one positive and one negative ion 
species) determines chemical forces, but more ions are involved. Consider a 
second container with another dissolved substance (another positive and the 
same negative ion species) with another ion specific equilibrium potential 
described by the Nernst equation. Now, pour the second container into the 
first container. The resulting potential depends on the equilibrium potentials 
of all ions. Ions may pass the membrane not equally easy – there is an ion 
specific permeability. Permeability has not been considered in the Nernst 
equation because only one ion species is taken into account. But if two or 
more differential permeabilities act in parallel, all must be considered 
because they affect the ion specific forces together with the corresponding 
equilibrium potential. Often, three ion species are regarded: the ions 
potassium K+ (the positive ion species of the first container), sodium Na+ (the 
positive ion species of the second container) and chloride Cl− (the negative 
ion species in both containers). The overall state of the membrane 
determined by the ion specific permeabilities (PK+, PNa+, …). The influence of 
chloride is small relative to those of sodium and potassium. 
 
The same the Nernst equation did for the single substance situation – 
relating electric forces to chemical concentrations – does the so called 
Goldman-Hodgkin-Katz Constant Field equation, in short “Goldman 
equation” for the multiple ions situation. 
 
E = −RT / zF·(PK+·[K+]out + PNa+·[Na+]out + PCl−·[Cl−]out) / (PK+·[K+]in + PNa+·[Na+]in+ PCl−[Cl−]in) 
 
The Goldman equation considers more ion species than the Nernst equation. 
The potential depends on the ion specific permeability of the membrane and 
the ion specific electrochemical forces that are set up by the differential 
concentrations. The permeability defines the factor by which the 
electrochemical force of a given ion species influences the overall potential. 
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fig. 4: “The container situation”. Typical approach to explaining the resting potential. Left: As 
long as the outside of the cell (left side of the container) is separated from the inside filled 
with equal amounts of negative ions A− and positive ions K+ ( igh  side o  the con a ne  by 
an impermeable barrier, no charges can move and no potential is observable. Middle: When a 
semipermeable barrier is present, positive ions can move to the outside leaving their 
negative counterparts behind: a negative potential from inside to outside is observable. With 
the moving ions, a chemical potential from outside to inside arises. When electric and 
chemical potentials are the same, a dynamic equilibrium appears: the resting potential. 
Right: The resting potential in a model cell. More ion species and ion specific channels types 
are shown. © Shizgal & Oda csbn.concordia.ca (permissive license). 
r t f t i r)
 
1.2.2.3. Molecules and electric activity 
 
The result of the explanation so far is a more detailed description of the 
resting potential. Step by step, a deeper understanding of the neuron as an 
electrochemical device was introduced. It should be noted that the electric 
level of organization was not yet left behind for entering the molecular level. 
(Of course, the transition between the electric and the molecular level is 
continuous rather than discrete: experts might have noticed, for example, 
that genuine molecules – e.g. proteins as opposed to atomic ions – might 
also carry charges. Anyhow, their role then is electric, i.e. that of a charge 
carrier – not as a molecule with its specific properties that are taken into 
account later.) The molecular level hosts explanations of major concepts that 
were only introduced as presupposed constraints so far. An instructive 
example of such a supposition is the selectively permeable membrane. What 
is its molecular basis? Generally, a cellular membrane is a phospholipid-bi-
layer (see fig. 5). The ‘heads’ of the phospholipids (phosphate) are on the 
outside of the membrane, i.e. one layer of heads points to the intracellular 
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side, while the other layer of heads point to the extracellular space. The tails 
build the inner space of the membrane that is apolar and, thus, only 
permeable for apolar (e.g. non-charged) substances but impermeable for 
polar substances, i.e. polar molecules such as water and charged substances 
such as ions. This explains the membrane’s ability to separate charges, i.e. 
its capacitance. 
 
But what enables selective permeability? A neuronal membrane is equipped 
with channels. Basically, channels are large proteins that pervade the 
membrane. Channels permit specific ions to pass the membrane, while they 
block other ions. One type of channel is particularly important: the ‘passive’ 
channel that is always open. It is assumed to be selectively permeable for 
potassium. A simple explanation of this selectivity (a more precise 
explanation is beyond the scope) refers to the size of potassium. In a 
solution, potassium is smaller than sodium because it has smaller 
electrostatic powers (‘electro-negativity’) than sodium. The surrounding 
water molecules are not ‘geared’ in the same radius as a sodium ion, 
resulting in a smaller ‘hydrate sheath’. Thus, the smaller solved potassium 
ions can pass a channel that sodium can not pass. Since potassium is the 
smallest positive hydrated ion with significant concentration around the 
membrane and is considered to pass the passive channel, it plays the crucial 
role in generating and maintaining the resting potential. For understanding 
this crucial role, the concrete concentrations at the membrane have to be 
taken into account. The concentrations of potassium inside the cell are high 
(relative to the outside). The concentration of sodium is high outside the cell 
(relative to the inside). The common explanation for this initial situation on 
the neuronal membrane is a molecular mechanism called “sodium-potassium 
pump”. This special type of channel is thought to exchange three sodium 
ions from the inside with two potassium ions from the outside (see fig. 4, 5b, 
5c). This works against the electric and chemical forces (potential and 
concentration gradient, respectively) and is realized as an active, energy-
consuming process. In exactly the same way as introduced in the container 
situation, potassium tends to come out and sodium tends to leak in. The 
potassium selective channel admits a small potassium outward current, 
thereby leaving an excess of negative ions behind. The intracellular space 
begins to charge negative relative to the extracellular space. The electric 
forces get stronger as the chemical forces get weaker and equilibrium turns 
up. 
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fig. 5: Molecular aspects of membranes. a) Fluid mosaic model. Phospholipid molecules 
consisting of hydrophilic phosphate part (small circles, outward) and hydrophobic lipid part 
(small lines, inward) constitute the phospholipid bi-layer. Proteins (larger ‘chunks’) are sunk 
in the membrane (e.g. receptors) or go through the membrane (e.g. channels). b) Sodium-
potassium pump. The mechanism is illustrated as four stages from left to right: three 
sodium ions from the inside of the cell and a phosphate (coming from ATP -> ADP+P) bind 
o the protein. The conformation of the protein changes and the sodium ions are released to 
the extracellular space while two potassium ions bind on other receptive structures of the 
protein. The conformation changes again and phosphate as well as potassium is released to 
the intracellular space. c) Alpha-helical channel protein. For illustrative purposes it is shown 
that channel ‘chunks’ can also be presented as structured proteins that could be further 




Channels explain why it is particularly important to consider potassium in 
explanations of general responsiveness because they provide an explanation 
for selective permeability (for potassium). Channels also explain the 
resistance of the membrane: as already stated above, resistance is the 
inverse of conductance, R~1/g. A given conductance is determined by the 
relative frequency of channels in the membrane and their efficacy. The more 
channels per area membrane and the more efficient the channels the more 
conductive it is. Current can be conceived as the actual amount of ions 
passing the membrane, thereby causing a change in membrane potential. 
 
In sum, introducing the molecular level contributes significant explanatory 
connections between the neuron and its electrochemical properties. In 
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particular, it provides a spatial notion, a ‘stage’, for the electric level of 
organization. The electric circuit and the container can be supplemented by 
biological objects that are made up of molecular objects such as cells, 
membranes and channels. For assessing the explanatory strategy that was 
applied, it should be noted that the molecular level of organization has an 
intermediate position in the spatiotemporal dimensions that were introduced 
before. It provides spatial building blocks for the neuron and provides 
positions and trajectories for charges. However, considering the molecular 
level is evidently not necessary to understand the responsiveness of neurons. 
Nevertheless, molecular dynamics (MD) models (see e.g. Leach 2001 for a 
textbook), for example, that allow one to imagine conformational changes in 
the structure, and movement of ions across the channel, can surely be a 
valuable means for deepening the understanding of responsiveness. 
 
Generally, it can be stated that responsiveness of neurons can be understood 
in terms of neurons, membranes, channels, ions, resistances, conductances, 
currents etc. The explanations so far were predominantly simple with respect 
to the information processing capabilities of neurons: responsiveness is the 
property of neurons to change their electric state if a stimulus is present: “no 
stimulus=straight line” and “stimulus=change”! Such a binary understanding 
of responsiveness is sufficient to represent the information processing 
capabilities considered so far. In a broad band of phenomena to be 
understood this notion of responsiveness is actually all that is needed. But 
what about more detailed observations? 
 
1.2.2.4. Temporal change and responsiveness 
 
The representational properties of neurons taken into account so far were 
restricted to changes from active to inactive. But the example of the RC-
circuit (see also 1.2.2.2) already implied that neurons do not show a binary 
behavior, but show intermediate states (transitions). Reconsider the simple 
experimental situation: the membrane potential of a neuron is measured via 
a microelectrode and monitored on an oscilloscope (see fig. 2). Current 
pulses can be applied with a stimulating electrode. If temporal resolution of 
stimulus and response is sufficiently high in the oscilloscope, it will become 
visible that the response of the neuron is not instantaneous, but changes 
gradually, i.e. the current pulse is needle-like, but the membrane potential 
follows the upward stroke gradually. How can this time-course be explained? 
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In the general introduction of responsiveness, the following explanatory 
strategy was applied: the observation (the signal) was first described and 
then explained on increasing levels of organization – from electric to 
molecular… This procedure shall also be applied here: the phenomenological 
description (gradual change) is first to be explained in terms of on an electric 
circuit (without reference to the molecular level). 
 
If a current pulse is fed into simple Resistor-Capacitor (RC) circuit (see fig. 
3a) through a power supply (the stimulating microelectrode), capacitive 
current causes an almost instantaneous charging of the circuit: the 
withdrawal of electrons (positive pulse) or the addition of electrons (negative 
pulse) causes an electric field that orients the elements of the isolating layer 
of the capacitor due to their polarization (positive vs. negative) and lets 
elements in the conducting material around the capacitor arrange 
correspondingly. It should be noted that no charges (e.g. electrons) have to 
move in the RC-Circuit to bring about this situation. Subsequently, electrons 
move along the electric field building a slow current that drains through the 
resistor. The electric field force is reduced. The overall current I can be 
conceived as the sum of both current types, the capacitive current IC and the 
resistive current IR: I= IC+ IR. 
 
The principles of this explanation can then be applied straightforward to the 
molecular level of organization (thereby considering the intermediate 
chemical level.) The excess of charges introduced by the current pulse causes 
an electric field that spreads almost immediately through the extracellular 
and intracellular space. Charges are organized along the electric field and 
tend to level out the electric field gradient. But the isolating membrane 
stands in the way for charges to move and level out the electric gradient. 
This resistance can be overcome by potassium ions passing through the 
passive channels in the membrane. These ions build the resistive current. 
Only few ions relative to the total amount of ions in the solution are 
necessary to level out the electric field gradient between both sides of the 
membrane. Thus, the concentrations of the ions are not effectively changed 
by current pulses and can be easily leveled out by the sodium-potassium 
pump. The dynamics of the membrane potential is determined by the 
resistive current because it moves charges in the system – the capacitive 
current does not move charges across the membrane, but rather can be 
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conceived as a reorganization of the actual charge budget. This 
reorganization does not take effect on the potential. 
 
Both capacitance and resistance of the membrane determine what happens to 
the injected current: the capacitor transforms charges electric field gradients 
and the resistance hinders charges to move through (or along) the 
membrane. Therefore both factors prolong the duration of the membrane 
potential after a current pulse and, thus, determine the time constant 
τ = R·C. This time constant determines the time course of the membrane 
potential for a given current and resistance: Vm(t) = I·R (1 – e– t/τ). The ‘input 
value’ I representing the injected current pulse does not equal the ‘output 
value’ Vm, but can be reached only to a certain degree that is indicated by the 
term that is subtracted from 1. What ‘is left’ from the input current also 
depends on the resistance R of the membrane. The ‘input value’ is 
approached exponentially (determined by the e in brackets). It becomes 
larger with progressing time t, but only to the degree that τ admits, i.e. a 
large τ prolongs the time course of the membrane potential. 
 
Considering the time course of responsiveness mediates an impression of 
how gradual change of membrane potential can be conceived. Furthermore, 
it provides a deeper understanding of the elements involved in 
responsiveness (e.g. ion, membrane, channel etc.), particularly because it 
enforces the definition of causal factors acting on the elements that help to 
define phases (‘charging’ vs. ‘discharging’). Notably, explaining this time 
course of electric activity is possible by nearly completely omitting the 
molecular level of organization, although it might help to ‘stage’ elements 
and their causal relations (a membrane might be conceived more illustrative 
than a RC-circuit). The molecular level of organization will come into place 
again at other instances of this section. 
 
1.2.2.5. Conduction: Spatiotemporal change and responsiveness 
 
In a natural situation such as the one in which the fly attempts to prevent 
collision with a frog’s tongue, a change of membrane potential is thought to 
function as a representation of the stimulus (e.g. the frog’s tongue) that can 
be processed in the system. For something to be processed, it must be 
handed over to the next stage of processing. The next ‘stage’ of processing 
is reached on the next instance in space and the next instance in time. In 
 51
1. BRAINS  Special Section 
other words, neurons were considered so far as being a single point in space 
– below, neurons will be conceived as having spatial extension. 
 
Considering first the electric level of organization, a spatial extension can be 
introduced by plugging together two RC-circuits (see fig. 3b). The dynamics 
of the simple stimulus-response situation can be described in terms of a RC-
circuit. The RC-circuit can be understood as a representation of a whole 
neuron but also as a representation of a patch of membrane. This 
combination of RC-circuits introduces a new resistance that current has to 
overcome – not through the membrane but along the membrane (the ‘cable’ 
from one RC-Circuit to the next.). Put in terms of the molecular level of 
organization, ions have to overcome the resistance of the cytoplasm. 
 
It becomes evident that considering a single RC-circuit as a representation of 
the membrane treats the membrane as a single point in space – a thing 
hardly conceivable on the molecular or cellular level of organization. So let’s 
first put things straight for the resistance through the membrane. The 
resistance through the membrane depends on the permeability of the 
membrane on a given surface area that can be conceived as the density of 
passive channels (see also 1.2.2.3) on a slice of the cell compartment. This 
leak resistance Rleak depends on the circumference of the slice 
1 / Rleak ~ 2·π·r. The greater the diameter of this slice the smaller the 
resistance. If x slices are plugged together to a compartment of length x, the 
resistance through the membrane decreases (more channels=more leaks). 
The specific term rleak quantitatively describes the decrement in resistance 
over length Rleak = rleak / x. 
 
Considering the length of the compartment introduces another new 
resistance along the membrane: the cytoplasmatic resistance. It can be 
conceived as the resistance that currents have to overcome when they flow 
along the inside of the neuronal membrane. (The outside is commonly 
neglected because it is often very large relative to the inside.) The opposite 
situation to that of the resistance through the membrane is given: the more 
slices are taken into account, the more resistance turns up (“more 
cytoplasm”). The specific term rcyto quantitatively describes the increment 
factor of cytoplasmatic resistance over length Rcyto = rcyto·x. 
 
Thus, the overall resistance of the compartment increases with length and 
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decreases with diameter. Thick, round compartments have a low resistance, 
while thin, long compartments of the same volume have a high resistance. 
Consider a compartment that has the same leak resistance as cytoplasmatic 
resistance Rleak = Rcyto and rleak / x= rcyto·x. Then the ratio of the two types of 
resistance determines the properties of the cell. This ratio is called the space 
parameter or length constant λ = rcyto / rleak. The greater the specific 
membrane resistance (through) and the smaller the internal resistance 
(along), the greater the length constant. Thus, the length constant describes 
the ease of a current traveling along a compartment. Consider a hose filled 
with a fluid (cytoplasm) that receives a shot of water (current pulse): rleak 
relates (inversely) to the amount of holes (leaks) in the hose and rcyto relates 
to the thickness of the fluid. The length constant determines how deep the 
shot of water can penetrate into the hose before ebbing. 
 
Coming back to responsiveness, the amount of water in the hose can be 
conceived as a response. The residual of an initial response at a given 
distance x can be determined by Vresidual(x) = Vinitial·e−x/λ. A complete 
geometrical description of a simple compartmented neuron, including all 
diameters and specific resistances, provides a model of the neuron in which 
arbitrary responses imposed on the neuron can be traced spatially and 
temporally. This approach allowing to relate the dynamics of the neuron to 
spatial organization is called ‘compartmental modeling’ (see Rall 1989 or 
Walter 1999 for a textbook). 
 
In the preceding sections, an explanation of a phenomenon (e.g. 
responsiveness in a neuron) was developed from the lower electric level of 
organization (refraining from molecular terms) towards the higher, molecular 
level. The explanations provided in this section on spatiotemporal change of 
activity applied the same procedure, but referred to molecular aspects from 
the beginning (as the term ‘cytoplasmatic resistance’ already indicates). One 
reason is that concepts referring to the electric level (e.g. resistance) were 
directly related to concrete molecular organization of the biological 
substrate, e.g. the spatial extension of neuronal structures. This mix of levels 
of organization is typical for brain studies and differs considerably from a 
pure electric account of responsiveness that treats the neuron as an electric 
building block. By mixing the levels of organization, the neuron is treated as 
a element of individual geometry that ‘deserves’ a specific approach of 
description, e.g. cytoplasmatic resistances. 
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1.2.2.6. Beyond responsiveness 
 
Several further mechanisms contributing to the generation, maintenance and 
conductance of a given activity can be considered. However, a fairly detailed 
account of responsiveness has been introduced so far. This account applied 
several concepts referring to the electric level, but rested on very few 
assumptions on the neuronal membrane, i.e. phenomena on the molecular 
level of organization. Merely a phospholipid-bi-layer with a passive channel 
(supported by an abstract sodium-potassium pump) was introduced. This 
account is also called the “passive membrane” because it just explains 
‘passive’ responses and does not imply still to be shown ‘active’ changes of 
the input signal introduced by further neural mechanisms. 
 
However, if studied experimentally, even a simple passive membrane would 
reveal phenomena that are not explainable with the mechanisms introduced 
so far. In every simple experimental situation (see fig. 2), it would be 
observable – if amplification factor and temporal resolution were maximized 
– that fluctuations pervade the neural signal. Given that these fluctuations 
are not artifacts introduced by the experimental setup, they are the result of 
activities in the neuron not considered so far. Since it is assumed that these 
activities do not contribute significantly to responsiveness, it is termed 
‘neuronal noise’. This phenomenon points at the possibility of a more 
differentiated understanding of responsiveness, even if only a passive 
membrane is considered. The sources of neuronal noise may be manifold. A 
prominent and illustrative explanation can be given on the electric level. 
Consider the differential concentrations of ions on both sides of the 
membrane as described by the Goldman equation. It is assumed in the 
equation that the equilibrium potentials for the different ions and, thus, the 
membrane potential stay constant over time. Even for non-physicists, it must 
be a strange notion that individual ions ‘wait’ and stand still all the time on 
either side of the membrane until that very moment when an electric field 
potential (generated by an activity) arises and drags it to the other side. It is 
known from everyday observations from elements in solution (such as sugar 
in tee) that these are in continuous movement. These movements can be 
traced back to Brownian motion. Generally the membrane potential is a 
dynamic equilibrium. Dynamics imply that individual ions change position 
(and even sides) and the membrane leaks continuously. This causes small 
fluctuations in the membrane potential that can be conceived as neuronal 
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noise. (Other ‘stochastic’ processes such as those in more complicated, so 
far unconsidered, channel types are even more influential, but are too 
complicated to be explained at this instance.) 
 
How can noise be added to the different versions of the explanations of 
responsiveness introduced in this section? For a phenomenological 
description of noise, it is possible to add fluctuations in the form of a 
stochastic (random) function that simply adds a value chosen arbitrarily from 
a small range of values on the signal at each instant in time. An 
electrochemical account would add stochastic qualities (probability functions) 
to the ion concentrations in the Goldman equation. A dynamic Goldman 
equation would be a complicated system of differential equations. The 
explanatory value of this detail is of inferior significance for most brain 
phenomena. (This, again, makes clear that the choice of mechanisms that are 
to be considered in an explanation of a phenomenon depend crucially on 
question posed.) For understanding the principles of representation (e.g. of 
the frog’s tongue) and for understanding simple stimulus response relations, 
noise is not essential. However, it definitely gains significance in other issues 




Neurons are responsive. They can represent a change of the environment by 
a change in their membrane potential (an activity). For an activity to serve a 
function (e.g. representing a frog’s tongue), it has to be embedded in a 
larger context. The questions are: Where does the activity come from and 
where does it go to? The question where it comes from shall be faded out for 
the moment. (For the sake of simplicity it can be assumed that the stimulus 
is injected in the cell by an electrode in an appropriate experimental setup.) 
Where it goes to is the question that shall be answered first. For transporting 
the representation bearing activity to another place, the neighboring 
membrane patch has to take it over. On the electric level of organization this 
can be explained in terms of RC-circuits in series (see also 1.2.2.2 and fig. 
3b). Unfortunately, the membrane is anything but an ideal conductor for 
currents; it rather resembles a leaky hose. In the cases considered so far, the 
activity seeps away in the extracellular space only after a short distance 
(relative to the overall size of the neuron). On the electric level of 
organization, several possibilities for improving this situation can be found: 
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(A) Decreasing the resistance between two RC-elements (resistance along the 
membrane) so that current passes RC-elements more easily. (B) Increasing 
the resistance in a single RC-element (resistance through the membrane) so 
that the leak current is reduced. (C) Amplifying the activity. All of these 
possibilities are realized in neurons: (A`) Since the resistance along the 
membrane increases with diameter of the cell compartment, the neuronal 
structures that shall propagate an activity (axons and dendrites) usually are 
long and thin cables rather than round and thick spheres. Alternatively, the 
resistance along the membrane could be reduced by changing the properties 
of the cytoplasm that, however, is not without reason as it is (it has to serve 
other functions than propagation of electric signals). (B`) Reducing the 
resistance through the membrane can be achieved by reducing leak currents 
and, equivalently, by improving the capacitive properties of the membrane by 
increasing its isolating properties. This is found in many neurons in the form 
of an isolating structure around the propagating structures – due to the 
major constituent called ‘myelin’ sheath. This measure improves propagation 
of electric signals considerably. (C`) Amplification of the activity can be 
realized by channels that facilitate certain ion species to move across the 
membrane by changing their conformational state. Such channels are called 
‘active’ for demarcating them from ‘passive’ (always open) channels that 
determine the passive membrane properties. Membranes with active 
channels show a variety of properties that passive membranes do not show. 
Accordingly, a lot of different types of active potentials supposedly have to 
be distinguished. But one type of active potential is spread across all animal 
species and extraordinary conspicuous when neural activity is analyzed. 
Sometimes it is called ‘action potential’ due to its active, energy consuming 
character; sometimes it is called ‘spike’ due to its short, needle-like form. 
For the sake of brevity the latter term is preferred in the following. 
 
Phenomenologically, spikes differ in their form from other electric membrane 
events. Compared to most activities on passive membranes, spikes are fast 
and large potential changes (see fig. 6). Observed on a large timescale (a few 
seconds on an oscilloscope) spikes look like peaks on a straight line, a finer 
temporal resolution (a few milliseconds) reveals a recurring characteristic 
time-course. First, a gradual upward (positive) change in membrane potential 
(initial depolarization) can be observed. Then an abrupt steep ascent 
(depolarization) begins. Near the maximum, the ascend becomes less steep 
and ends in the maximum amplitude. The descend (repolarization) begins: 
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only after short duration, the descend obtains nearly the same steepness as 
the ascend had, even though the descend is usually less steep in average. 
Typically, the membrane potential falls to a value below (more negative than) 
the initial value (usually the resting potential), which, afterwards, is slowly 
approached again (afterhyperpolarization). 
 
1.2.3.1. Spikes as electric activity 
 
How can the time-course of a spike be brought about in an equivalent 
circuit? How can it be understood on the electric level of organization? It is 
impossible to explain this time-course with a simple RC-circuit (see also 
1.2.2.2 and fig. 3). Simple RC-circuits also show a rising phase and a decay 
phase when stimulated appropriately, but they cannot account for the 
specific time-course of the spike and they cannot account for amplification. 
Explaining the time-course of spikes necessitates an extended RC-circuit 
with at least two different resistors and voltage sources. The initial 
depolarization can still be explained with a simple RC-circuit: if a current  
 
fig. 6: Spike. a) Course of membrane potential (abscissa) over time (ordinate). After 
stimulation (istim), the membrane potential (Vrest) decreases from resting state, 
(depolarization), turns and increases towards negative values (repolarization). The 
characteristic afterhyperpolarization (‘undershoot’) passes into the resting state again. 
b) Conductance changes of potassium (GK+) and sodium (GNa+) during spike (Vm). c) Channel 
kinetic  of sodium activation (m), sodium inactivation (h) and potassium activation (n) during 




c), sodium (INa+) and potassium (IK+). © Steven A. Siegelbaum 1994, APSIM v1.0. 
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pulse is applied, first capacitive current flows. Subsequently, resistive current 
flows according to given conductances building the initial depolarization. But 
the transition from the plane to the steep part of the ascend can only be 
explained by introducing a new mechanism. One mechanism that can explain 
the steepness is a voltage dependent resistor (‘varistor’), i.e. a resistor that 
changes its conductance with changes in voltage (see fig. 3c). In electric 
engineering, varistors are applied for preventing surge current to damage the 
system because the resistance increases for stronger currents. But here the 
varistor does exactly the opposite: the resistance is decreased with higher 
values so that more current can flow. This explains why the ascend of the 
positive potential becomes steeper. But what makes the potential descend 
again? Consider a second RC-circuit that contains a capacitor that is 
oppositely polarized. The current making up the steep ascend of the spike 
charges the second capacitor. This second RC-circuit also has a varistor that 
has a slower ‘reaction time’ than the first one. Thus, its increase in 
conductance lags behind. As the conductance of the second varistor 
increases, both currents work in the opposite direction and as the 
conductance of the first varistor decreases and the conductance of the 
second varistor increases, the overall potential does not rise anymore, but 
slowly turns and then descends again. (The afterhyperpolarization can be 
conceived as an effect of the prolonged increased conductance of the second 
varistor.) The two varistors explain the time-course of a spike. But how about 
amplification? To account for amplification, it can be assumed that the circuit 
is continuously charged by a voltage source and, thus, resembles a battery. 
The resting conductance of the varistors is so low that no current flows for 
discharging the battery, but it is ‘unleashed’ when the varistors are activated. 
In this sense, the spike is a local event at a large battery. 
 
1.2.3.2. Spikes as membrane events 
 
So far, an explanation on the electric level of organization was provided. On 
the molecular level of organization, most of the mechanisms introduced in 
the equivalent circuit also hold. In the resting state, the concentration 
gradients across the membrane correspond to a large battery that has stored 
chemical energy in abundance. Outside is sodium excess; inside is potassium 
excess leading to opposite concentration gradients. Potassium can leave the 
cell in limited amounts (leak conductance), but, as it pours out, it leaves 
behind a shortage of positive charges so that an electric gradient is 
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generated. The equilibrium of all forces is the resting potential that is 
described by the Goldman equation (see also 1.2.2.2). This explains a single 
battery. When a positive current pulse is applied to the cell, it can be 
conceived as an injection of positive charges (or a withdrawal of negative 
charges). As a result of this current pulse, an excess of positive charges is 
inside the cell. The depolarization activates sodium specific channels that 
have ‘sensors’ for positive charges. The conductance for sodium increases 
and a sodium inward current is brought about. This explains the initial 
depolarization. But the phenomenological description of the spike’s time-
course now shows the transition from a rather plane ascend to the steep 
ascend. What happens? In the equivalent circuit, the first varistor was used 
for realizing this phase of the time-course. The analogues of varistors at the 
membrane are the voltage dependent channels. The initial depolarization 
first affects channels that are specific for sodium. In a multi-stage process, 
positive charges that come near the ‘sensors’ of the channels cause 
conformational changes of the protein. This change is the transition from 
close to open: sodium can pass the membrane along its concentration 
gradient from outside to inside (inward sodium current). The initial 
depolarization is amplified by the increased conductance that releases power 
saved in the concentration gradients (batteries) and still triggers further, 
‘neighboring’ voltage dependent sodium channels. 
 
The turning phase from ascend to descend can be explained by three other 
factors that affect the situation. First, as the membrane patch depolarizes, 
the sodium equilibrium potential is approached. The electrochemical force 
acting on sodium ions decreases and the current is reduced. It should be 
noted that these processes occur primarily locally, at a given membrane 
patch. (The potential, the electric forces, the concentrations etc. are not 
significantly changed for the whole cell – only at a given location.) The 
second limiting factor for the sodium current (and the cause for the turn of 
the potential) is an intrinsic property of the channel: after being opened, the 
voltage dependent channel enters a state of inactivation before it can be 
activated and thereafter opened again. The change from active to inactive 
occurs autonomously, independent of the voltage. Thus, after a certain 
period of time many channels are inactive. Third, another type of voltage 
dependent channel (the second varistor) comes into play: the voltage 
dependent potassium channel. It also ‘senses’ depolarizations, but its 
responsiveness lags behind that of the voltage dependent sodium channels 
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so that the conductance increment for potassium of the membrane patch 
appears slightly delayed. (The leak conductance for potassium is very small 
relative to the conductance during a spike.) A potassium outward current 
along the chemical gradient can not only explain the turn of the potential, it 
also explains the repolarization of the membrane. The afterhyperpolarization 
can be explained by the still increased potassium conductance that is higher 
than the leak (‘resting’) conductance. Thus, the membrane potential comes 
closer to the potassium equilibrium potential than in the resting state. Ion 
species other than sodium and potassium play a minor role in the generation 
of the spike and are therefore neglected here. 
 
As it was already stated for the explanation of responsiveness (see also 
1.2.2), considering the molecular level of organization provides a ‘stage’ for 
the elements and activities participating in the explanation of the 
phenomenon. Ions can be imagined to be located around the membrane, 
move through channels etc. The molecular version of explaining spike 
generation also offers mechanisms that cannot be found easily on the electric 
level of organization. For instance, the voltage dependent channel is easier 
explained mechanistically than the varistor as the equivalent on the electric 
level of organization. In order to explain a varistor mechanistically, it has to 
be introduced that it is made of a mix of ceramic and metallic substances 
with an irregular structure that changes its conductance for electric charges 
as a response to currents in a complicated manner. By contrast, 
understanding the ‘sensor’-mechanism of the voltage dependent channel in 
the membrane is no more difficult than understanding the function of a 
number of doors. 
 
1.2.3.3. Spikes as a formal event 
 
The last version of explaining spike generation offered here shall provide a 
formal description. The ionic (resistive) current determines the membrane 
potential. The overall ionic current can be described as the sum of all ionic 
current types Iionic = INa+ + IK+ ( + Ileak). A given current type depends on the 
conductance of the membrane g and the electrochemical forces acting on 
them Vactual − Eion, i.e. the ‘farer’ the membrane potential ‘keeps away’ a 
given ion species from its equilibrium potential the stronger are the forces 
acting on that species Iion = gion (Vactual − Eion). It should be kept in mind that 
this is different for the different ion species: potassium tends to move 
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outward, but only weakly since it is very close to its equilibrium potential EK+ 
(due to leak conductance), whereas sodium tends inward with great 
electrochemical force because it is far from its equilibrium potential ENa+. The 
dynamics of conductance realized by the voltage dependence of channels is 
described by certain parameters that were determined experimentally. For 
example, the conductance of the membrane patch for sodium is described by 
two different parameters that are necessary to account for activation m and 
inactivation : gNa+·m³h. Potassium is slightly simpler in that it only needs a 
single parameter for activation n: gK+·n4. Each parameter represents a time 
constant for a channel state and therewith provides a description of the 
time-course of the actual fraction of channels being open. The exponents 
can be memorized as the channel’s gating elements, i.e. elements that have 
to be activated for opening the channel: the voltage dependent sodium 
channel is thought two have 3 (m³) gating elements, the potassium channel 4 
(n4). Beyond the ionic current, capacitive current determines the overall 
current: Im = Ic + Iionic. The capacitive current can be described as the product 
of change of voltage in time and the actual capacity of the membrane patch 
Ic = C·dVm / dt. Finally, adding the leak currents yields an equation of the 
current that determines the time course of the membrane potential. The 
general forms Im = Ic + Iionic and Iionic = INa+ + IK+ (+ Ileak) result in: 
 
Im = Cm ·dVm / dt + gNa+ m³·h (V − VNa+) + gK+·n4 (V − VK+) + gleak·(V − Vleak) 
 
This so-called Hodgkin-Huxley equation contains the dependence on the 
membrane’s capacitance on the actual change of potential, on the 
conductances as well as on channel kinetics and on the forces brought about 
by ion specific equilibrium potentials. The ‘batteries’ are represented in the 
different equilibrium potentials of sodium and potassium. 
 
A vast number of novel phenomena can be obtained by combining the 
interactions of spike-related mechanisms introduced so far. Just to give one 
example, a novel phenomenon in the temporal domain called refractoriness 
can be obtained by applying two stimuli in short succession (‘double pulse’). 
Refractoriness refers to the period of time in which it is not at all or only to a 
limited extent possible to generate a spike. That inter-stimulus-interval in 
which the second stimulus does not yield a spike is called absolute refractory 
period. That inter-stimulus-interval that yields an action potential with 
reduced amplitude is called relative refractory period which determines the 
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minimal inter-spike-interval. Refractoriness can be easily explained in terms 
of molecular mechanisms as that period of time after a spike in which a great 
fraction of voltage dependent sodium channels are in the state of 
inactivation. 
 
1.2.3.4. Propagation of spikes 
 
So far, the generation of a spike was explained as a local event, i.e. with 
respect to a given membrane patch. But with respect to the whole neuron, 
spikes function to solve the problems introduced by the poorly conducting 
membrane: spikes transmit signals over large distances. The principle of 
propagation can be described with elaborated RC-circuits for an active 
membrane patch plugged in series. The neighboring membrane patch is 
activated in just the same manner as a current pulse through a stimulating 
electrode activated the initial membrane patch. However, a novel 
phenomenon is introduced by the properties of voltage dependent sodium 
channels. If the membrane patch of a given location has generated a spike, 
the massive presence of inactivation states of the channels implies that no 
second spike can be generated on the same patch of membrane for the 
absolute refractory period. This is functional for signal transmission since 
refractoriness prevents that a given activity causes ‘ping-pong’ spikes 
between neighboring membrane patches. But how exactly travels a spike 
from position X to position Y? First, current goes the way of least resistance. 
The elongated form of the propagating structures alone causes a higher 
resistance through than along the membrane. Thus, activity prefers to travel 
along the axon. But still two directions are left!? In fact, if a pulse were 
applied in the middle of an axon a spike would be propagated in both 
directions. This case is improbable to occur in natural situations, however, 
since spikes usually are not elicited in the middle of an axon – the natural 
situation usually assumed is that a spike is elicited at the beginning of the 
axon at ‘the spike initialization zone’. Beyond this place (in opposite 
direction to the axon), the density of voltage dependent sodium channels is 
assumed to be too low for the generation of a spike. If a spike travels down 
an axon, it leaves behind a trace of inactivated channels that prevents the 
spike from being propagated back to its initial location. Thus, the 
propagation of the spike has a one-way direction. 
 
Mechanisms relating to spikes provide explanations for propagation and 
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amplification. Signals are propagated (A) along a structure (axon) that has an 
increased resistance through the membrane due to its long and thin form, (B) 
the axon is myelinated by which the resistance through the membrane is 
increased and (C) the signal is amplified by way of spike generation. Since 
the residual leaks do still impede signal propagation considerably, it must be 
amplified during transmission along the myelin sheath, particularly for long 
distances. Therefore, the myelin sheath is interrupted (‘Ranvier nodes’), 
thereby disclosing active membrane patches on which the signal can be 
intermediately amplified by a spike generation process. This form of 
propagation is called ‘saltatory’. 
 
This previous paragraphs introduced a basic account of spikes and their 
function of overcoming the poor performance of the passive membrane. 
Again, mechanisms on several levels of organization were necessary to form 
a sound explanation. However, only if a given phenomenon to be explained 
crucially depends on the exact spatiotemporal coordinates of spikes, it is 
mandatory to include all the mechanisms introduced in the previous 
paragraphs. Otherwise irrelevant levels of organization can be neglected. For 
example, if the precise timing of a spike is decisive for the ‘correct’ turning 
direction for the fly’s escape maneuver away from the frog’s tongue, 
comprehension of the underlying mechanisms might be indispensable. But, if 
a binary neuron without spatial extent is sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon (e.g. if there would be only one escape maneuver that is 
triggered by a signal representing the frog’s tongue), considering spikes on 
the electric or molecular level of organization might not make sense. Which 
kind of explanation is necessary, again, depends on the question posed. 
 
1.2.4. The classical neuron 
 
There is no archetypal neuron. Rather, there are countless types of neurons 
the classification of which would be far beyond the actual scope. The 
rationale applied throughout this section is to demonstrate how to combine 
the constituent mechanisms for obtaining sound explanations of a given 
phenomenon. However, there is one account of a neuron that recurs again 
and again that shall therefore be called ‘classical neuron’. Beyond the 
equipment of any other biological cell, the classical neuron has responsive 
passive and active membranes, soma (cell body), a dendritic tree and one 
axon. Since the functional contact zone between neurons is called synapse, 
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we have postsynaptic terminals in the dendrites (receiving) presynaptic 
terminals in the axon (transmitting). These elements can be conceived as 
being strictly hierarchically organized, i.e. being linearly and transitively 
ordered (see fig. 7). 
 
fig. 7: Outline of the ‘classical’ neuron. Possible general structure of concepts above and 
within the ‘classical’ neuron. The structure has a spatial organization beginning with the 
largest (‘environment’) and going to the smallest and it has a temporal organization 
(following a hypothetical signal) going from presynaptic to postsynaptic. It should be noted 
that some elements have multiple presence (e.g. active membrane). Moreover, some 
elements ould be positioned on o her places (e.g. c toplasm) constructing other accounts 
of the neuron, e.g. one that does not go from presynaptic to postsynaptic but from outside 
to inside: { extracellular space | neuron { membrane | cytoplasm } }. Inset shows a classical 
neuron as it is similarly presented in many textbooks. Insert © BIODIDAC (license permissive 
for reprint)  
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The classical neuron is particularly appealing because the elements are not 
only hierarchical, they are also spatially and temporarily organized: an 
incoming activity has to run through the spatiotemporal organization of the 
classical neuron, is modified by various elementary mechanisms and thereby 
transformed to the outgoing activity. In explanations of brain phenomena, 
the classical neuron is a kind of implicit operating instruction of how to put 
all the elementary mechanisms together in order to obtain a holistic notion 
on the cellular level of organization. 
 
For achieving a detailed spatial understanding of a neuron, mechanisms 
acting on the electric level of organization have to be applied to a given 
geometrical architecture of a neuron. An example is the construction of a 
compartmental model of a classical neuron that can explain the generation of 
spikes. Such a model can be conceived as a large wire frame consisting of 
numerous RC-circuits. How much RC-circuits are chosen, depends on the 
problem to be solved; more details call for more RC-circuits. Even though the 
classical neuron does not have one specific classical function, it has a general 
functionality: it is usually assumed that the dendrites have ramifications that 
make contact to different presynaptic neurons. Thus, they integrate activities 
from several presynaptic neurons. In the situation of the fly trying to escape 
the frog’s tongue, a useful function for a classical neuron would be the 
pooling of spatial information: since the frog’s tongue is represented in the 
fly’s eye as an accumulation of single activities corresponding to single 
receptive fields of photoreceptors, it might be useful for the fly’s escape to 
integrate these activities into a larger representation of, say, an object (a 
tongue) or an edge (boundary between tongue and not-tongue). Thus, as an 
exemplary function of the classical neuron it can be supposed that it pools 
activities of a specific area (say the lower left corner) of the fly’s retina. 
 
The classical neuron is a mental assistance that helps to localize and trace 
activities entering a neuron and understand their transformations. Multiple 
activities are received at the postsynaptic terminals and are conducted by the 
passive membrane. Since there is no strict mechanism that directs the 
activities (as there is one in the case of spikes), activities spread in all 
directions (‘electrotonically’). Those activities the fate of which it is to 
dwindle without significant consequences somewhere in the extracellular 
space do not have to be further considered in the classical neuron. The next 
relevant situation for conducted activities is encountered when (the residuals 
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of) two activities meet at a ramification point and are merged – a process 
called ‘spatial summation’. In equivalent circuits, this case can be described 
as parallel resistors: consider the two dendritic ramifications as two feeding 
resistors R1 and R2 that converge on to the receiving element R. The sum of 
current must be zero (first Kirchhoff law I1 + I2 – I = 0), i.e. the two feeding 
currents are summarized and have the same value as the receiving current. 
The conductance of the receiving element is limited by the sum of the 
conductances of the feeding elements (g = 1 / R). There cannot be more 
current (charges per time) than that what is delivered by the feeding 
elements. The overall potential is determined by the sum of the constituent 
potentials that, in turn, are limited by the resistances (second Kirchhoff law 
U = I1·R1 + I2·R2 ). Applying these rules provides possibilities of regulating 
the current flow by the design of the circuit. If the conductance of the 
receiving element was too low the activities would be damped and prolonged 
and activity is lost. Thus, the conductance of the receiving element must be 
at least as high as the sum of the feeding elements if the sum of the currents 
shall be transmitted. For a dendritic tree with constant membrane properties 
(resistivity, constant number of passive channels) this implies that the 
diameter must be increased for decreasing resistance through the 
membrane, i.e. the twigs of the dendrite get thicker towards the center. This, 
in turn, implies an increase of resistance along the membrane and, 
accordingly, a “loss” of activities (λ = rleak / rcyto). For loosing least activity, 
the best design of a receiving element is the one that corresponds exactly to 
the sum of the conductances of the feeding elements. This example 
illustrates that dendritic tree design can determine the concrete computation 
of activities. It should be noted, however, that there might also be cases in 
which damping a given activity by the design of the dendritic ramifications is 
functional, for example if ‘undesired’ activity shall be suppressed. 
 
The dynamics of temporal summation also determines the outcome of 
incoming postsynaptic activities. Since current represents the amount of 
moved charges per time, temporal summation basically follows the same 
rules as spatial summation of currents (Kirchhoff laws). Thus, in an 
equivalent circuit with parallel resistors that represents a ramification of a 
dendritic tree, two feeding currents are simply added in each time slice in the 
receiving element. However, the specific structure of the feeding elements 
can change the time-course of the feeding activity thereby delaying one 
activity before or after the other. A temporal shift “smears” two initially 
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synchronous feeding activities because the overall duration of activities being 
present will prolong (accompanied by a reduction of amplitude) because the 
maximum values of the feeding activities fail to ‘meet’ in the same time-
slice. For instance, thicker elements prolong the time-course of a given 
activity on passive membranes – the time constant increases with resistance 
τ ~ rcyto (see also 1.2.2.5). Considering the molecular level of organization, 
this can be conceived as currents that take longer to get through a larger 
volume of medium (cytoplasm). 
 
In the classical neuron, all activities are finally integrated by way of spatial 
and temporal summation into a single merged activity at the final 
ramification of the dendritic tree. The merged activity spreads into the 
regions of the “spike initialization zone”. On the electric level of organization, 
i.e. as an electronic component, this region can be conceived as a varistor 
with very high responsiveness, i.e. the threshold for initially increasing 
conductance is very low. On the molecular level of organization this property 
can be conceived as a high density of voltage dependent sodium channels. 
Thus, in the course of activity traveling through the classical neuron, now an 
active membrane is present. Here, a spike is generated if the merged activity 
arriving from the dendritic tree succeeds in activating enough voltage 
dependent sodium channels for initiating the self-amplifying process of 
channels activating channels… This process also depends on the time-course 
of the merged activity. The longer charges are present the more channels will 
be activated by these charges. But the longer the charges are present the 
more channels will get inactivated, too. Thus, a brief, high-amplitude activity 
is thought to be optimal for spike generation. Therefore synchronous 
activities in the presynaptic region are thought to be more likely to elicit a 
spike (given an equal propagation over the dendritic compartments). 
 
Eventually, an incoming activity ends either as contributor to a spike that 
travels saltatoriously down the axon in order to be transmitted to the 
subsequent cell on the presynaptic terminal – or it dwindles as leakage 
current in the extracellular space. For this strict division between ‘yes’ and 
‘no’, spike generation is frequently called an all-or-none process or a 
threshold procedure. The form of the threshold, i.e. the amplitude and 
duration of the pulse necessary to elicit a spike, depends crucially on the 
density of the voltage dependent sodium channels but also on their kinetics, 
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i.e. time constants for the phase transitions resting-active-inactivated (see 
also 1.2.3.3). 
 
The classical neuron is a simplification, a model in exactly the same sense as 
the binary neuron – it is only more complicated. Expressed a bit sloppily, it 
assumes that all dendrites pick up little packages of activity, bring them to 
the spike initialization zone where they all are collected and evaluated so that 
the spike supervisor says: “Ok, that’s enough for a spike. Fire!” or “No, throw 
the old activity stuff away. We begin anew!” If the spike is fired it travels all 
the way down to the axon to the next relay station. This account is very 
similar to the binary neuron. The concrete forms of spatiotemporal 
integration of activity in the dendrites (currents flowing ‘backwards’ in 
neighboring dendrites, for example) are often neglected. The possibility of 
neurons without axons, or axons having ramifications in their terminal region 
are blended out and the question whether activities other than those 
resulting from the stimulus that one has in mind (e.g. the frog’s tongue) 
might determine whether or not a spike is generated are usually not 
considered. Thus, thinking in ‘biological terms’ (classical neuron) can make 
possible thinking in terms of mathematical functions (binary neuron) by 
assuming a very sound case that does not afford much mental capacity by 
invoking problematic explanatory sidetracks. Even experts for the lower 
levels of organization (i.e. electric or molecular) can benefit from thinking in 
terms of the classical neuron, as it makes possible to ignore complexity 
meanwhile. However, the type and number cognitive processes involved 
(mental models activated or schemas instantiated) depends crucially on the 
prior knowledge of the auditor. Someone can think of a neuron as a binary 
element just differentiating between yes and no, while another one thinks of 
a color coded dynamic 3D full featured membrane model ad yet another one 
of a system of differential equations. There is no wrong or right – there is 




The synapse is both a crucial spatial connector since it explains 
mechanistically the transition between the level of neurons and the level of 
networks and the synapse a crucial temporal connector since it explains 
mechanistically how real-time phenomena (e.g. sensation) relate to 
‘persisting’ phenomena (e.g. memory). The real-time functionality of the 
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synapse comprises the transmission mechanism between two neurons in its 
entirety. The synapse is not a straightforward spatial unit: Does the synapse 
belong to the presynaptic or the postsynaptic neuron? The synapse is neither 
a temporally discrete event: When does ‘before’ begin and ‘after’ end? It is 
literally the ‘in-between’ two neurons, two instances of time etc. 
 
As all brain phenomena, synapses can be explained on different levels of 
organization. Particularly, two types of synapses call for explanations on 
different levels of organization: electric synapses vs. chemical synapses (see 
e.g. Bennett 1997). The ‘story’ about electric synapses is most often briefly 
told (even though they might actually deserve more detailed treatment): two 
neurons are connected by specific functional structures called ‘gap junctions’ 
that allow a nearly instantaneous, largely unchanged transmission from one 
neuron to the next. 
 
The chemical synapse is a functional unit in which neural activities can be 
significantly modified so that they have a completely different form after 
transmission. Thus, beside the function of merely transmitting a given 
activity, chemical synapses are thought to transform activities. Both neurons, 
the transmitting neuron with the presynaptic side and the receiving neuron 
with the postsynaptic side contribute to a synaptic transformation. In 
between lies a specific part of the extracellular space, called synaptic cleft. 
Anatomically, the whole unit is typically characterized by a membranous 
bulb-like protuberance on the presynaptic side, sometimes also on the 
postsynaptic side. 
 
Chemical synapses transform a presynaptic electric activity into largely non-
electric, molecular elements that in turn is transformed to a postsynaptic 
activity. At synapses, the electric level of organization (i.e. electric changes 
measurable with microelectrodes) is only tangible by comparing the 
presynaptic activity with the postsynaptic activity. Such an input-output 
analysis tells nothing about the molecular mechanism that characterizes 
synapses, but it can characterize synaptic phenomena that are then to be 
explained in terms of molecular mechanisms. A typical phenomenon found at 
chemical synapses is the ‘delay’ that synaptic transmission introduces: The 
time it takes for an activity to get from one neuron to the next is 
considerably longer than the time it takes for the activity to travel down the 
same distance an axon. Furthermore, the activity can be changed from a 
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given type of presynaptic signal to almost any other type of postsynaptic 
signal. What are these transformations? Consider a current step as 
presynaptic activity. Depending on the synapse, this step on the presynaptic 
side can look like an impulse on the postsynaptic side, but it can be also 
prolonged, it can even made negative or have a positive peak at the 
beginning and a negative peak at the end. It can stay largely unchanged, 
though. 
 
Explaining synaptic phenomena in terms of mechanisms is best possible by 
considering both the electric and the molecular level of organization. It is 
thought that the activities are transformed from the electrical-chemical into 
the chemical-molecular domain and back again. Thus, if only one level was 
considered, an incomplete account of synaptic phenomena would be 
provided. An explanation that reduces to the electric level of organization 
must fail at this instance because it could simply not detect the chemical 
processes involved. An explanation that reduces to the molecular level of 
organization must fail because the computational context would be missing 
when electric activity is neglected. This illustrates very concretely that a mix 
of levels of organization is the appropriate approach for explaining brain 
phenomena. 
 
The key process at the synapse is the involvement of so called transmitters. 
The rationale is that an activity in the form of an ionic current of a given 
amplitude and duration is translated into a given amount of transmitter that 
transports the activity over the synaptic cleft, there causing a retranslation 
into an ionic current of a given amplitude and duration. (In this period of 
time, the neuronal activity relating to the frog’s tongue is not an electric 
potential but an amount of a chemical substance.) The process in between 
has the form of a complex cascade of events that shall not be taken into 
account in every detail. The principle, however, is quite simple: transmitter is 
stored on the presynaptic side in vesicles, i.e. membrane inclusions. Activity 
arriving at the presynaptic side activates voltage dependent calcium 
channels, thereby causing an inward calcium current. A series of events is 
triggered by the incoming calcium ions. Effectively, this series of events 
causes the vesicles to fuse with the presynaptic membrane and transmitters 
are released into the synaptic cleft. Apart from some recycling processes on 
the presynaptic terminal, the activity has now left the presynaptic neuron. 
(No frog’s tongue represented anymore in that neuron.) Transmitter spreads 
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through the synaptic cleft and binds to specific receptors on the postsynaptic 
membrane thereby initiating another series of events, this time on the 
postsynaptic membrane. (Ionotropic transmitters directly bind to channels, 
metabotropic transmitters act indirectly by binding to other proteins that in 
turn trigger further processes.) Effectively, transmitter binding causes ion 
channels to open or close by a change in their conformational state. This 
opening or closure on a fraction of channels on the postsynaptic side 
changes the current of that ion species that moves through the channel 
thereby influences the postsynaptic potential. Thus, the selectivity of the 
channel for the transmitter on the one side and an ion species on the other 
side realizes the retranslation from the molecular into the electric domain. 
This newly formed activity can spread over the postsynaptic area (usually a 
dendrite). Apart from some clearing works in the presynaptic cleft (reuptake 
of transmitter) the synaptic transmission is completed. The postsynaptic 
activity is ended by inactivation of the postsynaptic channels. 
 
The account of synaptic transmission introduced so far can explain some of 
the synaptic phenomena introduced above, for instance, the delay that is 
typically observable when the presynaptic and postsynaptic signal are 
compared. Obviously, the reason for the delay lies in the transformations 
from ionic currents through channels on the presynaptic side to other 
molecular mechanisms at the synapse and back to ionic currents. Compared 
to the electrochemical processes on a passive membrane that determine the 
dynamics of a given activity, the molecular processes involved in synaptic 
transmission take considerably more time. In the case of the passive 
membrane, a given activity causes capacitive current that spreads almost 
immediately. The subsequent ionic current has a considerable delay, but 
solely depends on diffusion. In contrast, consider the multiple processes 
involved in synaptic transmission: opening of calcium channel --- activation 
of the vesicle --- fusion with membrane --- spread over cleft --- activation 
of postsynaptic channels --- (lines indicate the presence of intermediate 
processes). These processes have to occur one after the other for building a 
causal chain and, therefore, the durations of the single events have to be 
summed up. Thus, even if only a minimal duration of each process is 
assumed, it should become clear that these processes take longer than a 
diffusion process along a gradient through open channels. It should be noted 
that the overall time for synaptic transmission is not that much longer than a 
spike traveling down an axon (both are in the transition between µs- and 
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ms-range), which, however, has to overcome a much longer distance (mm-
range for axon vs. nm-range for synapse). 
 
Activity cannot only be delayed at a synapse, but can be also transformed. 
How can these transformations of a presynaptic signal into a sometimes 
completely different postsynaptic signal be explained? Again, the 
participating elements and activities are manifold and constitute a complex 
series of events. However, the principle is simple again: the mechanism is 
grounded in the selectivity of the channels for a given ion species. If sodium 
channels are opened, a sodium inward current and a depolarization is 
caused, i.e. the postsynaptic potential is positive or excitatory (EPSP). If 
chloride (or potassium) channels are opened an inward chloride (or outward 
potassium) current and a hyperpolarization is caused, i.e. the postsynaptic 
potential is negative or inhibitory (IPSP). The activation of a given channel 
type is determined by the transmitter that influences the states of the 
channel. Thus, combining appropriately transmitters and receptors yields the 
different possibilities of altering activities.This explains the direction of the 
postsynaptic effect, i.e. if it is positive or negative, but what about amplitude 
and duration of the postsynaptic signal? Quantitative transformation can 
partly be attributed to the characteristics of the synapse; the other part is 
determined by the incoming activity. The characteristics of the synapse that 
influence the amplitude of the postsynaptic signal are determined by the 
density of postsynaptic channels through which postsynaptic currents flows, 
by the membrane equipment, e.g. the different ion specific channels 
involved, the reversal potentials of the ions involved etc. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the whole transmission process is important: How much 
transmitter is activated per unit presynaptic activity and how much of the 
transmitter binds effectively to postsynaptic channels? This is the point 
where the stimulus-induced component takes effect – coarsely said: the 
more activity, the more transmitter. 
 
Dynamics (temporal prolongation or truncation) of the activity can, for 
instance, be determined by the kinetics of the postsynaptic channels, i.e. how 
long they are activated per transmitter action. (These dynamics can be 
conceived in the same way as the parameters n, m and h affect the 
membrane current in the Hodgkin-Huxley equation, see also 1.2.2.3). Short 
opening and long inactivation phases of the channel lead to truncation. For 
instance, a postsynaptic event has stopped, although a presynaptic event is 
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still present. Long opening times can lead to prolongations and possibly to 
amplification of the presynaptic signal. The mechanisms involved in synaptic 
transmission can also explain phenomena that exceed ‘real-time’, i.e. the 
timescale of an actual behavior (e.g. the fly escaping the frog’s tongue). 
Consider the marine snail Aplysia that withdraws its gill in order to protect 
itself against environmental dangers when specific sensitive areas (the 
‘siphon’ or the head) are touched (see fig. 8). Now, certain events can change 
the behavior over a larger timescale. For instance, touching the siphon 
repeatedly causes the snail not to withdraw its gill. (This might be functional 
or economic since the stimulus is obviously not dangerous because the snail 
is still living and able to withdraw its gill.) An explanation in synaptic terms 
can be given in terms of an inactivation of calcium channels (presynaptic to 
the decisive motor neuron) that leads to a decrease in calcium influx, a 
decrease in vesicle activation etc. In this way, the effectiveness of synaptic 
transmission is changed over seconds, minutes or even hours. This process 
is called ‘habituation’ and the synaptic mechanism ‘presynaptic depression’. 
 
Sensitization (sometimes also called dishabituation) is observable as an 
increase in the strength of gill withdrawal. This can be brought about by 
applying a new stimulus on the head. (This could be dangerous!) An 
explanation in synaptic terms assumes that the additional stimulus results in 
an activity of another neuron releasing a transmitter that can bind on the site 
that also is responsible for habituation, i.e. the site presynaptic to the 
decisive motor neuron. Effectively (after a series of events), it is thought to 
inactivate potassium channels, thereby prolonging the presynaptic activity. 
Thus, effectiveness of synaptic transmission to the decisive motor neuron is 
increased by way of ‘presynaptic facilitation’. 
 
Even longer timescales than the minutes of habituation can be approached by 
applying very strong stimuli on head and siphon. Then, the concentration of 
intermediate products of a first “series of events” (cAMP and calmodulin) is 
increased considerably and activate another “series of events”, namely the 
activation of processes in the genetic material. Generally, gene expression 
allows almost any conceivable change in a neural system: changing of the 
synaptic equipment (e.g. variation of the number of channels or addition of a 
new channel type), induction of growth processes of new synapses etc. (It 
should be noted that these processes are not exclusively synaptic because 
the whole cell comes into focus.) Since the marine snail can be caused to 
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withdraw the gill with increased strength for days, the phenomenon is 
termed ‘learning’, more precise ‘associative learning’. 
 
fig. 8: Plasticity in Aplysia. Upper: Schematic neural circuit. Tactile stimulation of the siphon 
causes withdrawal of the gill. Response decreases, however, when stimulation is repeated 
(habituation). The initial response strength can be brought back by applying another 
stimulus on the tail (dishabituation, sensitization). Lower: Molecular mechanisms habituation 
and dishabituation on a synapse (zoomed from dotted line in the left figure). Habituation is 
explained as resulting from decreased activity transmitted to the motor neuron (synaptic
depression). Sensitization is explained by activation of additional molecular mechanisms by 
a third synapse (presynaptic facilitation). The figures illustrate the principle of explanations 
on different levels of organization. from uscd.edu. 
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A lot more could be said about synaptic transmission, particularly about 
more sophisticated computations at synapses or about learning. But the 
section so far should last to illustrate what synapses are about. Synaptic 
transmission involves multiple mechanisms on different levels of 
organization. Moreover, it prepares the ground for a general change of the 
level of organization on which the functionally significant processes are 
located: whereas the representation of the frog’s tongue is in the classical 
neuron thought to be predominantly observable as an electric phenomenon, 
it is the concentration of transmitters that contains the representation during 
chemical synaptic transmission. But seen from the design stance, it seems 
circuitous to introduce such a complicated process. Why not just take electric 
synapses? An obvious benefit of such a transformation stage is their 
disposition for alteration of a given activity. Most of the conceivable 
transformations that can be performed on a given activity can be realized at 
the synapse. Thus, the transmission characteristics of the synapse determine 
the ‘fate’ of a given activity. Moreover, plasticity allows that the transmission 
characteristics themselves can also be altered. Plasticity introduces a strong 
dynamic quality since the activity itself changes the transmission 
characteristic. For example, if a synapse showing plasticity transmits the 
same presynaptic activity several times, each postsynaptic signal may look 
different. Therefore, a clear separation of stimulus (activity) induced 
component in a postsynaptic signal and the contribution of the synaptic 
transmission characteristic to the postsynaptic signal cannot easily be 
maintained. Of course, dynamics are introduced at the cost of making the 
synaptic activity more difficult to decode – but the benefit is an extension of 
representational power: an external event can not only be represented as a 
short, transient effect of an external change, but can impose longer lasting 
changes as in the case of habituation or can become (quasi) persistent such 
as an association. The transitions between these forms of representation, 
however, are only gradual. 
 
For assessing the overall effect of synaptic transmission on the postsynaptic 
neuron, it has to be taken into account that usually multiple (thousands) of 
synapses are activated in parallel. In a ‘classical neuron’, these are the 
activities that enter the spatial and temporal integration processes 
(‘summations’) that extend from the dendritic ramifications to the spike 
initialization zone. Reconsider equilibrium potentials, conductance etc. from 
the explanations of a simple current pulse on a patch of membrane (see also 
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1.2.2). Now, think of thousands of those activities in a dendritic tree. If it is 
then taken into account that all these activities come from synapses and that 
each synaptic transformation can be different, it becomes clear that synapses 
extend the scope of brain phenomena significantly: they do not only 
represent the crucial spatial and temporal connector for explanations of 
brain phenomena, they make conceivable almost any alteration or – seen in a 
functional context – computation of activity. 
 
Since the synapse introduces many new phenomena, it shall briefly be 
discussed what state of explanation is reached so far. Whatever complex the 
mechanisms necessary to provide a sound explanation for a given 
phenomenon might appear, the building blocks still are few. There are three 
membrane types and a gap, i.e. a passive, active, synaptic membrane and the 
synaptic cleft. These membranes are functionally determined by the two 
channel types ‘passive’ and ‘active’, the latter of which being ionotropic 
(controlled by ions/voltage) or metabotropic (controlled by ligands) and 
direct (activated by transmitters) or indirect (activated by mediators). Ions are 
present in differential concentrations that can represent environmental 
changes by moving through the channels. This ionic current representing 
environmental changes (e.g. a dangerous stimulus) can subsequently trigger 
processes that control the concentrations of transmitters that control the 
concentration of other substances triggering gene expression that controls 
the building of membranes and channels … 
 
It should be noted that neither the elements themselves nor the functions in 
which the elements are embedded are too difficult to imagine. Also, it is not 
difficult to integrate these into a mechanism – as long as a mechanism 
considered isolated. But when multiple mechanisms are considered, multiple 
causes act on the elements (e.g. ions) and the possibilities of thinking causal 
relations increase. (Think of different receptor types on a patch of synaptic 
membrane determining together postsynaptic currents.) If, additionally, 
dynamics are considered (e.g. adaptation), yet another quality is introduced. 
Finally, the possibility of temporal orders determining temporal orders 
(plasticity) and the generative mechanism of creating new elements (genetic 
expression) makes the possibilities endless. Thus, the principles of synaptic 
transmission supply explanations of brain phenomena with the power to 
equip neural systems with much more computational functionality than with 
neurons alone. Moreover they allow to connect neurons spatially and 
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temporally and to design networks. When networks of several neurons with 
thousands of synapses per neuron and thousands of dendrites (or RC-
circuits) per neuron are considered, complexity can easily get out of hand. 
Imagine how a given activity spreads in such a network! It should become 
clear at this instance how simplifying the classical neuron is. However, these 
remarks should not be deterring. Rather, they shall remind to keep the focus 
controlled: explanations on brains are easy as long as the explanatory 
aperture is narrow, but bear the power of unfolding massive complexity as 




Is any brain phenomenon explainable with the building blocks introduced so 
far? Do the explanations of brain phenomena considered so far imply that 
nothing new can be expected? Yes and no! Yes because no new building 
blocks are necessary and no because their combinatorial powers allow the 
construction of novel phenomena. This means: new are the phenomena, the 
observations to be made. What about networks, i.e. multiple neurons 
connected by synapses? Is it necessary to introduce a new level of 
organization, called networks? Isn’t it possible to explain any function of a 
network with the explanatory means gathered so far? It might be possible to 
explain network phenomena by low level phenomena – the functional result 
might be the same, no matter if a network is made up of electric circuits, 
dendritic trees or neurons. As long as the high levels are reducible to low 
levels, explanations can be based on any level of organization. But, as has 
been pointed out before (see also 1.1.12), it is not necessary in any case to 
explain any phenomenon down to the lowest level because possibly no gain 
is achieved. Moreover, sometimes dynamics and complexity do not allow for 
consideration of low-level phenomena since mental capacity is exceeded. 
 
Reconsider the classical neuron that is applied in explanations of brain 
phenomena as a kind of ‘concept container’: it reflects a fairly simple account 
of neurons that allows to apply it as an entity that is not further scrutinized, 
i.e. reduced to lower levels. But it is implicitly assumed that the entity can be 
reduced to low levels anytime when necessary. Thus, the conception as an 
entity allows for the reduction of complexity. The classical neuron serves as 
mental packaging mechanism. For example, the classical neuron makes 
possible to think of neurons as binary units: spikes help to justify why 
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complex activities of neurons can be simplified to a being active or being 
inactive. Now, the network level of organization is often characterized by a 
neglect of the cellular level: neurons are treated as abstract units that can 
carry out various computational operations on activities of precursors and 
pass the results of these computations to successors. It is not considered 
what spatial organization the computational units might have. In this sense, 
packaging low levels with the classical neuron makes possible to adopt the 
network stance. 
 
The transition from neurons to networks implies several changes in the 
levels-of-organization framework. When the spatiotemporal aperture is 
widened, phenomena resting on more than one interconnected neuron 
appear. When the functional aperture is widened, an increased computational 
complexity is revealed. These perspectives correspond to two prevalent 
notions of networks: first, small circuits made of neurons, chemical 
synapses, molecules etc. and, second, artificial neural networks. Even though 
these two notions are considerably different, both typically focus on 
computational phenomena – one with respect to biological realization, the 
other one with respect to algorithmic realization. Both assume that networks 
as opposed to single neurons realize that activity is processed parallel and 
distributed. In sum, networks are a distinct level of organization. The neglect 
of details makes possible compact and comprehensible explanations of 
parallel distributed processing. 
 
1.2.6.1. An example: Motion detection 
 
A phenomenon that offers explanations for both biological realization and 
algorithmic realization is motion detection (Borst & Egelhaaf 1989). However, 
biological realization was already treated in depth for the cellular level of 
organization in the previous sections. Therefore, a simple algorithmic 
account (that is characterized by a neglect of details) is provided here (see 
fig. 9). Motion is a change of an element in space and time, i.e. a 
spatiotemporal displacement. If an element on position x1 (left) changes to 
position x2 (right) from one instant of time t1 to the next t2, it has moved 
(from left to right). Now, how can a device be designed that can detect such a 
change? For the element to be detected, a receptor r1 for visual stimuli 
coming from x1 has to be present. This receptor can detect the change that 
occurs when the element disappears at t2. Thus, a single receptor can detect 
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if something has disappeared, but not unambiguously detect if it has moved: 
therefore, a second receptor r2 for visual stimuli coming from x2 has to be 
present. If (and only if) the other receptor r1 detects the stimulus at the same 
instant of time the first receptor detects nothing anymore, the movement can 
be detected. 
 
fig. 9: Motion Detec or. Upper left: Elementary motion detector with different stages of 
processing (a-e) responses to a square-wave grating moved in the preferred direction. Two 
symmetric half-detectors are shown that ‘use’ the same receptors and the responses of 
which are subtracted from another in order to obtain an unambiguous response. Lower left: 
Array of motion detectors that illustrates the principle of combining EMDs for sampling 
larger visual fields (from Haag et. al. 1999). 
t
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Initially, the representation of the movement is distributed over the two 
receptors. For an integrated representation of movement the two receptor 
activities have to be computed. A simple computing element could add up 
both signals. But such a computation would be not specific enough, because 
its activities would be the same when movement is present or a single 
receptor was active over both instants of time, i.e. both conditions x1(t1) = 1 
and x1(t2) = 1 or x1(t1) = 1 and x2(t2) = 1 amount to “2“. Thus, unambiguous 
results can be obtained only by way of evaluating the activities of both 
receptors at both instants of time. If these activities were summed up, the 
evaluating element would receive activity for both instants of time 
x1 + x2(t1) = 1 + 0 = 1 and x1 + x2 (t2) = 0 + 1 = 1. An observer could not 
see a difference in the resulting activity of the evaluating element between 
the two instants of time: no movement is detected. Therefore, the second 
instant of time t2 has to be compared to the first instant of time t1. This can 
be managed by making the activity of the first instant of time ‘wait’ for the 
activity on the second instant of time, i.e. delaying the first activity. If the 
duration of the delay matches exactly the time the stimulus takes to move 
from one location to the next, the resulting activity of the evaluating element 
is “0” on the first instant of time and “2” at the second instant of time. 
t1: r1(t0) + r2(t) = 0 + 0 = 0, t2: r1(t0) + r2 (t) = 1 + 1 = 2. Thus, the delay 
provides a means for obtaining detection of movement. 
 
Up to this point, it was neglected that a stimulus can also be longer than only 
one instant of time. Such a continuous stimulus makes considerable 
problems for the motion detector introduced so far: a continuous stimulus 
that activates both receptors would result in the same activation of the 
evaluating element as a moving stimulus t1: r1(t0) + r2 (t) = 1 + 1 = 2, 
t2: r1(t0) + r2 (t) = 1 + 1 = 2. Undesirably, there would be not only detection 
of movement, but also detection of continuous stimuli. A solution to this 
problem would be to allow only ‘changes’ to enter computations in the 
evaluating element. The desired response is called ‘phasic’ (biological term), 
differentiated (mathematical term) or high-pass filtered (cybernetic term) 
response, which means that only the beginning (and possibly the end) of a 
stimulus is transmitted, while the continuous part is neglected 
t1: r1(t0) + r2(t) = 0 + 0 = 0, t2: r1(t0) + r2(t) = 0 + 0 = 0. Thus, the most 
effective method to handle the problem of continuous stimulation of 
receptors in motion detection is to simply prevent their appearance in the 
computation. After all, it is change that matters to motion. 
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Of course, some problems are left aside. One problem is logical: consider 
two motion stimuli that are applied one after the other. If the first stimulus is 
delayed as long as the second one needs to arrive at the second receptor, 
these two are paired and motion is detected. However, two different objects 
caused the motion. The first stimulus has already passed the receptor before 
the second arrived. This phenomenon is called ‘aliasing’ and can be observed 
for durations of inter-stimulus-intervals that are multiple integers of the 
delay. 
 
Moreover, two synchronously appearing stimuli on both locations (no 
motion) would still cause the device to respond t1: r1 (t0) + r2 (t) = 0 + 1 = 1, 
t2: r1 (t0) + r2 (t) = 1 + 0 = 1. Even though this is not the maximum response 
(which is “2”) the process is still not exclusively specific for motion. Exclusive 
motion information could be obtained by applying a threshold function, 
though. Another simple change also helps: Instead of summing the incoming 
activities, they can be multiplied. Then, the criterion from the beginning is 
sufficed: if (and only if) r1 and r2 are activated on two subsequent instants of 
time t1 and t2, motion is detected: t1: r1(t0)·r2(t) = 0·1 = 0 and 
t2: r1 (t0)·r2(t) = 1·0 = 0 in case of synchronous appearance, but 
t1: r1(t0)·r2(t) = 0·0 = 0, t2: r1(t0)·r2(t) = 1·1 = 1 in case of movement. The 
computational principle exploited here is “coincidence detection“, i.e. the 
detection of the circumstance that two events happen at the same time. 
However, these events are originally not synchronous, but coincide by 
computation. 
 
Another obvious problem is introduced by the delay: if the delay does not 
exactly match the time it takes the stimulus to move from one receptor to 
the next, no motion at all will be detected. This problem is actually not easily 
overcome, but can be extenuated, e.g. by softening the hard criteria 
introduced above. For instance, the hard criterion of deleting all continuous 
parts of a stimulus can be softened by designing a filter that maximally 
transmits the beginning of the stimulus, but then gradually decreases while 
the stimulus stays the same. The portion of decrease of a step function can 
be manipulated by the time constant of the high pass filter: the larger the 
time constant, the longer the response, the shorter the time constant the 
sharper the response. Thus, the result of a softer filter is that a moving 
stimulus leaves behind a trace a bit longer so that there is still something 
other than zero to be multiplied when the other signal arrives. The behavior 
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of a hard high pass filter is not likely to occur in a biological system. For 
example, inactivation of channels will never occur perfectly simultaneously 
for all channels. The occurrence of a pure delay is likewise biologically 
implausible. Delays are typically introduced by a gradually increasing 
response as it can be modeled with a temporal low pass filter. The maximum 
response to a step function is not reached instantaneously but at a later 
instant of time. Thus, this is no pure ‘down time’ of the system just a delayed 
maximum. (Think of a gradually increasing number of activated channels…) 
 
A consequence of introducing the temporal low pass filter is that the delay is 
readily implied in the filters and does not have to be represented explicitly by 
a delay function. Depending on the time constant of the low pass filter, the 
activity of the system has a maximum at a delayed instant of time and 
decreases gradually afterwards. Thus, the low pass filter contributes to a 
prolongation of the signal. The time constant of the low pass filter therefore 
determines the tuning of the system for certain velocities, i.e. where the 
optimum is and how “tolerant” (broad) it is. 
 
Even though the motion detector will always have an optimum for a given 
stimulus velocity, the range of velocities of moving stimuli can be extended. 
Detecting stimuli of other velocity ranges can not only be realized by varying 
time-constants, but also by varying the distance between receptors: a wider 
distance in an otherwise unchanged configuration would detect faster 
stimuli. Of course, it seems unlikely that a biological system changes its 
receptor spacing. But consider an array of more than two receptors: given 
that wider spaced receptors are connected as a motion detector, faster 
moving stimuli can be detected. In this manner, different velocities can be 
detected without changing time constants – just by correlating elements with 
different spacing! 
 
The last problem considered here refers to direction. Until now, it was not 
considered what happens if a stimulus moved from right to left. It would be 
easily possible to extend the functionality of the motion detector if the same 
design that led to the detection of motion in one direction was applied for 
the opposite direction, i.e. if the design was symmetrically mirrored. For this 
to be realized, the signal of the right receptor has to be delayed and fed into 
a second correlating element. There, it has to be compared to the signal of 
the left receptor. However, the two correlating elements provide outputs with 
 82 
1st Brain-Special  1.2. Explanations of brain phenomena 
the same sign, so they have to be differentiated by subsequent elements or 
have to be sign-inversed (biologically realizable during synaptic 
transmission). An integrating element onto which activity about motion in 
one direction (say from left to right) enters with positive sign while the other 
direction is inversed, unambiguously responds to motion in both directions. 
Such a device is called elementary motion detector, EMD (Reichardt 1954). 
 
Finally, consider a row of receptors with elementary motion detectors whose 
activities are all summed up by a large integrative element. This device would 
detect global or ‘large-field’ motion. For detecting motion along this row of 
receptors, the same device has to be built in the orthogonal direction. 
Usually, biological systems have a matrix of receptors (a retina) that can be 
thought as being organized in horizontal and vertical directions. By 
computing the activities of two large-field elements that integrate orthogonal 
directions, an overall estimate of the motion direction is generated. Consider 
a fly over a pond: in a patterned environment, such a motion detection 
system can ‘tell’ the fly when it rotates. It will also respond to a frog’s 
tongue. (Of course, for detecting the frog’s tongue, a mechanism of figure 
detection is still missing, but see Egelhaaf & Borst 1993 for an introduction). 
 
The mechanism of motion detection was introduced here without questioning 
how it can be biologically realized. As it is typical for the network level of 
organization, it was primarily based on computational arguments. However, 
there is vast amount of experimental evidences that a motion detection 
mechanism can be realized biologically in a similar form (see again Egelhaaf 
& Borst 1993). The mechanism predicts very well the behavior of flies (or 
flies’ neurons), for example, and even of single cells responding to motion 
stimuli. Thus, it is easily conceivable to think of the elements of the 
movement detector in cellular or biophysical terms: a high pass filter as a 
membrane with inactivating channels, a low pass filter as a membrane with 
resistive properties, an inversion of signs as a synaptic hyperpolarization etc. 
But the consideration of details complicates the understanding of the 
network, while the computational account makes room for understanding the 
principles of motion detection. It is very well possible to realize the motion 
detection mechanism formally and integrate it in a technical system. 
Computational explanations are typical for both notions of networks cellular 
circuit and artificial neural network (see also 1.1.3). The difference is to be 
found in the smaller size of circuits that allows consideration of more details. 
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But it is frequently assumed that also the computational explanations of 
artificial neural networks are consilent with neural accounts. Computational 
explanations mediate between functional complexity and mechanistic 
explanation because they allow to neglect (mechanistic) details that release 
cognitive capacity for understanding functional principles. Imagine, the 
explanation of motion detection provided above in completely neural terms – 
it would be multiple times longer. However, this benefit is gained at the cost 
of the assumption that a given function is largely independent of the 




The explanations of brain phenomena considered so far covers a wide range 
of phenomena that can be encountered in relation to brains. Still, one 
important level of organization was touched only implicitly: behavior. 
Behavior is the one phenomenon enclosing all the constituent brain 
phenomena. Behavior is the first significant level of organization where the 
brain does not contain other elements (as the brain contains membranes, 
neurons, networks etc.), but is itself contained, namely by the organism that 
shows behavior. Thus, behavior as it is meant here does not refer to an 
arbitrary behavior such as the ‘behavior’ of a network – it refers to the 
behavior of a biological organism in its environment (i.e. an animal). This 
level of organization is relevant for an understanding of the brain because it 
is thought to be a phenomenon predominantly caused by a brain. It should 
be noted that a significant step is made in the succession of levels of 
organization. The brain is put in a functional shell of the organism. Thus, by 
taking into account the behavioral level of organization, the brain is solidly 
embedded in nature’s established categorical system of animals, flowers, 
earth, life etc. that does not necessitate dissection, but is overt and evident 
for everyone. The behavioral level of organization entrenches the brain by 
mediating an immediate and intuitive understanding of what the brain is all 
about, what function the brain has: the brain enables an animal to align with 
its environment. 
 
It might seem surprising that it is suggested to consider behavior as the 
relevant characteristic of possible levels of organization upward from the 
brain – the organism might seem more appropriate at first sight to constitute 
the next level. But some aspects make the organism a sub-optimal choice as 
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an exclusive level of organization. First, the organism as the sum of all bodily 
function (e.g. digestion, extremities etc.) is not the appropriate functional 
successor of the brain. The organism might be a container for the brain with 
respect to spatiotemporal organization, but not with respect to causation. It 
is not the organism that determines how the brain relates to the environment 
– if there is causation of adaptive behavior in the sensorimotor loop, then it 
is attributed to the brain. In other words, brain and behavior are causally 
more directly coupled than brain and organism or organism and 
environment. Of course, the brain needs to be embedded in motor and 
sensory systems, but the control of changes imposed to the environment is 
thought to reside in the brain (see Chiel & Beer 1997 for a detailed 
discussion). It should be noted, however, that this functional account of the 
levels of organization elicits the metaphoric aspect of the term brain (see 
also 1.1.1): organisms without brains can very well behave adaptively and 
nervous, motor or sensory structures can equally well contribute to adaptive 
behavior. The brain as it is understood here is, by definition, the cause 
underlying the generation of adaptive behavior. (Of course, evolution is a 
cause of adaptation, but the brain is the immediate cause of behavior.) 
 
The consideration of causal relations between brain, motor and sensory 
systems, behavior and environment already shows that the definition of 
borders between concepts is not trivial. But there is more: for example, the 
problem of defining internal and external factors. Generally, an environment 
can be described as a situation the animal resides in. Particularly illustrative, 
intuitive cases are provided when external, environmental factors directly 
determine the situation of the animal such as the environment of the fly 
being determined by the frog’s tongue. For their intuitive appeal, external 
factors are frequently overestimated and internal factors determining the 
situation are commonly underestimated. (With respect to humans this 
relation might be inversed.) But internal factors definitely determine the 
situation, too. Consider the energetic state of the fly: if the energy stores are 
empty and the muscles do not work optimally they might determine success 
or failure of behavior. Similarly, if the fly had no appropriate sensory system 
to extract motion information (e.g. because temporal resolution is too low to 
detect the fast tongue), adaptive behavior might not be realizable. So, where 
to draw the line between internal and external? Is it really the frog’s tongue 
itself that immediately determines the behavior or is it the fly’s internal 
representation of the frog’s tongue? Some internal representations of 
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external elements or activities are directly caused by external activities, such 
as the frog’s tongue. Other internal representations are not immediately 
caused by external factors. The energetic state of the fly, for instance, is 
determined by nutrition uptake that is determined by external factors, but it 
has undergone considerable changes while it was transformed by digestion 
processes that turned it into an internally caused factor. Sensory 
representations of the frog’s tongue could be compared to the stage of 
chewed nutrition (an externally caused factor) but not to glycogen saturation 
in the muscles (an internally caused factor). This example illustrates that the 
type of transformation performed on externally caused factors somehow 
determines whether or not it becomes internal. 
 
With respect to the control of behavior, it is the brain that performs these 
transformations on externally caused factors, sometimes adds internally 
caused factors and eventually generates a new internally caused factor that is 
applied in behavior. Therefore, it is the brain that draws the line between 
organism and environment for behavioral issues. Since the organismic level 
of organization is soaked with environmental factors on the sensory side and 
molds the environment on the motor side it is a rather indirect approach to 
the explanation of behavior. Nevertheless, it is important to find the 
interfaces between environment, sensory and motor processes in behavior. 
The brain is the most potent approach that can be taken to define these 
interfaces because it causes and controls the generation of adaptive 
behavior. 
 
1.2.7.1. An example: Phototaxis 
 
In order to demonstrate explanations of brain phenomena for behavioral 
issues, consider the very simple behavior of phototaxis, i.e. directed motion 
of an organism that relates to a light source. The simplest scenario necessary 
for explaining phototaxis is an environment that contains an organism. Seen 
from the perspective of an observer, the environment contains external 
activities, i.e. visual stimuli. For realizing phototaxis, visual stimuli must 
somehow lead to motor activities that propel the organism towards the light 
source – they must be processed in between uptake and delivery. Principally, 
the light source can be conceived as a brightness contrast, i.e. there must be 
a bright zone and a dark zone. Thus, the organism must be able to compare 
an activity relating to a bright zone and another an activity relating to a dark 
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zone. Most easily, this can be achieved by an organism with at least two 
equally sensitive receptors that look at different locations. The strength of a 
receptor’s activity differs depending on the brightness of the location it 
represents. The difference between the two externally caused activities 
indicates the direction of the brighter location. Given that brighter stimuli 
cause stronger, positive activities, for instance, subtraction of the activity of 
the right receptor from the activity of the left receptor provides positive 
values for a brighter left location and negative values for a brighter right 
location. Thus, the activity of a subsequent unit that integrates both values 
could represent the possible turning direction for approaching the light. 
However, an explicit representation of the difference is not even necessary if 
it is assumed that the receptor signal directly effect motor elements – one 
standing for movement in one direction, the other on standing for movement 
in the other direction. Given that the stronger signal causes stronger motor 
activity on the same (ipsilateral) side (i.e. does not cross to the other, 
contralateral side of the body), the organism moves to this side (consider a 
fly increasing its flap frequency on one side, for example). 
 
Is it also possible to design an organism with just one receptor that can do 
phototaxis? For a creature with only one receptor such an operation is not 
trivial. The only way to achieve the two contrasts necessary is to transform 
the spatial contrast into a temporal contrast by evaluating the time course 
that arises from self-motion, for example when the organism scans the 
environment for brightness contrasts by moving the receptor. A possible 
computation is the differentiation of the receptor signal and an evaluation of 
negative values: as long as the differentiation of the receptor activity stays 
constant or increases, the brightest point is not reached. But when the 
differentiation becomes negative the brightness contrast decreases and the 
scan must be stopped. Since the position of the brightest point encountered 
in the scan was reached an instant before the scan, motion in the direction of 
the actual receptor position is a good guess. Alternatively, the motion can be 
directed to the point the receptor was before, i.e. be corrected. However, 
when it moves and the brightness (and the differentiation) decreases, it will 
change its direction anyway. This question for a realization of phototaxis 
with only one receptor illustrates that a sequential system with just one 
pathway that is parsimonious in the number of elements imposes constraints 
for complicated computations. The benefits of investing a few more elements 
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to allow for parallel distributed processing pays off in offering much simpler 
computational solutions. 
 
Phototaxis does not have to be positive, i.e. yield motion towards the light – 
there is also negative phototaxis when organisms turn away from the light 
source. Altering positive phototaxis to negative phototaxis can be easily 
achieved by crossing the connection from receptor to motor. A stronger 
activity from the other (contralateral) side results in a turn away from the 
light source. 
 
A creature with this configuration is widely known as a simple Braitenberg 
vehicle named after the author (Braitenberg 1984). It shows behavior in the 
sense that it suffices the minimal needs for explanations of organismic, 
individual behavior, i.e. it applies the same scenario containing environment, 
individual, stimulus, mechanisms etc. Moreover, the Braitenberg vehicle 
offers a mechanism of phototaxis that can be well imagined to be realized in 
a biological organism. However, a Braitenberg vehicle definitely is no 
organism because the realization of the behavior differs substantially from 
the organismic realization: apart from all biologic functionality (autonomy, 
reproduction etc.), the molecular realization of the control mechanism of 
behavior is missing. So, does it really help to compare an organism with a 
vehicle? Yes and No! Taking into account the vehicle helps as long as the 
differences in realization do not determine functionality, i.e. as long as long 
as organism and vehicle behave the same. Of course, this functional 
equivalence is extremely dependent on the situations taken into account. If 
only simple cases are considered, the behavior will perhaps be the same in 
organism and vehicle. But, if a behavior is extensively tested, differences in 
the behavior will presumably appear. If these differences are to be explained 
in terms of the differential mechanisms on differential levels of organization, 
the use of the vehicle for explaining the behavior ends. The vehicle can be 
refined with new models to achieve functional equivalence again and the 
procedure can begin anew. Since in praxis always differences will appear, a 
consequent application of this comparative procedure would inevitably lead 
to a vehicle that accounts for phenomena on all levels of organization, i.e. 
systems, networks, neurons, molecules and atoms. However, such a 
simulation is only advisable if the vehicle still shows benefits in the form of 
clear or illustrative explanations. Thus, the explanatory target (the concrete 
question concerning the phenomenon to be explained) determines if the 
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vehicle is helpful or not (see also 1.1.12). The scope of the simulation (e.g. 
Braitenberg vehicle) for explaining brains ends where mechanisms that 
realize organismic behavior (primarily molecular mechanisms) are as 
comprehensible as the simulation. 
 
1.2.7.2. Further behavioral issues 
 
The consideration of the Braitenberg vehicle demonstrates that behavior, as 
all other brain phenomena, can be explained on different levels of 
organization. Narrowing the explanatory aperture reveals brain mechanisms 
on different levels of organization that realize the behavior. Widening opens 
the view for a purely functional approach. Considering the behavioral level of 
organization establishes an explanatory interface between brain phenomena 
and function, which is essential for brain sciences. Without this interface, 
brain studies are endangered of being l’art pour l’art. This becomes 
particularly clear when evolutionary questions are taken into account. 
Evolution encircles brain sciences from two sides: on the behavioral and the 
molecular level of organization. Behavioral, because evolution theory 
provides means for determining the functional value of a given behavior and 
therewith for brain mechanisms. Often it seems difficult to assess the value 
of a given brain mechanism: whether a certain synapse is inhibitory or 
excitatory appears to be an arbitrary question if considered isolated. But, if 
this synapse is decisive for showing positive or negative phototaxis, a 
functional value is added. If, additionally, it is taken into account that the 
kind of orientation leads the organism to nutrition or keeps it from being 
caught by a frog’s tongue (i.e. influences the fitness of the organism) the 
functional value is immediately clear. Evolution theory provides means to 
quantify these values and translate it into molecular mechanisms (genetics) 
that are placed on the other (low level) side of the scope of brain science. In 
evolution theory, phenomena on the molecular level of organization are 
explained on a larger timescale than the ‘real-time’ typically taken into 
account in brain science, i.e. ontogenetic and phylogenetic timescales. Thus, 
evolution theory extends the focus of brain science primarily temporally. 
 
Behavior is not only constrained by evolution and low-level neural 
mechanisms, but also can depend on cognition. Cognition can be conceived 
as a specific group of internal factors that determine behavior. In this 
conception, cognition is directly traceable experimentally by analyzing the 
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effects cognition has on behavior. The most common paradigms in cognitive 
science are performance tests on humans that measure reaction times or the 
quality of verbal reports in relation to certain treatments (environmental 
situations). Explanations resulting from these paradigms are largely 
independent from brain mechanisms. However, since cognitive factors are 
internal factors caused by the brain (see above) they are explainable in terms 
of brain phenomena. Whether the explanation of cognitive phenomena in 
terms of brain phenomena is adequate, depends, again, on the question 
posed: as long as an explanation in pure cognitive terms suffices, there is no 
need to mobilize brain mechanisms. 
 
Considering brain mechanisms for explaining cognitive phenomena can be 
helpful to describe the transition between cognitive and non-cognitive 
phenomena: for something to be cognitive, internal representations (no 
matter if externally caused such as the frog’s tongue or internally caused 
such as a dream) are transformed by the brain in a way nutrition is digested 
by the digestive system. The result of this transformation is an internal 
representation of the situation the animal resides in (a ‘model’). If (and only 
if) another transformation is performed on this model (of the situation the 
animal resides in), the situation the animal resides in is no longer caused by 
the environment – then it is caused by the brain. A behavior rests on 
cognition, thus, if it can be traced back to a model of the situation that was 
transformed in order to generate the behavior. The fly would have cognition 
in case it can be shown that its escape behavior rests on a model of the 
situation that was transformed (e.g. evaluated) in order to generate the 
behavior. Usually, it is not assumed that the fly has cognition because it is 
sufficient to evaluate internal representations of an externally caused factor 
(i.e. direction and velocity of a moving object) to explain the fly’s behavior. 
(And, applying ‘Occham’s razor’ according to which parsimonious 
explanations are superior, no superfluous assumption should be made in 
scientific explanations.) 
 
In an overall view, the behavioral level of organization integrates the levels-
of-organization framework underlying explanations of brain phenomena by 
determining its function: brain phenomena cause adaptive behavior! At the 
same time, behavior provides explanatory interfaces between the brain and 
further levels of organization outside the brain (e.g. evolution) and inside the 
brain (e.g. cognition). 
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1.2.8. Learning 
 
Explaining learning as a brain phenomenon demands consideration of all 
levels of organization that are usually taken into account in brain studies, i.e. 
molecular, cellular, networks etc. Plasticity, the neural basis of learning, was 
already introduced in the context of synapses. Plasticity denotes a general 
characteristic of systems, while learning as a brain phenomenon is typically 
assessed with reference to a changed behavior of an organism. But learning 
is considered as being on a further level of organization than behavior 
because it exceeds real-time (the immediate time span it takes to generate 
adaptive behavior) and shall conclude the explanation of specific brain 
phenomena. Learning is a phenomenon in the transitory area between 
cognitive and non-cognitive phenomena. A case of non-cognitive learning is 
given when externally caused elements or activities (e.g. the tone in the 
Pavlov paradigm) become internal representations that are applied in the 
generation of a behavior, even though the externally caused activity is not 
present in the situation the behavior is generated. This learning is non-
cognitive because it is not necessary to transform the internal representation, 
but rather to apply it. A case of cognitive learning would be given if a 
behavior is only explainable by assuming that a learnt representation is 
transformed before or during the generation of behavior, e.g. if two 
concurrent stimuli are evaluated in a situation model. The criterion for 
cognition of transforming the representation of a situation critically depends 
on the concept of transformation. For achieving a more precise notion of 
transformations they can be described as a set of procedures or rules 
operating on representations, short ‘computations’. In this sense, the 
concept of computations can also help to clarify cognition: the kind of 
computations made can determine if a behavior rests on cognition or not. 
However, developing such criteria in depth is not a primary objective in the 
present context. The comments shall rather illustrate that the concepts 
brains, learning, computation, cognition etc. can be arranged meaningfully 




Multiple versions of explanations of learning can be construed, ranging from 
purely formal over behavioral versions to those incorporating brain 
mechanisms. Here only a very basic example shall be introduced, again. 
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Since, unfortunately, a fly escaping a frog’s tongue does not learn that much, 
another case has to be chosen. Consider the simple example of conditioning 
(Pavlov 1904) and the well-known case of conditioning of the eye blink 
response: a human subject or an animal (frequently a rabbit) receives an air 
puff directed to the cornea that elicits a blink reflex. This response is thought 
to be a protection against noxious stimuli. If the air puff is repeatedly 
preceded (e.g. after 20 trials) by another stimulus, e.g. a tone, this stimulus 
will eventually by itself elicit a blink even before the air puff is applied. In this 
example, the eye blink is the response (R), the air puff is the unconditioned 
stimulus (US) and the tone is the conditioned stimulus (CS). Thus, the 
principle of conditioning is to modify an existing behavior ‘air puff causes 
eye blink’ (US > R) to ‘tone causes eye blink’ (CS > R) by associating air puff 
and tone (CS<>US). Here, learning takes place only at one specific instance, 
namely the generation of the association between air puff and tone 
(CS<>US). 
 
On the behavioral level of organization, the quality of learning can be 
assessed by defining the cases ‘tone causes eye blink’ (US > R) as success 
and then evaluating the frequency of successful trials. At the beginning of 
the learning procedure, the tone alone will not elicit an eye blink. After some 
trials the tone alone might be already successful in single trials. After more 
trials the tone alone might lead to success in almost each trial. This learning 
process yields an individual learning curve that shows rising performance 
with time or, better, trials. Making a lot of these experiments and pooling the 
gathered data yields an expressive learning curve that describes the learning 
process as such. Of course, various factors influence this learning curve and 
for obtaining a valid general learning curve, the conditions in the 
experiments determining the individual learning curves must have been 
approximately identical (i.e. strength of the stimuli, timing of the stimuli 
etc.). Assume that the ‘decision’ whether an eye blink is elicited by the tone 
alone is determined by a single connection (or switch) being activated. Then, 
learning is to be understood as an increase in the probability of this 
connection being activated. Applied to the stimuli (air puff<>tone), this 
means: the connection between CS and US sometimes functions and 
sometimes fails with a given probability. The actual association strengths 
between CS and US represent this probability. Under this premises, a value of 
0.5 in the learning curve means that in 50% of the cases an eye blink is 
elicited by the tone alone and the US-CS-connection is activated. 
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1.2.8.2. Formal explanation of learning 
 
The overall learning process depends on several factors. An important factor 
is the maximum value that can be approached, i.e. the highest probability of 
successful trials. Even after extensive training some trials still might fail so 
that the maximum value is under 100%, e.g. V max = 0,9. The amount of 
learning occurring between two trials ∆ can be described as the difference 
between the maximum value and the learning that has already taken place in 
the previous trials ∆ V(n) = Vmax − V(n−1). This ∆ represents the missing 
amount of learning or the ‘error’ that is still in the learning process. 
 
Furthermore, the specific character of the stimuli is important for the 
learning process. As already mentioned above, the ‘salience’ of the stimuli 
(e.g. strengths of the air puff, frequency of the tone) can influence the 
probability of an eye blink response by a factor K that is also between 0 and 
1. Alternatively, the constant K can be separated in α for the unconditioned 
stimulus and β for the conditioning stimulus: K = α (US)·β (CS). The learning 
curve can be described in terms of the different factors by 
∆V(n) = K·(Vmax − V(n −1)). Since every trial yields a certain increase in 
learning V(n), the curve approaches V max – but only the amount that the 
stimulus saliency K allows. This description is a simple version of the 
Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner 1972). It allows not only for the 
modeling of classical conditioning but also for various other conditioning 
phenomena such as ‘blocking’ (primary US already learnt prevents secondary 
US from being learnt) or inhibition (the absence of a US is learnt). 
 
The principles of the Rescorla-Wagner model are also applied in the field 
artificial neural networks: the so called ‘delta-rule’ (see e.g. Rumelhart et al. 
1986) is an equivalent of the Rescorla-Wagner model that is applied to the 
weights of artificial neurons. (‘Weight’ is just the technical term for 
connection strengths between units.) They determine the magnitude of the 
effect that an element x (a given input signal) has on an element y: y = w·x. 
The artificial neurons are organized in layered networks. For illustration of 
the function of such a network, consider an industrial robot that controls if a 
panel with six eggs is completely filled and that has to supplement missing 
eggs. The computations necessary for accomplishing this task can be 
achieved by teaching the network to associate all possible input patterns to a 
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correct output pattern. For instance, the network has to learn to respond to 
an input pattern 1-0-1-1-1-0 with an output pattern 0-1-0-0-0-1. Several 
combinations have to be stored in the network. The delta-rule is a means of 
teaching the network: the connection (‘weight’) between an input element i 
and an output element j (wij) is changed by adding the actual ∆ to the weight 
of the previous trial wij(n) = wij (n − 1) + ∆(n). The constant K from the 
Rescorla-Wagner model is usually conceived in a slightly different way, 
namely as determined by a learning rate ε and the input value xj: K = ε·xj. 
 
The differences between Rescorla-Wagner model and delta-rule are primarily 
to be found in the intention of modeling and in the organization 
(‘architecture’) of the system. The Rescorla-Wagner model was developed 
along experimental, behavioral data and usually refers to one or a few 
connections (stimuli), while the delta-rule is applied to train artificial neural 
networks with multiple units or massive connectivity. 
 
As can be concluded from the short account provided above, learning can 
very well be explained and formally described solely on the behavioral level 
of organization without reference to the brain mechanisms. The iterative 
observations of the behavior and the change in performance (‘error’) yield 
self-evident explanations and do not necessarily call for mechanistic-causal 
explanations. However, explaining learning as a brain phenomenon calls for 
other levels of organization. For the eye blink case, the general claim has to 
be that somewhere in the brain a connection between the tone and the eye 
blink has to be established. 
 
1.2.8.3. Neural Explanation of learning 
 
An explanation of learning on the neural level of organization demands an 
application of most of the brain phenomena considered so far. The following 
presentation is intentionally highly condensed in order to provide an example 
of what applied cases of explaining brains might look like. (Most 
explanations given so far presumably were quite lengthy for a brain expert). 
Consider the following premises as given (see fig. 10): (1a) the air puff, 
detected by sensory cells in the eye, is processed on a reflex path (via the 
trigeminal nucleus) over the brain stem (the reticular formation) to motor 
centers where the eye blink is generated. (2a) The tone is processed in 
auditory nuclei all over the brain. (3a) Motor learning can take place in the 
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cerebellum. For learning to take place it must be given that participating 
regions are interconnected: (1b) The trigeminal nucleus is connected to the 
cerebellum via ‘climbing fibers’. (2b) The auditory nuclei are connected to the 
cerebellum via ‘mossy fibers’. It can be shown that electric stimulation (CS) of 
the mossy fibers paired with air puffs (US) leads successfully to conditioning. 
(3b) The cerebellum is connected to the cranial motor nuclei for triggering 
eye blink generation. These exemplary evidences indicate that the circuitry is 
apt for realizing the connection between tone and air puff. The place of the 
connection, however, can be anywhere between the location where the 
pathways of the stimuli ‘meet’, i.e. in the cerebellar region and during 
generation of the eye blink (i.e. the cranial motor nuclei). Since (reversible) 
chemical inactivation of the cranial motor nuclei prevents conditioning, the 
location of learning is concluded to be the cerebellum. How is the connection 
realized on the cellular level of organization? The Purkinje cells project in the 
direction of the motor nuclei, i.e. are the output neurons of the cerebellum. 
The dendrites of the Purkinje cells are connected to both climbing fibers 
(involved in the air puff processing) and mossy fibers via parallel fibers 
(involved in tone processing). Synchronous activation of climbing and parallel 
fibers is thought to lead to a depression of the Purkinje cell that unblocks 
(releases) the connection between the two stimuli. 
 
On the sub-cellular level, the connection is thought to rest on a molecular 
mechanism called long-term depression. Principally, temporally correlated 
presence of the two stimuli (tone and air puff) leads to synchronous 
activation of the transmitters at two sites presynaptic to the Purkinje cell 
dendrite, namely at the climbing fiber and at the parallel fiber. The resulting 
synchronous activations of metabotropic receptors on the postsynaptic 
membrane of the Purkinje cell result effectively in a persistent increase in the 
concentration of the enzyme Protein Kinase C (PKC). The connection of the 
stimuli is brought about by the condition that the effective activation of PKC 
in the Purkinje cell dendrite depends on synchronous activities on both 
synaptic sites: cascades of intermediate activities at the parallel fiber synapse 
and calcium influx at the climbing fiber synapse. Since, it is known that PKC 
is a major regulatory enzyme and plays an important role in signal 
transduction as well as cell growth, differentiation and gene expression, the 
proposed mechanism for the establishment of the connection between the 
two stimuli focuses on PKC. 
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fig. 10: Eye-Blink Circuit. Eye blink conditioning. The rabbit responds to an air puff 
(unconditioned stimulus, US) with eye blinks. When the US is repeatedly preceded by a 
conditioning stimulus (CS) such as a tone, the eye blink is eventually elicited by the CS alone. 
Shown is the neural circuit hosting the mechanisms underlying the association. For details 
see text. © The Mauk Lab (permissive license). 
 
Learning, as exemplified by conditioning the eye blink response, is a brain 
phenomenon that spans from the behavioral to the molecular and electric 
level of organization. Furthermore it extends from microseconds over real-
time to ontogenetic time (or even phylogenetic if the causation of gene 
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expression and fitness value is considered). Therefore, a conclusive 
explanation must consider far more evidence than only the few of the vast 
number of evidence existing for the realization of the eye blink conditioning 
that were taken into account above. But for serving the present illustrative 
purpose - introducing the principles of learning as a behavioral brain 
phenomenon - this simplification should be allowed. Applying the 
explanatory construction for brains on any level of organization will unfold 
an almost arbitrary large complexity underlying the phenomena of learning. 
Experimental evidence, for instance was hardly taken into account. The 
experimental machinery behind evidences for mechanistic explanations of 
brain phenomena sometimes appears to be very remote from a behavior of 
an individual organism. For example, if someone investigates the regulatory 
capabilities of PKC, it is not immediately evident that this can be relevant for 
understanding eye blink conditioning. This difficulty of conceiving 
simultaneously the explanation of the phenomenon and the experimental 
procedures demands simplification strategies. Complex phenomena that 
incorporate explanations on many levels of organization and extend over 
larger timescales – such as learning – are primarily explained with strong 
simplifications, only taking into account such activity on such levels of 
organization that is indispensable for explaining the mechanism. More 
detailed aspects are omitted, not because of their irrelevance, but because 
they overload the explanations. As a consequence the explanatory focus 
‘jumps’ from behavior to molecules to systems and from microsecond to 
days to minutes. In this way it can be understood how the “strange brew” of 
levels of organization often found in explanations on brains emerges. 
 
1.2.9. Summary and conclusion 
 
Brain phenomena play a crucial role in explaining adaptive behavior 
mechanistically. The explanations apply a specific explanatory framework 
that is dominated by the implicit notion of levels of organization. The 
elements that play the leading part in the explanation of brain phenomena 
are neurons. Therefore, the cellular level of organization is a common 
checkpoint in explanations of brains. One essential property of neurons is 
their responsiveness: external (environmental) elements and activities that 
demand an adequate (adaptive) behavior cause correspondent activities in 
the brain. These responses can be passed to elements downstream in 
processing that also respond. In this way, responsiveness makes possible 
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that representational activities cascade from reception over processing 
(evaluation) to a possible reaction through the organism. Responsiveness can 
basically be explained as an electric phenomenon that takes place at the 
neuronal membrane. Electric accounts elicit the weakness of membranes to 
conduct activities efficiently so that ‘workarounds’ such as spikes as 
amplification mechanisms play an important role in processing responses. 
Even though the principles of processing activities without spikes (on a 
‘passive membrane’) or with spikes (on an ‘active membrane’) are not too 
complicated, the possibilities of processing explode already when the cellular 
level of organization is reached. Again, dynamics and complexity resulting 
from the spatiotemporal and causal variability prevent the formulations of a 
general account. Therefore, processing is often conceived in a simplified 
framework: the ‘classical neuron’. It performs spatiotemporal integration of 
activities collected from other neurons in dendrites that have a tree-like 
shape and evaluates the incoming activity by a threshold procedure at the 
spike initialization zone. Whether or not the activities are processed further 
depends on their ability to elicit a spike (when the activity is strong enough). 
If a spike is elicited an activity is processed further and can be passed to the 
next neuron. The mechanism by which the activity is passed to the next 
neuron is called synaptic transmission. Synapses are functional units that 
extend the range of processing spatially, temporally and causally (e.g. by 
inverting the sign or the form of the signal). The resultant level of networks 
of neurons is characterized by the distributed processing of several activities 
in parallel and is therefore thought to be the level where multiple 
representations (e.g. resulting from different elements and activities in the 
environment or different instances in time) are combined, compared and 
evaluated in order to generate adaptive behavior. Behavior is at the interface 
between brain and external world and allows for drawing further conclusions 
on the function of brain phenomena, e.g. if the brain phenomena are 
cognitive or have evolutionary significance. Learning extends the significance 
of brain phenomena beyond the actual behavioral context in a domain of 
possible behaviors that are themselves represented as brain states. 
 
In this section, the explanatory framework provided in the previous section 
was applied to some concrete brain phenomena. At the beginning, it was 
stated: “Brains are no easy things to explain”. But the systematic application 
of an explanatory framework (‘levels of organization’) to specific brain 
phenomena illustrates that the constituent brain mechanisms are fairly easy 
 98 
1st Brain-Special  1.2. Explanations of brain phenomena 
comprehensible. Complex phenomena become intelligible by applying 
simplifications such as the ‘classical’ or the ‘binary’ neuron. These 
simplifications can be compared to a ‘packaging mechanism’ that functions 
by considering a certain phenomenon as being self-contained. The 
underlying complexity is simply neglected for the moment and is only 
considered if the situation affords it. In this way, a phenomenon can be 
checked off the list of comprehension problems and, thus, releases cognitive 
capacity for thinking in a greater context. The problems of explanation arise 
primarily when the adoption of simplifications such as the ‘classical’ or the 
‘binary’ neuron are refused. Then, too many levels of organization are taken 
into account and the unfolding complexity (or dynamics) might render the 
explanation completely unintelligible. Of course, in specific cases the 
consideration of detail is mandatory, e.g. when inconsistencies are detected 
or new simplification mechanisms shall be developed. And what level of 
detail is appropriate? The significance of a given detail is only determined by 
the question posed, i.e. if it is needed to produce a sound explanation. In 
this sense, there is no general rule for explaining brains – there is just an 
explanatory construction kit and some operating instructions. 
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Reading Advice 
In the previous section, the first Brain-Special provided an extended insight into 
explanations of brain phenomena that illustrated the influence of dynamics and complexity. 
This will be important for understanding the role of simulation in explaining brains that is 
further analyzed in the next chapter. But first, the second Brain-Special in the next section 
will have a good look at the consensus on explanations of brains (as it was appealed in the 
first Brain-Special). The various disciplines contributing to explanations of brain phenomena 
are analyzed with respect to the commonality in their underlying ‘ontology’ that becomes 
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1.3.  “Where to put information on brains!?” 
 
“Brain Theory” has become an integral part of the scientific and even the 
public understanding of nature. But the notion of a uniform framework 
behind explanations of brain phenomena might be deceptive. In everyday 
practice, the various disciplinary approaches to the brain sometimes rather 
appear as an ever-growing amount of scattered explanatory fragments than 
as a homogenous ‘theory’. Consider a student of brain sciences sitting in 
front of a library computer: a query on the term ‘adaptation’ in the literature 
database might bring to light thousands of hits from hundreds of specialized 
disciplines – each one with special, if not contradictory, assumptions about 
adaptation. The following analysis mediates an impression of this variety of 
approaches to the brain. It will be accomplished by analyzing existing 
information resources on brains such as databases and textbooks. The 
purpose of this study is to test the integrity of the brain sciences. Differences 
and commonalities of conceptual frameworks in specific approaches to the 
brain shall be elaborated. The differences call for strategies to handle them 
and the commonalities should help to filter out a common conceptual 
framework for the brain sciences. For not becoming top theoretical also a 
practical application shall be envisaged. In the student’s database query 
mentioned above, a ‘brain navigator’ would be helpful to guides the student 
through the search results, suggests ranking of relevance, gives short 
tutorials, shows where to put gathered information in the records etc. But is 
there a common conceptual framework a brain navigator can be based on? 
This depends on the state of theoretical integration in the brain sciences. 
Thus, the brain navigator serves as a hypothetical benchmark test for the 




‘Neurobiology’, ‘artificial neural networks’, ‘cognitive psychology’ and related 
research areas obviously have something in common. All these disciplines 
seek to contribute to explanations of brains. However, even though there is a 
common explanatory target and despite political proclamations such as “the 
decade of the brain” (Bush 1990), or large scale programs such as “the 
human brain project” (Shepherd et al. 1998; Arbib & et al 2001; Koslow 
2001), a unified brain theory is not within reach. Rather, numerous highly 
specialized disciplines raise their voice in a chorus of explanatory fragments. 
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This is not necessarily a fundamental problem: it seems reasonable to 
assume that, when research has generated enough knowledge, all fragments 
will automatically assemble to a well-formed composition. At the moment, 
however, brain sciences appear to be much more differentiated than 
integrated. This is not so much a difficulty for researchers working in one of 
the specialized disciplines. These specialists have their own explanatory 
frameworks and manage it very well. But the lack of a common conceptual 
framework is a problem for other groups: first, for people who commute 
between the approaches i.e. interdisciplinary workers and, second, for 
novices of brain sciences. This lack may lead to a weak public understanding 
of the brain. If these groups ask cross-border questions such as “In which 
sense does an artificial neural network have a memory?” they might receive 
as many different responses as there are sub-disciplines: a 
neuropharmacologist could try to explain memory with the analogy of 
influences of pharmaceutical treatment, the computer scientist by forwarding 
storage routines of programming languages and the neuropsychologist by 
talking about diagnostic criteria of traumatic defects. This condition is 
certainly not an indicator for solid explanatory quality of brain phenomena! 
 
In general, an ambiguity is evident: on the one hand, there is a ubiquitous 
supposition of a common explanatory target, i.e. the brain. On the other 
hand, there is no commitment to a common conceptual framework. The 
general objective in the background of this study is therefore to find a 
common conceptual framework for explaining brains. However, in absence of 
a general brain theory that would allow us to deduce a conceptual framework 
in a top-down manner, an ‘empirical’ method that analyzes existing 
information resources on brains (textbooks, databases etc.) in a bottom-up 
manner is applied. First, existing resources are analyzed with respect to their 
classification systems (e.g. keywords in database structures). The grade of 
variance and redundancy between the specific classification systems can 
serve as an indicator of integrity of brain sciences. The current state will be 
assessed by attempting to integrate the different resources into a single 
account. A single, consistent and comprehensive classification system for the 
brain would bring us several steps closer towards a common conceptual 
framework. In the example of the student of brain sciences sitting in front of 
a library computer such a unified classification system would mean that the 
student does not have to switch between different search engines, glossaries, 
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data records etc., but would have an integrated access (i.e. the brain 
navigator). 
 
In the second part of this section, existing resources on brains are analyzed 
with respect to their underlying specific conceptual frameworks (e.g. in 
textbooks). Consistencies between the accounts can serve as clues for 
constructing a common conceptual framework, inconsistencies as warning 
signs for difficulties of theoretical integration. A common scheme for the 
brain sciences as an early stage of a common conceptual framework shall be 
proposed. For the student’s brain navigator, this would imply some kind of 
standardized tutorial of the brain. But first, for not getting lost in the ‘jungle’ 
of disciplinary variety with all their specialist accounts, a roadmap will be 
sketched. 
 
1.3.2. A sketch of the brain sciences 
 
Is there a term that subsumes all the disciplines that are concerned with the 
brain? It seems as if there were arguments to be found easily against any 
term. The term ‘brain science’ is somewhat void in that it does not present a 
certain phenomenon under scrutiny but rather an anatomical structure. The 
term ‘neuroscience’ comprises a wealth of the brain sciences, but it might 
come across as being insolent to silently include all cognitive aspects in the 
neural domain that might deserve their own credits. The term ‘cognitive 
neuroscience’, on the other hand, narrows the focus too much on cognition. 
The construct ‘neural and cognitive sciences’ misses the computational 
aspect and, hence, underrates certain theoretical approaches (neural 
networks theory) as well as practical applications (i.e. neural engineering and 
software engineering). The term ‘Neuroinformatics’ encompasses both these 
technical aspects and the theoretical aspects exemplified by artificial neural 
networks3. Taken together and facing the facts there is no single term 
properly representing all disciplines around the brain. Therefore, the term 
brain sciences is used here in a metaphorical sense – not simply referring to 
sciences that study the brain as an anatomical structure, but including all 
disciplines seeking to explain adaptive behavior of animals (including 
humans) with respect to brain phenomena. 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the relatively new term ‘Neuroinformatics’ was adopted by the Human Brain Project at the NIMH 
(Koslow 2001; Shepherd et al. 1998) and a thematic network from the European Union ‘computational neuroscience’ 
(Schutter 2002). 
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table 1: A collection of disciplines around the brain. Only disciplines that incorporate one of 
the three aspects ‘neural’, ‘cognitive’ o  ‘computational’ were taken into account. A total 
sum of 1,0 was split up between the three domains indicating the degree to which the 
domains are reflected in the respective discipline. 
r
 Neural cognitive computational
Cognitive Neuroscience 0,4 0,4 0,2 
Computational Neuroscience 0,4 0,2 0,4 
Neurobiology (Biophysics, Neurophysiology) 0,8 0,1 0,1 
Neuroethology 0,7 0,2 0,1 
Cognitive Psychology (Theoretical Psychology) 0,2 0,6 0,2 
Connectionism 0,2 0,3 0,5 
Neurophilosophy 0,4 0,5 0,1 
Philosophy of Mind 0,2 0,7 0,1 
Artificial Intelligence 0,1 0,3 0,6 
Cybernetics (System Theory) 0,1 0,1 0,8 
Neuroinformatics 0,3 0,2 0,5 
Neural Engineering 0,3 0,1 0,6 
Robotics 0,1 0,1 0,8 
 
The search for a name already indicated that there are three major domains 
to which brain phenomena can be attributed: the ‘neural’, the ‘cognitive’ and 
the ‘computational’. A collection of disciplines from these domains is shown 
in table 1. Since a comprehensive collection could begin with physics and end 
with religion, it appears to be sensible to restrict it. The criterion for 
‘relevant’ disciplines is that the properties ‘neural’, ‘cognitive’ and 
‘computational’ all have to be a valid classifier for the subject of the 
respective discipline. If one classifier does not apply (i.e. if it is outside the 
circle in the inset of fig. 11) the discipline is not considered. The degrees to 
which the classifiers apply to a given discipline vary and, thereby, determine 
the position in the ‘landscape’ of the brain sciences. Each one is assigned a 
value that indicates the degree to which a given classifier applies. (Since this 
is done only for illustrative purposes, the affiliation was simply subjectively 
rated than determined by laboriously defined objective criteria.) The result is 
normalized by the constraint that the total must amount to 1,0. The splits 
are summarized in table 1. For example, the case for computational 
neurosciences can be read as: “Computational Neurosciences is concerned 
with 40 percent neural, 20 percent cognitive and 40 percent computational 
issues.” The point resulting from these proportions is plotted in a coordinate 
system that is constituted by the three classifiers. The results provide a 
sketch of the brain sciences (see fig. 11). It illustrates the disciplinary variety 
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and shows that the affiliation of a discipline can be applied meaningfully to 
arrange a disciplinary landscape. The three domains ‘neural’, ‘cognitive’ and 
‘computational’ are advocated by three exemplars of scientific disciplines: 
Neurobiology, Cognitive Psychology and Neuroinformatics, respectively, 
because they all are characterized by showing a clear commitment to one of 
the domains, but are simultaneously affiliated to the remaining two domains. 
 
 
1.3.3. Classification methods 
 
The general sketch of the brain sciences provides an orientation in terms of 
disciplines and helps to develop a coarse orientation in brain sciences. 
However, disciplines do not contain explicit statements about the conceptual 
frameworks of the brain sciences. For example, disciplines are not very 
telling for a novice student on the library computer to file the information, 
e.g. search results. Generally, other classification systems are applied. But 




fig. 11: A sketch of the brain sciences. The locations of disciplines as determined by the 
classification used and explained in table 1. For clearer presentation, bars (rather than 
‘vectors’ originating from coordinate 0,0,0) were chosen to indicate from where and how far 
disciplines protrude into the neural domain. Only disciplines for which each of the classifiers 





1. BRAINS  Special Section 
For a better understanding, some general remarks on classification systems 
are provided. First, two methods of classification are well known: a ‘loose’ 
classification by keyword and a ‘fixed’ classification in a hierarchical 
directory (e.g. a table of contents). In between these poles are several 
intermediate classification methods. How can they be characterized? The 
simplest classification is given if a single keyword serves as a classifier, for 
example in an alphabetical list. Here, one keyword does not contain any 
relation to other keywords. A given keyword might imply a totally different 
meaning in different contexts (e.g. ‘agonist’ as functional descriptor for a 
muscle and as a receptor activating substance). Therefore, keywords often 
have a short description that allows distinguishing between different 
meanings. A keyword with a short description constitutes a simple glossary. 
If the keywords have relations to other keywords (“relates to“, “related 
terms“), a ‘referenced glossary’ is given. If, additionally, the parent-child 
relations “is part of” (narrower) and “contains” (broader) are allowed, it is a 
thesaurus. The forms of the different methods are shown in table 2. For 
general information on thesauri and indexing, see the specification of ISO 
standards 5963 and 2788 (ISO International Standards Organisation 2002; 
2002). 
 
table 2. Structure of different approaches to classification. Keywords as the simplest form 
can be extended to glossaries by provision of short descriptions and, further extended to 
referenced glossaries by provision of related terms. Thesauri, additionally, provide 
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Obviously, a thesaurus is the most potent approach to describe a knowledge 
domain comprehensively. Since the relations in a thesaurus can be multiple 
(e.g. ‘synapse’ relates to ‘neuron’ but also to terms of a different class such 
as ‘calcium’), there can be no unique directory that represents the knowledge 
domain but rather a (semantic) network4.  
 
In print media, this structure of thesauri can be represented by ordering the 
concepts alphabetically in the form shown in table 2. The reader has to leaf 
through the print to find the desired trajectory. In digital media, hypertext 
can be used and users can jump from concept to concept. Additionally, 
multiple directories can be generated using the selected concept as root 
element. The concrete configuration of multiple directories is determined by 
the choice of the number of nodes around a given concept (higher, lower, 
related) shown, i.e. the aperture of concept ramifications. Multiple directories 
can be applied for the presentation of concept positions (see table 3). If a 
general concept such as ‘learning’ or ‘sensory systems’ is selected, multiple 
directories can serve as some kind of table of content. 
 
With thesauri it is possible to build arbitrary trajectories through information 
on brains that resemble free associations, e.g. going from neuron to synapse 
to calcium, second messenger, adaptation, learning, Hebb’s rule, etc. 
However, the resulting system is not easy to comprehend. A novice student 
of brain sciences, for instance, would get lost almost immediately when 
confronted with such a representation of the brain sciences. An easier 
approach would be a static directory (e.g. a table of contents). Reducing a 
thesaurus just on the root element and defining specific classification 
parameters can achieve this static directory. For example, if ‘nervous system’ 
was the root element it would be possible to build the children ‘anatomy’ and 
‘physiology’ that are based on a distinction between structure and function 
(the classification parameter). Structure could further be divided into 
subsystems (e.g. vegetative and somatic) and function into sub-functions 
(e.g. supply and information processing). A directory is the result of mapping 
an ontology (e.g. a thesaurus) onto a specific conceptual framework5. 
                                                 
4 Imagining the network character of thesauri is not trivial. It might prove helpful to click through a hypertext 
representation such as MeSH Browser: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/ (National Institute of Health 2002b). 
5 For the sake of clarity, a terminological note: ‘ontology’ corresponds to ‘conceptual framework’ or ‘theory’. 
‘Theory’ is common in everyday language, while ‘ontology’ – in its non-philosophical but rather technical sense – is 
frequently used by knowledge and database engineers and in the field of artificial intelligence. 
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table 3: Concept positions in multiple directories. Shown is where the concept ‘neural 
network ’ appears in the MeSH. (The choice of this example does not imply a 




   Math. Computing 
   Decision Support 
    Data Interpretation 
     Decision Theory 
     Neural Networks 
 
Information Science 
 Medical Informatics 
   Computing 
   Computing Method. 
   Artificial Intelligence 
    Expert Systems 
     Fuzzy Logic 
     Natural Language 
     Neural Networks 
 
Information Science 
 Medical Informatics  
  Medical Inf. Comp. 
.   Computing Method. 
    Mathematic Comp. 
     Decision Support 
     Data Interpretation
      Decision Theory 
      Decision Trees 
      Neural Networks 
Information Science 
 Pattern Recognition 
  Neural Networks  
 
Two disadvantages of a static directory are obvious: first, as any selection, it 
implies the neglect of other views (e.g. other conceptual frameworks). There 
will always be also arguments against a selected view and other views are 
supposedly superior with respect to this or that issue. For example, 
distinguishing anatomy (structure) from physiology (function) might result in 
a lucid account of neuronal histology (in the anatomy branch) that is very 
useful for clinical neuropsychologist students learning diagnostic criteria of 
neural degeneration. This distinction might also result in a lucid account of 
the transmitter synthesis (in the physiology branch) that is important 
students in the Neurosciences for understanding the characteristics of a 
synapse. But students of computer science trying to assess the role of 
plasticity in neural networks might better be served with an account that 
does not differentiate between structure and function but, for example, 
works on specific animal models. The second disadvantage of a static 
directory is the omission of specific correspondences and relations between 
the different branches. This implies that these relations – on condition that 
they are actually referenced in the medium – only become overt in the second 
view as an extension of the respective concept. In hypertext, for example, the 
relation from synapse to calcium is hidden in the static directory view, but 
might become accessible when item ‘synapse’ is selected and a detailed view 
pops up that contains descriptions and hyperlinks. However, there are as well 
obvious benefits of a static directory. It mediates a standardized access to 
information as well as a map-like orientation, allows associating new 
concepts to nodes and branches of that framework and suggests a sequence 
of contents. A standardized, repeatable access to information (e.g. in the 
‘brain navigator’ on the library computer) serves several purposes. It is 
important for sharing and communicating it with others. For example, 
consider a student saying: “I mean that meaning of adaptation as it is defined 
in the brain navigator.” A standardized, repeatable access to information is 
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also important for positioning anchors in memory retrieval. Consider the 
student’s soliloquy: “Synapse was a topic under neuron and had the topics 
release, reception, reuptake, synthesis.” So, the student learns to navigate in 
memory by retracing the access to information in the computer. 
 
The benefits of a static directory can be explained by their property of 
reducing complexity. Given that recipients can only process a limited number 
of concepts and relations at a time (for an introduction into issues of limited 
capacity see e.g. Broadbent 1958; 1975), it follows that leaving out relations 
reduces the cognitive load and, thereby, makes possible a more general view. 
Furthermore, the conceptual framework the directory is based on, offers a 
strategy how to progress from one concept to the other. The decision of what 
to process next is not necessarily to be worked out at each step. 
 
In general, two modes of navigation in the knowledge of the brain sciences 
can be differentiated: a thesaurus offers primarily a view on the ‘nearest’ 
neighbors of a given concept (concept-centered, first person perspective). A 
directory offers a view on a specific high-level structure (framework-
centered, third person perspective). The former is comparable to landmark 
navigation, the latter to map navigation. Novices will probably prefer map 
navigation because it offers a reduced and standardized access to 
information. Experts will probably be nimble in both systems. They are able 
to abstract from a specific conceptual framework and ‘dive’ through the 
relations from one concept to another and they will be able to switch and 
plug concepts into several conceptual frameworks. The actual mode is 
determined by the task: the map navigation allows a categorical approach. 
For instance, a student using a ‘brain navigator’ on a library computer 
searching in the context of, say, synaptic receptors, could use the map mode, 
if a general categorization (e.g. ionotropic vs. metabotropic) is to be made. 
The landmark navigation with a thesaurus allows a step-by-step decision on 
where to look next that helps to check consistency of a concept against 
contextual details. The student could use the landmark mode for ‘scanning’ 
heuristically the topic for related transmitters. With each step the classifiers 
can be switched e.g. from ‘ionotropic/metabotropic’ to ‘inhibitory/excitatory 
effect’ to alphabetical order etc. 
 
In conclusion, two general forms of representing information on brains can 
be distinguished: a knowledge base and a conceptual framework. A concrete 
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representation of the former is a thesaurus, of the latter a directory. These 
forms are best understood as complementary, not as alternative 
representations. For example a ‘brain navigator’ on a library computer would 
provide both a map mode (conceptual framework, table of content) and a 
landmark mode (knowledge base, thesaurus/hypertext). 
 
The following sections review existing resources for the neural, cognitive and 
computational domain. In order to add a concrete touch to the abstract 
character of this task, it is viewed with respect to the question: How should a 
‘brain navigator’ (e.g. on a library computer) be optimally designed to 
represent the brain sciences? Three indispensable functions can be stated so 
far: 
1. The knowledge base must be capable of generating a thesaurus, which 
implies the simpler cases of a keyword repository and a (referenced) 
glossary. 
2. The system should generate multiple directories (e.g. show concept 
positions and concept ramifications) from the thesaurus. 
3. The system should provide a directory, e.g. a table of content. 
 
An ideal ‘brain navigator’ incorporating these expert skills would offer both a 
thesaurus inspired navigation and multiple directories that follow from 
different conceptual frameworks either in parallel or as exclusive modes. Of 
course, it seems sensible to offer novices a directory or table of content, and 
provide specified trajectories (courses) through the knowledge base, then 
confront advanced recipients with multiple directories and, finally, take 
experts to full functionality. 
 
1.3.4. Knowledge bases for brains 
 
1.3.4.1. Universal indexing 
 
If there was an index with a universal scope (i.e. one that covers not only the 
brain sciences appropriately but also other knowledge domains) this should 
evidently be taken as a classification resource for a knowledge base for 
brains. In fact, there are many indexing systems, mainly coming from the 
bibliographic professionals that seek to classify universal knowledge. One 
very influential system is called the “Library of Congress Subject Headings”, 
short LCSH (Library of Congress 2002). It encompasses all knowledge 
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domains, but not in an excessively specific manner. An alternative system, 
provided by the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC), is called Dewey’s 
decimal classification (Online Computer Library Center 2002). As the LCSH, it 
is insufficiently specific. Both classification systems could serve as a general 
guideline for a knowledge base, but would definitely have to be 
supplemented. For example, the field of the Neurosciences is not 
represented explicitly, but distributed over many subjects, such as Science > 
Physiology > Neurophysiology and Neuropsychology. As another example, 
cognitive psychology is weakly represented, namely only as an extension of 
Philosophy/Psychology/Religion > Psychology > Consciousness/Cognition. 
In short, universal indexes are too broad and sometimes, maybe, too old to 




A more specific resource developed and maintained by the US National 
Institute of Health is called Medical Subject Headings, short MeSH (National 
Institute of Health 2002b). It is well elaborated and widespread. For example, 
it is integrated in the major databases and indexing services such as BIOSIS, 
Medline etc. Thus, using MeSH for the ‘brain navigator’ would ensure easy 
recognition and reuse for indexers, bibliographers etc. and the existence of 
interfaces in digital systems. Furthermore, there are even theoretical 
approaches that employ the MeSH, e.g. a study that uses the MeSH to 
exemplify specific strategies for building dynamic classification schemes and 
ontologies (Kahng et al. 1997). 
 
However, MeSH is developed in the field of medicine. Looking at the MeSH-
Browser (National Institute of Health 2002b) reveals several oddities: for 
example, the term ‘neural networks’ does appear under ‘natural sciences’ 
and ‘information sciences’ but only as substructures of ‘medical informatics 
computing’, ‘decision support techniques’ or ‘pattern recognition’. Similarly, 
in the field of cognitive science, ‘attention’ appears as a sub-term of 
‘arousal’ but not as a sub-term of ‘cognition’. Neuroscience is quite well 
represented, even though some specialties (for example ‘dendritic spines’) 
could not be found. All in all, with respect to its comprehensiveness, MeSH 
appears to be very suitable for a keyword resource for the brain navigator 
(not least because the NIH offers ready to use downloads.) 
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Noteworthy, too, is the AOD (Alcohol and Drug Abuse) Thesaurus that is 
hosted by the same Institution as the MesSH (National Institute of Health 
2002a). At first sight, considering the AOD-T seems to be a categorical error, 
but – opposite to the purely medical approach always shining through the 
MeSH – the AOD-T obviously seeks to integrate biological and psychological 
concepts more carefully, quite similarly as it is usually done in the neural and 
cognitive sciences. For example, the section ‘concepts in psychology and 
thought’ exceeds the specificity and intuitive appeal of terms given in the 
MeSH many times over. However, the AOD-T is not so popular as the MeSH 
(e.g. search in www.google.com for “mesh+thesaurus” vs. “aod+thesaurus” 
resulted in 41400 vs. 967 hits, search performed 13.10.2003). 
 
Beside these public thesauri, useful resources come from bibliographic 
indexing services. An indexing service is the sum of efforts (usually an 
organization or company) that seeks to integrate all relevant publications of 
a knowledge domain into one index by filing bibliographic data (and possibly 
abstracts) and supplying each data-set with index terms. The indexers make 
use of thesauri that provide definitions and controlled vocabulary helping to 
find the correct index terms. The results of these procedures are the typical 
services on library computers such as indexes integrated in databases and 
equipped with user interfaces for queries by scientists or other information 
seekers. BIOSIS, for example, provides an online thesaurus that serves as a 
guide in search results. This BIOSIS online thesaurus is based on ‘major 
concepts’, which are very broad. For example, concepts relating to the field 
of the Neurosciences are to be found in the branch ‘neural coordination’, 
which contains only one more neighbored node, namely ‘nervous system’.  
 
A similar coarse graining is found in the thesaurus for Zoological Records 
(BIOSIS 2002). In the Science Citation Index (ISI 2002) no standard indexing 
terms are assigned; it is limited to the author’s choice of title and abstract 
words and the system’s choice of keywords. A rather specific thesaurus for 
the Neurosciences is provided by Elsevier Science publishers (2002). It 
contains 10 classes with approximately 150 fields that are specific enough to 
account for the neuroscience field. The fields of computer science and 
cognitive psychology are not covered. A thesaurus for psychology is provided 
by the American Psychological Association (Walker 1997). The APA thesaurus 
is comprehensive, but appears to be oriented on application, not primarily on 
basic research. For example, the ‘term cluster section’ provides 
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Neuropsychology/Neurology but not ‘cognitive psychology’. On the other 
hand, the ‘relationship section’ contains sufficient terms for cognitive 
psychology, e.g. ‘cognitive process’ yields about 20 narrower terms and 20 
related terms. A short description is also provided. There are many terms 
that actually do not fall in the neural-cognitive-computational cross-section. 
Thus, an extraction of the relevant terms is also missing. For the sake of 
transparency, only thesauri were taken into account here that were publicly 
accessible. There are likely to be many more thesauri and other indexing 
systems that are not publicly available (in the case of indexing companies 
evidently because they are an essential economical basis that is to be kept 
secret). But already the few examples considered here indicated that brain 
sciences are not appropriately represented by one existing thesaurus, but 




An alternative approach for classifying knowledge is to make use of 
keywords. Rich resources for keywords are glossaries. As stated above, these 
can be extended to thesauri when hierarchical relations and related terms are 
provided. Several resources are accessible but – as it was already the problem 
with respect to thesauri – none was found that could be called 
comprehensive. In detail: a comprehensive glossary for Neuroinformatics 
could not be found within the publicly accessible resources. An alternative is 
the glossary at Principia Cybernetica Web (Heylighen 2002), which offers 
about 600 terms with definitions and relations. Moreover, the Principia 
Cybernetica Web offers several textbook like articles on general terms. 
Similar resources are “Nonlinear Dynamics and Complex Systems Theory” 
Glossary of Terms (CAN Center for Naval Analyses 2002) and an online 
glossary to the book Computational Beauty of Nature (Flake 2002). For 
general computing issues, the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing (Howe 
2002) and the Mathematical Programming Glossary (Greenberg 2002) are 
recommendable resources. Cognitive science and philosophy are well 
represented on the internet: outstanding in the field of cognitive science are 
a glossary from Blackwell Science Publishers (2002), the glossary of the 
online textbook “Cognitive Psychology” (Medin 2002) and the University of 
Alberta’s Cognitive Science Dictionary (Dawson 2002), in the field of 
philosophy the Washington University (Eliasmith 2002) and the Meta-
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Chrucky 2002). 
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table 4. Aptitude of several resources to represent thesauri or directories in the neural, 
cognitive and computational domain. The number of circles in the column ‘thesauri’ 
indicates how of the demands ‘comprehensiveness’, ‘connectivity’ and ‘quality’ were 
satisfied. Crosses in the column ‘directory’ indicate if a resource can provide templates for 
direc o ies that represent the neural, cognitive and computational domain (large ‘X’), only 
with reservations (small ‘x’) or not (missing). 
t r
thesauri directories  
neural  cognitive computa-
tional 
neural  cognitive computa-
tional 
1 NIH 2002a OOO O  X X x 
2 NIH 2002b OO OO  X X  
3 LoC 2002 O O O X X  
4 BIOSIS 2002 O      
5 ELSEVIER 2002 OO   X   
6 Heylighen 2002 O O OOO    
7 CNA 2002 O O OO    
8 Flake 2002 O O OO    
9 Howe 2002   OO    
10 Greenberg 2002   OO    
11 APA 2002 O OOO O x X  
12 Blackwell 2002 O OO O    
13 Medin 2002 OO      
14 Dawson 2002 O OO     
15 Eliasmith 2002 O OO     
16 Chrucky 2002  OO     
 
 
1.3.4.4. Evaluation of resources 
 
 The analysis of the existing information resources on brains indicates that, 
contemporarily, there is no appropriate knowledge base for the brain 
sciences. Rather a combination of resources is a more promising procedure. 
In the example of the ‘brain navigator’, it would be necessary to merge 
thesauri and glossaries in one database. Since there is a considerable overlap 
in the coverage of terms that could result in a massive redundancy on the 
one hand and uncontrollable terminological heterogeneity on the other hand, 
it seems reasonable to concentrate on few, comprehensive resources rather 
than collecting as much as one can. A justified selection is only possible if an 
evaluation of their aptitude to be integrated in a knowledge base is carried 
out. With respect to our hypothetical application context of the ‘brain 
navigator’ and for the sake of concreteness, an exemplary evaluation was 
actually performed. 
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According to the two forms of navigation in the brain navigator ‘landmark 
mode’ and ‘map mode’, the evaluation of the resources was differentiated for 
thesauri and directories. The aptitude of a given resource to determine a 
static directory, was only assessed with ‘yes’ (indicated by X), ‘no’ (indicated 
by a missing) or ‘with reservations’ (indicated by an X in brackets). The 
aptitude of a resource to act as a resource for a thesaurus could be rated 
with a score from zero to three points (indicated by the circles). Points were 
scored for a match on either of the following points: 
 
o Comprehensiveness: Does the resource comprise one of the 
domains neural, cognitive or computational? 
 
o Quality: Is the resource well formed and evaluated? 
 
o Connectivity: Is it possible to merge the resource with other 
resources (e.g. in terms of data-structures)? 
 
In general, the evaluation illustrates that it is in principle possible to 
assemble resources in a way that could result in a comprehensive knowledge 
base for brain sciences (see table 4). In detail, the analysis shows that 
resources deserving preferential treatment are: (1) MESH, (2) the APA 
thesaurus and (3) the Principia Cybernetica Web (PCW) glossary. A valuable 
alternative is (4) the AOD thesaurus – not least because it is also quite strong 
in the neural domain, it should be considered anyway. When cross checking 
the resources chosen so far against the disciplines involved, special keywords 
from the field of Neuroinformatics and philosophy of mind are strikingly 
missing. Therefore it might be recommendable to supplement (5) the online 
glossary to the book Computational Beauty of Nature and (6) the Philosophy 
of Mind glossary of the Washington University. 
 
With respect to the design of a ‘brain navigator’ (see also the three tasks in 
1.3.3), resources for setting up thesauri (task 1 and, to large parts implied, 
task 2) can be scooped from resources taken into account so far. Setting up 
static directories (sufficing task 3) is still missing – and it is far more difficult 
with the resources at issue. For example, candidates for setting up 
directories for the computational domain that refer to Neuroinformatics are 
completely missing and even the neural and cognitive domains are not well 
staffed. This is not so surprising, however, since predominantly resources for 
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setting up knowledge bases were taken into account so far – and these 
typically provide dynamic, not static directories (see also 1.3.3). The issue of 
specific conceptual frameworks and static directories is topic of the next 
section. 
 
The analysis of existing information resources on brains in this section 
should also be regarded with respect to the question whether it can tell us 
something about the current state of theoretical integration of the neural, 
cognitive and computational domains. Obviously, one would expect 
nowadays from a well-integrated brain science that a comprehensive 
knowledge base already exists, as it is the case for the medical sciences with 
the MeSH. This is not the case for brains sciences. On the other hand, a 
disintegrated science would not have to offer comprehensive and 
supplementary resources at all and these would not contain segments that 
already show integrated accounts of the neural, cognitive and computational 
domain. Taken together, the existing information resources on brains 
indicate that brain sciences are in an intermediate state of theoretical 
integration. 
 
1.3.5. Conceptual frameworks for brains 
 
An integrated brain science should ideally offer a single conceptual 
framework that spans the neural, the cognitive and the computational 
domain. Whether pursuing this objective is naïve or even undesirable shall be 
left open here. Rather, the quest for a single conceptual framework should 
inform us about the state of theoretical integration in the brain sciences. As 
already became clear in the previous sections, the quest clarifies that the 
task of designing a directory, as a representation of a conceptual framework, 
is far more complicated than providing a repository of keywords. In other 
words, developing a ‘map’ for the brain sciences is something that differs 
considerably from representing knowledge of the brain sciences as a 
dynamic and variable landmark-system. In the example of the ‘brain 
navigator’ on a library computer, the task of finding a map results in a 
standardized access to knowledge that is offered to students – a kind of 
table of contents for the brain sciences. As already pointed out above, such a 
single conceptual framework for brain sciences is not within reach. But is it 
impossible? How can we proceed in order to find out more about a directory 
that is congenial to the neural, cognitive and computational domain? The 
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proximate task is to analyze existing conceptual frameworks from the 
respective domains. Typical cases for the application of conceptual 




On the one hand authors of textbooks seek to integrate a wealth of the work 
done in a given knowledge domain, on the other hand they aim at imparting 
a digestible scheme. They try to construct a comprehensive and 
comprehensible format. They map a specific, individual conceptual 
framework onto a knowledge base. How can these conceptual frameworks be 
extracted from the textbooks? It can be assumed that they are reflected in 
the tables of content of the textbooks. Consequently, the next step is to 
review tables of contents of textbooks, to analyze and evaluate them. The 
‘one and only’ integrated textbook for neural, cognitive and computational 
domain is missing. So, the question is: how can the various specific 
conceptual frameworks be used for finding a common conceptual framework 
for the neural, cognitive and computational domain? The first task is to 
decompose the specific conceptual frameworks of textbooks, and discuss 
their interrelations, consistency and coherence. The second task is to 
synthesize the results of the analysis. 
 
The method applied was to select actual textbooks from the neural, cognitive 
and computational domain from the subject headings ‘neuroscience’, 
‘cognitive psychology’ and ‘neural networks’, respectively, from the large 
online book store ‘Amazon’. The 30 best selling entries were searched for 
textbooks that offered a structured table of contents. As stated above, there 
is no fully consistent terminology. Thus, the main task was to identify the 
essential terms, dichotomies and other ordering criteria that represent the 
knowledge domain without being overrating, neglecting or misrepresenting 
(or being otherwise offensive). The rationale applied was: if there were a valid 
single conceptual framework for the brain sciences, it would probably result 
from an elaboration of the most commonly used classifiers. For this reason, 
it was analyzed whether a specific set of classifiers was characteristic for 
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Classifiers refer to the transition from one section to the next section. 
o ‘temporal’ refers to an earlier/later or slower/faster relation, e.g. 
if a chapter on perception was followed by a chapter memory, a 
temporal classifier would apply because the proposition 
“perception precedes memory” is true. Another example for a 
temporal classifier: “learning is faster than evolution“. 
o ‘spatial’ indicates if concepts are smaller or neighbored, e.g. 
neuron contains axon and neurons neighbor glia cells. 
o ‘complexity’ indicates that one chapter refers to a more complex 
issue than the preceding chapter, e.g. feed-forward network is 
simpler than recurrent network. 
o ‘functional’ indicates that different forms of functioning are 
worked off, e.g. visual, auditory, with or without learning, 
thinking or acting etc. 
o ‘keyword’ indicates that sections are ordered by prominent 
keywords that do not show obvious relations to each other, e.g. 
experimental model systems, famous works, milestones etc. 
 
Sometimes specific classifiers, dichotomies or keywords are remarkable (as 
stated in the column ‘comment’ in table 6). For example, clustered structures 
are quite common since they have the benefit of not implying a strong 
ontological claim and, thus, evade problems resulting from concurring 
approaches. Consequently, these structures are taken frequently when each 
chapter is provided by a different author. ‘Nodes’ indicate how many levels of 
hierarchy are used. ‘Neuron’ with subsection ‘synapse’ is one node – if 
‘synapse’ additionally has a subsection ‘calcium’, there are two nodes. For 
providing a general idea about the contents of the textbooks table 5 contains 
summaries. 
 
The results of the analysis are summarized in table 6. Textbooks on 
Neuroinformatics refrain from temporal and spatial classifiers. Instead 
‘function’ as well as ‘complexity’ are the dominating classifiers in the tables 
of content. This is not very surprising since computational issues are not 
bound to the natural categories space and time. The predominant classifier 
refers to the type of network architecture. For illustrating what the term 
‘architecture’ means in the computational domain, two exemplars (feed-
forward and recurrent) are shown in fig. 12. 
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table 5. Summaries of the analyzed textbooks. The tables of content were analyzed with 
respect to the application of certain classifiers. The results are presented in Table 6. The 




Handbook of brain theory and neural networks (Arbib 1998) The book is primarily based on alphabetically ordered 
articles that do not contain assumptions about a conceptual framework – only as a comprehensive theme list. 
However, two introductory chapters are offered: ‘background’ introduces the neuron (basics, receptors and effectors, 
models, details), different levels of analysis and dynamics. The chapter ‘road maps’ encompasses connectionism 
(psychology, linguistics and AI), dynamics (optimization, cooperativity, self-organization) learning (deterministic, 
statistical), applications, biological systems (neurons, networks, mammalian brain), sensory systems (vision, other), 
plasticity (mechanisms, development, learning) and motor control (e.g. patterns).  
Introduction to the Theory of Neural Computation. (Hertz et al., 1991) The book offers a structure clustered by 
exemplary models: Hopfield (and its extensions), optimization problems, perceptrons, multi-layer networks, 
recurrent networks, (unsupervised) hebbian and competitive learning and neural networks statistics.  
Neural Organization (Arbib et al. 1997) The textbook introduces 3 different structures explicitly (structure, function 
and dynamics), extends for the most part in anatomical exemplary systems (olfaction, hippocampus, thalamus, 
Cortex, cerebellum, basal ganglia) and roofs these with an outlook on cognition.  
Computational explorations in cognitive neuroscience (O'Reilly and Munakata 2000) The textbook is two-part. The 
first part deals with ‘basic neural computational mechanisms’. Herein, concepts referring to individual neurons are 
distinguished from concepts referring to networks and from learning issues (hebbian, error-driven, model related 
and others). The second part aims at cognitive phenomena: after introducing the large-scale organizational 
structure, the subjects perception and attention as well as memory, language and higher-level cognition are worked 
off. 
Neural and adaptive systems (Principe et al. 2000) This textbook is based on a structure that goes from simple to 
complex: after introducing data fitting, pattern recognition and different aspects of multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are 
treated. Learning is divided into hebbian as well as competitive and Kohonen-Learning. More general chapters on 
processing (signal processing, adaptive filters, temporal processing) precede the closing chapter on the (most 
complex) recurrent networks.  
Fundamentals of Neural Networks (Fausett 1994) This is a straightforward textbook that introduces neural networks 
by showing their fields and methods of application and a brief historical sketch. Then several networks for pattern 
recognition (Hebb, Perceptron, Adaline) and association (heteroassociative, autoassociative and other forms memory) 
are distinguished from competitive networks. The adaptive resonance theory and backpropagation are assigned 
separate chapters. A sampler of networks closes the book.  
Computing the brain (Grethe and Arbib 2001) The textbook is primarily concerned with technical – not with thematic 
– aspects. It introduces ‘Neuroinformatics’ as a science of databases and tools. Modeling and simulation is described 
in chapters on the Neural Simulation Language (NSL), a modeling system (EONS) and PET. In the following, databases 
for time series (experimental data, design concepts, interaction issues), for atlas data (brain maps, 3d surfaces, rat 
brain) and – along with concepts for data management (federation of databases, ontologies, annotations, space 
management) – for models (repositories, BMW brain model on the web, knowledge management) are explained.  
 
cognitive domain 
Cognitive Psychology (Anderson 1980) Anderson’s textbook goes from simple to complex, from lower to higher: the 
introduction is followed by the topics perception, attention and performance, representations, memory, problem 
solving, expertise, reasoning and decision and language. (Interestingly, learning is missing in the explicit structure!) 
Cognitive Psychology (Best 1999) Best’s textbook uses perception, (attention and object recognition), memory, 
knowledge (symbolic and connectionist), language and thinking (reasoning, decision, concepts, problem solving) as 
classifiers. 
Cognitive Psychology (Medin et al. 2001) The structure of the textbook is somewhat different to that of Anderson 
(1999) and Best (1999). However, it builds on a key concept, namely ‘information’. After this concept is deduced from 
the introduction, its acquisition (learning, perception, attention), storage (memory, knowledge, imagery) and its 
application in language as well as thinking (reasoning, problem solving, expertise, decision) is provided.  
Connectionism and the mind (Bechtel and Abrahamson 2002) This book uses a “basics prime subjects” structure, i.e. 
two chapters build a fundamental understanding on architectures for modeling cognition and special subjects 
(learning, pattern mapping, representation, higher cognition etc) and closes with implications (Artificial Life, Brain 
Issues etc.). 
 119
1. BRAINS  Special Section 
table 5. continued 
 
neural domain 
Biophysics of computation (Koch  1999) This book is strictly oriented on the neuron. Nonetheless, it uses a 
heterogeneous structure beginning with introductory ‘horizontal’ chapters (the membrane equation, linear cable 
theory), then following the doctrinal information processing direction (passive dendritic trees, synaptic input, 
synaptic interactions in a passive dendritic tree, the Hodgkin-Huxley model of action-potential generation), where 
in-depth excursions are made (phase space analysis of neuronal excitability, ionic channels, beyond Hodgkin and 
Huxley: calcium, and calcium-dependent potassium currents, linearizing voltage-dependent currents). Then the 
logical extension in time (plasticity) is considered (diffusion, buffering, and binding, dendritic spines, synaptic 
plasticity) before again general issues are treated (simplified models of individual neurons, stochastic models of 
single cells, bursting cells input resistance, time constants, and spike initiation, synaptic input to a passive tree, 
voltage-dependent events in the dendritic tree, unconventional coupling). 
From Neuron to Brain (Nicholls et al. 2001) The book is divided into an introduction and three parts: Signaling, 
integrative mechanisms and development. The first part has a strong low-level (biophysical, molecular and cellular) 
orientation, i.e. several chapters on ions and ion channels, electrical and biochemical bases of synaptic transmission 
and plasticity. ‘Integrative mechanisms’ is clustered by selected (well-known) systems such as, cellular basis of 
behavior in leeches, ants and bees, the autonomic nervous system, transduction (mechanical, chemical), processing 
(somatosensory, auditory), several chapters on vision (transduction, primal visual cortex, general cortical 
architecture, ocular dominance) and one on motor control. The first chapter of the third part (development) is 
structured temporally. The other parts are concerned with general developmental aspects (denervation and 
regeneration) and the visual and auditory model systems, respectively. 
Principles of neural science (Kandel et al.1991) This is the best-known textbook for the neural sciences. The contents 
in brief offer a general introduction that relates biology to behavior. The structure then is from small to large: After 
neuron and synapse follows another introductory section on cognition. Then, as functional domains of neuroscience, 
perception, movement, arousal and emotion, development, and, finally, language, thought, mood as well as learning 
and memory are offered.  
Essentials of neural science and behavior (Kandel et al. 1996) This is a ‘digest’ of the principles of neural science 
(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessel 2000). The structure is somewhat different: the general introduction is followed by a 
purist biological introduction (cell biology, anatomy, development). Then signaling within and, thereafter, between 
nerve cells is considered. Then, again an introduction of (non-purist) cognitive aspects is presented and followed by 
perception, action, genes/emotions/instincts and language/learning/memory.  
Cognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga 2002) This is a textbook that offers a historical introduction followed by basics 
(the cellular and molecular basis of cognition, gross and functional anatomy of cognition, the methods of cognitive 
neuroscience). Then, a complexity criterion (from simple to complex, from early to late) is applied to functional 
systems (perception and encoding, higher perceptual functions, selective and attention orienting, learning and 
memory, language and the brain, cerebral lateralization and specialization) that closes with a chapter on behavior 
(the control of action). Some general chapters roof the structure (evolutionary perspectives, development and 
plasticity, the problem of consciousness). 
The New Cognitive Neurosciences (Gazzaniga 2000) This book is a comprehensive and very well known and edited 
handbook that is made of chapters of specialist authors. It begins temporally organized (development, plasticity), 
then functional (sensory systems, motor systems). The extensive sections on cognitive aspects are functionally 
ordered (attention, memory, language, higher cognitive functions, emotion, evolution, consciousness). 
The Computational Brain (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992) This book has a non-hierarchical structure that is primed 
by a hierarchical structure that introduces several ‘levels’. Readers have to map the functional themes computation, 
representation, plasticity and sensorimotor integration onto these levels. The structure could be called ‘basics prime 
subjects’ 
Neurowissenschaft (Dudel et al. 2001) This German textbook applies a straight sequence of chapters that uses a 
mixed set of classifiers, temporal (phylogeny, ontogeny) spatial (molecular, cellular) or functional (perceptual, 
hormonal). One after the other, evolutionary aspects serve as general introduction followed by molecular aspects. 
Then, ontogeny precedes biophysical basics of cells synapses and motor aspects. The vegetative and hormonal 
system conclude this general section. The remainder refers to sensory systems (general, chemical, thermo, 
mechanical, auditory, peripheral and central vision, electrical, magnetic, proprioceptive) and cognitive aspects 
(plasticity, learning and memory, rhythmics, sleep).  
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table 6. Summary of the analysis of textbooks. Analyzed were classification criteria in the 
tables of contents. ‘Nodes’ shows how many levels of hierarchy are used. Within the 
classifiers’ section, small letters (x, o) indicate ‘is applied’, large letters indicate ‘major 
classifier’, ‘-’ indicate ‘not applied’. For the classifier ‘keyword’ another symbol (o) is used 
because it belongs to an exclusive classification category. The column ‘comments’ contains 
special classifiers etc. For a detailed description of the procedure, see text. A summary of 
the contents is given in table 5. 









comment (special classifiers etc.) 
 
computational 
Arbib 1998 1 - - - - - alphabetical 
Hertz et al. 1991 1 - - x X o unsupervised/supervised learning 
Arbib et al. 1997 2 - x - x O structure/function/dynamics 
O'Reilly and 
Munakata 2000 
3 - - x X o neuron, network, learning, cognition 
Principe et al. 
2000 
2 x - x - O recognition, learning, association 
Fausett 1994 3 - - x x O architecture 
Grethe and Arbib 
2001 
2 - - - x O technical 
 
cognitive 
Anderson 1980 1 X - x x o  
Best 1999 1 X - x x o  
Medin et al. 2001 1 - - x X o  
Bechtel and 
Abrahamson 2002 
2 - - x x O  
 
neural 
Koch 1999 1 x x - x o neuron/synapse, passive/active  
Nicholls et al. 
2001 
2 x x x x O  sensory/motor, clustered by model 
systems 
Kandel et al.1991 3 x X x x o neural/cognitive 
Kandel et al. 1996 3 X x x x o  
Gazzaniga 2002 2 x x X x o  
Gazzaniga 2000 2 x - x x O  
Churchland and 
Sejnowski 1992 
1 - - x x o  
Dudel et al. 2001 1 x x x x o ontogeny/phylogeny 
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A typical textbook on Neuroinformatics will probably provide an introductory 
chapter on the neuronal analogy (i.e. the relation to biological neurons and 
networks), and then go through the different architectures: feed-forward and 
recurrent with or without (un-) supervised learning. An appendix offers 
mathematical and statistical prerequisites. As implied above, the specific 
classifiers are feed-forward vs. recurrent, learning/non-learning and 
unsupervised/supervised learning. The textbooks differ in their explanatory 
orientation, i.e. whether they seek to account for formal-mathematical, 
technical or natural (biological or cognitive) phenomena. 
 
Textbooks on cognitive psychology are quite uniform. Probably, this is due to 
the consequent application of the so called ‘information processing 
paradigm’ that replaced behaviorism in the 50s and 60s (see e.g. Broadbent 
1958; Neisser 1967; Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968): According to this notion (see 
fig. 13), external information causes sensation and perception. Selective 
attention routes information to short-term memory and elaboration and 
coding routes it further to long term memory. Actions are the result of the 
processing at the different levels. Beside this structural unanimity, the 
textbooks differ, above all, in the sequence and the focus on the major 
concepts of the information processing approach.  
 
fig. 12: Typical architectures of neural networks. The upper semicircles are input elements, 
the arrows indicate output interfaces, and the symbols indicate artificial neurons constituting 
‘layers’ in a horizontal line. On the left side, a feed-forward network is shown in which it is 
assumed that the information is processed exclusively from the upper layers to the lower 
layers without feedback. On the right side a recurrent net is shown. The graphical 
presentation as a matrix shows that all neurons are completely inter-connected. The 
connections (‘weight’) to other neurons are indicated by ‘-a’ connection to the respective 
neuron is indicated by ‘1’. © rubin (reprinted with permission). 
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fig. 13: A sketch of the Information Processing Approach anchored on memory systems. 
External stimuli come into the sensory memory, are pre-processed and possibly routed to 
short-term memory. Then a response is chosen and/or coding in long-term memory is 
carried out. 
 
A typical textbook on Cognitive Psychology would probably begin with 
sensation and perception followed by attention, memory and thinking. The 
topics representation and knowledge could be made explicit. The classifiers 
applied in textbooks on cognitive psychology are time (sensation precedes 
attention), complexity (thinking is more complex than sensation) and 
function that results from the information processing paradigm. The books 
usually differ in their focus on a specific processing stage. 
 
Textbooks on Neuroscience show the most mixed application of classifiers. It 
is obligatory on a natural science that spatial and temporal criteria are 
applied – and so they are present in the tables of content. Additionally, they 
are mixed with the classifiers ‘complexity’ and ‘function’. Consequently, 
most of the structures found, show a high level of conceptual integration, but 
are at the same time characterized by a mixture of biological classifiers such 
as ontogeny/phylogeny, sensory/motor, neural/cognitive, 
organism/environment, neuron/network, wired/plasticity, neuron/synapse 
vertebrate/invertebrate and others that were already mentioned above 
(simple complex, early/late). But there is a logic behind this ‘strange brew’ of 
classifiers. Usually, textbooks apply a spatiotemporal framework.  
 
The spatiotemporal framework implies a notion of complexity in that large-
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scale processes are usually more complex than small-scale processes, if the 
small-scale explanations are applied to the large scale. For example, the 
transition between neurons to networks is simultaneously a transition from 
small to large, from short to long and – due to the combinatorial powers – 
from simple to complex. However, it is not clear that the large scale is 
explained by small-scale processes. But, generally, it is conceivable that the 
large scale was explained by the small scale. (Here the reductionist 
commitment of neuroscientists becomes evident.) Along the axis of time, 
space and complexity the levels of organization are to be found (see also 
1.3.2). This notion is pervasive in the Neurosciences and presumes a 
hierarchical structure that extends from microscopic (e.g. electric, molecular, 
cellular etc.) to macroscopic (e.g. organism, environment etc.). A sketch of 
the levels of organization is shown in fig. 14. A typical textbook for the 
Neurosciences will appeal to levels of organization and focus more or less on 
one of the constituent classifiers (e.g. time or space). For example, 
excitability (biophysical and molecular basics) primes synaptic transmission 
and is followed by plasticity, sensory systems (sometimes all modalities), 
motor systems, cognition, learning, development and evolution. It becomes 
obvious when analyzing in this arrangement that a mix of temporal, spatial 
and organizational classifiers are applied and that the order is progressive: 
excitability-LATER-Synapse-LONGER- Plasticity-LARGER-Sensory Systems-
LATER-Motor Systems-HIGHER-Cognition-LONGER-Learning-LONGER-
Development-LONGER-Evolution (classifier determining the progression 
between topics in large letters). In conclusion, the guidelines for explanations 
in the Neurosciences implied in textbooks appear to be: “Progress on the 
scales time, space and complexity” and “Explain a given phenomenon with 
concepts residual on a lower level”. 
 
It is concluded from the analysis of textbook structures that the neural, the 
cognitive and computational domains use different classification systems. 
Predominant classifiers in disciplinary exemplars of the domains can be 
extracted. These classifiers correspond to major conceptual frameworks: in 
Neuroinformatics it is architecture, in cognitive psychology it is the 
information-processing paradigm and in the Neurosciences it is levels of 
organization. 
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fig. 14: ‘Levels of organization’ as extractable from textbooks of the Neurosciences. The 
abscissa shows a time section, the ordinate a space section. Both are presented on a 
logarithmic scale. Common measures (e.g. seconds, meters) are shown as additional tic 
descriptors. The second axes (upper horizontal and left vertical) show conceptual 
descriptions of the respective measures. Inside the coordinate system, major processes are 
shown. On the level of the nervous system action, learning and selection are evident and 
determined by ‘underlying’ mechanisms of (elec ric) activation, plasticity and evolution. t
 
With respect to the initial question whether resources in the neural, cognitive 
and computational domain can form a common conceptual framework for 
the brain sciences, the analysis of textbook contents has two important 
implications. First, there is no common conceptual framework that becomes 
evident in the analysis of textbooks accounts and that could be directly used, 
for instance, as a standardized access (e.g. table of content) in a ‘brain 
navigator’ on a library computer. Second, the specific conceptual frameworks 
used within the domains are homogenous to a certain degree and can 
therefore serve as starting point for further efforts. (The further analysis of 
commodity between the specific conceptual frameworks is started in the next 
section.) With respect to the general question whether the analysis of 
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textbook accounts tells us something about the state of theoretical 
integration in the brain sciences, these two implications (“no common 
conceptual but already integrated specific frameworks”) corroborate the 
conclusion already drawn from the analysis of existing knowledge bases: 
brain sciences are in an intermediate state of theoretical integration. 
 
1.3.6. A common scheme for the brain sciences 
 
It would presumptuous to propose a common conceptual framework for the 
brain sciences. This goal is far beyond the scope of this study, but will rather 
be the result of theoretical integration brought into being within the next 
years and decades by concrete scientific work in the contributing disciplines. 
Nevertheless, it can be tried to analyze the interrelations of the specific 
conceptual frameworks concerning their consistency and discrepancies. A 
more moderate goal is, thus, the development of an exemplary account that 
contains no major inconsistencies: a common scheme for the brain sciences. 
In a ‘brain navigator’ on a library computer, such a common scheme could 
act as a preliminary stage of a standardized access to information on brains 
(a table of content). A common scheme for the brain sciences should 
integrate all the specific conceptual frameworks of the neural, cognitive and 
computational domain, i.e. the levels of organization, the information 
processing paradigm and architectures, respectively. The questions are then: 
“Do the conceptual frameworks commute?” and “How exactly do they relate 
to each other?” 
 
Elements of the information-processing paradigm are found frequently in 
Neuroscience textbooks. Logical sequences like dendrite-soma-axon-
synapse or sensory-cognitive-motor are inspired by the flow of information. 
Thus, the idea about levels of organization is consistent with the 
information-processing paradigm. Of course, information processing is also 
an essential framework in Neuroinformatics since the basic computational 
element is a simple input-computation-output device. In sum, information 
processing definitely is a shared framework in all three domains. Levels of 
organization are not only a conceptual framework in the Neurosciences, but 
are also adopted by cognitive psychologists when they embrace 
neuroscientific explanations. It is easily possible to embed information 
processing in levels of organization, while it is difficult or, at least, not 
common to understand the levels of organization as information processing. 
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The architectures in Neuroinformatics can also be conceived in the 
framework of levels of organization (spatiotemporal structure), even though 
the notion of space and time that is usually meant in the Neurosciences, is 
sometimes very different to that used in Neuroinformatics. Two meanings of 
space and time can be distinguished in the Neuroinformatics domain: one 
refers to physical implementations, i.e. computers, chips, robots etc. The 
other refers to abstract temporal or spatial differences between data samples 
or units of computation, i.e. in time series analysis, computational maps etc. 
The former (physical space and time) is the same that is typically used in the 
Neurosciences, while the latter (abstract space and time) is usually only 
meant in the Neurosciences if the topics of neural representation and coding 
are addressed. A similar distinction holds for cognitive psychology: if the 
behavioral or the neuronal aspect is addressed, physical space and time (e.g. 
reaction time) are customary. But if theoretical aspects (e.g. PDP – parallel 
distributed processing) are addressed, abstract space and time is used. 
Additionally, the PDP paradigm ‘blurs’ the straightness of both, the temporal 
domain (parallel instead of before-after) and the spatial domain (distributed 
instead of before-behind). In sum, the architectures in the Neuroinformatics 
domain are effectively comparable to levels of organization of the 
Neurosciences, but it is important to differentiate between abstract 
(computational) architectures and physical (neural) architectures. 
 
So far, the specific conceptual frameworks fit each other. The intersection 
between the Neurosciences, Neuroinformatics and cognitive psychology 
explains information processing in specific architectures at different levels of 
organization. Information processing can concern neural, cognitive and 
computational issues, the levels of organization allow a categorization in 
terms of spatial, temporal and complex quantity and the architecture denotes 
specific qualities of the system under scrutiny (e.g. learning, recurrent). The 
common notion of an outcome of these processes can be termed ‘behavior’: 
the system processes information in order to generate adequate behavior. 
The adequacy of the behavior is situated and not a priori given and is defined 
in terms of neural, computational or cognitive constraints. Levels of 
organization are not logically (or lawfully) deduced from theoretically 
grounded spatiotemporal framework, but rather clustered by general 
assumptions (paradigms, primitives or doctrines). These are, for instance, the 
‘neuron doctrine’, ‘connectionism’ (PDP), the sensorimotor primitive, and the 
specific functional modes of learning and cognition. Taking these bits and 
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pieces together, the basic concepts are: neuron, network, sensor, motor, 
learning, and cognition. The relationships between these basic concepts are 
not strictly hierarchical, but might be better comprehensible in a block 
diagram (see fig. 15). The basic container of the concepts can neutrally be 
called ‘system’. The system can have various instantiations: a human, an 
animal, a robot, a computer, a software, a theoretical model etc. The system 
is not self-contained, but constituted by specific functional domains: it 
processes information from ‘Sensor’ (input) to ‘Motor’ (output) and might 
have the modes ‘Learning’ or ‘Cognition’. Information processing is based on 
networks that themselves are constituted by ‘neurons’ (understood as basic 
computational units). Generally, the scheme should not be understood as an 
ontological claim, but rather as an elaboration of typical conceptions of the 
neural, cognitive and computational domain, i.e. what is in the head of, say, 
textbook-authors. With respect to a ‘brain navigator’ on a library computer, 
the standardized access that can be derived from the common scheme in 
order to represent the neural, the cognitive and the computational domain 
has the form of clusters around the basic concepts: neuron, network, sensor, 
motor, learning and cognition. 
 
 
fig. 15: A common scheme in the neural-cognitive-computational domain. Information 
enters the system via sensors and is processed by neurons organized in networks. 
Processing is possibly accompanied by learning and cognition and leads to a motor response 
(an externally observable behavio ) that is adequate with respect to the incoming 
information. The scheme is not proposed here as the adequate approach in brain studies but 
rather as minimal common denominator in the contributing disciplines. 
r
 128 
2nd Brain-Special  1.3. "Where to put information on brains!?" 
For illustrative purposes, it might help to conceive the common scheme as an 
abstract device or creature that lurks behind the thoughts of a majority in the 
neural, cognitive and computational domain. The concrete form of this device 
might differ from domain to domain: in the neural domain it might be an 
animal, in the cognitive domain a human and in computational domain a 
software or a robot. The abstract incarnation of this creature that could be 
accepted in all the domains is the Braitenberg vehicle (Braitenberg 1984). In 
this sense, the common scheme is not so much a perfectly hierarchical 
structure that can be represented as a directory, but rather an explanatory 
strategy commonly adopted in the neural, cognitive and computational 
domain. Consequently, a standardized access to information on brains in a 
‘brain navigator’ might not be adequately realized as a table of content, but 
rather a representation of an abstract creature. How this could look like shall, 
for the moment, be left to the reader’s imagination… 
 
1.3.6.1. Applying the common scheme 
 
In order to assess the validity of the common scheme for the brain sciences, 
it shall be tested if it performs well as a guideline in a common knowledge 
base for the neural, cognitive and computational domain. Consider an author 
wishing to integrate a piece of information into the ‘brain navigator’. The 
first task would be to determine the general affiliation of the piece of 
knowledge to the common scheme. In a questionnaire that is designed to 
determine the affiliation, the following question can be posed “Which of the 
themes are addressed: neuron, network, sensor, motor, learning or 
cognition?” If only one hit was enough for counting as ‘affiliate’, a rather 
weak notion of affiliation would be given. In this case, for instance, any 
educational theme (e.g. any basic school sports curriculum) would belong to 
the neural-cognitive-computational domain because learning is addressed. 
Such a weak notion of commonality would not be very informative. If two hits 
were necessary, the case in which ‘learning’ and ‘cognition’ are chosen 
illustrates that still great arbitrariness is present. For preventing this, the 
condition must be extended to: “If learning and/or cognition apply, another 
basic concept must also apply.” In this case, two further degrees of affiliation 
can be distinguished: choosing either ‘sensor’ or ‘motor’ (input/output) 
would indicate a commitment to an information processing approach. This 
notion of affiliation could be called moderate and would imply any 
information processing system e.g. conventional AI systems. A questionnaire 
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suggesting a strong notion of affiliation would also demand the commitment 
to the essential concepts ‘neuron’ and ‘network’ (PDP paradigm). The strong 
notion would exclude many systems from psychology and AI and would 
presumably restrict the potential of theoretical integration by reducing the 
knowledge base to poverty. (It should be noted that the relationships 
between the commitments enforced in the questionnaire are nested: a 
commitment to the PDP paradigm implies a commitment to a general 
information processing paradigm, while a commitment to a general 
information processing paradigm does not imply the PDP approach.) For the 
sake of completeness, the ultimate affiliation would be given if all basic 
concepts applied. However, such a notion was not the objective of the 
exercise since, for instance, making ‘learning’ or ‘cognition’ obligatory, 
would definitely restrict the scheme too much. In conclusion, the moderate 
affiliation appears to be a good approximation for deciding whether a piece 
of knowledge belongs to the common scheme or not. 
 
 
fig. 16: Categorization into the common scheme. A orced choice dialogue determining to 
which basic concept of the common scheme a given piece of knowledge shall be assigned to. 
f
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After heaving determined whether a piece of knowledge belongs to the 
scheme, it is necessary to specify the class it belongs to. The common 
scheme should allow a sound categorization for any piece of knowledge. 
However, the actual target class (category) “in the head of users” may vary. 
For example, memory issues can be classified to ‘learning’ as well as to 
‘cognition’ because the borders between classes are not discrete but rather 
gradual. Thus, it is adequate to speak of ‘degrees’ to denote the affiliation of 
a given piece of knowledge to a given class. A simple multiple-choice 
questionnaire that only asks whether classifiers apply or not (but not what is 
the decisive classifier) yields a pattern of choices (e.g. ‘learning’ and 
‘cognition’ apply for memory issues). This pattern of choices made in the 
questionnaire contains information on the piece of knowledge and represents 
relationships between the basic concepts. In a ‘brain navigator’ on a library 
computer, these relations could be provided as referenced glossaries or 
implemented as a “see also …”-function. But such a classification is not 
unambiguous. 
 
An unambiguous classification of any given piece of knowledge into a 
directory, can be realized with a forced choice dialogue as it is shown in fig. 
16. The basic assumptions of this dialogue are: “network implies neuron”, 
“sensor, motor, learning, cognition implies network”, “sensor excludes 
motor”, “cognition implies learning”, “learning, cognition exclude motor, 
sensor”. Certainly, these assumptions contain flaws. For example, “cognition 
implies learning” seems as well questionable as “cognition excludes sensor”. 
But these flaws are to be accepted if a standardized access shall be provided. 
So, any system that does not ‘exit’ the dialogue falls in a specific categorical 
slot of the neural, cognitive and computational domain. Since, there is a 
general assumption of information processing in the classification, the 
dialogue demands a commitment to the information-processing paradigm 
and, hence, implements the moderate affiliation to the common scheme. In 
conclusion, applying the common scheme for classifying knowledge is 




The common scheme for the brain sciences reflects the conceptual 
intersection between the neural, cognitive and computational domain as it 
can be synthesized from textbooks accounts. If there are any inconsistencies, 
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oddities or flaws in the common scheme, they can very well lead to 
misunderstandings between members of the neural, cognitive or 
computational domain. This could impede theoretical integration, which was 
supposed to be supported. Thus, it is important to critically discuss the 
common scheme for the brain sciences. 
 
A general flaw of the common scheme is the high degree of abstraction that 
allows for multiple meanings for major concepts being inherent. For 
example, there are inconsistencies between several terms: as already 
explained above (see also 1.3.6.2), there is no uniform notion of space and 
time in the different scientific disciplines studying the domains – a factor that 
undermines the ‘levels of organization’ scheme. Nor, is there a uniform 
notion of information, which would be desirable with respect to the aptitude 
of the information-processing scheme as a common concept. There are at 
least two notions: a general, qualitative notion of information that is 
customary in everyday scientific language has to be distinguished from 
quantitative information in the sense of Shannon because, unfortunately, the 
semantics differ substantially. Whereas theoreticians address Shannon 
information, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists frequently use the 
term wrapped in teleological explanations, i.e. information necessary to 
generate a specific action. Of course, there are a lot more notions of 
information that shall not be exhaustively presented here (but see e.g. 
Maynard Smith 2000). In sum, the understanding of general concepts such as 
space, time and information differ substantially within and between the 
domains. 
 
There are also disparities between understandings of ‘architectures’ that bear 
a given function. These become immediately evident when the term 
‘learning’ is considered: neural mechanisms (LTP etc.), learning mechanisms 
(conditioning etc.), memory systems (implicit etc.) and formal rules 
(backpropagation etc.) are not refereed to each other, but are in many cases 
treated solitarily or separately from each other. As a consequence, 
researchers from Neuroinformatics (working on backpropagation) and 
researchers from the Neurosciences (working on LTP) could very well refer to 
something completely different when they use a term such as ‘association’… 
 
Other terminological problems are also prevalent. Recipients in the 
computational domain will probably have problems with the terms ‘sensor’ 
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and ‘motor’. In Neuroinformatics, ‘input’ and ‘output’ are customary. 
(Generally, in the computational domain the behavioral framework is not as 
present as in the neural and cognitive domain.) In cognitive psychology the 
dichotomy perception/action, but also attention/performance is common. 
Moreover, the class ‘motor’ can cause misunderstandings because there may 
very well be cases that do not at all imply motor issues, but are to be 
assigned at the output level. For instance, ‘decisions’ as output of cognitive 
processes or specific activation patterns of abstract networks are interpreted 
as output. Moreover, dynamicists will probably criticize that sensor and 
motor are separated and not treated as a closed ‘sensorimotor’ loop. 
(However, as an alternative, the principles of feedback can be treated 
separately from the issues of sensory and motor systems – what is an ever-
continuing sensorimotor loop anyway?) 
 
Another problem is that the neuron doctrine is heterogeneously applied in 
the domains. Generally, two meanings have to be distinguished, a biological 
cell and an abstract computational unit, usually defined as input – activation 
function – output unit. Cruse (1996), for example, uses the terms ‘neuron’ 
and ‘neuroid’ to emphasize the difference. In the neural domain, for the most 
part, biological cells are meant, but in theoretical and computational 
neuroscience, one can find abstract neurons. Cognitive psychology refers to 
both to the abstract unit in connectionism and to the biological cell cognitive 
neuroscience. In the very same sense as connectionism, Neuroinformatics 
refers predominantly to the abstract computational unit. The varying 
abstractness of neurons also affects the concept ‘network’ because neuron 
and network are interrelated by definition: neurons are the constituents of 
networks and networks are made up of neurons. Instead of networks, 
Neuroscience frequently uses the term ‘circuits’ but also ‘tissue’, ‘ensemble’ 
or ‘region’ as well as ‘area’. The latter two are also customary in the cognitive 
domain, particularly in neuropsychology or cognitive neuroscience. Finally, 
cognition is probably the worst defined term (see also 1.2.7.2 and 1.3.6.2). 
However, for the present study it can be understood as anything that is 
‘higher’, not directly covered by the other basic concepts and refers to 
sensation and perception, attention, memory, thinking and knowledge or 
related functions such as motivation and emotion. Cognition seems 
indispensable to imply functions such as selective attention, problem solving 
or categorization that otherwise would not be contained, but yet are believed 
to be explainable in neural and computational terms. 
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In sum, terminological problems as well as inconsistencies are present in the 
common scheme for the brain sciences. Such problems are, on the other 
hand, ubiquitous, even (or all the more so) within a single scientific 
discipline. Thus, in spite of the terminological and theoretical problems 
found, it can be concluded that the proposed scheme can be assumed to be 
common in the neural, cognitive and computational domain. Of course, it 
would be more instructive to provide a more elaborated scheme, for example 
to have more subclasses that allow for finer grained knowledge categories. 
But, for the moment – with respect to the problems that this simple scheme 





From the practical side, it can be asked what is left to do for developing such 
a thing as a ‘brain navigator’ on the library computer. Presenting knowledge 
bases (e.g. thesauri) in an appropriate manner could yield a comprehensive 
knowledge ‘landscape’ through which the student can actively move or be 
informed about the actual position. But this mode of navigation might cause 
difficulties. The student only sees the nearest pieces of knowledge and can 
therefore only perform landmark orientation. Additionally, even landmark 
orientation might be difficult since the ‘landscape’ is not organized along 
explicit dimensions such as space and time, but determined solely by the 
relations between the pieces of knowledge. Therefore, a standardized access 
to knowledge in the brain sciences should also be offered that can guide the 
student and serve as a map. The common scheme for the brain sciences as 
proposed above (see also 1.3.6) can be understood as a first step towards a 
standardized access, but it is definitely too coarsely grained for acting as a 
guide. A finer graining of knowledge classification can be achieved by 
mapping the common scheme onto knowledge bases such as thesauri. 
Concretely, terms are to be assigned to the basic concepts (i.e. neuron, 
network etc.) and then grouped together by major concepts (e.g. neuron 
divided into passive, active and synaptic membrane). Ambiguities revealed 
during the mapping should be notified because they hint at transitions 
between basic concepts (e.g. memory could be assigned to ‘learning’ as well 
as ‘cognition’) or problems concerning theoretical integration (e.g. 
contradictory accounts of ‘learning’). When the choice of major concepts is 
completed, a consistency check – similar to the textbook analysis provided 
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above that yielded the basic concepts – should lead a step further towards a 
conceptual framework. If an even finer graining seems desirable (i.e. a 
deeper node in the hierarchy), the mapping and consistency check can simply 
be repeated for the major concepts. This procedure is similar to the above-
mentioned mapping of a conceptual framework onto a thesaurus for 
generating a directory for the brain sciences. But it uses, for lack of a 
common conceptual framework, the ‘homemade’ common scheme as 
template. Additionally, subclasses are not deduced, but ‘empirically’ 
selected6. Irrespective of the actual realization of a standardized access to 
information on brains, its emergence appears realistic. As a conclusion of the 
practical thread of discussion, it can be stated that such a thing as a ‘brain 
navigator’ on the library computer is an achievable goal. 
 
Seen from the theoretical side, the prospects of theoretical integration in the 
brain sciences, for example in the form of a common conceptual framework 
for the neural, cognitive and computational domain are the central question. 
The analysis of existing information resources on brains indicated that brain 
sciences are in an intermediate state of theoretical integration. There are no 
unified, comprehensive resources for the brain sciences yet, but parts in the 
domain specific resources show an integrated view on the neural, cognitive 
and computational aspects. Moreover, the specific conceptual frameworks, 
i.e. the levels of organization in the Neurosciences, the Information 
Processing Approach in Cognitive Science and the architectures in 
Neuroinformatics are consistent, in principle, and even supplement each 
other. However, the expectations are to be kept low: an integrated ‘brain 
theory’ might be hard to find. The relevance of high level theories for 
biological issues has recently even been challenged altogether by the claim 
that general laws (as the high level organization principles of theories) might 
not be adequate approach to explain all biological phenomena scientifically. 
Rather more specific regularities such as models and mechanism might be 
the appropriate approach. There is a continuing debate on the existence of 
general laws (Mitchell 1997; Sober 1997). Thus, if philosophy of science calls 
into question a lawful, theoretical basis for ‘old’ biology in general, it seems 
unwise to claim it for the ‘young’ brain sciences. This suggests that the claim 
for a common theory might better be dropped right from the beginning. On 
                                                 
6 Here, the difference between the common scheme and a conceptual framework becomes obvious: a conceptual 
framework would allow of theoretically deducing subclasses that could be filled with terms of thesauri (top-down), 
while the common scheme requires the ‘empirical’ procedure of analyzing thesauri (bottom up). 
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the other hand, the brain definitely is a common subject of the disciplines 
concerned with the neural, cognitive and computational domain. What if the 
distinction between neural, cognitive and computational domains might turn 
out to be nothing more than a methodological artifact resulting from the 
different experimental approaches used, e.g. wet preparations in the 
Neurosciences, behavioral paradigms in cognitive science, and technical 
preparations in Neuroinformatics? Then, all the participating disciplines are 
actually targeting at a single phenomenological ‘brain domain’ and 
something like a theory is within reach. Thus, a common conceptual 
framework that characterizes the brain sciences should, of course, be 
pursued further on. An explication and optimization of a common conceptual 
framework should help to propel theoretical integration and mediate 
orientation for recipients. In spite of the general reservations concerning 
theories, it should be analyzed further, for example, whether major 
theoretical works are consistent with a common scheme for the brain 
sciences as it was proposed here (or any other common scheme). Cross 
checking the common scheme with existing general theories could 
corroborate it or call it into question – if Marr’s Levels of Analysis (Marr 
1982), the Atkinson-Shiffrin-Model (Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968), the neuron 
doctrine or even evolution theory would contradict general assumptions of 
the common scheme, it would be alarming. General works that can serve as 
sources for cross checks can be found within each of the domains 
(paradigmatic accounts), between domains (interdisciplinary works), below 
the domains (generative theories, such as mathematics, cybernetics, 
complexity theory, information theory), above domains (philosophies such as 
reductionism, materialism, supervenience) and through domains (methods 
such as imaging, statistics). Furthermore, explanatory frameworks or notions 
of theory, respectively, for the neural, cognitive and computational domain 
are brought about by the philosophy of science (e.g. Craver & Darden 2001; 
Machamer et al. 2001) and are to be considered. The multitude of 
possibilities for further studies stands in contrast to the simplicity of the 
common scheme for the brain sciences proposed here. This contrast 
indicates how much there is left to do. However, these tasks are beyond the 




As the analysis of resources for information on brains indicates, there are no 
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striking inconsistencies between the neural, the cognitive and the 
computational domain that could principally prevent their theoretical 
integration, i.e. that could prevent obvious (e.g. conceptual or disciplinary) 
boundaries between the domains to vanish. A common scheme for the brain 
sciences exists in the form of an abstract device applying neural processing 
principles in order to show adequate behavior in a given situation. On the 
other hand, it is somewhat unsatisfactory, if not alarming, that the major 
correspondences between domains are very abstract, sometimes not 
uniformly applied or even ill defined. There is no common conceptual 
framework or theory for the brain sciences. Generally, theoretical integration 
of the neural, the cognitive and the computational domain is likely to 
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Reading Advice 
The overall objective of this study is to examine the role simulation plays in explaining 
brains. In the first hapter (now finished) it was shown “what brains are about …“. The first c
section of the first chapter introduced an explanatory framework that is applied throughout 
this study. The following two “Brain-Specials” extended this rather general framework in 
order to provide novices in the brain sciences and interested brain experts with a more 
detailed account of what it means to explain brains. The chapter on brains already pointed at 
some causes why simulation is important for explaining brains: simulations help to control 
dynamics and complexity found in brains. The following chapter will show “what simulation 
is about…” In o der to understand that it is not trivial to get a grip on the concept of r
simulation, consider the two following ‘everyday’ cases: a child unpacking a flight simulator 
CD on Christmas and a high jumper simulating an attempt before actually starting. These 
cases are both referred to as cases of simulation, but they are based on completely different 
notions of simulation: simulation being something external (e.g. a program on CD) and 
simulation being something in our head (an imaginary situation). Some readers (simulation 
experts) might be able to easily reconcile these notions o  simulation, but o hers may see no f t
evident connection at all. I wish to unite these different groups of readers by providing a 
“Simulation-Special” for the non-experts directly at the beginning of this chapter: the text  
“Simulations as media” introduces different notions of simulation and critically examines the 
notion o  simulation being something external by asking whether there can be a f
standardized simulation medium. The second section of this chapter “Simulation in science” 
then picks up the main thread of explaining brains (first chapter) and weaves in the thread of 
simulation: an analysis of the work of a (brain) scientist will reveal that there is a generic 
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2. SIMULATION 
 
2.1. Simulations as media7 
 
What is simulation? Is it a medium such as a flight-simulator software or is it 
an imagination such as a high jumper preparing an attempt before actually 
starting? This question shall be answered by analyzing whether a simulation 
can be conceived as a standardized medium. Why should the consideration of 
standards help us to better understand what simulation is about? A standard 
is a specification of how to conceive something or handle it. Thus, if there is 
standard for simulation there is also a clear-cut notion of simulation. As the 
International Standards Organization ISO, for example, specifies standards 
for tennis rackets, audiovisual engineering and the determination of salt 
content in butter, organizations like the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG 
consortium) or several IEEE initiatives develop standards for interactive media 
such as simulation. In the following, the idea of standardizing simulations is 
critically examined. This brings to light not only the various notions of 




The venture of standardizing simulations shows a large gap between desire 
and reality. On the one hand nearly everyone concerned with media asserts 
that simulations play a prominent role beside films, texts etc. And nearly 
everyone claims to know what simulations are about (at least tacitly). On the 
other hand neither a common sense nor a binding formal specification is 
visible. Expressed in terms of computer applications, a “save as …” button for 
simulations has been scarcely realized. Without a common sense, the 
development of simulation-specific formats, authoring tools, metadata, 
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7 The text, originally titled S andardizing Simulations – “Uphill all the way!” was written for the congress Virtual 
Campus 2002 of the Association for Scientific Media in German speaking countries (“Gesellschaft für Medien in der 
Wissenschaft”) and provides an analysis of the venture of integrating standards for simulations as media 
(Horstmann 2002). Here is the abstract of the original abstract: “Simulations are capable of representing complex 
and d namic knowledge by being inheren ly func ional. Despite this ex aordinary capability no realized in any 
o her medium – no widespread standards for simulations as media have p evailed. Con idering he concep ual 
difficulty, the seman ic variety and the specialization in complicated con en however, he lack of standards is no
surprise: the versatility of simulation takes a heavy toll on their poten ial of standardization! Moreover, he p ovision 
o  inherent func ionality necessita es that users decide what the simulation will be like and forces them o make the 
corresponding in erven ions. These active cognitive and behavioral processes inescapably introduce a human factor
that canno  directly be included in standardization ven u es. Since the p inciple of simulation is based on the human 
factor, it is concluded here tha  attempts to standa dize simulations can only be successful if they focus on the 
human facto  – a work that eventually implies enduring research and development p ocesses.” 
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ordered databases, quality standards, evaluation guidelines or instructional 
designs is hardly achievable. 
 
A prominent illustration of the present situation is given by the Learning 
Object Metadata initiative IEEE-LOM (2003), probably the best known 
approach seeking to introduce classification standards (‘metadata’) for 
educational media: according to the LOM-Specification, simulations are 
conceived as a specific “Learning Resource Type”. But beyond that, 
simulations just serve to exemplify learning objects showing an “active 
interactivity type”, a “high interactivity level” and “high or low grades of 
semantic density”. Hence, an unbiased reader of the LOM specification can 
take home the message that an important role of simulations is 
acknowledged. But apart from a characterization as ‘something interactive’ 
the conception of simulations is void. 
 
But do we really need more specific standards? For answering this question, 
consider a teacher looking for usable simulations within the countless 
applets on the internet (e.g. simulations on the “traveling salesman”, a 
famous formal problem asking for the optimal order to deliver goods to 
numerous recipients that is often mathematically solved by way of artificial 
neural networks). Suppose, the search yields about 100 different simulations 
(a minimalist estimation). Which one is the best? Which one to take for which 
instructional setting? Which one is evaluated? This case illustrates that there 
is a huge resource, but it is hard to utilize it without more specific standards 
for simulations. Standards could help to assess in advance what is to be 
expected when a specific simulation is first encountered. Serious efforts have 
been made in order to condense the medial aspect of simulation. There are 
several attempts to provide classification systems for simulations (see e.g. 
Schmucker & Apple Computer Inc. 2000; Fishwick 1995) and countless 
programming approaches and mark-up languages, but none of them did 
break through in a way that could serve as a guideline in standardization 
ventures. Continuing research traditions on simulations in psychology, 
education and artificial intelligence have been successfully pursued for 
decades. But, obviously, they didn’t flock together. With respect to all these 
efforts the question is: Why didn’t emerge a common sense for simulations 
in a way that there is common sense, say, about what a film or a text is? At 
least some kind of common sense, obviously, would be the minimum 
demand for any standardization venture. 
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In sum, the way to simulation standards is definitely explored, but in the 
present situation too many different paths sidetrack from a way straight-
ahead. Therefore – rather than outlining yet another path – this text, in the 
first step, seeks factors that explain why the different paths do not effectively 
converge towards common sense. In the second step, it is attempted to peel 
out specific features that point the way towards the core of simulation. The 
third step previews how such core characteristics of simulations could be 
employed to yield a classification system that in turn could be applicable in 
standardization ventures. 
 
2.1.2. Impediments for simulation standards 
 
Three major factors impeding the emergence of common sense and 
standards are considered here: first, conceptual difficulty arises from the 
simulation’s characteristic to be inherently functional (that is to be 
organizational open) and a non-trivial conceptual structure that 
encompasses three levels of meaning: simulated system (source, 
‘simulandum’), simulating system (model, ‘simulans’) and implementing 
system (simulator, see fig. 17). These difficulties are ‘supported’ by the 
closely related and no less complicated sub-concepts ‘representation’ and 
‘model’. As a result, multiple notions of what is meant by simulation in a 
given situation are possible. These different notions prepare the ground for 
the second impeding factor: semantic variety. At least five major accounts of 
simulation can be found when combing through scientific databases: ‘social’ 
often in the form of role-plays (Heitzmann 1973), ‘gaming’ (Crookall 2001), 
‘device’ as in cockpit simulations (Kieras & Bovair 1984), ‘model’ (formal-
mathematical) and ‘cognitive’ simulation (Johnson-Laird 1980; Johnson-Laird 
1983; Gentner & Stevens 1983; Barsalou 1999). Third, to top it all, 
simulations are specialized in bearing complicated content; i.e. the 
represented knowledge is usually dynamic and complex – possibly exactly 
because otherwise the use of such a difficult concept would not be justified. 
In other words, the conceptual difficulty might be viewed as prerequisite that 
allows for the representation of complicated content. In sum, facing these 
impediments, the lack of common sense on simulations appears to be 
understandable. In the next sections, the difficulties shall be analyzed more 
detailed. 
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fig. 17: The concept of simulation. Simulations refer to a certain system (box with symbols). 
The system shows inherent functionality, which results from the activities (arrows) of the 
constitutive elements (symbols) according to certain causal rules. At least three levels of 
simulation can be distinguished: The source denotes the simulated system (‘simulandum’). 
The knowledge structure (‘simulans’) is located in an abstract representational domain. The 
relation between simulans and simulandum is that of modeling. Simulations depend on 
interventions and are therefore instantiated in a simulator, e.g. a cognitive system. 
 
2.1.2.1.  Conceptual difficulty 
 
Simulation is an abstract term and, therefore, particularly prone to 
misunderstandings. A very common misconception, for example, is to mix 
up simulation with animation. What are distinctive features of a simulation 
then? Merriam-Webster’s dictionary (2003) paraphrases simulation as “the 
imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process by 
means of the functioning of another”8. 
  
An essential concept in the paraphrase is “system or process“. Since a 
process, in this context, can be conceived as a certain order of the system’s 
states (in time or in a logical order), I will only use the term “system” in the 
following. The representative aspect of a simulation implies that a simulation 
is not exclusively defined by one entity, but always refers to a second entity. 
                                                 
8 Of course, there are many paraphrases and definitions. However, the concrete paraphrase can be chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily, because it shall not motivate a universally valid account of simulation, but rather serves as a 
starting point for discussions on terminological problems of simulations. 
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Thus, a simulation refers to two systems, in the following called system A 
and system B. Consider system A as the simulation and system B as the 
“original” system, i.e. the system to be simulated. In the style of the 
distinction between the “explanans” and the “explanandum“, I will call A the 
“simulans” and the B the “simulandum” (see fig. 17). The relation between A 
and B is described as an “imitative representation“. This relation can be 
conceived straightforward (like conventional media) as the relation between 
an entity and a picture of that entity. “Imitative” indicates that the 
representation has a specific purpose, namely not merely to depict, but to 
reproduce. Reproduced is the “functioning”. Thus, the analysis so far 
provides at least one specific feature of simulations, namely ”inherent 
functionality”. Represented is not the system itself but the functioning of a 
system. The system’s elements show certain activities according to specific 
regularities. Elements, activities and causal relations “in action” realize the 
functioning of the system. 
 
Inherent functionality is a characteristic specific enough to differentiate 
between simulations and other media. Animations, for example, are not 
inherently functional. They do not aim at reproducing the functions of the 
system; they depict the functioning by applying dynamic images. 
 
However, it is exactly this inherent functionality that gives rise to two further 
conceptual difficulties. The first can also be illustrated by the 
animation/simulation distinction: simulations must be based on models in 
order to reproduce the functioning of the system, while animations can 
depict the functioning just by showing the phenomenological behavior of a 
system that might be based on no model at all or even a wrong model. Thus, 
simulations imply models and, therefore, a theory of simulation necessitates 
a theory of models. Unfortunately, there has been continuing debate about 
the question whether there can be principally a theory of models and it does 
not seem is to find an end (see e.g. Magnani et al. 1999 for a general 
account). A review of these issues would definitely be beyond the scope of 
this article. But it is important to note these circumstances in order to 
understand the potential sources of the conceptual difficulties of 
simulations9. 
                                                 
9 The Problem with ‘Model simulation’. It is suggested here that promising approaches to design simulations as 
media might probably be found if the aspect of models is put to the center. However, if we used the term “model 
simulation” we might have gained a more telling account, but we eventually land ourselves with new problems. First 
of all, it seems to be difficult to think of a simulation that does not imply a model! As already explained, simulation 
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The second conceptual difficulty resulting from inherent functionality relates 
to the issue of representation. As in the case of models, there is no unified 
theory of representation (see also 3.1.3.1). Like all other media simulations 
represent (i.e. “carry information”) about something else. And, again like all 
other media, simulations only represent something in case they are used. (A 
picture of the Eiffel-tower lying in the desert without someone noticing it 
does not actually represent something.) But simulations depend on use in a 
special manner: the functionality inherent in the simulation is only 
represented if a user makes interventions, i.e. it does not only depend on 
perception and cognition but also on decided actions. This distinctive feature 
of simulations renders the attempt to find a common-sense concept of 
simulation extremely difficult because it introduces an undefined human 
factor (a “blank”) into the concept of simulation that demands a triadic 
organizational scheme of simulation (see fig. 17). These relations between 
the three compartments of this organizational scheme will be discussed later 
(see also 2.1.3). 
 
In sum, the conceptual difficulty might explain a large part of the question, 
why no common sense on simulations emerged. The term “simulation” 
invokes an organizational scheme that may encompass three different levels: 
a simulated system (the simulandum), the simulating system (the simulans) 
and a user that processes the simulations (the simulator) make up a 
simulation. The manifold possible relations within and between levels and 
the dependence on human interventions endanger the concept to be vague. 
                                                                                                                                                        
can be conceived as a simulandum that is represented by a simulans. On the one hand, the simulandum can be 
conceived as a model for the simulans, on the other hand the simulans can be conceived as a model of the 
simulandum. It should be noted that this relation is mutual but not reciprocal as indicated by the different 
prepositions of model (“model of” vs. “model for“). That means, the representation as such could be conceived as a 
model. (You can exchange “imitative representation” with “modeling” in the paraphrase used above.) Thus, it could 
be argued that the concept of model simulation is redundant or even circular. The second problem with the 
supplementary term ‘model’ relates to the semantics. Model might have even more meanings than simulation. Since 
even philosophy of science has a continuing debate about models (see e.g. Magnani et al. 1999), I will not go into 
detail here. Thus, it might be concluded that the combination of the term model with the term simulation multiplies 
the probability of misunderstandings. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the term is common: the extra use of 
the term model indicates explicitly that the simulation refers to a formal model. Furthermore, the process of 
modeling (that must have been passed before) is highlighted. As a side effect the deceptive notion is avoided. 
Finally, the term ‘model simulation’ is commonly used and, actually, in many cases media are meant. In this respect, 
the use of the term is justified by the use of the term. What is the recommendation following from all these pros 
and cons? The use of the term ‘model simulation’ does not help in the long run. But what is meant by the people 
using the term presumably leads to a precise account of simulations as media because the ‘modeling community’ 
has the most advanced and formalized approach that should help to design simulations as media. (Frankly spoken, I 
would be happy if I could omit the ‘model’ supplement, but I am afraid that more people will misunderstand what I 
mean when I just say ‘simulation’.) 
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However, the feature of inherent functionality provides a means for 
differentiating between simulations and all other media. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Semantic variety 
 
Almost inescapably, the aforementioned difficulties to conceptualize 
simulations result in a ‘rich’ semantic variety. In order to coarsely categorize 
different accounts of simulations, some of them shall be considered in the 
following. Since there are too many different accounts of simulations to deal 
with all of them, only selected domains that frequently “pop up” during 
inquiries on (various) scientific databases shall be considered. Moreover, I 
will focus on the last decades since before then the term was mainly used in 
a purely abstract sense (see e.g. Baudrillard 1988) or in the sense of 
deception. Both of these notions will not be considered since they do not 
lead to an understanding of simulations as media. 
 
a. Social Simulation 
An early use of simulation can be found in relation to social situations (see 
e.g. Heitzmann 1973), especially in the business or management and in the 
political domain. The objectives range from personnel training for specific 
(social) skills, assessment of applicants, conflict resolutions (‘war games’) 
and the control of complex decisive situations. This account of simulation is 
often designed as role-play or board game and does not necessarily rely on 
computers. 
 
b. Gaming Simulation 
The “gaming” domain is similar to social simulations insofar that role plays or 
especially training board games might count as the precursors of fun-
oriented games. In its computerized form this simulation domain is probably 
today’s most popular as indicated by the commercial success of the various 
computer products (e.g. SimcityTM to name only a ‘classic’). Despite its 
‘funny’ notion gaming can have serious implications for the development of 
simulations in general (see e.g. Crookall 2001). 
 
c. Device Simulation 
Another customary simulation account is, as social simulation, grounded in 
the training domain. Device simulations were used early and are still used for 
training controllers of all kinds for mobile devices (e.g. pilots, astronauts) or 
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local devices (e.g. plants, machines, robots). Traditionally, device simulations 
are implemented as hardware (i.e. as a cockpit), but nowadays there are 
probably outnumbered by computerized devices (i.e. flight simulator). The 
example of the flight simulator illustrates that device simulations can be 
gaming simulations. 
 
d. Cognitive Simulation 
Any simulation has a correspondence “in the head of the user” (see fig. 18). 
Approaches to such cognitive representations of simulations can be termed 
cognitive or mental simulation. Approaches from cognitive psychology are 
most noteworthy in this context. Promising candidates for capturing the 
cognitive part of simulation are schemas (see e.g. Rumelhart 1980) or mental 
models (especially Gentner & Stevens 1983 but also Johnson-Laird 1983). 
Mental simulation is directly addressed and related to other cognitive 
theories by Barsalou (1999). 
 
e. Model Simulation 
A large part of ‘everyday’ simulation is covered by the formerly presented 
accounts. Nevertheless, the formally oriented simulation domain is missing. 
Consider an economist doing statistics in order to predict the gain of stocks, 
an engineer evaluating a circuit design for a power plant in a laboratory 
setup with resistors and capacitors or a biologist analyzing motion vision in 
an artificial neural network. All of these simulation types (more or less) 
explicitly refer to theoretical or formal models. The economist assumes a 
statistical, the engineer an electro-technical and the biologist a functional 
model. Since the economist’s situation can be conceived as a social 
simulation and the engineer’s as a device simulation it is evident that model 
simulations – like the other accounts – do not form an exclusive account of 
simulation. Model simulation the most promising candidate for the venture 
of designing simulations as media. It is broad enough to include a wealth of 
different simulation situations and demarcates from social or mental 
simulation (that do not directly refer to media), but rather include the media- 
related forms of, for example, gaming and device simulations. And it is 
based on formal grounds. 
 
The accounts presented above illustrate the semantic variety of simulations. 
They do not form exclusive domains, but rather are possible roles of 
simulations that resulted in certain application contexts or development 
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traditions. Thus, they can be related to each other or contained in another. 
However, as can be concluded from a missing common ground in terms of 
theory, methodology or terminology, the state of theoretical integration 
between the various accounts does not appear to be very advanced. In 
practice, people may very well find themselves talking at cross purposes 
(consider a meeting of an social simulation expert and a model simulation 
expert.) Thus, semantic variety provides another intelligible reason for the 
lack of a common sense on simulations. 
 
2.1.2.3.  Complicated content 
 
The third major factor that impedes the emergence of a common sense on 
simulations refers to the kind of knowledge that is represented in 
simulations, i.e. the content. Consider the motivation to simulate: 
simulations are usually carried out because ‘reality’ (the simulandum) is not 
sufficiently tractable – it is too difficult, too complex, too dynamic …, in short 
too complicated (see below). Thus, simulations usually represent complicated 
content. Systems with simple functionality do not necessitate simulations 
because they can be readily explained in words (e.g. “a bread slicer functions 
by a applying a sharp edge to the loaf”). But especially systems showing 
dynamics and complexity call for simulations (see also 1.1.11). Their 
behavior often is not predictable and therefore examined by probing the 
system with parameter variations frequently accompanied by dynamic 
visualizations of the resulting changes in the system’s behavior. The result of 
the learning process might in large parts not be explicit knowledge about the 
world but rather implicit skills in controlling the system (a circumstance that 
complicates the assessment of learning success). On this view, the resulting 
knowledge is often non-declarative or procedural and hard to express in 
words (e.g. Anderson 1980). Thus, another factor impeding the development 
of common sense for simulations becomes obvious: It would be naïve to 
assume that a medium specialized in representing complicated content could 
be convincingly standardized by defining a few simple classification criteria. 
On the contrary, in order to represent complicated content, simulations have 
to be extremely versatile. 
 
It should be noted that complicated content is not assumed to be 
characteristic for specific knowledge domains, e.g. physics, biology etc. 
Complicated content is assumed to result from general properties of the 
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knowledge represented in simulations, e.g. dynamics, complexity etc. The 
ability to represent complicated content drives frameworks for simulations to 
represent any imaginable kind of knowledge (e.g. MatLabTM). Not without 
good reason, simulation environments are endowed with all prerequisites for 
a ‘production system’ in the sense of Andersons Act-R (see e.g. Anderson 
1993). However, versatility and arbitrariness are two sides of the same coin. 
The versatility of simulation takes a heavy toll on standardization. 
 
In sum, three major factors impeding the emergence of common sense and 
standards are proposed: the conceptual difficulty refers to the triadic 
organizational structure of simulation with simulandum, simulans and 
simulator (e.g. nature, knowledge, cognition) that is – mutually potentiated 
by such complicated sub-concepts as ‘representation’ and ‘model’. As a 
result, multiple accounts of what is meant by the term simulation in a given 
situation are possible. These different accounts, together with the domains 
to which simulation can be applied, prepare the ground for the second 
impeding factor, namely semantic variety. Finally, the content, i.e. the 
represented knowledge, is usually complicated (e.g. dynamic and complex). 
The capability of representing complicated content might be viewed as a 
cause for conceptual difficulty and semantic variety. 
 
2.1.3. Towards the core of simulation 
 
2.1.3.1.  Simulation and media 
 
The impediments explained above raise the question where to begin with 
standardization attempts? Usually, standards are to be applied to media. 
Consequently, simulations should be conceivable as a certain type of medium 
that runs on a device (as a film that runs on TV). On this view, the simulation 
would be what is left when the device is removed. If people were asked what 
device could be taken for realizing simulations, the answer would in most 
cases presumably be: a computer! The obvious reason is that the ‘inherent 
functionality’ of simulations (see above) depends on an implementation that 
goes beyond plain rendering. In order to provide all the facilities necessary to 
process and control a simulation, a versatile device as a computer seems to 
be indispensable. But the fixed focus on the computer can also hinder a clear 
view on the essentials. Think of simulations on cell phones or, particularly, 
on TV accessible via digital satellite receivers and used with remote controls. 
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Such applications might be tomorrow’s standards10. However, simulation 
may even happen without any technical help, e.g. in social simulations (role-
plays). In these cases humans provide the device and the medium is spoken 
language (sometimes combined with print media containing definitions and 
rules). Finally, simulation may also happen exclusively in the cognitive 
domain. For example, consider an athlete (e.g. a high jumper or a bob pilot) 
cognitively simulating the task before starting an attempt. 
 
The case of cognitive simulation is most interesting for attempts of 
standardizing simulations. It shows that simulation can very well be given 
without any tangible representation as a medium. The representation can be 
exclusively cognitive. Of course, to a certain degree this situation applies to 
all kinds of media: a picture, a text or a film is only a functional medium 
when perceived and processed in some way. But a pure cognitive 
representation of films and texts is not easily conceivable. (It seems easier to 
conceive the cognitive form of films or texts as cognitive simulations.) On the 
other hand, films or texts as pure media have a straightforward meaning 
(videotape or book). Thus, films and texts are well defined by being a specific 
medium11. Certainly, a simulation can be represented on CD (e.g. SimCityTM), 
but a simulation on CD appears not to be as complete as a film on videotape 
or text in a book. 
 
A possible answer to the question what is actually missing could be: 
simulations are generally not consumed, like films and texts are consumed, 
but have to be done. Doing a simulation requires actions and actions require 
decisions. Simulations are incomplete as long as nobody decides what shall 
happen and carries out the corresponding interventions12. Consider a 
rehearsal of a text or imagery of a film and compare these to simulation. 
More specific, compare (perhaps facilitated by closed eyes) a mental film of 
the high jumper’s attempt to a cognitive simulation of the high jumper’s 
attempt. In the case of the film the trajectory is fixed and the result is known. 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the MPEG-Consortium (MPEG 2002) has acknowledged this challenge in their specification 
process of the forthcoming MPEG-formats 7 and 21 that attach more importance to interactivity. 
11 In simulations, the functioning of the medium as such is modified. Such decision processes are not possible in 
films or texts. Changing the functioning of films or texts would mean to intervene in the plot, e.g. by changing the 
character of a role. Of course, a DVD offering different ends for films or texts offering several strands of the plot 
might be conceived as marginal cases. However, they are not distinctive features of the respective medium. 
12 Since the term ‘interaction’ gives rise to uncertainties about the causal direction of a relation and, particularly, 
since it does not clearly express that a simulation is driven by the user’s decisions (e.g. by parameter variation) the 
term ‘intervention’ is used. 
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In the case of a simulation, the trajectory still has to be determined – 
according to different hypothesis certain steps can be exchanged, varied, 
tried anew etc. – and the result of the simulation will depend on the decisions 
and interventions made in the runtime of the simulation. While the cognitive 
processes that accompany films and texts are primarily media-driven, 
cognition that accompanies simulations has to drive the medium. 
 
In sum, the attempt to distinguish between media and device fails in the case 
of simulations because the device still has to specify what the medium will be 
like. On this view, simulations are characterized by a lack of specification. 
This raises serious questions for any standardization attempt: How can we 
standardize a lack of specification? How can we expect a self-contained 
format for simulations when there will always be blanks in simulations that 
have to filled in by human decisions13? On the other hand, the analysis above 
peeled out a human factor; namely decisions (and eventually interventions) 
carried out in runtime of simulations that distinguish simulations from other 
media. Thus, when standardization attempts come in at this point, there is a 
chance of finding adequate criteria for specifications. 
 
2.1.3.2.  Standardizing humans? 
 
Standards usually refer to media, not to human decisions. How can a 
standard for simulations that incorporates human decisions then be 
accomplished? Even though there might be no clear-cut between medium 
and human, there is still possible distinction between a medial part and a 
cognitive part of the simulation. Since there is no way to standardize the 
human decision process itself, the place nearest to the decision process has 
to be chosen. This place is at the interface between medium and human. An 
adequate conceptual framework has to encompass the medial and human 
part and the respective interfaces (see fig. 18). Consider a user in front of a 
simulation-device (e.g. a computer with monitor) starting a simulation, say, 
of a thermostat with a control instrument (e.g. mouse). As stated above, the 
simulation shows an inherent functionality. In order to unfold that 
functionality the user has to act on the simulation. Interventions change the 
state of the simulation from S(t0) to S(t1) that might be monitored (in most 
                                                 
13 Maybe, it is the difficulty of this task that hindered the most an emergence of a unified conception of simulation 
as media. Providing space for decision processes means to provide certain degrees of freedom – and providing 
degrees of freedom is something that directly contradicts the nature of standardization. It is hardly conceivable that 
this field of tension is easily overcome. 
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cases visually) and fed back to the user. Cognitive processes referring to the 
new state at t1 of the simulation close the circle. Another intervention 
establishes a feedback-loop. Then, the user is embedded in the simulation-
cycle.  
 
The means by which the user can inform the medial part of the simulation 
about the decisions is an intervention that can be transmitted through the 
input devices. The intervention is received at a specific interface between 
medium and human. Such intervention ports are usually realized as buttons, 
sliders etc. In the absence of methods that directly include the decisions, 
they can be constrained by providing a limited number of intervention ports, 
providing them at certain places, at certain moments in time etc. 
 
fig. 18: Simulation cycle as human-computer interac ion. The user receives sensory input of 
a system’s medial representation, processes it and decides to start an intervention that is 
realized via behavioral outputs and device inputs. The intervention affects elements in the 




0). These changes 
cause changes in other elements of the system due to certain causal relations. The overall 
result is a new state of the system (t1) that is presented on an output device and processed 
again. Arrows indicate tempo al order. Dotted arrows indicate that a process is carried out 
only virtually. 
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As prescriptions for the design of intervention ports, standards reflecting the 
human factor could well be introduced. Intervention ports have the neatest 
correspondence to human decisions in the medial representation of the 
simulation. 
 
2.1.3.3.  A theory of cognitive simulation 
 
Practitioners might maintain that – even without any explicit consideration of 
prescriptions for intervention ports and a theory about the corresponding 
cognitive processes – there are many examples of well-designed simulations. 
Indeed, we have a tacit understanding of intervention design (i.e. we know 
where and when we have to place a button or slider)14. But in order to state 
explicitly and explain causally what factor enhances or weakens the 
simulation we need to test systematically (along the lines of a theoretical 
framework encompassing the corresponding cognitive processes). The 
analysis above showed that simulations represent complex and dynamic 
knowledge by providing systems with inherent functionality that are to be 
operated by specific interventions. According to this description, a cognitive 
theory must explain: 
1. the representation of complexity and dynamics 
2. how representations can be inherently functional 
3. inferences based on these representations 
4. how decisions and interventions are inferred and carried out 
5. the general correspondence between medial and cognitive simulation 
(i.e. provide a representational framework) 
 
Cognitive psychology offers several approaches of complex or ‘molar’ 
knowledge structures, e.g. schemas (Bartlett 1932; Rumelhart 1980; Mandler 
1984), frames (Minsky M. 1975), scripts (Schank R. & Abelson R. 1977) and 
mental models (Johnson-Laird 1980; 1983; Gentner & Stevens 1983). 
According to Brewer (1987), the former three can all be subsumed under 
schemas, while mental models have to be distinguished from these. Brewer 
describes schemas as unconscious mental structures underlying the molar 
aspects of human knowledge and skill that involve ‘old’ generic information. 
Mental models, then, shall account not only for ‘old’ information but also for 
                                                 
14 The design of simulations might be so familiar to us because cognitive simulation is a natural way to compile 
knowledge (cf. Barsalou 1999). Moreover, the designer’s (author’s) method to anticipate what the user will do is 
conceivable as that kind of mental simulation as it is used to explain folk psychology (cf. Gordon 1986).  
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situations we have never been in before, i.e. they demand imagery and 
inference. Concerning the differences between schemas and mental models, 
Brewer points out that schemas are precompiled generic knowledge 
structures, while mental models are constructed at the time of use. Thus, 
with respect to the demands 3 and 4, mental models clearly outperform 
schemas as a candidate for explaining simulations. (Even though schemas 
might not be the right choice for explaining inference, they definitely play a 
role in explaining the ‘precompiled’ parts of a mental model.)Inside the 
research tradition of mental models two different threads have to be 
distinguished: one referring primarily to Johnson-Laird (1980; 1983) and one 
referring primarily to Gentner and Stevens (1983). According to a distinction 
that Markman & Genter (2001) suggest, each approach might play its specific 
role in explaining simulations – Johnson-Laird’s in the explanation of logical 
models and Gentner & Stevens’ in the explanation of causal models (see also 
3.1.2). 
 
Obviously, there are many more sources to be taken into account for 
explanations of the cognitive aspects of simulation. For example the issues 
of implicit learning (Berry & Broadbent 1988), procedural knowledge 
(Anderson 1993), complex problem solving (Dörner & Wearing 1995; Funke 
1992) or general cognitive architectures (Anderson 1993; Johnson-Laird et 
al. 1987) certainly provide rich resources. Most notably, there are accounts 
directly addressing the issue of cognitive (mental) simulation (e.g. Barsalou 
1999). But, a comprehensive review of these theories and an evaluation in 
terms of the aptitude for explaining simulations would be beyond the scope 
of the present context (see, however, 3.1). In a first step, it is sufficient to 
put to the record that mental models provide a theoretical framework that 
can principally meet the demands of a cognitive theory of simulation and that 
numerous further specific theories can supplement the mental model theory. 
 
2.1.4. Practical implications 
 
In the absence of widespread standards, each project that deals with 
simulations can contribute significantly to standardization ventures in that it 
stringently integrates specific features of simulation into their architectures 
(databases, metadata-tools, experimental setups etc.) and test their practical 
value. An example how this can be accomplished is given in the following 
(see table 7). 
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table 7: Examples of criteria characterizing simulations. See text for detailed description. 
feature attribute Comment 
 
INTERVENTION FEATURES 
intervention type [passive | scalar | discrete | 
continuous | immersive | … ] 
ranging from minimal to maximal 
intervention depth [ trigger | visualization | parameter 
variation | element design | system 
variation | system design | …] 
ranging from superficial or deep 
intervention ports [ 0 | 1-5 | 6-20 | 21-50 | > 51 ] number, classification arbitrary 
… … … 
 
SYSTEM FEATURES 
system representation [ text | symbolic | graphic | … ] comprising sheer naming (e.g. 
filename), full-text description, 
formula, schemes, 3D-models etc.  
system behavior [ digits | data visualizations | 
animated graphics | … ] 
e.g. digits in a command line, plots, 
oscilloscopes, dynamic 3D 
update procedure [ static | stepwise static | stepwise 
dynamic | continuous dynamic | …] 
describes what changes caused by 
interventions are computed and 
shown 
variables [ 1 to 5 (S) | 6-20 (M) | 21-50 (L) | > 
51 (XL)] 
number, classification arbitrary 
connectivity level [ > 1 | ~1 | < 1 ] quotient of variables and 
connections 
connectivity type  [ directional | mutual] naming of predominant type  
feedback [ 0 | 1 | n ] order of feedback, n is given by the 
number of interconnected feedback 
systems 
learning [ yes | no ] system stores previous states 
… … … 
 
COMBINED FEATURES 
coverage [ 0 < x < 1 ] quotient of variables and 
intervention Ports 
size (time of use) [ 0 < x < n ] quotient of variables x connectivity 
level x … related to intervention 
ports 
… … … 
 
2.1.4.1. Intervention features 
 
How can the interventions that drive simulations be characterized? The 
intervention type might be passive (start/stop of a sequence), scalar (slow 
motion, spatial resolution etc.), discrete (setting of initial-
conditions/discontinuous parameter variation), continuous (effects of 
parameter variation visible without further operation) or immersive 
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(parameter variation directly changes system representation). The 
intervention depth describes how the simulated system is affected. Ranging 
from external to internal, the system can be affected by way of trigger, 
visualization, parameter variation, element design, system variation, or 
system design. Intervention type and intervention depth are just two 
examples of simulation features that refer to the human factor. 
 
2.1.4.2.  System features 
 
Independent from the human factor, but indispensable for assessing and 
classifying the simulation are the system features. A minimalist form of a 
system representation would be the sheer naming of the simulandum. Other 
forms are e.g. full-text, formula or graphics. Dynamics and therewith the 
system’s behavior is mediated by process representations that can 
encompass digits in a command line representing the state of an element, 
data visualizations (e.g. plots or color-coded schemes) or animated graphics 
resembling real-world situations. These representations of processes can be 
further characterized by the update procedure, which can be: static (the 
behavior is visualized as a simple plot, e.g. representing an input output 
relation, no intervention possible), stepwise static (interactive plotting of 
states, one datum per intervention), stepwise dynamic (triggering one 
sequence after initialization, e.g. a ‘sweep’ shown in an oscilloscope) or 
continuous dynamic (effects of interventions are visualized dynamically in 
runtime). Complexity can be characterized by the number of variables 
contributing to the functionality and the connectivity between them. For 
practical reasons the number of variables could be classified: 1 to 5 (S), 6-20 
(M), 21-50 (L), > 51 (XL). Several cases of connectivity levels could be taken 
into account: each variable affects each other variable (>1), one variable 
affects one (~1) or less than one (<1) other variable. It might be practical to 
distinguish connectivity types on the basis of specific architectures 
(hierarchical, serial, parallel, layered etc.). In the spatial domain, connectivity 
can be predominantly directional or mutual. In the temporal domain 
connectivity can be ‘feed-forward’ or ‘feed-back’. If specific rules change the 
connectivity as such (and the changes are stored) learning takes place in the 
simulation. The type of operators used could further describe functionality: it 
can be qualitative, logical (‘and’, ‘or’ etc.) or relational (‘more’, ‘less’ etc.), or 
quantitative (numerical). However, the specification should be left to formal 
experts. 
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2.1.4.3.  Combined features 
 
The above named criteria describing intervention and system features can be 
combined to form further telling criteria. For example, an important feature 
of simulations is that not all of the variables are accessible to the user. In 
most cases – especially in the educational domain – the challenge of 
intervention design is to provide only ‘relevant’ intervention ports to specific 
variables, while the ‘irrelevant’ variables are hidden. This coverage15 can be 
defined as the ratio of the number of intervention ports and the number of 
contributing variables (0 > x > 1). 
 
In a similar combinatorial fashion, the size of a simulation can be defined as 
the state space of the system, e.g. by merging the number of variables with 
depth and type of spatial and temporal connectivity and relate this to the 
number of intervention ports. Such a feature (also to be properly designed by 
formal experts) could gain insight on the time-range a simulation offers: 
greater state spaces generally contain more possible trajectories a user can 
choose and the greater the number of trajectories the greater the time a user 
can spend. 
 
2.1.4.4.  Things left aside 
 
Beside the intervention and system features that characterize simulations as 
media, simulations have a specific content, belong to a subject etc. 
Numerous criteria for describing the simulated system in this respect can be 
found, e.g. is it concrete or abstract, natural or artificial etc. However, those 
features are not under investigation here. It is assumed that every application 
context will have its own taxonomy for the respective subject area, probably 
borrowed from bibliographic databases (see also 1.3.4). Also ignored were 
the technical specification criteria: Which programming language is used (e.g. 
C/C++, Java, Delphi), is it a pre-specified format (e.g. ToolbookTM, 
ShockwaveTM, FlashTM), which platforms (WindowsTM, MacOSTM, Unix-
derivatives, cross-platform etc.) are possible etc.? Furthermore, the 
simulation may have a specific role, e.g. scientific, educational, economical 
                                                 
15 The art of designing a simulation as a convenient medium is to make the necessary decision processes easy, to 
design easy intervention ports. It should be noted that – contrary to the widespread expectation of ‘good’ 
simulations being massively interactive – interaction might be heavily restricted in convenient simulations. In this 
sense, a simulation that shall be powerful is at risk of being inconvenient. On the other hand, a simulation being 
user friendly is endangered of being trivial. Thus, simulation design is always a power-convenience trade-off. 
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etc. For characterizing simulations as educational media, for example, it has 
to be specified which type of use (e.g. demonstration, individual, grouped) is 
possible, which prerequisites (prior knowledge, qualifications etc.) are given, 
what the context is (single unit, course, exam) etc. Here the LOM or projects 
like the Educational Modelling Language EML (Koper 2003) come into play 
since they provide metadata designed for this purpose. A comprehensive 
characterization of simulations as media somehow has to incorporate all 
types of criteria. Of course, it should be ensured that the resulting set of 
criteria is small enough to be manageable. 
 
2.1.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
The analysis given above can be summarized as follows. (1) Simulations have 
specific features: they represent inherent functionality of a (complex and/or 
dynamic) system that is to be operated by specific interventions. (2) The core 
of simulation is cognitive: simulations contain a human factor (i.e. decisions 
preceding interventions) that cannot be directly included in simulation 
standards, but can be approached indirectly by the design of intervention 
ports. (3) Standardization ventures should therefore refer to a (still not 
mature) cognitive theory of simulation (and corresponding experimental 
paradigms) that should protect them from ending halfway because having 
missed the human point. In sum, the venture of standardizing simulations is 
still in its infancy. The period of every expert clearing one’s own path to 
simulation is not yet overcome. With respect to conceptual difficulty, 
semantic variety and the specialization in complicated content, the must of 
expertise is no surprise: the versatility of simulation takes a heavy toll on 
standardization! However, continuing effort will make this exclusive medium 
– at the moment primarily preserved to experts – finally fully accessible to 
the public. The venture of standardizing simulations goes uphill all the way – 
but it goes. 
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Reading Advice 
The Simulation-Special provided an introduction into the various notions o  simulation by f
asking whether simulation can be conceived as a medium like a film or a text is conceived as 
a medium. It was shown that simulations – contrary to films or texts – crucially depend on 
interventions in their inherent functionality. Simulations can therefore be successfully 
conceived as media if (and only if) the human factor is clarified and respected. But this also 
implies that focusing on media will bring us only halfway in understanding simulation. An 
approach to simulation that can reconcile the variety o  notions has – as it was already f
suggested in the Simulation-Special – to focus on the human factor. In the next section, this 
human factor will be analyzed in the context of scientific work. Where else than in science 
can we find a more sophisticated and well-planned exertion of simulation as an explanatory 
tool!? Thus, scientific work will serve as a good practice scenario of simulation and therewith 
as a basis for the analysis of behavioral and mental processes accompanying simulation. 
This analysis aims at the extraction of a unifying account of simulation – a generic 
simulation scheme. 
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2.2.  Simulation in Science 
 
Simulation performed on computers has matured to an approved method in 
science. But its benefits of gaining explanatory power and new insights often 
are achieved at the cost of introducing new problems: How abstract might 
simulation be? Is natural plausibility of the simulation mandatory? How to 
evaluate the explanatory value of the simulation? Who actually needs 
simulation? Some of these problems are due to novelty effects that will sort 
themselves out in time. But the confusion also unveils serious inconsistencies 
in the underlying conceptions. The following section shall address some of 
the conceptual issues by providing a framework in which simulation can be 
understood as a genuine part of scientific work. First, a general 
characterization of a scientific workflow with the aspects ‘theory’, ‘design’, 
‘experiment’ and ‘evaluation’ is provided. Particularly, it is discussed how the 
specific aspects of modeling and simulation relate to this workflow. It is 
argued that simulation – the external and the internal aspects – are best 
understood in a framework that focuses on mental simulation of the system 
under scrutiny. This framework allows comprehending why ‘artificial 
preparations’ such as simulations help to scrutinize natural phenomena. 
 
2.2.1. Scientific work 
 
The specific role that simulation plays in scientific work can be understood 
theoretically and practically. I chose a practical account. Therefore, I will not 
provide an exhaustive review of philosophy of science (but see e.g. Carnap 
1995 for a concise textbook account and  Bechtel et al. 2001 for a specific 
account of the brain sciences). Neither will I introduce any particular account 
for the aspect of modeling (but see Magnani et al. 1999 for a general 
introduction and see  Webb 2001 for brain sciences). I presume that 
simulation in science is, in most of the cases, model simulation. Instead, I 
will provide a simple, practical account of scientific work that includes the 
aspects of modeling and simulation and extend this account to a more 
generalized (cognitive) framework. This framework shall help to ‘dissect’ 
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2.2.1.1. A scientific workflow. 
 
Consider the following four aspects of scientific work: 
(1) Theory: system specification, problem analysis, hypothesis, prediction 
(2) Design: methods, experimental protocols, problem–operationalization  
(3) Experiment: concrete setup, preparation, data acquisition 
(4) Evaluation: data analysis, statistics, conclusion, discussion 
 
Obviously, these four aspects are interwoven and not clearly demarcated 
from each other. Even more important, they are additionally circular in that 
the experimental design (last aspect) leads consequently to the experiment 
(first aspect): the conclusion refers to hypothesis and implies suggestions for 
what to do next. In order to illustrate the different aspects they will be 
discussed in an example (the four aspects of scientific work are indicated by 
the numbers in parenthesis): A neuroscientist studies the visual system of 
flies. Assume that the fly is integrated in an experimental setup in which the 
electrical activity of single neurons in the fly’s brain can be observed on an 
oscilloscope and registered on a computer while arbitrary visual stimuli can 
be presented. The neuroscientist – for the sake of legibility let us assume 
that the neuroscientist is female – can individually identify neurons in each 
fly preparation by the response to a motion stimulus probe. Thus, she knows 
that the neuron responds to moving stimuli. She hypothesizes that the 
neuron is involved in a figure detection task (1). For this to be true, the 
neuron must specifically react to a specific stimulus condition, e.g. a dark 
spot in front of a light background (2). The experiment (3) yields data 
showing that the activity change during presentation of the stimulus was 
above chance (4). Now, she knows that the neuron reacts to a moving spot, 
but she does not know if this stimulus is specific, i.e. if it can be called ‘a 
figure’ (1)? The cell could react to movements of large spots as well (2). So 
she decides to test different sizes of the spot (3). She chooses, say, ten 
stimulus sizes and tests each stimulus, say, 50 times (randomized) in, say, 
20 individual fly preparations. She will digitally record the responses and 
build mean values of each response amplitude of the different stimulus sizes. 
As a summary of her experiment, she can plot the ten mean responses (and 
variance) against the corresponding stimulus size (4) (see fig. 19). The 
aspects of modeling and simulation will be considered extra in the following 
paragraphs for assessing the role simulation plays in this workflow. 
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fig. 19: Characteristic of a model neuron. Maximal response amplitude (ordinate) increases 
with stimulus amplitude (abscissa). Linespoints (dotted) show hypothetical measured values 
with standard variation. Line shows approximation of the relation between stimulus and 
response with logistic function. 
 
2.2.1.2. Modeling and simulation 
 
Further consider our female neuroscientist studying figure detection in flies. 
By connecting the ten points graphically with a line, she can construct a 
preliminary stage of a simple model of the neuron (more exactly: of it’s 
response properties), i.e. its characteristic for different stimulus sizes under 
the specific experimental conditions that she used. It should be noted that 
she has not measured the values on the line between the data points; but by 
graphically extrapolating these points, she assumes the relation between 
stimulus size and response to be continuous. (It might be the case, however 
improbable, that somewhere in between two measured stimulus sizes the cell 
does not respond at all or completely different from her assumptions.) The 
assumed relation in the characteristic can be considered a model of the 
neuron’s response properties. She can predict a response for a given 
stimulus condition from the characteristic by reading the response for the 
corresponding stimulus size from the plot. She does not have to measure 
again, i.e. she does not have to go through the workflow again! (It should be 
noted that this is already a kind of mental simulation of the experimental 
situation.) Alternative to the graphical extrapolation, she can fit a curve to 
the data points. This mathematical method has the advantage of providing 
not only a graphical but also a formal model of the neuron’s response 
properties. For example, she could take the logistic function y=1/(1+e−ax) 
 161
2. SIMULATION   
representing a sigmoid characteristic. In a simple case, she has to adjust the 
parameter a for receiving a fit accounting for the data points. Then, the 
response amplitude y can be predicted simply by computing the model for a 
given x. 
 
Of course, models are frequently much more complex and comprise 
numerous series of experiments in which theory, design, experiment and 
evaluation are nested in a sometimes complicated manner. For example, our 
neuroscientist has to exclude errors and corroborate the specificity of the 
neuron’s response properties by testing for further stimulus properties that 
could also cause the same responses of the neuron, e.g. contrast, color, 
patterns, motion etc. As a further step, by analyzing other neurons that feed 
into or are fed by the putative figure detection neuron she might by able to 
assign or even construct a model of the whole figure detection mechanism. 
For clarifying, whether the neuron plays a role in that specific figure 
detection mechanism, she implements it as a computer program and 
simulates the situation she has chosen in her experiments. By using 
comparable stimuli in both experiment and simulation, she can observe the 
response properties of the model neuron and compare it to her experimental 
results. Consistency between the response properties of the natural 
preparation and the model confirms her hypothesis, while differences point 
at problems. Now, she can use the model to simulate other stimulus 
conditions and predict how the neuron will respond. Consistency between 
simulations and experiment, again, corroborates her hypothesized 
mechanism. In this way, natural and artificial preparations supplement each 
other. 
 
It should become clear from the aforementioned that modeling is embedded 
in the scientific workflow. It relates to evaluation (4) in that it results from 
data analysis, but also contains elements of theory (1) in that assumptions on 
the system under scrutiny are made. It relates to the design (2) and 
experiment (3) as well, but only theoretically: by accepting a model, it is 
assumed unnecessary to perform the experiment for each value because it 
will supposedly bring the result predicted by the model. In a sense, the 
experiment is carried out virtually in the cognitive domain. The model builds 
a short cut between theoretical analysis and data analysis. 
Where is simulation in this conception? If the scientific workflow was 
considered as a circuit with the aspects theory, design, experiment and 
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evaluation and if the model is considered as that component, which realizes 
the short cut between theory and data, then simulation can be considered as 
the entirety of processes going on in the short circuit. Thus, simulation is 
more than the model. It implies: 
i. rules for applying the model that result from the stage of theoretical 
analysis, i.e. hypothesis or problem definition, 
ii. a prediction in the form of choosing initial parameters for the model 
(experimental design), 
iii. operating the model (experiment), 
iv. an evaluation of the output (or at least a preliminary stage of 
evaluation). 
 
In the case of the neuroscientist simulating the model of the figure detection 
mechanism she has to define the problem (i): “Does the model mechanism 
respond specifically to figures or also to other stimuli?” Further, she has to 
parameterize the model (ii), and run the model on the computer (iii). Finally 
she has evaluate the results, i.e. determine if the response to figures is 
specific (iv). Seen from the perspective of the scientist, it does not make a 
difference if she interacts with the model or with the natural preparation (i.e. 
the fly) – in both cases she performs scientific work as it was defined above. 
 
In the case of the neuroscientist applying the simple graphical characteristic 
of the neuron just by looking at it and analyzing it (without a computer), 
speaking of simulation appears to be less adequate at first glance. But she 
also has to define the problem (i), e.g. determine responses for stimuli she 
has not measured. As a form of theoretical analysis, the neuroscientist 
(implicitly) instantiates participating elements and activities (setting up the 
model), i.e. that there is a neuron, that it receives an input value, that it 
generates an output value (and, usually, that it serves a specific function, e.g. 
figure detection). She has to specify the parameters (ii), e.g. by looking at the 
abscissa for a given stimulus size. She presumes that the model will behave 
in certain manner if she imposes certain conditions on the model, i.e. an 
input value of x will result in y. Thus, choosing a certain case (selecting a 
value of a variable, defining a parameter set) reflects the principle of 
experimental design. She has to operate the model (iii), e.g. look at the 
ordinate for obtaining the response value. She has to generate the 
appropriate eye movements to produce the sensations necessary for 
concluding the neuron’s response for a given input amplitude. Finally, she 
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has to evaluate it, e.g. accept it as plausible and assess the implications for 
the question posed. So, again, all aspects of scientific work are implied in 
this case. If simulation is seen as the short-circuit of scientific work 
introduced above, applying the graphical characteristic is also a kind of 
simulation. 
 
Another case, even more ‘decoupled’ from practical scientific work, is given 
when the neuroscientist simulates the characteristic (e.g. the logistic 
function) exclusively mental. Visualization (imagery) can cast the inner eye on 
the sigmoid form of the characteristic and help the experienced 
neuroscientist to find the correct response amplitude for a given stimulus 
size. She might not be able to determine the exact value, but she will be able 
to give an approximated answer in terms of ranges in which the response 
might occur. For example, she might chop the characteristic into the three 
parts: ‘pre-threshold’, ‘dynamic range’ and ‘saturation’. She can conclude 
from this partitioning that increasing the stimulus size at large values, say, 
relative values between 0.9 and 1, will result in only minimal changes of the 
response amplitude. Moreover, if she knows the steepness of the quasi-
linear dynamic range she can approximate it by a linear function y=a·x. 
Without any external media or devices, she can even make a good guess for 
the exact value of a response amplitude y for a given stimulus size x. This 
case illustrates that scientific work can be performed also independent of 
external events, i.e. a fly, an experimental setup, digital data etc. All 
conditions necessary for scientific work are already ‘in the scientist’. 
 
The cases provided above show that simulation comprises the four aspects of 
scientific work introduced above. Thus, simulation can be conceived as 
virtual experimental work, hypothesis testing or scientific reasoning (see 
Klahr 2000 for a similar account). On first glance, this notion of scientific 
work appears very general. For example, data analysis is usually conceived as 
acting on externalized data (e.g. files on paper or in a computer) and not as a 
brain process of the scientist that accompany eye movements directed to 
data. Moreover, simulations are usually known as computer simulations, not 
as mental states and affairs. But it is also evident that any data analysis and 
any computer simulation is based on cognitive processes that can also be 
performed isolated from external media and devices, such as graphs, 
oscilloscopes or computers. Nevertheless, it might particularly seem strange 
to see simulation as an integral part of scientific work (and mental simulation 
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as the core of any simulation). But the analysis provided above (particularly 
the case of the thought experiments with the characteristic) make clear that 
an account of mental simulation is needed to understand the issue of 
simulation in scientific work (e.g. computer simulation). In this way, mental 
simulation introduces itself as a cognitive mechanism used in scientific work. 
This view is not new. Particularly brain scientists propose compelling 
argumentation and evidence in favor of an even more general conception of 
mental simulation. Jeannerod (1994; 2001), for instance, argues that 
cognitive processes become possible for humans by suppressing motor 
activity. The internal representations of motor activity can be handled more 
freely without actual execution and result in the ability to mentally simulate 
future actions. Jeannerod presents a wealth of evidence from neural and 
behavioral sciences in support of this hypothesis. A similar account, but with 
focus on lingual processes is provided by Hesslow (1994; 2002). A very 
comprehensive presentation of mental simulation covering also the field of 
cognitive science is provided by Barsalou (1999). 
 
It can be concluded so far that theory, design, experiment and evaluation 
describe the aspects of scientific work comprehensively. Modeling can be 
described as a shortcut between theory and evaluation because it serves as a 
surrogate for experiments. But a model alone does not serve any scientific 
purpose as long as it is not operated. Operating the model means to perform 
experiments with models. Thus, operating the model re-introduces the 
aspects of design and experiment. A simulation is such an operated model 
and, consequently implies all aspects of scientific work. Thus, considering 
simulation poses the question where to draw the line between scientific work 
and simulation? Scientific work can be conceived as simulation if cognitive 
processes of the scientist are put to the center of analysis. Mental simulation 
is pervasive in scientific work. However, mental simulation is not scientific 
work – it is a cognitive mechanism used in scientific work. A closer look to 
mental simulation in the next section will help to reveal the differences and 
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2.2.1.3. Mental simulation in scientific work 
 
Mental simulation is a general cognitive process that helps to answer 
questions, to find explanations. Consider this very simple case: a person (let 
him be male this time) seeing a moving twig on a tree during a walk asks 
himself why the twig moves. Assume that, eventually, the man will come up 
with an answer to that question. Now, mental simulation can be described as 
the entirety of processes in between question and answer. The moving twig 
example shall be analyzed in more detail in order to understand how mental 
simulation helps to find explanations. The following analysis is a (quite raw) 
conceptual specification of mental simulation. A more detailed account is 
provided elsewhere (see section 3.1.; Jeannerod 1994; 2001;  Barsalou 1999). 
 
It should be noted that all states and affairs described below could happen in 
parallel and with mutual causal connections. The whole is only partitioned for 
a clearer presentation. For instance, having perception and posing a question 
might very well be same process since perception is already an interpretation 




Premise of mental simulation is the perception of arbitrary elements and 
activities, i.e. perception of the moving twig. Generally, it does not matter if 
elements and activities are genuinely natural or artificial because both end 
effectively as a perceptual element or activity. Even an observation of inner 
phenomena (e.g. an idea) is part of this perceptual domain. 
 
1. Question 
Perceptual activity alone makes no observation. But ongoing perceptual 
activity during the walk can become an observation by posing a question, 
e.g. “What caused the twig to move?” If there were no question there would 
be no observation, just ongoing perceptual activity. The question triggers the 
extraction of specific perceptual elements or activities from the ongoing 
activity. The raw version of the question might be described as: “Mmmhhh?” 
or “What was that?” The verbal specification will presumably happen at later 
                                                 
16 Even though it shall not be considered in depth here what actually causes the question to come up, it might help 
to think of a cognitive mechanism that detects inconsistencies and tags them for scrutinizing, such as a ‘checking 
for cheaters’ module (see Cosmides 1989 but see also Johnson-Laird 1999 for critical remarks). 
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instants. An elaborated version of the question could be: “Was it the wind 
that moved the twig or was it something else?” 
 
2. Model 
Instantiating an appropriate model for answering the question and clearing 
inconsistencies comprises several parts. (a) Elements and activities must be 
distinguished from the ongoing perceptual activity, e.g. ‘twig’, ‘motion’, 
‘wind’. Obviously, memory processes can very well come into play at this 
instant, e.g. names for elements (verbalization), personal experiences with 
wind etc. Certain attributes can be specified, e.g. size and weight of twig, 
force and direction of the wind. (b) Causal relations ‘stage’ the elements and 
activities (for obtaining a mechanism), e.g. “wind is a force that acts on the 
twig and causes motion”. Elements and activities and the causal relations 
between them make up the model. (c) Rules must be found for how the 
model shall be operated, e.g. “transfer a non-moving twig (state#1) to a 
moving twig (state#2) by applying the force that wind causes to the twig”. 
This ‘design’ or ‘plan’ can be very implicit, but should be explicitly notified at 
this point for not being confused with the rules inside the model (‘causal 
relations’) that put the model to stage. Model and operational rules build the 
mental ‘setup’ or ‘preparation’. 
 
3. Operation 
Enacted elements and activities, causal relations (the model) and operational 
rules yield a running model – a simulation. Due to the serial character of 
thoughts it seems hardly conceivable that these enacted models are smooth 
Hollywood-like pictures running through our head. Rather, enacted models 
might better be conceived as checking single configurations of elements, 
activities and causal relations, one at a time. (In non-controlled, non-
thoughtful simulation configurations might rather be checked in parallel.) For 
example, the state space of the model is sampled step by step in a controlled 
fashion when the twig model is envisaged without wind as one configuration 
‘state#1’ and with wind as the next configuration ‘state#2’. At this point, 
again, broadcasting prior knowledge (memory) to the running model seems 
obvious (e.g. the personal experience with wind). 
 
4. Evaluation 
The results of the running model must be analyzed in order to assess their 
implications for the question, i.e. their explanatory value. This is not 
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necessarily an explicit reflection, in the sense: “What does it mean?” The mere 
transfer of the model from ‘state#1’ to ‘state#2’ can be seen as a first step of 
evaluation: the running of the model as such is the first indicator for 
explanatory value of the simulation. The transfer from ‘state#1’ to ‘state#2’ 
could also fail, e.g. due to the wrong wind direction. Then, a new 
inconsistency would be thrown up and the game has to start anew. Thus, 
successful simulation makes explanations conceivable and the failed 
simulations render explanations inconceivable. Something being conceivable 
can be sufficient for being a successful consistency check. Something being 
inconceivable is to be seen as an inconsistency in the simulation that hinders 
the model from running (‘malfunction’). Eventually, depending on the priority 
of the question, several outcomes are possible: the twig issue can be settled 
by instantiating a running model, e.g. “The wind moved the twig!” But the 
running model can also serve as the starting point for further questions, e.g. 
“OK, the wind is a possible candidate for moving the twig, but what about an 
animal?” Malfunction of the simulation throws up a new inconsistency and 
can cause a new iteration of the simulation with changed parameters or new 
elements and activities, e.g. “Was the twig moved by an animal?” Finally, the 
question can be considered not to be worth answered, e.g. “That shall not be 
my problem!” Consistency is the premise for something being a possible 
explanation, i.e. it indicates high explanatory values. Inconsistency, on the 
other hand, points at low explanatory values (which is better than none, 
because one can hook off that configuration of the model). In sum, the phase 
of evaluation ends with a “decision” for an explanation (an adoption of an 
answer to the question) and, consequently, implications of how to proceed. 
 
The moving twig example illustrates what mental simulation is about. But 
aren’t there other concepts that also describe what happens? The entirety of 
processes between question and answer might be also termed, depending on 
the context, thinking, reasoning, modeling, problem solving or mental 
simulation. What is the correct term, then? Reasoning has no reference to the 
external situation (i.e. the moving twig perceived during a walk). Modeling 
bears a too generic and explicit notion, i.e. developing something for 
applying it in another context. Similarly, the real problem is missing for 
calling it problem solving. Thus, mental simulation appears to describe best 
the mechanism that helps the man taking a walk giving an answer to the 
initial question: it relates to something external (i.e. the simulated system, 
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the moving twig) and has an ongoing, casual and automatic character. Mental 
simulation is that something in between question and answer. 
 
Comparing this account of mental simulation with scientific work, i.e. the 
examples of the moving twig and the neuroscientist, respectively, reveals 
striking similarities: The peculiarity in the ongoing perceptual activity that 
poses a problem in mental simulation corresponds to theorizing in scientific 
work, the staging of elements and activities corresponds to design, operation 
of the model corresponds to experimental work and the assessment of the 
outcome corresponds to evaluation. The striking and obvious difference 
between mental simulations and scientific work is that the former is 
predominantly internal and the latter is also external. Moreover: mental 
simulation can be very implicit and automatic, while scientific work is usually 
explicit and controlled. For example, there is not necessarily an explicit 
prediction or hypothesis in mental simulation but rather an inconsistency 
between perceptual activity and internal representation. 
 
In sum, there are strong correspondences and obvious differences between 
the accounts of scientific work and mental simulation described above (see 
fig. 17). The comparison indicates that mental simulation can be assumed to 
be a crucial cognitive mechanism used in scientific work. Consequently, 
mental simulation shall now be applied for describing the role simulation 
plays in science, generally. Whether or not mental simulation is a tenable 
cognitive framework of scientific work should become clear when applied to 
the different situations of scientific work. 
 
2.2.2. Domains of scientific work 
 
Several situations of scientific work can be distinguished. The ones already 
considered were: experiments in the laboratory, computer simulations and 
thought experiments. These situations can be classified according to the 
domains in which they are performed, i.e. experiments in the natural domain, 
computer simulations in the artificial domain and thought experiments in the 
cognitive domain. However, these domains show considerable overlap in the 
situations of scientific work since, for instance, mental simulation is involved 
in any case. So the question is: Which aspect in a given situation of scientific 
work belongs to which domain? How are the domains arranged so that they 
help to solve capacity problems? In order to demonstrate that almost any 
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aspect of mental simulation (e.g. model, operational rules etc.) can refer to 
any domain in scientific work, the different situations of the neuroscientist 
studying figure detection in flies (e.g. characteristic, curve fitting, thought 
experiments) shall be reconsidered in the following sections and discussed 
with respect to domains of scientific work. 
 
One broad distinction for domains is natural-artificial. In the sense of the 
term ‘artifact’, the artificial domain might be conceived as a man-made 
construction inside the natural domain. It definitely comprises digital 
computers and simulation environments with computerized models, and 
might, depending on the concrete case, additionally be true for experimental 
environments. The case of experimental environments makes clear that the 
application of the natural-artificial distinction to organisms is not trivial: 
while it seems clear to call wildlife animals natural, it seems at least 
questionable if mice with genetically knocked out behavioral traits are 
natural. However, for the sake of simplicity, I propose to refer to computer 
simulations and robots as being artificial, while animals and biological 
preparations are termed natural. Experimental environments (setups) are 
considered to refer to natural phenomena as long as the relevant data are 
extracted from biological preparations. 
 
In the lab situation of our female neuroscientist, the fly fixed in the 
experimental setup is a biological preparation. It belongs to the natural 
domain. Operational control of the biological preparation (i.e. the 
experiment) is realized in the cognitive domain by way of mentally simulating 
the experimental setup including the biological preparation. In another 
situation the neuroscientist developed a characteristic. The graphic 
characteristic of a neuron that is used to predict a response amplitude for a 
given stimulus size is an artificial preparation. The actual application of the 
artifact can be diverse: while the novice has to perform the procedure of 
applying the artifact explicitly (and probably with great effort), the expert 
simply ‘knows’ the result. Thus, the artifact can become more implicit by 
repetition of mental simulation and can eventually become exclusively 
cognitive: there is a transition between artificial and cognitive. The advanced 
scientist (in between novice and expert) can develop and apply a ‘recipe’ to 
generate a prediction, e.g. “note given stimulus value, look x-axis, find 
stimulus value on x-axis, fixate, move straight up to curve, fixate cross-
section, go from cross-section to y axis, read y-value, make prediction with 
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y-value”. Similarly, a formula can be applied. A linear function y = a·x is a 
simple case: “note given stimulus value, take as x-value, multiply with ‘a’, 
note result, take as y-value”. In this situation, not the model but the 
operational rules for using the model are learnt (and become cognitive). The 
logistic function, for instance, might pose more problems so that the 
neuroscientist realizes it as a computer program. Then, the ‘recipes’ for 
simulation are implemented in an automatic program that offers predefined 
intervention ports, e.g. a field in which a value of a stimulus size can be 
entered for computing the corresponding response amplitude. The model 
(the formula) as well as operational rules are outsourced to an artifact. Only 
the aspects of perception and evaluation are exclusively left to the scientist. 
In the case of the neuroscientist performing curve fitting for finding a 
characteristic analytically, the role of computer simulation is even more 
obvious: she specifies the elements and activities that describe the neuron 
(modeling) and defines operational rules for computing the model in the 
form of input, output and evaluation functions. She might be able to do this 
in her head or on paper, too, but it is more economical to externalize parts 
of these tasks to a computer program, particularly computing model and 
evaluation functions. These cases illustrate that computer simulations are 
mental simulations outsourced to the artificial domain. 
 
By acting in the artificial domain, it is possible to work scientifically 
independent of a natural preparation. For example, if the scientist changes 
from laboratory to computer, the ‘medium’ in which scientific work is 
performed changes from a spatiotemporally larger and structurally more 
constrained environment to a more compact environment. The artificial 
preparation (e.g. the computer simulation) offers a variable amount of 
degrees of freedom. In order to get models running in the artificial domain, 
elements and activities affecting the natural preparation have to be translated 
into artificial elements and activities that obey formal rules17.  
The last situation of scientific work that will be considered here are thought 
experiments. Seeing scientific work as ‘thought experiments’ means to move 
the final step towards the cognitive domain: here, the experiments are 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that, in this conception of scientific workflow, it does not matter how similar simulated 
elements and activities are with respect to the natural situation (as one might feel tempted to think) – the only thing 
that matters to understanding is how similar elements and activities in the artificial domain are with respect to 
those in the cognitive domain. This elucidates that cognition drives the understanding of the natural domain. 
However, cognition itself is also driven externally, for instance, by the causal rules it is confronted with when 
experiments are carried out and perceived. 
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carried out exclusively in the cognitive domain. Genuine thought 
experiments do neither necessarily refer to natural environments nor to 
artificial simulation environments and, therefore, are less subjected to 
natural or formal constraints. Hence, even more degrees of freedom than in 
the artificial domain are possible. The boundlessness is also illustrated by 
the “Martian” touch of typical thought experiments frequently found in 




fig. 20: Domains of scientific work. The natural domain comprises all other domains. Natural 
preparations (in experimental environments) are used in scientific work to ‘feed’ the 
cognitive domain (mental simulations) with data of external world. Mental simulations in the 
cognitive domain, in turn, operate the natural preparation. Similarly, artifacts, e.g. computer 
simulations are used to feed mental simulations of the artifact. The difference between both 
systems, seen from the mental simulation stance, is that natural preparations provide 
inherent functionality (a ‘momentum’) by themselves, while artificial preparations have to be 
created. The inset in the upper right corner indicates that the modeling relation refers to
three different instances: source (the preparations), medium, i.e. the representational 
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In sum, three different domains of scientific work can be distinguished: 
natural, artificial and cognitive (see also fig. 20). If mental simulation is 
assumed as the underlying mechanism, a clear view on the relation between 
the domains can be provided: an external preparation – be it an experimental 
device (e.g. natural preparation or animal model), a computer simulation or a 
verbal description – is an extension of mental simulations that can aid 
handling the mental simulation. Put another way, the external preparation 
can guide or control mental simulation. The natural, artificial and cognitive 
domains relate to each other in a specific manner. The natural domain 
contains both the artificial and the cognitive domain. Inside the cognitive 
domain are representations of the natural and artificial domains (call it N’ 
and A’). These representations allow mental simulation of systems that are 
inside these domains. Mentally simulated systems can be investigated by way 
of “scientific work ”. Scientific work can be targeted at a natural preparation 
(e.g. lab experiment), to artificial preparations (e.g. computer simulation) or 
to cognitive preparations (e.g. thought experiments). Natural preparations 
can be transformed to artifacts by externalization of cognitive preparations 
(‘modeling’).18 
 
The account of scientific work introduced so far might cause the quite 
unusual impression that anything in scientific work is simulation (Jeannerod 
1994; 1999; Hesslow 1994; 2002; see, however, Cruse 2003 for similar 
accounts). But seen from the scientist’s point of view this is true: since the 
principle of mentally simulating external states and affairs is propagated in 
the experiment, the experiment can itself be regarded as a simulation of the 
natural states and affairs (‘natural simulation’). The experiment and the 
natural preparation were built after the construction plan of the mental 
simulation. This might sound as if there was no nature at all in scientific 
work: “Everything is simulation? Why bother about the natural preparation? 
Why don’t we do it all in our head?” This notion is definitely not meant, here! 
As will be shown in the next sections, there are very good reasons to focus 




                                                 
18 As the attentive reader might have noticed, the domains of scientific work, i.e. natural, artificial and cognitive 
correspond nearly exactly to the domains of the brain sciences, i.e. the neural, computational and cognitive domain, 
respectively (see also 1.1.3). This is not surprising since the activities of scientists form the domains of the brain 
sciences. It could be stated that they refer to the same ontological category. 
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2.2.2.1. From natural situations to natural preparations 
 
Presumably, no one seriously doubts that a neuroscientist should aim at the 
most natural possible situation for studying the brain. In the example of the 
neuroscientist (remember, she was defined to be female) investigating the 
figure detection mechanism in the visual system of the fly, the most natural 
situation the scientist can seek, is probably a field experiment, in which a 
wild living fly (coming from a wild population) performs spontaneous figure 
detection (e.g. chasing mates) during free flight. If she is lucky, she can 
derive approaches for explaining the free flight performance with her 
observational data from the field. However, she is unlikely to make 
substantial progress concerning the neural mechanisms underlying the 
observed behavior. For analyzing neural mechanisms, she has to measure the 
neural activity. Optimally, she would like to implant an electrode with radio 
transmitter into a figure detection neuron of a wild fly and measure in a wild 
situation. But various factors can (and will) render this plan futile. First, 
realization will be difficult. For example, the technical equipment needed for 
transmitting the neural activity is many times heavier than the fly! Second, 
interference with other neural factors will be a problem. Even if she 
succeeded in technical realization and registers neural signals during 
chasing, the signals she registers can be superimposed with many other 
signals that arise from the various other tasks the fly has to perform in a 
natural situation. For ruling out the influence of other sources, the stimulus 
must be reduced. Moreover, for ruling out the influence of chance (noise, 
spontaneous activity) the same sequence must be repeated several times. 
These changes would already restrict the natural character of the situation. 
 
Most of the factors that are decisive for success or failure of such an 
experimental venture are ultimately economical. They have to be assessed by 
cost and benefit. Consider the following hypothetical premises: the technical 
equipment needed for the experiment is realizable in a development process 
taking 10 years and the sequences she needs to record might be reachable if 
she measured another 10 years with a team of 100 scientists. Usually, she 
will conclude from these premises that a more promising way to study figure 
detection in the fly is in the laboratory. So, she designs a natural preparation: 
she fixates the fly in the middle of an experimental setup and defines what 
the fly shall see and how long, how often etc. it is presented. In other words, 
she simulates the natural situation in order to gain control over it. The cost-
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benefit rationale underlying these decision to go to the lab is: she presumes 
that the time and effort it takes to get the free flight data is better invested in 
laboratory work since she can gather so much data in the laboratory that she 
will outperform a colleague attempting the free flight project by lengths. This 
way to a successful observation is based on reduction of complexity and 
dynamics of the natural situation. The example illustrates that the control of 
dynamics and complexity is important for scientific work. Two aspects of 
gaining control have to be distinguished, one that is external of the scientist 
and one that is internal. Externally, dynamics and complexity of the natural is 
reduced. For example, the fly cannot fly where it would spontaneously fly, 
but is fixated. It does not see, what it would see during free flight, but is 
presented artificial stimuli. Internally, the dynamics and complexity of the 
mental simulation the scientist has to perform is reduced with respect to 
various aspects. For example, reducing the natural dynamics and complexity 
means to get rid of unmeant alternative explanations. Interfering factors are 
eliminated. 
 
But is it really desirable to reduce internal dynamics and complexity? Why not 
consider the whole problem? What if money is no object and the scientist 
could do both: the field experiments and the lab experiments? For 
understanding the necessity of reducing complexity more thoroughly, 
imagine an extraterrestrial intelligence that has the same basic prior 
knowledge on brains that our scientist has, but that has superior perceptual 
and cognitive abilities. Observing a single (natural) chasing sequence of the 
fly might be enough for determining the neural mechanism because its 
superior cognitive apparatus enables it to mentally simulate all possible 
models and compare it with the observations. On the basis of a characteristic 
difference between a trajectory observed in the natural free flight situation 
and a trajectory generated in a mental simulation the extraterrestrial 
intelligence can conclude that only one specific neural mechanism is 
possible. This becomes possible because it can mentally simulate all possible 
mechanisms and predict the trajectories and compare these simulated 
trajectories to the observed trajectory. In contrast, the scientist does not 
have this cognitive ability and has to reduce complexity by analyzing neural 
activity in experiments. Thus, one reason (and an economical constraint as 
well) that necessitates reduction of internal complexity is the limited capacity 
of the human ‘simulation engine’ (see e.g. Broadbent 1958; 1975) Seen from 
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the mental simulation stance, the goal of reducing internal complexity is a 
reduction of cognitive load. 
 
But which aspects of scientific work can be reduced? Comparing field 
situation to lab situation reveals that the spatiotemporal coherence of the 
participating elements and activities is increased, e.g. the fly cannot fly 
anywhere, the light source is not the sun etc. Interactions with a given 
experimental environment have to be planned and controlled in the cognitive 
domain by way of representations concerning elements and activities in the 
respective environments. Thus, the operational rules and, therewith, the 
sensorimotor coordination and planning necessary to control the situation is 
reduced. Reducing the environment means to reduce the cognitive load while 
the model is operated. The model is ‘cleaned’ from sensory-motor 
representations of environmental constraints. Assuming a limited capacity 
process underlying the cognitive handling of the model, reduction of 
environmental complexity can explain why the scientist is able to increase 
the amount of manageable complexity. Choosing the lab situation reduces 
cognitive load in almost any aspect of scientific work – alone by reduction of 
representations. 
 
Ultimately, a maximum of cognitive capacity is achieved by omitting the 
external world altogether, i.e. in the case of pure mental simulation (thought 
experiments). Here, the model can be enacted almost undisturbed from 
external constraints. Given that cognitive capacity is maximized in thought 
experiments, why, then, not do it all in our head? Supposedly, as long as it 
goes it is actually done in our head because it is the most economical way to 
solve problems. But mental simulation is not secure for two reasons: 
 
1.Thought experiments can be inappropriate if the question necessitates the 
natural preparation to show its inherent functionality. For example, it would 
be a categorical error to try to ‘imagine’ a neuron’s response in order to 
assess it’s intrinsic noise amplitude. 
 
2. Thought experiments can fail because complexity and dynamics become 
too strong: When one factor in the model influences multiple other factors 
and, hence, multiple parameter configurations are possible for processing a 
model, no clear result might be obtained. This can be termed the ‘problem of 
complexity’. Similarly, when the final state of the simulation is difficult to 
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predict because each state determines the next intermediate state. This can 
be termed the ‘problem of dynamics’. Note that dynamics can be seen as 
resulting from a great number of activities, while complexity can be seen as 
resulting from a great number of elements. Both ‘masses’ are causally 
interconnected (see also 1.1.6). 
 
It is assumed here that thought experiments can fail because processing the 
whole thing at a time exceeds cognitive capacity and does not reveal the 
rules necessary to understand elements and activities of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny. Cognition is too slow and too limited in capacity and 
temporal resolution. Without partitioning, slicing and chopping the 
simulation and thereby reducing cognitive load, the simulation engine 
obstructs. Here, not only the model itself, but also its operation is a key 
problem of processing dynamics and complexity. The model can be “well 
formed”, while it is not clear which is the initial, the final and the 
intermediate state and what are functions that determine the transitions from 
one state to the other. Serialization fails. Since the model cannot be 
operated, no validation can take place: the model is not comprehended. 
 
In conclusion, observing natural situations can be regarded as the optimal 
approach to explain natural phenomena. But natural situations are often too 
complex or dynamic to be analyzed efficiently. Therefore natural situations 
are reduced to experimental situations that contain natural preparations. 
Economical factors might hinder a scientist to investigate natural situations. 
But economical factors are not a principal impediment – rather the limited 
cognitive capacity of the scientist makes reduction of the natural situation to 
a natural preparation in an experimental situation inevitable. The next 
section will concretely show solutions to capacity problems. 
 
2.2.2.2. From natural to artificial 
 
In scientific work, solutions to capacity problems can be found in all domains 
considered here: the natural, the cognitive and the artificial domain. The lab 
situation can offer a solution to these problems caused by dynamics and 
complexity by reducing the cognitive load in the mental simulation. As 
explained above, one approach is the reduction of the natural situation by 
developing a natural preparation. Another approach that will be analyzed in 
more detail in the following section is to develop experimental protocols that 
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include operational rules for the natural preparation. In an experiment, the 
natural preparation is operated in a predefined way and the cognitive system 
is fed with only that amount of perceptual activity that is needed to drive the 
mental simulation. In the example of the neuroscientist, these operational 
rules have the form of specific stimulus conditions and specific metrologies 
that extract specific activities of the natural preparation. For example, 
electric activity is measured while, say, motor activity is not measured or 
even suppressed. Each running model, i.e. each state transition of the model 
that does not reveal inconsistencies is a step towards validation of the model 
and its comprehension. (Whether the model is ‘really’ understood, is never 
certain, of course. It is just demonstrated that the model can be operated – it 
‘functions’.) Within the various possibilities to conceive the natural 
preparation, experimental protocols show one specific trajectory through the 
state space of the natural preparation that guides attention in a predefined 
way. Experimental protocols are reproducible, i.e. operable on other 
cognitive systems (e.g. colleagues) another time, another place. This is why 
experiments are well suited for communicating models between scientists. 
 
The example of the scientist communicating experimental procedures to the 
scientific community also points at the role of artifacts in solving capacity 
problems. Any externalized version of the operational rules, be it a verbal 
description, a journal paper or any other medial representation, is to be seen 
as an artifact. Scientific work is full of artifacts: the experimental equipment 
can be seen as an artifact that implies operational rules, especially if it is 
computer controlled. The preparation itself can be an artifact, e.g. when the 
neuron is modeled on the computer. This artificial preparation can be used to 
control the experiment with the natural preparation. Consider that our 
female neuroscientist presents motion stimuli to the fly, e.g. an object 
‘passing by’. She measures activity of neurons in the figure detection circuit 
while the fly is fixed in the experimental setup and cannot move (because the 
neural activity would otherwise not be recordable). The neural activity that is 
elicited by the object passing by would be used in the natural situation to 
trigger a motor response, e.g. a chasing maneuver. But the fly cannot 
generate a motor response because it is fixed. The object passes by without 
any approach of the fly towards the object. (Since the natural sensorimotor 
loop is ‘cut’ this condition is called ‘open loop’.) Now, consider that the 
neuroscientist has developed a computer program that simulates the motor 
system. She can feed the neural responses into the computer program and 
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simulate that motor response, which would be generated by the fly on the 
basis of the neural activity as a response to the object passing by. Finally, she 
can feed that motor response to the program that produces the stimulus of 
the object passing by and generate the stimulus that the fly would have seen 
if it had moved. The resulting situation is as if the fly would have moved. 
(This condition is called ‘closed loop’.) In this example, natural preparation 
and artificial preparation are interwoven. This is not an unusual method (see 
e.g. Kern et al. 2001). 
 
In the final step towards the artificial, a natural momentum is reproduced 
with artifacts that substitute the natural preparation. In the example of the 
neuroscientist, this would be a computer program that also simulates neural 
activity in the figure detection circuit. Thus, irrespective of the concrete 
realization with a machine, a robot or a computer program, a simulation is 
characterized by an artificial momentum. Note that the artificial momentum 
can only be achieved by operating the model, not by the model alone. A 
machine, a robot or a computer, which is not operated will not show any 
momentum. (Neither will a graph or a journal paper show a momentum as 
long as it is not mentally simulated.) As a consequence, the model will not 
help the scientist solving capacity problems. The model alone does not help – 
only together with the operational rules a helpful situation is generated. 
Then, the operation of the model is successfully outsourced and the scientist 
can concentrate on observing the results of the operation. The capacity 
problem is solved in the artificial domain. 
 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that experiments with 
natural preparations not only help to solve the capacity problems of the 
scientist in the lab situation by guiding the experimental protocols – the 
natural preparation also does some of the operations itself that must be 
performed by the cognitive system of the scientist in the case of thought 
experiments. For example, a neuron shows signals (momentum) without any 
effort of the scientist. In a thought experiment, these signals must be 
mentally simulated by the scientist. When utilizing the natural momentum of 
the neuron, just the results of the operation are perceived. Generally, the 
external preparation, be it natural or artificial performs the operation of a 
part of dynamics and complexity. (Exactly this is the momentum!) Thus, 
natural preparations and artificial preparations serve the function of an 
external operator. 
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In sum, natural preparations and artificial preparations are used to solve 
capacity problems of the scientist in that they reduce cognitive load of the 
mental simulation (e.g. perceptual input) to the amount that is needed to 
drive the mental simulation in way that produces intelligible results. Natural 
preparations and artificial preparations can be used solitarily or mixed. The 
difference between them lies in the origin of the momentum they have. If it is 
inherent in the preparation without adding human design, it is natural. If 
humans have designed the momentum, it is artificial. This account of 
scientific work implies that the natural momentum is the only thing that can 
not be termed “simulation”. Also the preparation of the natural, i.e. the 
experiment as such is to be seen as an artifact that serves the function of 
simulating nature. Concerning epistemological power, however, both are 
equal. There is no principal superiority of the natural preparation over the 
artificial preparation. Both can only be evaluated in terms of their explanatory 
value concerning a specific question (see also 1.1.12). If the artificial 
preparation gives better answers to a question concerning nature than the 
natural preparation, it is superior for that question. Thus, the notion of doing 
science with an obligation of a natural preparation appears ignorant and not 
constructive19. On the other hand, following this conception of scientific 
work is the point where a functionalist / computationalist commitment is 
implicitly made. Even if one might have in mind to use computers exclusively 
as explanation tools, it has to be assumed that a telling explanation is not 
principally rendered impossible once the natural domain is left. This is a 
radical change in approaching the subject, from specific natural science to 
general nomothetical science. 
  
2.2.2.3. Generating the artificial 
 
The principal difference between a ‘genuine’ experiment and a computer 
simulation is that the former has a natural momentum and the latter has an 
artificial momentum. The situation becomes a bit more complicated, though, 
when it is considered that the artificial is derived from the natural. Where 
                                                 
19 There is no computer simulation about nature. There is only a computer simulation about the scientist observing 
nature. Computer simulations do not directly refer to nature – they refer to the cognitive processes that the scientist 
has about nature. There is no direct representational relation between nature and artificial simulation. There is just 
the representational relation between natural and cognitive, between artificial and cognitive and between cognitive 
and cognitive. 
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from does the artificial come? It has to be assumed that mental simulation is 
a generative mechanism for the artificial momentum.20  
 
When the scientist changes the investigatory focus from a natural preparation 
in the lab to the development of an artificial preparation on a computer, a 
typical case that implies this generative mechanism is provided. On the one 
hand, it seems to be the same as in the nature/lab-transition (see also 
2.2.2.1): the mental simulation is streamlined since more elements and 
activities are sorted out and less sensorimotor representations are needed to 
operate the model. Just think of a skilled scientist sitting in front of a 
computer just moving hands for keyboard and mouse control and moving 
eyes for feeding back sensory inputs into the mental model. The scientist in 
front of the computer sets himself in a nearly direct feedback loop with the 
model. This close connection between the system under scrutiny and mental 
simulation is usually much more difficult to achieve with a natural 
preparation in the lab or field. But beside these quantitative differences there 
is also a categorical difference between the nature/lab-transition and the 
transition from nature/lab to the computer: a complete redesign of the 
elements and its possible interactions is necessary in order to omit the 
natural by substituting it with something artificial. All the elements and 
activities that constitute the natural have to be converted to objects and rules 
in the artificial. Omitting natural constraints implies a definition of artificial 
constraints that are, in principle, arbitrary. (Although there are means to 
measure the aptitude of the model, mathematical soundness, for example.) If 
the scientist aims at exploring the model heuristically, the complexity of the 
model can be even increased in the artificial preparation. Handling this 
increased complexity becomes possible because some of the scientist’s 
cognitive capacity is relieved by externalization of operational rules (see also 
2.2.1.3). However arbitrary the definition of the model might be, if the model 
is operable, an artificial momentum has been generated by the cognitive 
system. Thus, the artificial is generated by a mental simulation of the natural. 
 
2.2.3. A generic simulation scheme 
 
Concluding from the previous sections, the following picture reveals: the 
                                                 
20 A “first order” simulation directly refers to the natural preparation, i.e. it refers to something that did not receive 
the treatment of design by cognition. An experiment can also refer to an artificial preparation (e.g. testing a robot). 
If artifacts are the subjects of the study, an “nth order” simulation is given. 
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scientist performs natural simulation in the case of experimental work with a 
natural preparation (e.g. in the lab) and artificial simulation in the case of 
working with artificial preparations (e.g. with a computer). Mental simulation 
is performed in parallel in both of the former cases and isolated in the case 
of thought experiments. These three forms of simulation build the scientific 
simulation framework. The generic scheme underlying all forms of simulation 
is that operational rules are applied to a model so that a ‘momentum’ is 
generated, which means that the model changes autonomously from an 
initial state to a goal state. Since this generic simulation scheme is a key to 
understand the role of simulation in science a more detailed account will be 
provided in the next section by specifying the modeling relation the 
simulation scheme is based on. Since ‘modeling’ is the main topic in the 
following paragraphs it should be kept in the back of the mind that a model, 
in the generic simulation scheme proposed here, is rather understood as a 
post-hoc defined structure of an ongoing simulation than as a necessary or 
sufficient condition for a simulation to happen. Simulation contains more 
‘ingredients’, namely operational rules and some kind of activation, These 
are not considered in the following paragraphs for obtaining a clearer view 
on the underlying modeling relations21. 
 
 
fig. 21: The modeling relation. A state transition in the world from w1 to w2 accords to a 
rule or law L. The representation function E ‘transfers’ these states to the model domain in 
which the state transition from m1 to m2 is brought about by a model-rule R. 
 
                                                
 
 
21 Scientific work is merely a specific case of the general principle of simulation that was proposed in 2.1 with its 
threefold architecture: there is (i) a source or simulandum, i.e. the situation the phenomenon originates from, (ii) a 
representation or simulans, i.e. the natural or the artificial preparation and (iii) a representing or implementing 
system, i.e. the scientist. If no explicit representation of the source is necessary, because it is as it is (e.g. in the 
case of observing natural situations), the situation during observation is the implicit representation in which the 
source manifests. The momentum in scientific work corresponds to inherent functionality in the general account. 
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“The most immediate kind of a model is a metasystem, which implements a 
homomorphic relation between states of two subsystems, a modeled system 
and a modeling system. Formally, a model is a system 
 
S = <W, M, E> with: 
 
 A modeled system or world 
 W = <W, L> with states W = {wi} 
 and actions or laws L: W -> W. 
For example, W could be the set of key presses of a computer operator 
or the physical world, while L is the behavior of the operator or natural 
law;  
 
 A modeling system 
 M = <M, R> with internal model states, or representations M = {mj} 
 and a set of rules, or a modeling function R: M -> M. 
For example, M could be a set of symbol strings or neural signals, 
while the rules R  are the activity of a computer or a brain;  
 
 And finally a representation function 
 E: W -> M. (Remark: the original text used R instead of M!) 
For example, E could be a measurement, a perception, or an 
observation. 
 
When the functions L, R, and E commute, then we have: 
 
m2 = R(m1) = R(E(w1)) = E(L(w1)) = E(w2). 
 
= E(L(w1))  The representation function is based on the neural 
mechanism (law) L that  operates on the inactive state w1 in the neuron 
 
= E(w2) The representation function shows the active state of the 
neuron w2. 
 
Thus, when these conditions apply, the mental model can predict the 
neuron’s response properties and mental simulation can be successful (see 
fig. 22). 
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Additional modeling relations come into play when an artificial preparation is 
considered (see fig. 22). On the basis of the mental model of the natural 
preparation, an artificial preparation is designed and produced, e.g. on a 
computer. The artificial preparation is a second world that has another 
mental model Ma (a= artificial).  
 
Sa = <Wa, Ma, Ea> with: 
 
 The modeled system is an artificial world 
 Wa = <Wa, La> with states W = {wa} 
 and actions or laws La: Wa -> Wa. 
For example, Wa could be a variable in a computer program, while La is 
an algorithm or method;  
 
 The modeling system 
 Ma = <Ma, Ra> with internal model states, or representations Ma = {maj} 
 and a set of rules, or a modeling function Ra: Ma -> Ma. 
Ma and Ra are analogous to the natural modeling relation, i.e. cognitive 
processes;  
 
 The representation function 
 Ea: Wa -> Ma. 
Corresponding to the observations in the experimental setup, Ea can be 
the observable computer output. 
 
It should be noted that this approach offers no way to determine directly 
whether the artificial preparation commutes with the natural preparation or 
the mental model of the natural preparation – the only way to determine this, 
is to compare the mental model of the natural preparation with the mental 
model of the artificial preparation. This can be achieved by the third 
modeling relation of the cognitive model that ‘reuses’ the former two 
models, but necessitates a new, cognitive representation function. 
 
Sc = <M, Ma, Ec> with: 
 
The modeled system is identical to the model of the natural 
preparation 
 M = <M, R> with states M = {mj} 
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 and actions or laws R: M -> M. 
 
The modeling system is identical to the model of the artificial 
preparation Ma = <Ma, Ra> with internal model states, or 
representations Ma = {maj} 
 and a set of rules, or a modeling function Ra: Ma -> Ma. 
 
 The representation function Ec is exclusively cognitive: 
 Ec: M ->Ma. If M and Ma commute, W and Wa should also commute. 
 
Thus, the cognitive domain is the only possibility to evaluate if (natural) 
world and artificial world commute. Put more generally, assessing the 
aptitude of a model is strictly observer dependent. And the use of artificial 
preparations is an elegant means for performing this check of a model for 
oneself. It closes the modeling loop from the side of the abstract version of 
the natural preparation. Simultaneously, the externalization Wa of the mental 
model M is a way of presenting the model M to other observers without the 
necessity of using the natural preparation. In a sense, verbal reports on M 
(e.g. talks or journals papers) can be regarded as restricted versions of 
artificial worlds Wa that can serve as an instruction for others of how to setup 
M. What is missing, however, is the artificial momentum with all its benefits 
(see also 2.2.2.1), which is only given in the case of artificial simulation. The 
momentum has to be generated during mental simulation. Thus, rather than 
providing a complete artificial modeling relation, such restricted versions of 
Wa serve to initialize the cognitive representation function Ec. 
 
Setting up a cognitive system Sc without artificial modeling is the case of 
performing thought experiments with a second (abstract, maybe often 
formal) mental model Ma. This is the case of analogical reasoning (see e.g. 
Markman & Gentner 2001). Finally, thought experiments without the 
modeling relation to the world W are also conceivable and can be seen as the 
basis of designing an artificial model. 
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fig. 22: The modeling relations in scientific work. The scientist (the cognitive 
domain) models both the natural preparation and the artificial preparation. 
The artificial domain with laboratory and computer provides the 
representation function between preparation (‘world’) and model. General 
unc ion o  s mula ion is to find commu ing men al mode s o  the cogni ive 
and the artificial preparation COG
f t f i t t t l f t
NAT and COGART. 
 
It can also be stated that the experimental situation (e.g. the neuroscientific 
experiment) is a model for a general natural mechanism (e.g. figure 
detection). In biology this is often called ‘animal model’ (see e.g. Schaffner 
2001 for a detailed account). Here it is termed ‘natural preparation’. This 
modeling relation can be understood with the same approach as artificial 
modeling: the experiment shifts to the position of the artificial and nature 
takes the place of the experiment. Correspondingly, the artificial model has a 
natural dimension in terms of a computer hardware that represents the 
artificial model and the mental model has a natural dimension in terms of a 
brain representing the mental model. (And the fly models the object during 
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figure detection…) However, all these relations add nothing essentially new 
to an understanding of scientific work as it is proposed here. 
 
2.2.4. Strong and weak Simulation 
 
The modeling relation between natural, cognitive and artificial provides three 
simulations: natural simulation, artificial simulation and cognitive (mental) 
simulation. The former two realize a domain transition from external (natural 
and artificial) to internal (cognitive) with the respective representation 
functions. Whereas the natural domain is as it is, the artificial domain can be 
seen as an interaction layer between natural and cognitive that is designed to 
cause perceptions and to receive actions and, therewith, realizes the 
representation function. Both natural simulation and artificial simulation 
represent pre-existing external states. Mental simulation, on the other hand, 
generates its own, internal, representational domain. Thus, there is a 
principal difference between natural or artificial simulation and mental 
simulation. Strong mental simulation is given if the mental model M is 
modeled as another mental model Ma by the cognitive representation 
function Ec. The other modeling relations (to natural and artificial 
preparations) apply representation functions that involve perceptions and 
actions relating to the world, be it W or Wa. These worlds show a momentum 
that is modeled (or represented), but not simulated in the cognitive domain. 
Only Ec generates a genuine cognitive momentum that makes out the case of 
mental simulation. Since Ec makes possible an exclusively internal operation 
of representations it can be called the realization function. 
 
Since this realization function does not have to comply with the constraints 
of the natural or artificial preparation, it is easier to change the direction of 
the modeling relation. For example, in the case of natural simulation, the 
scientist’s cognitive processes M are the model for the neuron in the fly’s 
brain W, but the neuron is not the model of a cognitive process. But in the 
cognitive domain it can very well be the case that the initial modeling relation 
is reversed. Consider that the scientist has a mental model M of a neuron in 
the fly’s brain and an artificial (abstract) version of that model Ma, e.g. a 
formula for the response behavior of that neuron. Now, computing the 
formula can (and shall) very well make predictions for the behavior of the 
natural neuron. Then, the mental model of the artificial becomes the source 
in the modeling relation while the mental model of the natural becomes the 
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model. Thus, first the artificial mental model Ma is model for natural mental 
model M. But then, Ma becomes the source for M. In this case, the 
representation function is bi-directional: Ec: M -> Ma and Ec: Ma -> M. This 
relation is the prerequisite for generating an inner word or, as Cruse (2003) 
puts it, a system “having internal perspective“. 
 
Put more generally, this approach arrives at a distinction between a strong 
and a weak sense of simulation. In the strong sense, simulation is only given 
if the model, the modeled system and the operational rules reside in the 
same domain (‘internal’), e.g. the cognitive domain. It is not principally 
excluded that an artificial system can also realize a strong simulation, but 
this question has been sufficiently discussed (Searle 1980) and is left to 
experts. In the weak sense of simulation, model and source reside in 
different domains. 
 
In the account of scientific work provided here no other strong simulation 
than mental simulation can be found. (Definitely, there is no simulation 
relation between the World W and the Artificial World Wa as one might be 
tempted to think.) Weak simulation applies also to the notion of a simulation 
being a running model: the scientist mentally simulates the natural or 
artificial preparation by operating the model in the lab or computer (see also 
2.2.2.2). In these weak cases, sensorimotor coordination is usually necessary 
to bridge between the domains, e.g. the scientist has to perform actions on 
the natural or artificial preparation. The system is “reactive” rather than 
genuinely “cognitive” (cf. Cruse 2003). Additionally, the natural or artificial 
preparation itself contributes its momentum to the simulation. This implies 
that the operated model, i.e. the rules R applied to the states m (“enacted 
elements and activities”) are caused and controlled by external events. In 
strong simulation, the model must be operated inside the domain. 
Generating these causal powers is, literally spoken, ‘making sense’. The 
operational rules, e.g. the parameterization of the model can be controlled 
from the cognitive domain in both weak and strong simulation. Artificial 
simulation is closer to strong simulation because a mental simulation had to 
be performed to create the artificial simulation. Natural simulation is the 
weakest form of simulation and, therefore, is not necessarily conceived as 
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2.2.5. Summary 
 
Scientific work aims at explaining a phenomenon that relates to a system 
having certain elements and showing certain activities that are causally 
related. An explanation typically implies a mechanism that causally relates 
elements and activities. Scientific work can be described as a four-step 
process: 
1. Theory: definition of elements and activities in the scrutinized system 
and hypotheses concerning causal relations. 
2. Design: operationalization of the hypothesis by staging elements and 
activities. 
3. Experiment: operation of the design and recording of data. 
4. Evaluation: checking data against hypothesis. 
 
If a theoretical implication is concluded from the evaluation, a new iteration 
of the process can be initiated, providing new conclusions … 
 
The means by which the scientist manages scientific work can be described 
as a mental simulation that shows also four aspects (coarsely corresponding 
to the four aspects of scientific work): 
1. Problem: observation (phenomenon) causes a question (inconsistency 
or ambiguity). 
2. Model: elements, activities, causal relations and operational rules are 
assembled so that an answer becomes possible. 
3. Operation: the model is active. 
4. Analysis: observation of the model’s behavior is tested as a possible 
answer. 
 
Even though simulation primarily applies to the operated model (3.), the 
whole process (1.) – (4.) can be termed mental simulation since the steps are 
difficult to separate from each other. Mental simulation is a limited capacity 
process that forces the scientist to prepare and organize investigations in the 
different domains: 
1. Natural: the scientist uses a natural preparation (typically in a 
laboratory experiment) or observes a natural situation (in the field). 
2. Artificial: the scientist uses an artificial preparation (typically a model 
in a computer or a robot). 
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3. Mental: the scientist uses a mental model and generates a 
representational domain independent from the external world, 
typically, the case of scientific reasoning and performing thought 
experiments. 
 
Natural preparations and artificial preparations and mental simulation can be 
mixed in a given scenario of scientific work. There is no other principal 
difference between natural and artificial preparations, but that the natural 
shows an inherent functionality – a momentum – that is as it is (not designed 
by cognition), whereas the artificial has a momentum that was designed by 
cognition. Operating mental models for representing the external domain 
(natural or artificial) is termed weak simulation since the momentum is 
caused by external elements and activities. Operating internal models by way 
of internal representations is termed strong simulation because the 
momentum is caused by an internal generative mechanism. 
 
This analysis of scientific work was started to describe the role simulation 
plays in science. Beginning with a notion of simulation as computer 
programs it became obvious almost immediately that computer programs are 
not to be understood as media but rather as cognitive processes of the 
scientist. This introduced the concept of mental simulation. Seen from the 
‘mental simulation stance’, computer simulations are artifacts that are made 
for serving a guiding function for mental simulations. If the concept of 
mental simulation is applied consequently, investigation on non-artificial, 
natural situations is to be considered, too. So it turned out that there it is no 
way too account for the role simulation plays in science without treating 
science as simulation! 
 
As already mentioned, it might seem strange on first glance to stress the 
simulative aspect in experimental scientific work (or thinking in general) – 
experiments are usually thought to relate to “real” nature. But it is much 
easier to conceive all scientific work as simulation than conceiving some 
aspects as real and others as unreal. Simulation offers an alternative 
perspective of scientific work (or thinking in general). In brain sciences, 
discussions on biological plausibility are frequently observable (see e.g. Crick 
1989; Webb 2001). The question that is frequently tried to be answered is 
how the natural relates to the artificial (nature vs. model)? In the present 
approach this question of ‘reality’ is ill posed: there is neither a natural nor 
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an artificial phenomenon without mental simulation of the scientist. 
Therefore, the question how the relations of both preparations to the mental 
simulation can be described should be the primary objective. “How does a 
given preparation help to explain the phenomenon?” Of course, this 
introduces an epistemological aspect in the discussion that can be annoying, 
too. However, this aspect is not necessarily philosophical, but rather can be 
targeted towards a practical or even pragmatic discussion. The question is: 
“How can we find good explanations for the phenomenon under scrutiny (and 
what are these explanations good for)?” Admittedly, this implies to abandon 
ontological questions such as: “The nature of figure detection is …” But 
instead of an often futile wish for answers to the ultimate nature of 
something, another aspect is put to the center (where it belongs): function 
and value of human explanations of nature. 
 
2.2.6. Implications: “Simulation, media and explanation” 
 
Rather than providing general notes of the role of simulation in science for 
concluding this chapter, implications for the enveloping sections, namely the 
account of simulations as media (see also 2.1) and the following chapter on 
explanation (see also 3.1) will be provided. 
 
Simulations as media have a straightforward meaning in the scientific 
simulation framework proposed above: they are the externalized version of a 
mental model, the artificial world Wa. It can be stated that the typical case of 
‘modeling’ is particularly this process of externalization. According to the 
generic simulation scheme, the externalization (‘modeling’) can only be 
assessed by setting up a second modeling relation that again is related to the 
first modeling relation by the cognitive simulation function Ec. In this sense, 
there is no serious modeling without simulation. (Of course, there is no 
serious simulation without a model, too.) 
 
The section on simulation as media contains also a general sketch of 
simulation (see also 2.1.3). What was termed ‘source’ there is the modeled 
system W, the ‘representational domain’ is the representation function and 
the cognitive system corresponds to the model M. Generally, the sketch of 
simulation from the section on media corresponds and complies to a single 
modeling relation provided in scientific simulation framework. The section on 
simulations as media emphasizes the topic of interactivity (‘intervention 
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ports’) because media are otherwise conceived as external elements that do 
not necessitate active intervention. Stressing intervention ports should clarify 
that the external character might be true for other media but not for 
simulation. Simulation necessitates an active cognitive (and/or sensorimotor) 
component. This characteristic of simulations as media can also be 
understood in the context of the scientific simulation framework. A 
simulation (and this applies to all of the approaches named in 2.1.2) entails 
not only the artificial domain Wa (medial part) but also the cognitive domain. 
Furthermore, the medial part of the simulation Wa cannot build the realization 
function Ec. Since there is no direct relation between the artificial preparation 
(e.g. a computer program) and the natural preparation (e.g. a fly), the user 
must build the realization function (e.g. relate computer program to fly). 
 
But the medial part of the simulation can contribute instructions for building 
the realization function. Consider the difference between artificial modeling 
and artificial simulation. In artificial simulation the momentum is in the 
medial part, whereas in artificial modeling (film, a painting, a text etc.) the 
momentum is not in the medial part, but added by cognition. Thus, the first 
step towards the realization function is to demonstrate the functioning of a 
system in artificial simulation (a computer program with a neural circuit of 
the fly). It provides an artificial momentum that helps to set up the artificial 
modeling relation. In a second step, the artificial momentum is manipulated. 
Intervention ports (e.g. sliders, buttons that change stimuli or response 
properties) are such manipulations. These manipulations (e.g. a parameter 
choice) are operations on elements, activities or causal relations in the 
artificial domain – it is demonstrated how to operate elements, activities and 
rules of the mental model (e.g. the computer simulation). Thus, part of the 
operation is taken away from the artificial domain and transferred to the 
cognitive domain. Precisely, the operational rule is not controlled by the 
artificial but by the cognitive. An operational rule, for example, is the 
assignment of a value to an ambiguous (polyvalent) attribute (e.g. assigning 
3 to x). Applying the operational rule means to determine the consequences 
of the assignment (e.g. computing a formula with x = 3). Controlling the 
operation by defining and performing operational rules for the mental model 
is a step towards strong simulation in which, eventually, elements etc. are 
operated independent of the external world W. The final step after the 
internalization of the operations is the generation of a cognitive momentum. 
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States of the system can be predicted and operated internally. The realization 
function is built. 
 
It becomes clearer at this point, why simulations as media can help to 
manage dynamics and complexity. Serialization and decomposition are the 
major strategies (see also 1.1.12). In a first step, the operational rules can be 
specified and outsourced to the medium. The artificial momentum relieves 
internal processing capacities and simultaneously provides patterns for 
mentally simulating the model. In a step after outsourcing, reintegration of 
the operational rules can be done by internalizing (‘learning’) these patterns. 
The mental model can be partially operated with these patterns. Ultimately, 
the goal of mental simulation is to internalize the operation of the model 
completely, i.e. in terms of automating operational rules so that the 
simulations can be performed as an inner film rather than a slide show 
involving a choice of each slide and its presentation parameters between 
each slide. In the case of automation, a cognitive momentum can be realized: 
the ‘cognitive preparation’ has an inherent functionality like the natural is 
autonomous or the artificial operates automatically. 
 
An explanation can be conceived as such a pattern, as a serialized operation 
of a model, as a specific trajectory through its state space. Spoken or written 
language is one (widespread and effective) form of explanation. But 
explanation is not principally lingual, but can be conceived as mental 
simulation. Generally, an explanation has the same structure as a simulation: 
there is an explanandum (phenomenon) and an explanans corresponding to 
the modeled system (‘source’, ‘natural preparation’) and the model, 
respectively. The relation between explanandum and explanans corresponds 
to the representation function. The elements, activities and causal relations 
are equally present in an explanation and in a simulation. The difference 
between simulation and explanation is that an explanation has a serialized 
character by applying specific operational rules and it uses specific values for 
the attributes. Thus, an explanation corresponds very well to a specific 
simulation. Of course, there is another striking difference between simulation 
and explanation: explanation shall cause understanding. Thus, an 
explanation is a simulation with the somewhat explicit (‘aware’) intention to 
comprehend. Understanding takes place if a specific (parameterized) 
modeling relation is commutative. In this view, an explanation can be present 
in the natural or artificial or cognitive domain, i.e. can be dependent on a 
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laboratory experiment, a computer simulation or a thought experiment. 
Verbal explanations can be conceived as specific cases of artificial simulation 
(except speaking soundless to oneself, which is rather a thought 
experiment). Explanations, as the target of scientific work, are internalized 
representations of the world. Mental simulation can be conceived as the 
mechanism that produces explanations by staging elements, activities and 
causal relations according to specific operational rules. Artificial simulations 
can help to get mental simulations running.  
 
Reading Advice 
The analysis of simulation in science led to framework incorporating mental, artificial as well 
as natural simulation and it led to a generic simulation scheme describing an activated 
model driven by operational rules that trigger an autonomous change from an initial to a 
goal state (‘momentum’). It was shown that the generic simulation scheme reconciles the 
various notions int oduced in the Special “Simulations as media” and provides a clear-cut r
conception of simulations as media. Consideration of the scientific simulation framework 
allowed elucidating the role of simulation for understanding, learning and explanation in 
science. It was also shown how simulation helps to handle dynamics and complexity, which 
are a major impediment in explaining brains and a major motivation for applying simulation 
in brain science. Thus, the overall objective of this study – examining the role of simulation 
in explaining brains – is achieved to the part that concerns science: It was shown that mental 
simulation is crucial to scientific reasoning and that artificial (as well as natural simulation) 
can guide mental simulation and relieve cognitive capacity by providing external input 
(operational rules, perceptual activity, momentum etc.). But explaining brains by simulation 
is not necessarily a scientific issue! Science is rather a good practice scenario of simulation. 
Thus, one question to be answered to complete the examination is left: Is simulation also a 
general explanatory mechanism? Does the generic simulation scheme also hold in contexts 
other than science? An answer to that question will be given in the next section that provides 
an approach for treating explanation as a natural, cognitive phenomenon and simulation as 
a general explanatory mechanism. The “Explanation-Special” that concludes the study 
demonstrates that this approa h even allows to empirically analyze the issue of explaining c
brains by simulation. 
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3. EXPLANATION 
 
An explanation is something that answers questions concerning a 
phenomenon. In the scientific context, explanation is often regarded as a 
rather general, primarily logical issue, particularly in the philosophy of 
science (see Carnap 1995 for an introduction). In this formal-logical notion, 
it is implicitly assumed that explanation is something independent from an 
explainer (e.g. a scientist) and the mental states: it has an existence 
independent from a specific temporal or spatial context. It is not viewed as a 
natural phenomenon. But there is another notion of explanation that relates 
to the actual performance of a scientist or any other cognitive system, e.g. a 
scientist lecturing students or a parent informing children. In this notion, 
explanation can be understood as a natural phenomenon because it is 
embedded in a concrete spatial and temporal context. Of course, both 
notions correspond and it is possible without further ado to use the term 
explanation without specifying which notion is meant. However, for arriving 
at a more detailed understanding of the role simulations play for 
explanations, the concept of explanation has to be dissected. Both the logical 
notion from philosophy of science and the natural notion used in everyday 
language contribute to the concept of explanation: logical explanation 
implies precise specifications for form and content of an explanation e.g. in 
terms of formal logics (Lemmon 1987) and natural explanation describes 
what is actually happening during an explanation. 
 
From the naturalist’s point of view, logical explanation is, of course, a 
specific case of natural explanations: not every natural explanation is logical, 
while every logical explanation has a nature. There are several approaches 
that aim at naturalizing scientific explanation (see e.g. Giere 1992; 
Carruthers et al. 2002). In order to understand the role of simulations in 
scientific work, a similar (natural) approach was already implicitly applied in 
the chapter on simulation (see also 2.1). Accordingly, in the following section 
logical explanation will be treated as the final, well-formed and valid result 
of the process of natural explanation. Arriving at a logical explanation in a 
naturalization procedure involves a variety of highly complex phenomena 
such as verbalization, writing, discussing, peer-reviewing etc. These issues 
shall altogether be put aside in the present context in favor of focusing on 
the role of simulations as a generative mechanism in explanations. Thus, for 
avoiding lengthy philosophical discussions in this introduction, details of 
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logical explanation shall only be applied when necessary – more relevant for 
describing the role simulation plays in explanation is to analyze the cognitive 
(natural) domain. 
 
The situation of natural explanation comprises an explainer, an explanans 
and an explanandum (see also 2.2.6). The relation of explanans and 
explanandum can generally be conceived as a modeling relation (see also 
2.2.3). The explainer uses the modeling system to represent the modeled 
system. Mental states represent elements, activities and causal relations of 
the explanandum. The neuroscientist, for example, uses a mental model of a 
natural preparation to represent the natural preparation (e.g. a fly’s neuron). 
Applying operational rules to this mental model allows for a mental 
simulation of the model that reveals specific behaviors. In sum, an 
explanation contains all aspects of a simulation: a model (elements, activities 
and causal relations) as well as operational rules. This also implies that a 
model alone will not suffice to construct an explanation, while simulation 
does. On this view, simulations can be conceived as a mechanism for 
generating natural explanation. The task of analyzing natural explanation 
corresponds to the task of analyzing the nature of simulation. As a 
consequence, explanation is not necessarily a verbal description, but can also 
be purely mental, e.g. explaining to oneself. These cognitive processes are 
necessary and sufficient and the minimalist case of explanation. 
 
In conclusion, the task of analyzing natural explanation reduces to the task 
of analyzing simulation as cognition. Consequently, the strategy underlying 
this chapter is to introduce an account of simulation as cognition. In the first 
section, simulation will be described as a cognitive phenomenon by applying 
the generic simulation scheme that was developed along the lines of the 
modeling relation (see also 2.2.3) in the previous chapter. Cognitive theories 
that are important resources for an account of simulation as cognition are 
reviewed in the following sections. Candidates that can explain the generic 
simulation scheme as a cognitive mechanism shall be filtered out and 
analyzed in more detail. 
 
3.1. Simulation as cognition 
 
The information processing approach, prevalent in cognitive science (see also 
1.3.6) offers a simple and well-known entry point to cognitive theories. 
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Regardless of whether it perfectly matches everyone’s demands (see 1.3.6.2 
for a discussion), it can be taken as a framework in which the role 
simulations play for explanation can be extended in the cognitive domain. 
The information processing approach generally assumes stimulus, response 
and information processing in between. This can also be described in terms 
of the modeling relation (see also 2.2.3). A stimulus corresponds to a world 
and a modeled system (explanandum), information processing corresponds 
to representation function and modeling system. Finally, a response 
corresponds to the behavior of the system that can enter further processing. 
Information processing typically begins with sensory processing. For 
example, a man observing a moving twig receives sensory input on the visual 
scene that is encountered during a walk. These sensory representations 
already contain a raw model of the world since certain elements and activities 
are separated from other aspects of the sensory representation (cf. Marr 
1982), but will fade away almost immediately unless they are gated (e.g. by 
selective attention) for ‘central’ processing. This was already explained to be 
the case when inconsistencies turn up (see also 2.2.2.1). Central processing 
is typically associated with short-term memory that allows operating on 
sensory representations for a considerable but limited time. For example, the 
observation of a moving twig can be reviewed in short-term memory with 
respect to its possible causes, such as wind, bird, monster etc. Elements, 
activities and causal relations build a model of the situation. Operating on 
the model can be conceived as simulation in terms of hypothesis testing (see 
also 2.2.2.1). Simulation may lead to elaborated versions of the model that 
can enter long-term memory that, in turn, can reentry the ongoing 
simulation and provide elements, activities and causal relations, e.g. a bird in 
the mental simulation of the moving twig scene, which is actually not there. 
 
An explanation is a consistent simulation, i.e. the case when world and 
model commute. For example, both the wind and the bird are possible 
explanations for the moving twig. They are not necessarily competing 
because a decision for this or the other possibility does not necessarily have 
any severe consequences for the observer. But the possibility of the monster 
must be resolved because it would imply danger. A resolution could be the 
categorical exclusion of the possibility due to the believe that monsters do 
not exist. This evaluation of the model is an example for further operations 
on models, i.e. elaborations. According to the information processing 
approach, elaborations increase the probability of recall, i.e. involve long-
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term memory. Elaborating observations therefore corresponds to learning. If 
elaborations are pursued with more effort, still more alternative explanations 
can be taken into account and (thought) experiments can be performed in 
order to assess these alternatives. These efforts will possibly lead to a logical 
explanation that has a more general form such as: “A twig can be moved by 
application of a force that exceeds its elastic resistance.” An ultimate result 
of the process of elaborating an explanation is knowledge about an issue 
that is expressed as the ability of the explainer to recall the elements, 
activities and causal relations and integrate them into ongoing simulation. 
 
Taken together, the information processing approach offers an 
understanding of simulation in cognitive terms. It becomes clear that 
simulation involves all basic aspects of a cognitive system: thinking or 
reasoning, attention, perception, learning, memory, knowledge, 
representation etc. This is no surprise since simulations tend to come into 
place when cognitive processes relate to complex and or dynamic situations 
(“knowledge rich domains”). These situations demand all that cognition has 
to offer. 
 




For an understanding of the cognitive aspects of simulations, it should be 
clarified what the cognitive items are that are processed in a simulation. 
Thus, an adequate concept of knowledge structures has to be found. As has 
been pointed out before (see also 2.1.2.3), the type of knowledge to be dealt 
with in simulations is complex and dynamic. Cognitive psychology offers 
several approaches of such complex or ‘molar’ knowledge structures, e.g. 
schemas (Bartlett 1932; Rumelhart 1980; Mandler 1984), frames (Minsky M. 
1975), scripts (Schank R. & Abelson R. 1977) and mental models (Johnson-
Laird 1980; 1983; Gentner & Stevens 1983). According to Brewer (Brewer 
1987) the former three can all be subsumed under schemas, while mental 
models have to be treated separately (see fig. 23). Brewer circumscribes 
schemas as “unconscious mental structures that underlie the molar aspects 
of human knowledge and skill“. They involve “old” generic information. An 
instantiated schema is a “specific cognitive structure that results from an 
interaction of the old information of the generic schema and the new 
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information from the episodic input“. (Episodic input can be conceived as a 
kind of sensory representation.) Mental models, as opposed to schemas, 
shall account not only for old information, but also for situations we have 
never been in before, e.g. imagery and inference. Concerning the differences 
between mental models and schemas, Brewer points out that schemas are 
“precompiled generic knowledge structures”, while mental models are 
constructed at the time of use. Accordingly, the methodological distinction 
is: inquiries into schemas involve items known before the experimental 
situation began, while mental models aim primarily at knowledge generated 
in the experimental situation. In addition, schemas relate to more global 
knowledge, while mental models relate to more local (specific) knowledge. 
 
Similarly, Markman (1999) describes schemas as ‘general belief structures’ 
and scripts as ‘schemas that wrap event sequences’. He adds naive theories 
or folk theories encompassing larger domains such as biology. In a 
description of molar knowledge structures as simulators, Barsalou (1999) 
comes to a similar conclusion about the way memorized perceptual symbols 
are organized. (Perceptual symbols are specific representations that are 
taken in to account in 3.1.3.2). Unlike Brewer (1987), Barsalou chooses the 
term “frame” for denoting the ordering structure in which ‘old’ information is 
represented, but, like Brewer, he states that frames are similar to schemas 
and scripts. Frames integrate perceptual symbols and are contained in 
simulators so that potentially an infinite number of simulations can be 
constructed. Like Brewer, Barsalou refers to a mental model as non-generic 
but rather a specific structure. However, in his view, “mental models tend not 
to address underlying generative mechanisms.” Barsalou’s account can be 
summarized as follows: 
perceptual input + simulators (or ‘frames’) –> simulation (~ mental model) 
 
fig. 23: Concepts on molar knowledge structures. “Instantiated schemas are specific 
knowledge structures derived from generic knowledge represented in global schemas, while 
Episodic models are the specific knowledge structures that are constructed to represent new 
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Recently, the cognitivistic approaches to understand (the generation of) 
knowledge introduced so far have been challenged by the claims of situated 
cognition proponents (e.g. Greeno 1989), who put forward the idea that 
contextual factors rather than cognitive operations dominate learning 
processes. There has been a continuing debate between Anderson et al. who 
criticized the situated cognition approach (primarily as empirically invalid) 
and Greeno (Anderson et al. 1996; 1997; Greeno 1997). The debate led into 
a partial settlement in a common description of ‘territorial properties’ 
(Anderson et al. 2000). Situated cognition has originated from research on 
Artificial Intelligence and attempts to account for puzzling phenomena, such 
as that the children in Brazilian street markets that having little or no 
schooling are able to perform nontrivial operations, e.g. determining 
complicated prices of lottery tickets. Knowledge based, cognitivistic 
approaches have difficulties explaining such results. Greeno describes the 
general problem as “the insulation of symbolic knowledge” (the loss of 
context) and proposes a framework for a more relational epistemology. But 
the role he attributes to mental models is similar to those attributed by 
Brewer (1987) or Barsalou (1999): they serve as the most valid approach to 
explain the generation of novel knowledge. Other recent cognitive theories 
are similar to that of Greeno in that they propose a domain-specific 
organization of cognition rather than content-independent mechanisms: ‘the 
modularity-theory’ (Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994), ‘evolutionary psychology’ 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1989) and ‘embodied cognition’ that focuses on the role 
of sensorimotor processes (Glenberg 1997). It would be beyond the scope of 
this study to review all of these approaches that could contribute to a theory 
of knowledge, even though they might contribute interesting aspects. But it 
already became obvious that the most interesting approach for describing 
such ‘rich’ knowledge structures – resembling those found in simulations – is 
mental models. Since mental models, therewith, become the most promising 
candidate describing simulation as cognition, theories of mental models shall 
be reviewed in more detail in the next but one section. Before, a brief review 
of theories on the cognitive processes that generate knowledge, namely 




Cognitive psychology offers approaches that take into account not only the 
learning outcome, namely ‘knowledge’, but also the learning process that 
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leads to knowledge. For the sake of brevity, only approaches that deal with 
complex systems are taken into account. 
 
The concept of ‘Implicit Learning’ refers to phenomena that elucidate 
discrepancies between measured performance and verbalizable knowledge. 
In a typical case, learners perform better after a training phase, but are 
unable to explicate their acquired skill or knowledge22. Interesting with 
respect to learning with simulations is the approach “control of complex 
systems” (e.g. Broadbent 1977; Berry & Broadbent 1988). In these 
experiments, subjects had to control parameters of a system (e.g. “city 
transport“, “sugar production” or “person interaction“). The results 
consistently showed that the subjects’ performance to control the system 
improved with practice, but practice had no effect on their performance in 
answering written questions after the test. However, there is a continuing 
debate about the existence and validity of implicit learning (Haider 1992; 
Berry & Dienes 1993) that is additionally expressed in a confusion on 
meaning and use of the implicit/explicit distinction in combination with the 
concepts of knowledge, memory and learning (Dienes & Perner 1999). The 
research tradition of implicit learning that is important for the present study, 
namely control of complex systems appears not to be continued 
consequently. The majority of the continuing research on implicit learning 
has applied the paradigms of “artificial grammar learning” (e.g. Reber 1967) 
and “sequence learning” (e.g. Nissen & Bullemer 1987). “Control of complex 
systems” is still applied (Cleeremans et al. 1998) but apparently less 
frequently. 
 
‘Complex Problem Solving’ is a strong German research tradition and is 
dominated by the work of Dörner (see e.g. 1989; 1998). The focus of 
Dörner’s work lies on the analysis of users handling large simulation systems 
with more than 100 variables, e.g. controlling the virtual city “Lohhausen” 
(Dörner et al. 1983). Most of Dörner’s work differs methodologically from the 
aforementioned studies in that idiographic approaches (e.g. single case 
studies) are applied. Demarking from Dörner’s work (but simultaneously 
neatly related to it) researchers in Germany developed several approaches for 
nomothetical, experimental studies (for reviews see Funke 1991; Frensch & 
Funke 1995). These studies apply small systems with less than 10 variables 
that are completely described mathematically. Measures are post task tests, 
                                                 
22 Note, by the way, that implicit learning was found to go along with decreased brain activity (Buckner et al. 1995). 
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e.g. the ‘goodness’ of verbal reports or of causal diagrams. However, most of 
these studies had no measurement of performance during the task so that an 
operation of the model during the task (the simulation) was not monitored. 
 
“Learning Decomposition” introduced recently by Lee and Anderson (2001) is 
to be seen more as a keyword than as an established approach. However, the 
study is worth paying special attention because it integrates many aspects 
one would propose for an extensive experimental analysis of learning with 
simulations and can, thus, serve as an exemplar. Subjects had to work on the 
Kanfer-Ackermann-Air-Traffic-Control-Task, a simulation in which airplanes 
have to be landed depending on several parameters like wind, other airplanes 
etc. It combines measuring learning and behavioral performance in one 
simulation task and integrates various aspects in an elegant manner: 
paradigmatic approaches of cognitive psychology such as Anderson’s 
theoretical framework (Anderson 1980) and formal models, such as ACT-R 
(Anderson 1993) are combined with actual accounts such as the ‘information 
reduction hypothesis’ (Haider & Frensch 1996) and corroborating behavioral 
measures such as eye tracking. 
 
The approaches to learning as cognitive processes taken into account here, 
all referred to the learning of complex systems. Mental models were not 
considered so far. But the research tradition on mental models deals with 
complex systems and provides a rich resource on learning as well. Thus, 
theory of mental models provides both substantial approaches to knowledge 
and to learning complex systems. Therefore, it is the most promising 
approach for developing an understanding of simulations as cognition. 
Consequently, the focus of the following sections is adjusted to mental 
models. This should not imply that the other cognitive theories could not be 
valuable alternatives or supplements – but that is left to be shown by future 
work. 
 
3.1.2. Mental models 
 
In order to understand the underlying cognitive structure of simulation, 
mental models seem to be the most important approach. They are to be 
understood as the actual construct of elements, activities and causal 
relations that are to be modeled. Schemas, on the other hand, are specific 
(precompiled) sources from memory (and could be the format in which an 
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elaborated model is represented). Mental models, however, seem to be more 
relevant for understanding the role of cognition in simulation because they 
incorporate the concept of schemas and can well be described as a 
generative mechanism for developing an explanation. 
 
Inside the research tradition of mental models, two different streams have to 
be distinguished: one referring primarily to Johnson-Laird (1980; 1983) and 
one referring primarily to Gentner and Stevens (1983). While Johnson-Laird 
focuses on language comprehension, Gentner and Stevens focus on 
understanding devices and simple physical systems. As Gentner & Stevens 
put it in their introduction (1983), (their) research on mental models is 
characterized, first, by a specific domain of simple physical systems. These 
systems are well suited for analysis because they are based on explicit 
normative models. Second characteristic is the application of AI-theory (e.g. 
constraint networks, production systems) rather than mathematics. Finally, 
they propose an eclectic methodology (e.g. a mixture of protocol analysis, 
experimental cognitive psychology and simulations). 
 
More recently, Gentner and coworkers (Markman & Gentner 2001) defined 
mental models as a representation of some domain or situation that supports 
understanding, reasoning and prediction. Again, it is differentiated between 
Johnson-Laird’s ‘logical mental models’ as working-memory constructs that 
support logical reasoning and ‘causal mental models’ as the characterization 
of knowledge and processes that support understanding and reasoning in 
knowledge-rich domains. (‘Knowledge-rich domains’ and ‘complex systems’ 
presumably denote similar things…) Two distinctive features of a causal 
mental model are that their ‘tokens’ (i.e. what is processed) correspond to 
elements of a causal system (rather than the ‘algebraic symbols’ in logical 
mental models, see below) and that they involve long-term memory 
structures. ‘Mental simulation’ is considered as a prominent example for how 
people employ mental models. It can be circumscribed as the imagination of 
a future trajectory of a system given a set of initial conditions that are 
qualitative (relativistic) in nature (e.g. Forbus 1983) and might be strongly 
coupled with motor movements (Schwartz & Black 1999). 
 
Indeed, as can be read from the more recent publications (e.g. Johnson-Laird 
1999), Johnson-Laird’s focus in the last years was inference (especially 
deduction) oriented on formal logics and investigated through text 
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comprehension tasks. As Payne (1992) points out, Johnson-Laird’s theory 
encompasses the basic theoretical commitment shared also by all authors in 
the Gentner & Stevens volume: that people’s existing knowledge has a 
considerable influence on their reasoning about a new problem, 
phenomenon, device or idea. Payne sees Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental 
models as more developed in that it specifies the format of representations 
and procedures, which are used to operate them. But Payne also points out 
that Johnson-Laird’s theory is essentially a mental models theory of 
interaction with a particular artifact, namely text. Predominantly because of 
this focus on text (as opposed to the focus on physical systems in causal 
mental models), understanding the cognitive aspects of simulations appears 
to be better supported by the approach of causal mental models (Gentner & 
Stevens 1983). Even though text plays a dominant role in reasoning, it seems 
unlikely that it explains the operation of an experimental situation or a 
computer simulation. Two examples will illustrate what causal mental models 
are about. 
 
A typical piece of research on (causal) mental models is given by Kieras and 
Bovair (1984). They use the term ‘device model’ to distinguish it from 
Johnson-Laird’s use of the term mental model. They presented an unfamiliar 
piece of equipment (a phaser controller borrowed from StarTrek™) to 
subjects and tested whether and how the knowledge of the device’s 
underlying principles that were mediated in training, affected the 
performance compared to a group not having that knowledge. The trained 
group was superior in terms of time, errors and inferential behavior. As 
further experiments indicated, the specific effects of these general benefits 
can be referred to advantages carrying out inferences (Experiment 2) with 
specific information (Experiment 3) on the model’s functions. 
 
Their practical suggestions for mediating a mental model were: 
1. Mental models support inferences about specific (rather than general) 
tasks. 
2. The knowledge can be incomplete because the user is able to carry out 
inferences in order to operate devices. 
3. In case of easy devices or simple operations on difficult devices no 
mental model is necessary (task dependence). 
4. Incorrect knowledge will impair performance. 
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This example of Bovair & Kieras illustrates that the approach of causal mental 
models nicely matches the typical situations in scientific work, i.e. device 
operation. 
 
Another typical piece of research on causal mental models refers to the 
understanding electrical circuits (Gentner.D & Gentner.D.R. 1983). This is 
particularly interesting in the context of explanation in neuroscience because 
electrical circuits are not only physic’s and engineer’s basic lecture – also 
neuroscientists use these circuits to model electrically responsive 
membranes of neurons (see e.g. Rall 1989). Consequently, these circuits are 
potentially part of a curriculum for brain sciences. Primarily, they focus on an 
account of “generative analogy” as a basic process in scientific reasoning. 
The two analogous systems ‘base’ B and ‘target’ T are described as a 
propositional network typical for the schema theoretic representation of 
knowledge (e.g. Rumelhart & Ortony 1977). Nodes of the networks are 
concepts b1, b2 … bn and t1, t2 … tn that can have predicates A, R, R` etc. 
(A = attribute = predicate with one argument, R = relation = predicate with 
two arguments). Analogy is described as a structure mapping procedure 
between B and T (M: bi −> ti) in which relations R(bi,bj) are preserved 
M: [R(bi,bj)] −> [R(ti,tj)], while attributes are not preserved in any case. For 
example, in the analogy between the solar system and the Rutherford model 
of the hydrogen atom, the relation between ‘central’ (sun vs. nucleus) and 
‘peripheral’ (planet vs. electron) and ‘more massive than’ or ‘revolves around’ 
are typically preserved, while the attributes mass = 1030 kilograms or 
temperature = 25.000.000°F are not. The principle of systematicity expresses 
that higher order relations, such as cause R`[R(bi,bj), R(bk,bl)] are more 
strongly predicated than isolated relations in the structure mapping 
M: [R`(R(bi,bj), R(bk,bl))] −> [R`(R(ti,tj), R(tk,tl))]. 
 
Gentner & Gentner tested two analogies of electricity for their aptitude of 
explaining electric circuits, namely ‘water’ and ‘moving crowd’. In the water 
analogy, a simple electrical circuit with battery and resistor corresponds to a 
hydraulic system with a pump or reservoir and a constriction of the pipe. In 
the moving crowd analogy, the circuit is racetrack with gates (resistors) with 
mice (or vehicles) that obey a loudspeaker (battery). The tests asked for 
predictions of current and voltage in four circuits: serial batteries, parallel 
batteries, serial resistors and parallel resistors. The rationale of the study 
was: if analogies were actually used to solve the problem, differences in the 
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analogies should result in different inferences and, consequently, different 
performance. For example, parallel resistors in an electrical circuit double the 
amount of passing current rather than reducing it. The moving crowd 
analogy should result in better predictions because two gates for mice or 
vehicles easily explain an increase in current, while a second constriction in 
the water analogy may also suggest another impediment that reduces current 
flow. Gentner & Gentner conclude that their account of generative analogy is 
supported by the results and that “analogies help to structure unfamiliar 
domains” and “can indeed serve as inferential frameworks”. 
 
Obviously, the approach to mental models presented by Gentner and Gentner 
relates closely to the generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3) proposed 
here. The structure mapping procedure corresponds almost perfectly to the 
modeling relation between the world model M and the artificial model Ma. 
Thus, the mutual interaction between two mental models (rather than one) 
that is put forward in the generic simulation scheme is assumed for an 
approach to scientific reasoning (even though Gentner & Gentner do not 
explicitly note it). In sum, the two concrete examples of research on causal 
mental models illustrate that they convey a well suited approach – 
conceptually as well as experimentally – for understanding the knowledge 
structures and the inference simulation is based on. 
 
3.1.3. Mental simulation 
 
Mental models describe comprehensively the knowledge structure underlying 
the generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3). For a description of mental 
simulation, though, the notion of a model ‘in action’ is still an open issue. 
Particularly, two aspects are strikingly missing in the approaches introduced 
so far. First, the principle of how the models enter the cognitive system and 
come out again is left unclear. How can the relations between the tokens of 
the natural, cognitive and artificial domains be described? Thus, an account 
of representation is missing. Second, the concrete operation of elements, 
activities and causal relations, i.e. the inherent functionality and the 
momentum of simulation were not covered so far. How are causal relations 
applied to entities in order to obtain a prediction? How do mental models 
relate to the stages and mechanisms of the information processing approach, 
e.g. attention, working memory etc. These questions call for an integrative 
understanding of simulation as a mechanism in a ‘fully functional conceptual 
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system’, i.e. a system that can represent, perceive, analyze and, finally, 
explain. These two aspects of representation and conceptual systems are 
topic of the next sections. The final section, then, probes a conception of 




Mental simulations are operated (or enacted) mental models. They are 
internal ongoing activity. But the elements and activities of the simulations 
are determined by external ongoing activity. The neuroscientist probing 
different stimuli on a visual neuron, for example, has to perform a mental 
simulation of the characteristics of the visual neuron that provides clues for 
deciding which stimulus to probe next (see also 2.2.2.1). This internal 
ongoing activity depends also on external ongoing activity, namely changes 
in electric activity of the fly’s brain audible via audio-monitor or visible via 
oscilloscope. Thus, the actual sensory input of the neuroscientist shapes and 
changes the mental simulation and determines motor output (e.g. the next 
stimulus probe) that determines further sensory input (e.g. the next response 
of the fly)… Thus, the ongoing character of simulation exceeds the purely 
cognitive domain and introduces the necessity to consider the whole 
situation of the explainer (e.g. the neuroscientist) in an environment (e.g. the 
experimental setup and the natural preparation). Therefore, it is not 
sufficient to simply presume elements and activities in the model as given 
representations (e.g. as being something in the head of the explainer) 
without specifying how they can be conceived as a natural phenomenon in 
the situation the explainer resides in. This question calls for a natural 
account of representation, i.e. an account that allows embedding mental 
simulation in an actual situation and specifies the relation between internal 
and external elements and activities. 
 
Interesting for approaching a natural notion of representation is the account 
of representation provided by Bechtel (2001b). He suggests applying the 
concept of representations also for ‘simple’ physical systems. According to 
his account, the state of a part of a mechanical device (e.g. bike’s shifting 
lever) represents (“carries information about“) an object or event (e.g. gear) if 
it is used for behavior. Y carries information about X for Z, which uses Y in 
order to act or think about Y. The state of the shifting lever represents the 
gear in the drive train that uses the shifting lever to adjust the gear of the 
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drive train. Similarly, the state of the scientist’s mental model represents the 
characteristic of the fly’s neuron that is used to determine the stimulus 
probe. This account of representation is use-dependent. It should be noted 
that this account is consistent with most uses of representation in the 
Neurosciences, e.g. a neuron’s firings represent features in order to use 
them for realizing a given function23. So, Bechtel’s account even allows to 
further naturalize the representation of the fly’s neuron: the neuron’s firings 
in the head of the scientist represent aspects of the characteristics of the 
fly’s neuron that are used to specify the parameters of motor activity needed 
to show the next stimulus probe. 
 
It should be noted that Bechtel’s account of representation differs 
substantially from many approaches to representation that are used in the 
cognitive sciences – first and foremost Fodor’s account (Fodor 1975; 1987). 
Due to its abstract, amodal character Fodor’s account or, put more generally, 
the propositional account of representation begs the question “…of how 
representations might be embodied in brains.” Bechtel proposes to consider 
the approach of perceptual symbols, developed by Barsalou (1999) that 
mediates between Fodor’s and Bechtel’s account of representation. 
 
Barsalou puts forward a modal (e.g. bound to a sensory modality) account of 
representation that is supposed to avoid the problems of the amodal 
accounts favored by Fodor and also by many connectionists (McClelland & 
Rumelhart 1986). The amodal account assumes that representations do not 
imply references to the perceptions they originate from. This makes them 
flexible (‘arbitrary’) in use and, therewith, the favored candidate for 
designing conceptual (e.g. cognitive) systems (artificial intelligence) in the 
last decades. As the main problems of the amodal account Barsalou names 
the little “direct empirical evidence”, “the symbol grounding problem” (How 
are amodal symbols mapped to perceptions, if they contain no reference?) as 
well as “unfalsifiability” that results from their ability to explain virtually any 
finding post hoc, while failing to make predictions. In a modal account, 
symbols are represented in the same mode as the perception that produced 
them. This account is, in his view, unrecognized: since modal systems satisfy 
                                                 
23 However, according to this view, cells should not be viewed as feature detectors but rather as “…filters with a 
representational profile.” Bechtel stresses the neuroscientist’s need for such an account of representation. They 
need it to make sensible statements about the function of neural systems for controlling the organism’s behavior. A 
challenge following from this view is that the use of representations is “…often many steps removed from any 
behavior” (Bechtel 2001a). 
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the conditions of being inferential, productive and supporting propositions, 
required for building a conceptual system, they should no longer be 
conceived as pure recording systems that only provide input for a central 
processing stage. 
 
In conclusion, Bechtel’s account of representation provides an easy to grasp 
notion for representations as elements and activities (corresponding to 
neural activities, for example) that are operated in a simulation. Barsalou’s 
perceptual symbols provide a first idea what representations actually are. 
Naturalized representations are the premise for integrating elements, 
activities and causal relations in the framework of natural, cognitive and 
artificial domains (see also 2.2.2). How these representations are actually 
operated in a fully functional system will be shown on the next section. 
 
3.1.3.2. A conceptual system 
 
In order to understand how models are operated and become inherently 
functional, simulations have to be embedded in a fully functional conceptual 
system (e.g. a ‘cognitive’ system / an explainer). This implies the questions: 
 
i. What are the demands of a conceptual system? 
ii. How does the generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3) relate to the 
conceptual system? 
 
Rather than developing yet another account of a conceptual system that is 
based on the generic simulation scheme, an existing account shall be 
described in detail and compared to the simulation scheme. Fortunately, 
Barsalou’s ‘perceptual symbol systems’ (1999) are not only a good approach 
for naturalizing representations (see also 3.1.3.1) but are also to be seen as a 
full conceptual system that incorporates most cognitive processes such as 
attention, memory etc. Moreover, it directly refers to simulation. Therewith, it 
is the optimal candidate of serving as a pattern for relating the generic 
simulation scheme to a conceptual framework. This exemplary analysis of a 
conceptual system shall show if the simulation scheme can be connected to 
other cognitive processes. Connectivity would be a sign to be on the right 
track, while inconsistencies or contradictions show where still problems are. 
 
Barsalou suggests six core properties of perceptual symbols that will be 
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described in the following. The empirical evidence he provides will not be 
reviewed. Paraphrases (not necessarily citations) of Barsalou’s account are 
shown in italics. Comments that relate Barsalou’s account to the generic 
simulation scheme are added afterwards as plain text. 
 
1. Perceptual symbols are record of the neural states that underlie 
perception. They can be processed consciously or unconsciously. This is the 
notion of representations being natural phenomena (see also 3.1.3.1). 
Perceptual symbols correspond to the elements, activities and causal 
relations that are operated in the generic simulation scheme. 
 
2. Perceptual symbols are schematic. They represent coherent aspects of a 
brain state (not the whole brain state) ‘chosen’ via selective attention and 
stored in long-term memory. Furthermore, they are dynamic (as an attractor) 
and componential. This statement shows how perceptual symbol systems 
relate to the ‘classical’ information processing approach, i.e. how they relate 
to concepts like attention, memory etc. Additionally, the extraction of 
elements, activities as coherent aspects of a brain state is implied. The 
storage in long-term memory would be possible, but not a necessary 
criterion in the generic simulation scheme. 
 
3. Perceptual symbols are multimodal. i.e. they include sensory modalities 
(audition, haptics, olfaction and gustation) as well as proprioception and 
introspection (representational states, cognitive operations and emotional 
states). This property makes clear that all representations of a given situation 
the explainer (e.g. the neuroscientist) resides in are integrated in one 
domain, namely the cognitive domain. And this property illustrates that it is 
not necessarily an abstract element or activity that is to be operated in a 
mental simulation – it can very well be concrete such as a switch of an 
oscilloscope. 
 
4. Perceptual symbols “become organized into a simulator that allows the 
cognitive system to construct specific simulations of an entity or event in its 
absence“. These are similar to dispositions, schemata and mental models. 
The difference between simulators and mental models is that the former not 
only address “simulations of specific entities and events” but also “underlying 
generative mechanisms that produce a family of related simulations” (Mental 
models are specific simulations). A simulator is equivalent to a concept 
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(including knowledge but also accompanying processes) and sets up 
categories and allows categorical inference (predictions). Simulators are 
based on the same representational mechanisms that are used in implicit 
memory, filling in, anticipation and interpretation. The generic simulation 
scheme (see also 2.2.3) strongly coheres with Barsalou’s notion. He uses the 
term ‘simulation’ in a very similar manner for the actual (real-time) process 
of staged elements, activities (he terms it ‘entities and events’) and causal 
relations. He adds the term ‘simulator’ for explicitly denoting the case in 
which a simulation is not parameterized and activated. This stresses the 
generative character of simulation. The feature that distinguishes simulators 
from mental models is exactly that generative character that can be 
compared to “operational rules” in the generic simulation scheme. Mental 
models can be understood as single states of mental simulations. The “family 
of related simulations” can be understood as models with different 
parameterizations and the “generative mechanism” as the operational rules 
that define how the parameterizations have to be performed. 
 
5. Perceptual symbols can be integrated in frames. Frames and simulations 
constitute a simulator. Schemata (Minsky M. 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony 1977) 
and scripts (Schank R. & Abelson R. 1977) are similar to frames. A frame 
(schema) comprises predicates, attribute-value bindings (‘parameterization’), 
constraints and recursion (Barsalou 1993). Specific simulations (mental 
models) are generated via a constraint satisfaction process and, hence, 
represent the strongest (actual) attractor in a frame’s state space. Event 
concepts are simulated by recursing this process. Simulations allow not only 
for retrieval of entities and events but also for transformations on them. This 
property is particularly interesting because it provides a simple approach for 
dynamics: temporal order is conceived as a recursion of a constraint 
satisfaction process. An open question is, however, how the rule according to 
which the simulation is processed can be conceived, i.e. what temporal logic 
is. 
 
It seems that Barsalou uses frames for denoting the representation of 
elements and activities as predicates + attribute-value bindings. (The generic 
simulation scheme used mental models for this purpose.) A frame already 
contains most specifications necessary for setting up a simulation, i.e. 
constraints + recursion. It is left unclear what is actually added to a frame to 
obtain a simulator, i.e. what the simulation itself is? 
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Barsalou’s notion can be summarized as: 
 
frame = predicates + attribute-value bindings + constraints + recursion 
simulator = simulation + frame 
simulation = mental model = ? 
 
It is actually unclear whether a simulation is less specific than a mental 
model in Barsalou’s view. It is clear that a simulation is more specific in the 
generic simulation scheme: 
 
mental model = elements + activities + causal relations 
simulator = mental model + operational rules – activation (e.g. as memory structure) 
simulation = mental model + operational rules + activation 
 
However, the notion of a simulation as an attractor in a frame’s (mental 
model’s) state space reconciles both notions. The slight differences are to be 
further discussed in other contexts. 
 
6. Perceptual symbols of speech and audition can help to develop simulators 
for words in memory. These can control simulations, if they are linked to 
simulators of concepts. In this manner linguistic indexing and control is 
realized. This view corresponds nicely to the here-proposed role of lingual 
aspects as specific cases of a more general cognitive mechanism. 
 
The discussion of these six core properties of a conceptual system already 
shows that the generic simulation scheme can be connected to Barsalou’s 
account. Beyond these six core properties, Barsalou demonstrates derived 
properties that characterize a fully functional conceptual system. As before, 
paraphrases will be shown in italics and will be related to the generic 
simulation scheme as plain text added afterwards. 
 
A. ‘Productivity’ refers to the Chomskian notion of systems’ capability to 
generate, principally, an infinite number of conceptual structures. Perceptual 
symbol systems implement productivity through combinatorial and recursive 
processing of simulators. Production can be conceived as the reversal of the 
symbol formation process. It allows for transcending experience, especially 
in imagination (e.g. the “Cheshire cat“), although productive, perceptual 
symbol systems are constrained (as opposed to amodal symbols). For 
example, a schematic perceptual symbol (e.g. running) can hardly be applied 
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to a simulated entity (e.g. a watermelon), because it lacks critical 
characteristics (e.g. leg). Humans can control productivity by linguistics that 
enables them to communicate, i.e. share simulations of non-experienced 
entities and events. Productivity is a prerequisite of many processes in the 
generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3): particularly, the realization of the 
cognitive and, consequently, artificial momentum necessitates such 
generative powers. 
 
B. Propositions refer to the ability of a conceptual system to construct a given 
situation in an infinite number of ways by an infinite number of propositions. 
The consideration of propositions provides means to establish consistency 
between perceptual symbol systems and other theoretic approaches such as 
schema theory, causal mental models. For the generic simulation scheme, 
this was already demonstrated in the context of causal mental models (see 
also 3.1.2). 
 
C. ‘Variable embodiment’ is the idea that a symbol’s meaning reflects the 
physical system in which it is represented. This property is not present in 
amodal symbol systems because it is assumed that they are represented 
independently from the concrete implementation. This ‘disembodiment’ is 
typical for functionalism. This concept provides a source for explaining both 
intra- and inter-individual conceptual variability and conceptual stability. 
Variable embodiment is reflected, for example, in the generic simulation 
scheme by the clear differentiation between the natural, artificial or cognitive 
domain in which the models are operated. Disembodiment is prevented in 
that it is assumed that there is no representation ‘outside’ of these domains. 
 
D. ‘Abstract Concepts’ can be represented by the three mechanisms of (i) 
‘framing’ as representation in the context of a larger body of temporarily 
extended knowledge, (ii) ‘selectivity’ as highlighting the core content against 
the event background and (iii) ‘introspective symbols’ as extraction from 
internal experience. Abstraction is applied in the generic simulation scheme 
for realizing the complexity reduction, i.e. freeing ‘rich’ representations (for 
example a natural situation with a free flying fly) from unnecessary 
background activity (for example by designing a reduced experimental 
situation). 
 
The six core properties and the four derived properties of perceptual symbol 
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systems show that all premises for being regarded as a conceptual system 
are given. The attempt of relating the generic simulation scheme to 
perceptual symbol systems reveals no major inconsistencies and illustrates 
how simulation can be conceived as cognition. Next, the actual operation of a 
mental model will be described in cognitive terms. As before, this shall be 
done along the lines of perceptual symbol systems (italics for paraphrases of 
Barsalou’s account and added plain text for comments). 
 
3.1.4. Simulation in action 
 
In the generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3), simulation refers to an 
operated model. For example, mental simulation is given when a cognitive 
system has a mental model of a situation, e.g. a moving twig perceived 
during a walk adds possible causes for motion (e.g. wind, cat and monster) 
and applies operational rules to the model (e.g. wind with a given velocity). 
The result is a mental simulation of a moved twig. The simulation serves the 
function of generating an explanation. In the moving twig example, this 
could be an answer to the question what actually moved the twig? Along the 
lines of Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems it will be probed whether the 
generic simulation scheme can be described in cognitive terms. 
 
Working memory is the system that runs perceptual simulations. Attention 
extracts schematic perceptual symbols. Automatic processing is the running 
of a highly compiled simulation, whereas strategic processing is the 
construction of a novel simulation using productive mechanisms. Skill results 
from compiling simulations for most of the plans in a domain through 
extensive experience (see Anderson 1993; Logan 1988; Newell 1990). 
Working memory corresponds to short-term memory in the information 
processing approach (see also 1.3.6). In the generic simulation scheme, 
short-term memory was also assumed to be the stage where simulations are 
operated (see also 2.2.3). Attention was seen as the selective mechanism that 
provides elements and activities from the ongoing perceptual activity. The 
poles of automaticity (automatic vs. strategic) can be regarded as the state of 
a learning process. Automatic processing applies learnt mental models, while 
strategic processing is a generative mechanism. The role of computer 
simulations is to mediate between these poles by doing some of the 
automatic processing, but leaving enough space for performing strategic 
processing to be performed in order to learn the underlying model. Skill 
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refers to an automatic processing of simulations rather than models. It 
implies operational rules. 
 
Long-term memory as well as categorization is best conceived as 
propositional construal. Memory retrieval is another form of perceptual 
simulation. It was pointed out here that elements, activities or causal 
relations could enter the ongoing simulation from memory (see also 2.2.2.1). 
A kind of propositional construal was also used in the account of causal 
mental simulation in the sense of Gentner and Gentner (1983) that was 
identified as the most appropriate cognitive theory for the notion of models 
applied in the generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3). 
 
Concepts arise from the ability to simulate an entity or event perceptually. In 
the generic simulation scheme, concepts are important to complexity 
reduction because they enable the organism ‘not to bother’ about the details 
of a system. In this sense, a concept has no perceptual presence, but is 
characterized by an implicit character and automatic processing. A neuron, 
for example can be ‘unfolded’ from a simple binary element to a highly 
complex system (see also 1.2.4). An expert, however, can reduce a complex 
system and process it as a singular entity, simultaneously being able to 
detect references from other aspects of the situation (e.g. a presynaptic 
structure) to details of the model (e.g. a specific membrane channel). 
 
Language comprehension can be viewed as the construction of a perceptual 
simulation to represent the meaning of an utterance or text. Perceptual 
simulation offers a natural account of how people construct the meanings of 
texts, or what other researchers have called situation models and mental 
models (see e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983). This function of simulation was 
already discussed in more detail (see also 3.1.2). Particularly, the account of 
Hesslow (Hesslow 1994; 2002) provides an idea of the lingual aspects of 
mental simulation. 
 
Problem solving is the process of constructing a perceptual simulation that 
leads from an initial state to a goal state. Decision making can be viewed as 
specializing a simulated plan in different ways to see which specialization 
produces the best outcome (cf. the simulation heuristic of Kahneman & 
Tversky 1982). Similarly to Barsalou’s description of problem solving, the 
generic simulation scheme (see also 2.2.3) used simulation as leading from 
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question to answer. Decision-making corresponds to the evaluation stage. 
However, decision making often has an explicit character – it might better be 
conceived as a post-hoc construction of an inner perspective that results 
from recurrent networks with attractor dynamics achieving relaxation states 
(cf. Cruse 2003). 
 
Formal symbol manipulation in logic and mathematics becomes possible 
through the simulation of arbitrary symbols. From perceptual experience 
with external symbols and operations, the ability to construct analogous 
simulations internally develops. In the example of the neuroscientist applying 
a logistic function as a characteristic of a neuron, formal symbol 
manipulation was described in terms of the generic simulation scheme (see 
also 2.2.3). It is worth adding that people often construct non-formal 
simulations to solve formal problems. For example, mathematicians, 
logicians, and scientists often construct visual simulations to discover and 
understand formalisms (see e.g. Thagard 1992). Non-academics similarly use 
non-formal simulations to process formalisms (see e.g. Bassok 1997). 
 
Even though perception, imagery and cognition are neither identical 
behaviorally nor neurally, they “share representational mechanisms to a 
considerable extent.” In terms of the simulation scheme, the difference 
between perception on the one hand and cognition as well as imagery on the 
other hand is simply its source, i.e. externally driven or internally driven. All 
lead to representations of elements, activities and causal relations that are 
operated in a simulation. 
 
The implementation of artificial intelligence is possible, but peripheral 
devices of computers are very different from natural peripheries (‘bodies’) at 
the moment. Therefore, it should not be expected that a technical perceptual 
symbol system would be similar to humans. Similarly, it was concluded from 
the generic simulation scheme that there is no principal difference between 
natural and artificial models. Since both are mentally simulated to be 
‘realized’, successful implementation is not an ontological but an 
epistemological question. 
 
Whereas photos and videos only capture information holistically, a perceptual 
symbol system extracts particular parts of images schematically and 
integrates them into simulators. Once simulators exist, they can be combined 
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to construct simulations productively. Such abilities go far beyond the 
recording abilities of photos and videos. This view corresponds well with the 
differences between computer simulations and other media (see also 2.1). As 
opposed to other media, simulations, no matter whether artificial or natural, 
have inherent functionality and can be operated with various configurations. 
 
Cognition is continuous with perception in that bottom-up and top-down 
information can be merged. (Fodor (1975) claimed that perception is 
impenetrable by cognition because of its modular nature.) Sensorimotor 
systems are penetrable but not always. When bottom-up information 
conflicts with top-down information, the former usually dominates. When 
bottom-up information is absent, however, top-down information 
penetrates, as in mental imagery. Perhaps most critically, when bottom-up 
and top-down information are compatible, top-down processing again 
penetrates, but in subtle manners that complement bottom-up processing. 
This statement is interesting with respect to possible formulations of the 
function of computer simulations as carriers of an artificial momentum 
(‘inherent functionality’). Consider first a pure thought experiment as a 
special case of imagery. In this case, the bottom-up input, i.e. perception of 
external entities and activities is ‘missing’ and, following Barsalou’s notion, 
the probability of top-down information that interferes in the simulation is 
increased. Top-down information can overtake control if the user does not 
“get a grip” on the simulation. At this instance, computer simulations aid the 
learning process by providing a perception-driven precompiled sensorimotor 
cycle that decreases the probability of interfering top-down information. 
Computer simulations can provide this grip as an external force imposed on 
the elements and activities in the ongoing mental simulation. On the other 
hand, if the computer simulation (sensory input) is not ‘compatible’ with 
cognition, computer simulation will fail because no stable connection 
between sensory input and cognition can be established. In terms of the 
generic simulation scheme, this is the case when the representation function 
between the artificial preparation and the mental model of the artificial 
preparation cannot be setup because the models do not commute. 
 
In sum, no major contradictions between Barsalou’s account and the generic 
simulation scheme could be detected. On the contrary, Barsalou’s account 
provides a rich source of concepts concerning the cognitive theory of 
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simulation. This indicates that the generic simulation scheme can be 
conceived as a genuine cognitive mechanism. 
 
3.1.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
General background of this section is a conception of ‘explaining by 
simulation’. Natural explanation, i.e. the notion of an explainer actually 
performing an explanation is envisaged here (as opposed to logical 
explanation, i.e. the notion of an explanation being something independent 
of an explainer). Since natural explanation is primarily a cognitive 
phenomenon, the issue of ‘explaining by simulation’ is reduced to the task of 
describing simulation as cognition. It was probed whether the generic 
simulation scheme coheres with existing cognitive theories. The information 
processing approach (see also 1.3.6) served as a starting point. Its capability 
of bearing the notion of simulation scheme can be seen as a first sign of 
consilience with existing cognitive theories. A review of cognitive theories 
that account for the characteristic properties of simulations, namely 
representing dynamic and complex content and showing inherent 
functionality, showed that candidates sufficing these conditions can be 
found. Particularly causal mental models as characterized by Gentner and 
Stevens (Gentner & Stevens 1983) account for the notion of models used in 
the generic simulation scheme24.  
 
What is left somewhat unclear by causal mental models is how 
representations (i.e. elements, activities and causal relations) can be 
conceived as being part of a natural explanation, for example, which aspect 
of an explanation is natural, which is cognitive or artificial? Causal mental 
models lack a concrete specification of the ‘nature’ of tokens contained by 
the models because they are primarily propositional (see also 3.1.2). 
However, the approaches to naturalized representations as proposed by 
Bechtel (2001b) and Barsalou (1999) allow to integrate models in the generic 
simulation scheme in the natural, cognitive and artificial domain. Therewith, 
it becomes principally possible to see explanations as a natural phenomenon 
                                                 
24 It should be noted, though, that most of the theories of knowledge and representation described above fail to put 
the issue of dynamics in concrete terms. Frequently, dynamics are conceived as state or event sequences (see e.g. 
Barsalou 1999). This is a good for the beginning. But more global (‘higher order’) differentiated temporal structures 
like velocity, acceleration (derivatives) or integrated structures like duration (integrals) are not explained by simply 
gluing together states. Thus, future work should provide a deeper notion about how they are represented (explicitly 
or implicitly): we know how long it takes to get to work; we can imagine a car slowing down etc. Detailed accounts 
should also explain different perspectives on time, e.g. time-moving vs. ego moving (Gentner 2001). 
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and – as a side effect – to account for simulations as brain processes 
(Jeannerod 1994; see 2001 for compelling evidences). Not only maintaining 
models, but also operating them in order to generate the inherent 
functionality of genuine simulations calls for a comprehensive theory of a 
fully functional conceptual (cognitive) system that goes beyond plain 
modeling. Barsalou’s approach of perceptual symbol systems provides both a 
fully functional conceptual system and a treatment of the issue of simulation. 
Therefore, it served as a pattern for an exemplary analysis in which it was 
probed whether or not the generic simulation scheme can be described in 
cognitive terms. The analysis showed that perceptual symbol systems show 
large correspondences to the generic simulation scheme. In conclusion, 
simulation can be described as a cognitive mechanism that produces 
explanations. 
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Reading Advice 
The previous section showed that the generic simulation scheme holds as a general 
explanatory mechanism because it can be described in terms of general cognitive 
phenomena. But the gap between a general account and a concrete case can be deep. 
Whether o  not simulation is the adequate approa h to explanation requires a case-to-case r c  
evaluation. The following “Explanation-Special” demonstrates how such an evaluation could 
be performed (empirically) for a single case of “Explaining Brains by Simulation“. 
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3.2. Explaining brains by simulation: Design for a case study 
 
The issue of ‘explaining by simulation’ was introduced in the second chapter 
and extended in the first section of this third chapter. Simulation is described 
as a cognitive mechanism that generates explanations. Simulations as 
explanatory tools are necessary to account for complex and dynamic systems 
such as brains. Generally, the issue of this study ‘Explaining Brains by 
Simulation’ is a cognitive issue. However, the approach to simulation 
proposed here is not to be understood as a complete subjectivistic or even 
solipsistic account of science and learning – it does not describe cognition as 
an isolated domain, but embeds simulation in a situation in which it is 
applied: the ‘natural’ explanation that is analyzed here has an explainer and, 
additionally, a concrete (situated) explanation most often has a recipient. 
Thus, besides describing simulation as a cognitive issue, it is also 
characterized as a concrete situation. There are many different concrete 
cases of explainer-recipient situations: a lecturer explains for students, 
students explain to other students during learning for an exam, students 
explain for lecturers in exams, an assistant explains to another assistant 
during five o’clock tea, a scientist explains to colleagues in a talk etc. The 
general role simulation plays in all these situations is described by the 
generic simulation scheme. But the specific role simulation plays in all these 
different explanatory situations can be very different. So far, a coarse 
framework of understanding the role simulation plays has been developed. 
The actual variety of specific situations is not yet covered. 
 
How can the variety of specific situations be covered? One possibility is the 
discussion of various explanatory situations in which simulations are applied. 
Though a valuable alternative, this would be a task for years and could be 
realized only unsatisfactorily superficial in this study. What then? I will 
provide a design for a case study on an empirical approach to “Explaining by 
Simulation“. This can be presented with sufficient detail and can mediate a 
concrete impression of what it means to analyze and evaluate a single 
explanatory situation. This concrete impression can then be hypothetically 
transferred (extrapolated) to the variety of possible explanatory situations 
that rest on simulation. The cognitive theories reviewed above (see also 
3.1.1) already demonstrate applicable empirical approaches to an evaluation 
of cognitive mechanisms. However, the underlying studies of these cognitive 
theories do not address directly the issue of brains. For being neatly bound 
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to the actual theme of this study, and bringing together the aspects of the 
previous chapters and sections, the case provided here will apply a model 
that relates to brains and, thus, to the issue of “Explaining Brains by 
Simulation”. 
 
Which model that reflects brain issues can be chosen? Models in the Brain 
Sciences come from such different fields such as Neurophysiology, neural 
network theory or cognitive psychology (see also 1.3.2). A common scheme 
prevalent in the brain sciences was identified in the analysis of the state of 
theoretical integration in the Brain Sciences as being an information-
processing creature showing adaptive behavior (see also 1.3.6). A 
Braitenberg vehicle (Braitenberg 1984) is a possible model for this common 
scheme. Thus, the exemplary case study on “Explaining Brains by Simulation” 
applies a simulation of the Braitenberg vehicle. The role simulation plays in 
brain science was identified as improving the handling of dynamics and 
complexity in order to gain control (see also 1.1.11). Therefore, the task in 
the case study is to control different Braitenberg vehicles of varying 
complexity and dynamics. The role attributed to computer simulations was to 
provide some of the system’s momentum (inherent functionality) in order to 
show the user how the model can be mentally simulated. This role of 
computer simulations is tested in the case study by comparing an 
experimental group that receives an instructional computer simulation with a 
control group that receives no such computer simulation and must work 




The world is full of things that we do not perfectly understand: refrigerators, 
flower buds, computers, brains and the like. Nevertheless, we can handle 
situations in which these things play a role. Thus, it is not necessarily a 
problem that we do not see through them. But certain situations, particularly 
malfunctions, force us to understand the underlying mechanisms in order to 
predict their behavior – at least this is true for certain people such as the 
fridge repair service, the orchid grower, the network admin or the scientist. 
Things that we do not perfectly understand are often complex and dynamic: 
we have problems arranging all the elements, activities and causal relations 
of the system under scrutiny. But such proper arrangements are necessary to 
comprehend the underlying mechanism. Experts who understand those 
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systems must have undergone a learning process during which they acquired 
skills and knowledge: experts have learnt to accomplish these arrangements 
and are able to generate hypothesis about (mal-) function, predict and test. 
In an optimal case, experts are able to perform a mental simulation of the 
system under scrutiny and, therewith, are able to test every possible cause of 
malfunction ‘in their head’ to come up with diagnosis and decisions what to 
do next. 
 
The theoretical question addressed here is how mental simulation can help to 
solve complex and dynamic problems. This shall be achieved by analyzing 
the learning process taking place when subjects interact with models on a 
computer. The specific objective is to design a prototypical experimental 
framework for testing hypotheses on processes involved in learning models 
showing considerable dynamics and complexity. Influences of specific 
presentations of the models on the learning process, e.g. different trainings 
or different instructional material shall be assessed. Thus, the practical 
objective readily implied is to assess the design of educational model 
simulations. 
 
Since the experiments cannot be directly derived from a tried and tested 
paradigm for evaluating learning with model simulations, this work has the 
status of pilot tests. These pilot tests shall eventually lead to a conclusive 
experimental framework, which is approached in first steps by the studies 
presented here. 
 
3.2.1.1. General task 
 
For the sake of clarity (but at the risk of loosing suspense), a short overview 
of the task will be presented before the procedures are explained in detail in 
the theoretical and technical sections. One general goal in this work is to 
elicit situations in which comprehension of mechanisms (the ability of 
controlled mental simulation) makes a difference, i.e. is advantageous or 
hindering. How could such a difference look like? Obviously, experts (as 
compared to naive learners) should show superior performance in verbal 
description tasks referring to a given mechanism: they should be able to 
generate better explanations. But verbal description during the task would 
interfere with the cognitive processes involved and verbal description after 
the task is remote as a primarily subjectively reconstructed interpretation of 
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the individual experience during the task? Consequently, a behavioral, 
primarily non-verbal task (a “skill”) was chosen as dependent variable, 
namely the skill of controlling a device. 
 
The general task is to steer a vehicle in a given environment (a circular 
‘arena’) from a specified starting position towards a specified target position. 
The vehicle can be guided towards its destination by placing a virtual 
stimulus in the arena. Subjects are told that the vehicle has to find nutrition 
and can be guided by a light source. Initially, the vehicle ‘waits’ in the middle 
of the arena (see fig. 24). The learners see the target (a blue circle). Then, 
they can place a stimulus by clicking on the arena’s rim. In the moment of 
the stimulus placement, the vehicle is activated and begins to move relative 
to the stimulus. The vehicle stops when it crosses the arena’s rim. Depending 
on the learners’ choice of stimulus position and the final architecture of the 
vehicle, the target can be hit or missed. Before the first condition of the 
experiment is presented, learners have two make two test trials.  
 
Each condition is a set of twenty trials (‘runs’): during one condition twenty 
target positions of a fixed set are presented in a randomized order. When 
learners have finished the first condition, learners are informed that they 
might find another vehicle in the next set of trials. Five conditions are 
defined: the first two are conditions in which the vehicle moves directly 
towards the stimulus (positive phototactic), directly in opposite directions of 
the stimulus (negative phototactic). In the last two conditions, the vehicle 
shows skew trajectories that tend to miss the stimulus. Again the first is 
positive the second negative phototactic.  
 
The third is the critical condition in which the control group makes a neutral 
task (tic-tac-toe) while the experimental group receives an instructional 
treatment on the internal organization of the vehicle (see also 3.2.1.1). The 
experimental group is informed that the vehicle is bilaterally symmetric and 
has two sensors and two motors and sensor-motor connections. The activity 
of the sensors depends on the stimulus position (bright vs. dark light) and 
determines the activation of the motors. The direction of activation 
(acceleration vs. deceleration) can cause positive or negative phototaxis and 
differential sensitivities of the sensor-motor connections on either side can 
cause skew trajectories. Learners are instructed to rebuild one of four 
predefined configurations of the vehicle and can observe the resulting 
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trajectories. The sensor’s activity during the run is dynamically visualized 
during the run. Learners of the experimental group, thus, have the 
opportunity to learn the vehicle’s architecture and the influence of different 
configuration to different behaviors. They receive information necessary to 
conclude a vehicle’s configuration from observations of the vehicle’s runs in 
conditions ‘3’ and ‘4’ and predict trajectories for subsequent runs. The 
instructional section of the experimental group contains instructions of how 
a mental simulation of a specific problem can be performed. 
 
There is a problem distinguishing between training effects resulting from 
steering the vehicle through the arena and effects of instructional unit. It is 
conceivable that the experimental group outperforms the control group 
because learners have more opportunities to learn about the problem of 
steering the vehicle, but not because they receive the instructional unit. This 
could be tested by having a second control group that has to steer another 
vehicle in the critical condition and compare it to the control group and the 
experimental group. However, for the sake of (conceptual and statistical) 
clarity, the preferred approach is to quantify the overall effect of the 




fig. 24: The task. (a) Schematic presentation o  the GUI. A is the ‘arena’ where the task of 
steering a vehicle is presented; C contains instructions and feedback as text. B contains 
instructional material on the vehicle for the experimental group and task-independent 
information (tic-tac-toe) for the control-group. (b) ‘Arena’. Learners have to lure the vehicle 
(triangle), with a stimulus (circle) towards a target (square). (c) Internal organization of the 
vehicle. This is presented exclusively in the experimental condition for the experimental 
group. Learners can choose between four different vehicle configurations and test them in 
the arena. Additionally, learners can change weights of the configurations. (d) Tic-tac-toe 
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3.2.1.2. Learning strategies 
 
The rationale in the experimental design is that the ability of mentally 
simulating the run before the decision of stimulus positioning takes place, 
helps to generate more exact predictions of a specific trajectory. These 
should be measurable as smaller distances between target position and the 
final position of the vehicle, i.e. smaller errors. The experimental treatment 
with the instructional unit on mechanisms acting in the vehicle shall provoke 
a clustering of learners that mentally simulate successfully and those who do 
not. Consequently, a difference in the performance between groups is 
predicted. However, as it is typical for performances on complex tasks 
various strategies for solving the tasks might be developed and applied by 
learners. More detailed, some learners of the experimental group might not 
mentally simulate and some of the control group might do so. 
 
This problem can be explained by the assumption that mental simulation 
corresponds to the handling of complex and dynamic systems. The more 
elements and activities a system has and the more time steps are to be 
considered in which elements and activities can influence the overall behavior 
of the system, the more possibilities the learner has to ‘navigate’ through 
this problem space. All elements and activities might give rise to different 
elementary cognitive skills that finally act together to predict the behavior of 
a system. In this sense, mental simulation is a concerted action of elementary 
cognitive skills that happens before the decision of stimulus positioning. It is 
obvious that it is not trivial to predict exactly each performance of each 
learner on a complex and dynamic task. This is a fundamental problem of the 
analysis of mental simulation and performance on complex and dynamic 
situations, respectively. It should be noted that this problem of multiple 
learning strategies is a question of finding the correct experimental design – 
it is put forward here that each ‘interesting’ design (i.e. one that creates 
situations of considerable dynamics and complexity) will suffer from this 
problem. It would be naïve to assume that complex and dynamic situations 
can be investigated with simple designs. 
 
As a consequence of the multiple learning strategies, it must be considered 
that, even if a difference between experimental and control group was found, 
it couldn’t necessarily be referred to mental simulation. The expected 
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variance necessitates a more detailed analysis of the different strategies to 
carry out the task – different learner models have to be specified. 
 
3.2.1.3. The model 
 
The vehicle’s motion and, therewith, the resulting trajectory of a given run is 
based on a model of Braitenberg (Braitenberg 1984) that is implemented as 
an experimental computer program.25 The vehicle has sensors and effectors 
(‘motors’). The effectors move the vehicle, the sensors ‘react’ to certain 
events in the environment (see fig. 25). Effectors and sensors may have 
various properties (e.g. linear or dynamic characteristics) and may be 
interconnected in several ways (e.g. feed-forward or recurrent). By exploiting 
the combinatorial possibilities, small but considerably complex and dynamic 
vehicles can be designed. However, for the sake of simplicity of the 
experiments, very reduced architectures are considered in the pilot phase. 
Sensors are designed as visual elements that can detect light stimuli – even 
though other principles of stimulus detection (e.g. distance dependent as in 
the case of odor detection) are possible. The receptive field of the ‘eyes’ is 
monocular (no overlap between both hemispheres) and has a sine wave 
sensitivity function: it is maximally sensitive for stimuli being exactly lateral 
to the respective eye (90° relative to the symmetry axis of the vehicle) and 
become less sensitive to the front (0°) and the back (180°). 
 
fig. 25: Model of the vehicle. (a) The vehicle has no binocular vision but registers only 
information coming from one side at one instance of time. The sensitivity of the sensor 
varies with the Α. (b) and (c) Types of connections inside the vehicle. In the experiment only 
the crossed type was applied (r: right, l: left). (d) Points and angles relevant for data analysis. 
All angles are measured from the symmetrical axis of the vehicle (0°). The hypothetical final 




                                                 
25 This program was developed by the student coworker Olaf Gerstung. 
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Generally, two feed forward connections are possible – one ipsilateral 
(connecting sensor to motor on the same side, i.e. right to right and left to 
left) and one contralateral (connecting sensor to motor on the other side, i.e. 
right to left and left to right). However, since the effective behavior does not 
principally change, only one connection type will be considered (i.e. the 
contralateral). The connection strength (‘weights’) between sensors and 
motors can be varied. By setting weights, differential propulsion on the 
motors on either side of the vehicle can be realized that results in different 
types of behavior. For example, positive contralateral connections result in 
vehicles moving towards the light source (positive phototactic), while 
negative contralateral connections cause the vehicle to steer clear of the light 
(negative phototactic). Asymmetric weights, e.g. one connection weak (0.1) 
and the other strong (0.9) will result in skew trajectories. 
 
Note that the vehicle’s behavior is not explainable as a simple stimulus-
response relation. Information processing in the vehicle is continuous over 
the whole run so that the sensory input will change with each bit the vehicle 
moves. Thus the vehicle tends to produce curved trajectories instead of 
running directly towards or away from the light source. More precisely, 
motors cause constant propulsion from the onset of stimulation with the 
light source to the moment the vehicle reaches the arena’s rim. If all 
connections were maximal and no sensory input were present the vehicle 
would move, say 5 pixels per instant of time of the model simulation. If the 
arena had 200 pixels, so the vehicle would receive 40 sensory inputs before 
it reaches the arena’s rim and would stops after, say 4 seconds. If sensory 
inputs were continuously maximal, the vehicle would move, say 10 pixels per 
instant of time and reach the rim after 20 steps (2 seconds). If only one 
sensory input were maximally activated, the vehicle would move towards the 
side where the activation (‘the light’) is, because the propulsion of the 
contralateral side is increased. (Alternatively, the same behavior can be 
realized by decreasing propulsion on the ipsilateral side with negative 
connections and ipsilateral connectivity). A directional turn (180°) is 
performed after, say, 5 steps (approximately 0.5 second), which would 
correspond to an angular velocity of 360 deg/sec. The tuning of the vehicle’s 
movement is a trade-off between smoothness (not too slow) and 
transparency of the movement: learners should be able to observe that the 
actual sensory input continuously determines the turning direction, i.e. the 
trajectory can change gradually during the run. 
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3.2.1.4. Learning the vehicle 
 
Learners are not informed about the configuration of the vehicle in a given 
condition. By observing the vehicle’s behavior, they have to learn to control 
the vehicle. Thus, they have to conclude from their observations of the 
vehicle’s behavior to the ‘mechanism’ that controls the vehicle, e.g. “the 
vehicle is scared away by light“. Learners are informed when they are 
confronted with a new vehicle (a new condition). The performance measure 
for the success of learning is the “goodness of steering“. This is defined as 
the reversal of the error (angle), i.e. the deviance of the vehicle from the 
target (dependent variable). The prediction following from these assumptions 
is that the error will decrease over runs and a learning curve will be 
measurable. 
 
More precisely, the arena’s top (along the symmetry axis of the vehicle’s 
starting position) is defined as zero degree, angles are given in radians [-
π, π], clockwise angles are positive, counterclockwise are negative. α is the 
angle between top and target position a, β is the angle between zero and 
stimulus position b (see fig. 25a) and γ the angle between top and the 
vehicle’s final position c, i.e. where it’s tip touches the arena’s rim. The 
normalized error δ is determined by the distance between α and γ (see fig. 
25d), the inner angle between the points a and c is δ [0,1].26 
  
3.2.1.5. Error correction 
 
However, not all targets are equally easy to be hit. This poses a problem for 
computing the learning curve over several runs. If target positions are 
presented in randomized order, variance of observed errors averaged over 
learners might not be caused by the degree of comprehension of the 
mechanism that controls the vehicle (as intended), but by the varying 
difficulty of the target position. On the other hand, if target positions are 
presented in a fixed order, specific learning strategies for a given run 
interfere in the results. Therefore, the error for a single target position 
should be weighted with its difficulty. But how can error correction be 
achieved? Assume that the circle is divided into 100 tics and a given target 
position counts as ‘hit’ if the vehicle’s final position is within the tic. If only 
                                                 
26 As will be described later, some targets are not reachable. Then, the nearest reachable point – depending on the 
end position of the vehicle – in left or right vicinity of the target is taken as point a. 
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one stimulus position caused the vehicle to hit the target, the probability 
would be one out of hundred (p = 0.01) if every possible stimulus position 
led to a hit, the probability would be 100% (p = 1). Thus, the amount of 
possible stimulus positions causing hits indicates the chance level for hitting 
a given target position. Consequently, each target position in each vehicle 
configuration (each run ‘i’) has its specific chance level pi = nhit / ntics (nhit is 
the number of hitting stimulus positions, ntics the number of tics). The chance 
level in a given condition is determined by the mean individual chance level 
over the number of trials ni: pmean = Σ (pi) / ni. This individual chance value 
can be applied as a weight for each stimulus position when assessing the 
error that learners make for a single run. 
 
E = δ / (1 − p) 
 
It should be noted that this conception of the error implies no assumption of 
learning strategies – it just reflects the statistical prerequisites. This 
normalized and weighted error allows for the consideration of learning 
curves during the runs averaged over learners for a specific vehicle when 
target positions are presented in a randomized order. 
 
3.2.1.6. Distinguishing strategies 
 
Different vehicles are used to introduce different conditions (each 20 runs). 
Some conditions might very well be performed without understanding the 
control mechanism of the vehicle, while others might be better performed 
when comprehension has taken place. For instance, some vehicles might be 
successfully controlled with simple strategies, such as: “The vehicle hits the 
target when I place the stimulus on the target position.” Other vehicles 
require more sophisticated strategies, such as: “The vehicle hits the target 
when the stimulus is placed slightly on the right (seen from the perspective 
of the approaching vehicle).” and/or “…the lower the target the greater the 
required shift of the stimulus to the right.“ 
 
Which strategies can be distinguished? An initial question might be that the 
vehicles’ behavior is either positive or negative phototactic. But a learner 
having experienced both types of vehicles has to take into account both 
possibilities. Compared to a naive learner, the problem space, i.e. the 
number of possible positions ntics is doubled. For predicting the performance 
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of a learner who does not know which vehicle is present the chance level 
consequently also has to be doubled. In the actual experiment, learners are 
instructed that one vehicle is present and will only be changed if they are 
informed. Thus, they will assume that they have the same vehicle during 
successive runs. Nonetheless, when they are confronted with a new vehicle 
(and informed about that), they initially have an enlarged problem space. 
After a certain amount of trials, learners might be able to assume a given 
mechanism for the vehicle, i.e. if it is positive or negative phototactic. This 
assumption bisects problem space again. This learning process should be 
accompanied by a drop of the error production from the level determined by 
the possible occurrence of positive and negative phototactic vehicles to the 
level determined by the possible occurrence of only one vehicle type. This 
should be visible in learning curves as an initial drop of error (boost of 
performance). 
 
If the learner experiences quantitative deviations (‘skew vehicles’), much 
more trajectories are possible and the problem space becomes larger. One 
approach to predicting learner performance is to compute problem space 
with all possible positions. But it seems implausible that actual learners will 
take into account all possible positions, but rather bisect problem space for 
positive and negative phototactic vehicles and then try to figure out the 
direction of skewness before they finally try to determine skewness 
quantitatively. Consequently, a different approach of predicting performance 
by learner modeling is applied for skew vehicles: If the learners’ error is 
corrected with a difficulty factor for each single target position the error 
levels predicted for straight vehicles should not change. 
 
How can this difficulty factor be conceived? Consider the simple case that the 
vehicle runs directly to the light source and compare it to the situation in 
which the vehicle runs away from the stimulus and tends to hit the arena’s 
rim slightly right to the stimulus. It can be assumed that the operation of 
predicting the shift is more difficult than predicting no shift and that 
difficulty is increased with increasing angular distance of the shift. Thus, the 
difficulty of a given target position is assumed to be proportional to the 
angle ε (normalized by 1/π) between the target position a and the point e 
indicating the Stimulus-On-Target (SOT) error. The SOT error ε is the 
resulting error angle when the stimulus was set directly on the target 
position (a = b). 
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What can this SOT error ε tell about difficulty as subjects perceive it? It 
expresses how far a given vehicle would deviate from a given target position 
if learners assumed that the vehicle moved straight towards the target 
position when the stimulus is set on the target. If difficulties ranged between 
zero and one, the “straight vehicle” would be defined as having zero 
difficulty. This would imply that the difficulty is greatest if the vehicle lands 
straight on the other side. Of course, this measure of difficulty is consistent 
only for the assumption that the vehicle is positive phototactic. Thus, this 
measure of difficulty is sensitive for (and at the same time dependent on) a 
learning strategy. Negative phototactic vehicles have to be treated 
alternatively: learners have to assume that the stimulus position is directly 
opposite to the target position a = | b − π |. (A simple practical solution is to 
base all computational operations not on the target position a but on the 
mirrored target position a’ = | b − π |, ceteris paribus.) 
 
The SOT error can be used as a difficulty measure that allows for an 
assessment of learners’ performance in tasks with the same target position 
but different vehicles: Given are the vehicles V1 and V2 of different difficulty 
and learners that produce the errors V1: δ1 = y1(V1) and V2: δ2 = y2(V2). Now, 
it does not make much sense to compare these errors directly because it is 
clear that learners produce greater errors for more difficult vehicles. Now, 
the error angles εV1 and εV2 that result from the assumption of straight 
vehicles (steered by placing stimulus on target position a = b) indicate the 
difficulty of the vehicle. By correcting the observed error with the 
corresponding SOT error, the performance of the learner can be separated 
from the theoretical error. For example, if learners consistently performed on 
the level predicted by correcting the observed error δ by the SOT error ε, it 
would be indicated that they have learned how to control the vehicle. If they 
performed worse, on the other hand, it might be due to “additional 
confusion“. Put another way, if the performance (e.g. learning curve) on 
straight vehicles and the corrected performance on skew vehicles is not 
distinguishable, the learner successfully compensates the SOT error. 
 
It should be noted that this measure primarily refers to single trials and not 
to the whole condition (vehicle) because the SOT error ε is not uniformly 
distributed over the arena, but varies with target position. Since the vehicle’s 
starting orientation is always ‘up’ (0 degree), targets in the back pose 
different problems than targets in the front. For example, the vehicle must 
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turn to reach targets in the back. Depending on the actual configuration of 
the vehicle, the turn might increase the SOT error ε in back positions relative 
to front positions. Thus, it is not precise to compute an overall error for the 
vehicle simply by averaging ε over all possible positions. However, this is 
what learners might do – the mean vehicle skewness helps determining 
another level of learning: Given that the probability of target positions is 
homogenously distributed (e.g. each target position appears once or multiple 
integer times), it can be conceived simply as the mean SOT error εmean over 
all possible target positions. 
 
εmean = Σ εi / ni 
 
The mean vehicle shift provides a means for assessing the learning process: 
the more the learners can ‘move’ away from the error level predicted by 
vehicle shift over trials, the more they leave their hypothesis of a “straight 
vehicle“. In case they minimize the distance, they learn to compensate the 
mean shift of the actual vehicle. Increases in distance, on the other hand, 
would indicate that they are confused. Thus, a possible learning strategy 
would be to minimize η = δ − ε that can be seen as an indicator of the 
amount of learning that has taken place (e.g. if a level of a steady state in 
error production is reached). 
 
As already explained above, SOT errors are not distributed uniformly over the 
arena, but vary with position. Learners performing on the level predicted by a 
mean vehicle shift still make considerable errors: They will sometimes 
overestimate and sometimes underestimate the shift. But learners who 
correctly anticipate not only the direction of the shift and the mean 
magnitude of the shift, but also the distribution of specific shift magnitudes 
produce an even smaller error than predicted by the mean vehicle shift – 
optimally zero. (A jitter resulting from the imprecise positioning of the 
stimulus and a residual error is expected, though). For a comparison of 
performances on straight and skew vehicles (e.g. a comparison of learning 
curves) the predicted performance is not simply determined by mean vehicle 
skewness, but demands a trial based correction with the SOT error ε. Then 
these learners should perform exactly as if they control a straight vehicle 
because they perfectly anticipate the shift. 
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In sum, the following problems for learners can be differentiated with the 
help of the error conceptions introduced above: 
1. The task: “steer vehicle to target“. 
2. The control principle: “use stimulus to direct vehicle to target“. 
 
>>Prediction A (for 1. and 2.): Learners who do not understand 1. 
and 2. perform on the chance level. A corresponding learner model 
positions stimuli randomly. 
 
3. The stimulus quality / vehicle preference: “positive and negative effects 
of the stimulus must be considered“. 
 
>>Prediction B: Due to bisection of problem space the error should  
decrease instantaneously after vehicle preference is understood. 
 
4. The shift direction: “vehicle misses the target on a specific side when 
stimulus is set on target“ 
5. The shift compensation: “shift can be compensated with a 
corresponding shift of stimulus position“ 
6. The shift magnitude: “the (compensatory) shift is about x tics“ 
 
>>Prediction C (for 4., 5. and 6.): learners who compensate the 
mean vehicle shift perform worse than on a straight vehicle. 
Actually, individual learners with different error sources 
(corresponding to steps 4., 5. and 6., respectively) are summarized 
in this model. 
 
7. The shift distribution: “the (compensatory) shift is about x1 tics when 
target in front of the vehicle, x2 tics when target on right side, x3 tics 
when target on left side and x4 tics when target is in the back“. 
 
>>Prediction D: learners who compensate the skewness of a given 
vehicle for each target position perform as if the vehicle was 
straight. (The difficulties introduced by shift distribution can be 
subdivided into several subclasses. For example, learners might or 
might not distinguish between different shift distributions on the 
left and on the right. However, these differences are assumed to be 
too fine-grained for the present state of the analysis.) 
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Generally, all problems (1-7) in the task have to be overcome by learners in 
order to control a difficult (e.g. ‘skew’) vehicle. Having analyzed these 
problems encountered by all learners, no matter whether experimental group 
or control group, we arrive at a stage where experimental and control group 
can be compared. Most problems encountered by learners might be 
overcome just by observing, analyzing and evaluating the vehicle’s behavior – 
be it by trial-and-error or by goal directed hypothesis testing. Thus, it is not 
mandatory for learners to hypothesize about the mechanisms underlying the 
vehicle and, therewith, it is not mandatory to receive the instructional 
treatment of the experimental group: it is also possible to detect the 
correlation between stimulus and response by phenomenological analysis. 
The control group, hence, has a chance of competing the experimental 
group. But the global hypothesis behind the experimental design is that skew 
vehicles (presented after the experimental treatment) are hardly predictable 
without mentally simulating them. Consequently, learners of the 
experimental group who have received instructions for mental simulation are 
predicted to outperform other learners. This should be measurable as 
differential error niveaux produced by the two groups. Following the 
assumption that mental simulation helps particularly in difficult situations 
(i.e. situations showing dynamics and complexity) ‘skew’ vehicles should 
particularly be better steered by the experimental group. 
 
3.2.2. Material and methods 
 
3.2.2.1. Experimental procedure 
 
A computer (Pentium II, 256 MB RAM or comparable), a mouse and a JAVA-
program (JRE 1.3) are required. Learners sit in front of a monitor and use a 
mouse with at least one switch as exclusive steering (input) device. 
Monitored by the program are mouse clicks (onset, offset, duration, x-y 
position). It is possible to refer all monitored user data to events in the 
runtime of the application, i.e. data referring to the same ‘master time’ in the 
application. 
 
Relevant information is presented via a graphical user interface (GUI) 
1024x768 in size on an otherwise black screen. The GUI has the sections A, 
B, and C (see fig. 24). 
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A-Task field. This is the ‘arena’ in which the user has to place a stimulus in 
order to lure the vehicle towards the target (see fig. 24b) 
B-Experimental field. Different tasks are presented for experimental and 
control group. The experimental group receives instructional material on the 
organization of the vehicle, the control group a tic-tac-toe game. 
C-Text field. The textual information provided in this field may be instruction 
or feedback (i.e. if a condition is finished etc.) 
 
The experiment is organized into four phases, (i) introduction, (ii) ‘pre’, (iii) 
critical (experimental vs. control group) and (iv) ‘post’ (see table 8 for a 
detailed description of the phases). The introduction contains a textual 
instruction and several trials for luring the vehicle towards a target by placing 
a stimulus on the arena’s rim. The vehicle used in the introduction is the 
simplest possible: if the stimulus is placed on the target, the vehicle always 
hits the target, i.e. the Stimulus-On-Target (SOT-) strategy is successful. 
After the introduction, learners should have understood the general principle 
of the task. Only if the learner has performed two successful trials, the 
program enters the next mode. 
 
The phases ‘pre’ and ‘post’ show the same organization: each has two 
conditions (i.e. ‘pre1’, ‘pre2’, ‘post1’, ‘post2’). Each condition comprises 20 
trials. In each trial, one of a fixed set of 20 target positions that are uniformly 
distributed over the circle is presented. The program randomizes the order 
of presentation in each experiment to prevent the influence of a specific 
sequence of target positions. The conditions vary in the vehicle’s 
configuration that, in turn, determines the vehicle’s behavior. (Between 
conditions learners are informed that a new vehicle is presented). Even 
though vehicles show curved trajectories, the vehicles were tuned to hit the 
arena’s rim before they turned 360°. Vehicle ‘pre1’ moves towards the light 
(‘positive phototactic’) and shows the same (mirror-symmetrical) behavior on 
its left and right side (‘symmetrical’). Vehicle ‘pre2’ moves away from the 
light (negative phototactic), but is also symmetrical. Vehicle ‘post1’ is 
positive phototactic but asymmetrical: when users place the stimulus on the 
target, the vehicle will miss the target with different absolute error angles on 
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table 8: Schematic overview of the task. First, instructions for experimenters before the task 
are shown, then the overview of the actual experiment. Column 1 shows the name of the 
phase (prog.=program), 2 the vehicle type (see text for details) presented on screen A, 3 the 
experimental/control treatment on screen B, 4 the instructions (translated from German), 5 
he way of progression in the program and 6 the number of iterations. Finally, the 




Experimenter opens program, chooses ‘E’ for experimental group or ‘C’ for control group enters Learner-ID 
and confirms by pressing enter. 
Experimenter welcomes learner and asks learner to sit down.  






Screen A Screen B Screen 
C 
Progression # 
Intro “intro” - You see an artificial being in the middle of an 
arena. Without help, the being (triangle) is not able 
to get to its feed (blue circle). But by placing a light 
on the arena’s rim, you can lure it towards its feed. 
Just click where you think the light should be! 
forward only when 
target was hit 
 - - G eat! Now comes the next feed! r auto-forward 3 sec.
1 
 “intro” - - forward only when 
target was hit 
1 
Pause - - - auto-forward 3 sec. 1 
“pre1” - Let’s get started! Notice, however that the being is 
exchanged for the following 20 runs. It might 
behave different from the one of the test run. 




“pre1” - -  
Part 1 
“pre1” - Next run. forward on click 
19 
Pause - - - auto-forward 3 sec. 1 
“pre2” - For the next 20 runs, you get another being again. 
It might behave different again. 




“pre2” - -  
Part 2 
“pre2” - Next run. forward on click 
19 






Here, you can learn something about the 
functioning of the beings for better control of the 
beings pre ented later. Beings registe  light signals 
with their eyes and pass it ove  cables to the 
motors. Beings only differ in their cables: Light 
signals passed by red cables boost the motor, light 
signals passed by blue cables slow the motor 
down. Thick cables boost or slow down stronge  
than thin cables. In the model, you can exchange 
cable types with the slider. When your being is 
ready, place a light and observe the resulting 















Now, you have 20 test runs (you can place a light 
20 times). Build the being  shown in boxes 1-4 and 
make yourself clear the following characteristics: 
s
s
- Being 1 does not reach lights in the rear parts of 
the arena because it turns too slowly. 
- Being 2 runs away from light because light on the 
right side, for example, slows down the left motor 
and the now stronger right motor turns the being 
to the left. 
- Being 3 reache  almost any light in the right half 
but not in the left half because the cable from the 
right eye is too thin for boosting the turn 
sufficiently. 
- Being 4 runs away from light, but makes better 
turns to the left because light coming from the 
right slows down the left motor too much for a 
sufficient turn.  
forward on click 19 
- Tic Tac 
Toe 
The game TicTacToe is about placing 3 tokens in 
straight or crosswise line. The computer program 
places its token promptly after yours. Then it’s 
your turn again. In the next game the computer 
program begins. You play 20 games.  
forward on click 1 
- Tic Tac 
Toe 
- After game over 
Contr. 
- Tic Tac 
Toe 
[Game number]: [won | draw | lost ] forward on click 
20 
Pause - - - Auto-forward 3 sec. 1 
“post1” - For the next 20 runs, you get another being again. 
It might behave different again. 
forward after first 
stimulus  
1 
“post1” - -  
Part 3 
“post1” - Next run.  forward on click 
19 
Pause - - - Auto-forward 3 sec. 1 
“post2” - For the next 20 runs, you get another being again. 
It might behave different again. 
forward after first 
stimulus  
1 
“post2” - -  
Part 4 
“post2” - Next run. forward on click 
19 
End - - Thanks.   
 
Questionnaire 
Item  Options to be filled by … 
Name  first name, last name learner 
Age  integer learner 
Gender [male | female] learner 
Profession  … learner 
Schooling (for students, subject of study) learner 
Braitenberg Vehicles prior known  [ yes | no ] learner 
Other prior knowledge on task  … learner 
Tic Tac Toe [ yes | no ] experimenter 
ID … experimenter 
Date … experimenter 
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A single trial comprises the following sequential states: in the ‘inactivated’ 
state, it is not possible to place a stimulus. The activated state is entered 
automatically after a program internal downtime of the system and is 
characterized by ‘waiting’ for learner’s choice of the stimulus position. The 
active state is entered when the learner places the stimulus: the vehicle 
begins to move relative to the stimulus position and stops on the arena’s 
rim. The target can be hit or not. The program provides feedback to the 
learner in several forms. The target is ‘hit’ if the vehicle exceeds the arena’s 
rim within a corridor of 5 % of the circumference of the arena (5 out of 100 
tics). In successful cases the target changes its color from white to red. 
Moreover, learners see a counter that indicates how many targets were hit. 
This feedback has exclusively motivational reasons. By instructing learners to 
hit as many targets as possible, it is ensured that they focus on minimizing 
their error. The mere number of hits is, however, a measure too coarse (and 
statistically problematic) to evaluate performance of learners – the error 
angle is taken as measure instead. 
 
The critical condition comprises a short introduction in textual form and the 
actual task. The control group is provided with information how to play Tic-
Tac-Toe and plays 20 games as task-irrelevant treatment. The experimental 
group is provided with a short introduction on the organizational principles 
of the vehicle, the respective mechanisms and the information on their 
opportunity to perform 20 tests on a given vehicle configuration. In the 
actual task, they see a model of the vehicle with its most important 
components (sensors, motors, connections). They can vary the connection 
strengths of the left and right connection with sliders that are on the left and 
right, respectively. The upper end of the slider is ‘full positive’, the middle is 
zero and the lower end ‘full negative’. The connection strength is visualized 
directly as a color code in the vehicle model: red for positive and blue for 
negative values, thick for strong connections and thin for weak connections 
(zero is visualized as a dotted line). Below the model are four switches with 
symbols of specific configurations. Characteristic are the differential colors 
of the connections. The symbols have a text label indicating the behavior of 
the vehicle (e.g. “positive phototactic, asymmetric”). Learners are advised in 
the instructional text to rebuild these models by changing the connection 
strengths. These pre-configured vehicles help learners to match a given 
configuration with a given behavior. The pre-configured vehicles correspond 
to the four vehicles presented in the different conditions during the 
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experiment (e.g. ‘pre1’ is upper left symbol), but learners are not explicitly 
informed about that. The learner can start a test anytime. It does not matter 
whether configurations were changed by sliders or symbols or both or none. 
The number of already performed tests is indicated by a counter. 
 
3.2.2.2. Model implementation27 
 
The activation of the vehicle’s sensors depends on stimulus position. Only 
one sensor at a time can be activated because there is no geometrical overlap 
between the sensitivity functions of both sensors that could build a binocular 
visual field. The activation maximum for stimuli being directly on the left or 
on the right (90°). That means: a stimulus of the amplitude 1 causes the 
activation 1 when the stimulus is directly on the right or on the left relative to 
the middle of the vehicle. The sensitivity decreases to the front and to the 
back following a sine function and becomes zero directly on the symmetric 
axis. The stimulus amplitude Iin is constantly 1 and does not depend on 
distance. Thus the activation of a sensor at a given instant of time is defined 
by IS = sin(Iin). 
 
3.2.2.3. Propulsion of the vehicle 
 
Position and alignment of the vehicle is computed with a 4x4 transformation 

























































                                                 
r s27 This was carried out by the student cowo ker Olaf Ger tung. 
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The angle γ indicates the rotation relative to the z-axis. The values m14 =: tx, 
m24 =: tx and m34 =: tx determine translation along x-, y- and z-axis, 
respectively. Since the vehicle moves on an x-y plane, m34 as well as m41, m42 
























Global reference point is the starting position of the vehicle p0 = (x0,y0,z0)T; 
z0 = 0. The initial alignment of the vehicle is γ0= 0° relative to symmetric axis 
of the vehicle. By combining p0 and γ0 to a vector V = (p0y0)T the actual 










































For computing a step of the vehicle, the angle ∆γ has to be determined by 
multiplying the maximal possible rotation γmax with the given activation of 
the sensor weighted with the connection strength (weights) rr, ll, rl or lr (see 
fig. 25b, 25c): ∆γ = γmax (−ll·SL − lr·SR + rl·SL + rr·SR) 
 
Translation tx and ty is first computed as a distance: s = 1 − | ∆γ | and then 
separated in the corresponding angles by:  
 
∆tx = −s·sin(γ), ∆ty = −s·cos(γ)  
 
The program registers and stores the values α (target position), β (stimulus 
position), γ (end position) and the trajectory length. The reference line for the 
angles is a vertical line through the middle of the arena. Clockwise angles are 
positive, counterclockwise negative and are in the interval [-π, π]. Trajectory 
length is defined relative to the shortest possible trajectory. The connection 
strengths ll, rr, lr, and lr (r: right, l: left, see also fig. 25b, 25c) between 
sensors and motors are those parameters that determine the different 
conditions (see also 3.2.1.1). Only the connections rl and lr are actually 
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applied in the experiment. If both sides are equal, the configuration is 
symmetric, if they are unequal it is called asymmetric. 
 
3.2.2.4. Model simulation28 
 
Assessing the performance of learners for different vehicles is only possible 
if the ‘behavior’ of a given vehicle is known. Therefore simulations of 
different vehicles were performed in the run-up of the experiments. The 
simulations recurred a specific procedure: “For a given parameter set 
(‘configuration’ ll, lr, rl, rr), set target to position a (a = 1,…,20), and test for 
all 100 possible stimulus positions b what the final position c results and 
register the error angle δ between a and c.” The simulations yield a 
comprehensive description of the individual behavior resulting from a given 
vehicle configuration. Several parameters were evaluated from the data. The 
simulation was applied for nemerous vehicles configurations with parameter 
sampling of 40 per parameter (0,05 steps in range [-1,1]). Stored was the 
distance between target position and end position in each run. Several 




fig. 26: Behavior of a specific vehicle configuration (overview). Parameters of the vehicle 
configuration (ll,lt,rl,rr) are shown in the upper left followed by the number of SOT hits 
(shown after ‘::’), i.e. those cases in which stimulus on target (or directly opposite for 
negative phototactic) leads to a hit (ε < 0.2 RAD). Columns 1-20 of the table indicate final 
positions of the vehicle in a given run. Each comprises five tics, i.e. the circle is sampled by 
100 tics. Rows 1-20 indicate the possible target positions. The asterisks represent hit  (  
<0.2 RAD), the points in a row represent misses (ε 
 
s ε
 > 0,2 RAD). In the end of each row, the 
number of hits is shown, followed by the information on discontinuous hit (asterisk) series 
(exclamation mark) followed by the nearest possible approach to the target [RAD]. 
                                                 
r s28 This was carried out by the student cowo ker Olaf Ger tung. 
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fig. 27: Distribution of errors for a given vehicle configuration. (a) Columns 1-20 of the table 
indicate final positions of the vehicle in a given run. Each comprises five tics, i.e. the circle is 
sampled by 100 tics. Rows 1-20 indicate the possible target positions. Grey levels represent 
the error ε in a vehicle run: white corresponds to zero and black to maximum. (b) Possible 
target positions. Number 1-20 and large tics indicate the target position. Between each large 
tic are five small tics. 
 
3.2.2.5. Selection of the vehicle configurations 
 
In order to decide, which concrete vehicle configuration should be applied in 
the experiment, the difficulty of a given vehicle configuration was 
approximated: first, the cases in which the strategy of placing stimulus on 
target (SOT) should be counted. Since the four vehicles in the conditions ‘pre’ 
and ‘post’ should not be too easy, only vehicles with less than 5 SOT hits 
(within a tolerance of >.2 rad) were taken as candidates for the four 
configurations. In some cases it is principally impossible to hit all targets. In 
order to keep learners motivated to try to get as near as possible, the 
number of valid targets should be maximized. (The learner should not get 
the impression that the target actually cannot be hit.) However, total 
exclusion of unreachable targets did not allow for ‘interesting’ vehicles, i.e. 
vehicles in which the number of SOT hits is minimized. (This dilemma shows 
that the process of finding the appropriate difficulty of a vehicle is always a 
trade-off between being interesting and being overtaxing.) 
 
Split hit ranges (see discontinuous asterisk series indicated by exclamation 
marks in fig. 26) should also be minimized. These cases typically occur when 
the vehicle performs a 180° turn in order to move towards a target “in its’ 
back”, but is stopped before the turn could be completed because it exceeds  
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table 9: Overview of the chosen vehicles. The rows show the different vehicles used and the 
corresponding condition. In columns 2 and 3 is shown if they are positive or negative 
phototactic and their symmetry, columns 4-7 contain the concrete configurations 
(connection strengths: l=left and r=right). The remaining columns contain statistics on 
behavior: SOT-number of SOT hits; splits-number of split hit ranges; invalid-number of 
unreachable targets. 
condition phototaxis llsymmetric lr rl rr SOT  splits  invalid
in otr  positive yes -1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 20 0 0
pre1 positive yes 0.00 +0.30 +0.30 0.00 5 5 5
pre2 negative yes +1.00 0.00 0.00 +1.00 5 2 3
post1 positive no +1.00 0.00 0.00 +0.55 4 3 6
post2 negative no 0.00 -0.80 -0.55 0.00 3 5 7
 
the arena’s rim. In this way, it is possible to hit a target by placing a stimulus 
on a supposedly ‘senseless’ position. Analogously to the dilemma described 
above, split hit ranges could not be totally avoided without excluding all 
‘interesting’ vehicles: these cases become increasingly probable with 
increasing asymmetry. 
 
Five vehicle configurations were needed for the experiment (see also 3.2.1.1). 
One very simple for the intro phase, a positive and one negative phototactic, 
symmetric with less SOT hits for the pre-experimental phase, and one 
positive and one negative phototactic asymmetric for the post-experimental 
phase (see table 9). 
 
3.2.2.6. Data analysis 
 
A variety of interesting approaches to data analysis result from the 
conceptions introduced before (see also 3.2.1.2). But the central question 
posed in the experimental design concerns the differences between control 
group and experimental group. The influence of the instructional model 
simulation that was presented exclusively to the experimental group shall be 
quantified. The hypothesis is that the experimental group performs better in 
the conditions post1 and post2, whereas the both groups should perform the 
same in the conditions pre1 and pre2. Thus, a group-specific performance 
measure has to be determined for a single condition (‘vehicle ‘). How can this 
be achieved? The performance in a single trial is measured by the error δ, i.e. 
the deviance of the vehicle of the target position in radians (see fig. 28). For 
determining the mean error for a single person, all errors could be averaged. 
But, as explained before (see also 3.2.1.2), the problem space is far too large 
at the beginning of a condition because the subject does not even know if 
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the vehicle is positive or negative phototactic. Since it is not assumed that 
experimental and control group differ substantially in their ability to 
distinguish between vehicle preference (stimulus quality), this first phase 
(initial drop in the learning curve in fig. 28) can be ignored. Therefore, only 
the last 15 trials are averaged for determining the mean performance of a 
single subject. As already explained (see also 3.1.2.1), the correction for the 
differential chance levels has to be applied to the error of each single trial. 
The corrected values can be averaged for the experimental groups exp and 
control group con, which yields mexp and mcon for each condition (pre1, pre2, 
post1 and post2). Additionally, the inter-group variances sexp and scon for 
each condition has to be determined. A t-test for different variances (and 
possibly different sample sizes nexp and ncon) 
t = mexp − mcon / (sexp / nexp + scon / ncon)−2 show the statistical certainty of 
the statement to be made (cf. Sachs 2003), i.e. whether or not there is a 
difference between the two groups in the conditions before the experimental 
treatment and after it. The obtained result will show the adequate way to 
carry on with the experiments. 
 
 
fig. 28: Learning curves. Predictions for performance of modeled learners (ordinate) over 
trials (abscissa) on different tasks. Least errors are expected for straight vehicles. If a 
stimulus on target strategy is applied to skew vehicles larger errors will be produced that 
can however, be reduced if a generalized correction factor ε or a trial specific correction 
factor εi is applied. 
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3.2.3. Discussion 
 
3.2.3.1. From performance to mental processes 
 
What exactly is the designated role of mental simulation in the experimental 
design proposed here? It is assumed here that mental simulation helps to 
overcome problems introduced by dynamics and complexity. In order to 
predict the final position of the vehicle in a simple task, e.g. a ‘straight’ 
vehicle, no hypotheses on intermediate positions of the vehicle are 
necessary. An interpolation between starting and final position is sufficient 
for producing correct results. But skew trajectories require interpolation with 
intermediate points. Thus, the dynamic component in the task is a change of 
direction during the trial that is introduced by the continuous sensorimotor 
processing: the internal states of sensors in each time step determine, via the 
motors, the turning angle in the next instance of time that determines the 
orientation to the stimulus and, therewith, the internal state of the next time 
step… It is assumed here that a mental simulation of the run (before the 
actual run) yields clues for determining the coordinates of intermediate 
positions. (This hypothesis might be nicely tested by studying eye 
movements). The intermediate positions of the vehicle are particularly helpful 
for illustrating to oneself that the differential activation of sensors can be 
very different in a late phase of a run as opposed to the starting position. 
This can lead to an understanding of the course of activation over the run 
and, finally, a prediction of asymmetric weighting of sensor activation that 
causes asymmetric shift magnitude distributions. 
 
The complex component in the task is introduced by the interdependence of 
variables and, therewith, the amount of case differentiations necessary to 
predict the vehicle’s behavior and minimize errors. For example, learners 
controlling a ‘straight’ vehicle just have to differentiate between positive and 
negative phototaxis (shift direction). But skewness of vehicles introduces an 
enormous amount of sources of error. One example is the mistaken direction 
of the compensatory shift: having a vehicle that ends left of target when 
stimulus on target, for example, the stimulus must be set more to the right 
of the target, but can erroneously be put more to the left. Another example is 
the failure of distinguishing between different shift distributions on the left 
and on the right or the assumption of a constant shift over a given range in 
the arena (whereas the shift magnitude increases with increasing angle). 
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These errors can be led back to a confusion of elements, mistaken mappings 
between two factors, misinterpretation of correlations etc. and are therefore 
summarized under complexity errors. 
 
Complexity is inferable from the vehicle’s behavior, but has its roots in the 
elements and activities that determine the vehicle’s internal mechanisms – 
particularly from its combinatorial powers. Therefore, complexity errors can 
be successfully prevented if the internal mechanisms are known and can be 
mentally simulated. For example, differentiating shift directions might be 
better performed if learners assume that the vehicle has two motors. Then 
learners can hypothesize, e.g.: “The right motor is stronger…” A 
correspondence between a left-right distinction in the internal organization 
and a left-right distinction in the behavior can be established more easily: “… 
so the vehicle shows a spin to the left.” Learners who do not have a clue on 
the internal mechanisms might even be unable to detect the systematic in the 
erroneous behavior (shift direction): “Why does that thing always run beside 
the target?“ 
 
As already noted above, learners might also successfully predict the 
trajectories without a concrete hypothesis on the internal mechanisms – just 
by detecting the ‘spin’ of the vehicle in phenomenological analysis: “It tends 
to move to the left, so I have to lure it a bit more to the right!” It might even 
be that these naive learners actually produce fewer errors than learners 
thinking in mechanisms because they are not loaded with the elements and 
activities that make up the mechanism. Then, naïve learners have more 
capacity for processing and are not prone complexity errors, e.g. 
confounding elements or inferring an erroneous hypothesis such as “the 
right sensor is stronger so the vehicle tends to go to the right“. Naive 
learners cannot have that hypothesis since they do not know about a right 
sensor. Thus, the introduction of a mechanism in the task might imply not 
only the potential to prevent complexity errors, but also to provoke 
complexity errors that otherwise would not be there. Even a performance 
drop caused by instruction has to be taken into account. On the other hand, 
the self-evident benefit of applying mechanistic thinking is to generate 
concrete hypothesis that can be verified and falsified. The final level of error 
production should therefore (depending on the application situation) be 
lower for learners that mentally simulate internal mechanisms of the vehicle 
than for learners that apply phenomenological control strategies: in this 
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sense, mental simulation is a cognitive investment strategy. This line of 
arguments predicts a U-type learning curve for mental simulators, i.e. 
performance decreases first, but increases later. Eventually, mental 
simulation before every run might not be necessary anymore or is performed 
implicitly. (This should also correspond to a decrease in reaction time.) In 
this case, the mechanism is condensed to a (more or less) simple relation 
between stimulus position and target position. Then, the controlled and 
active mental simulation is to be interpreted as an intermediate phase – a 
mental tool – for detecting and learning a relation. 
 
3.2.3.2. Efficiency of mental simulation 
 
Controlled and active mental simulation can be viewed as a mental tool for 
detecting and learning a relation. But would such a result be sufficing for 
justifying the expense of mental simulation? In order to assess this question, 
it must be clarified whether there is an alternative way of solving the task. 
The investments of mental simulation would be clearly worth it if mental 
simulation were the only strategy that leads to superior performance. But if 
there is a simpler way that leads to the same performance, the benefit of 
mental simulation seems less clear. In the concrete case of the vehicle task, a 
critical question is: isn’t there a much simpler way to correctly learn the shift 
magnitude distribution? Seen from the design stance, it seems much more 
efficient to directly aim at the characteristic – and not take the deviation with 
mental simulation. But is it actually possible to detect difficult relations such 
as shift magnitude distributions in the vehicle task without mental 
simulation? One strategy that might be used to detect even asymmetric shift 
magnitude distributions just by testing some stimulus positions could assign 
the respective shifts (‘stimulus-on-target errors’ as ordinate) to the arena’s 
coordinates (target positions as abscissa) and interpolate between the 
samples. The result would be a ‘mental characteristic’ from which errors can 
be predicted and correct stimulus positions can be inferred. This can equally 
well be termed a ‘mental model’ of the vehicle as it reduces the vehicle to a 
single input-output relation. It does not imply any hypothesis about the 
internal organization of the vehicle and it does not necessitate dynamic 
activation of the model, e.g. as a mental film. Only a minimal mental 
simulation of a diagram (or a formula) is necessary to generate the correct 
prediction. These learners can be termed – due to their minimal dependence 
on mental simulation during and after the learning process – ‘direct mental 
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modelers’. But is it actually probable that such perfectly rational learners 
exist? One can only speculate on this question: a skilled experimenter or 
mathematician might detect and perform this strategy, simply due to prior 
knowledge on the analysis of formal relations or experimental situations. But 
also learners using a form of verbal self-instruction might describe the same 
characteristic, e.g. “The deviation of the vehicle increases with increasing 
distance from top and decreases in the middle of the lower left section.” 
 
However probable direct mental modelers are, they could exist. Therefore 
they must be discussed as opponents to mental simulators in the question of 
assessing the efficiency of mental simulation: direct mental modeling 
represents the case in which the same result can be obtained with an 
alternative (more parsimonious) learning strategy. What could still justify the 
expense of mental simulation? One obvious argument is that learning direct 
mental modeling is left to learners with specific prior knowledge (e.g. 
mathematicians, experimenters etc.). The exclusivity of simulations is 
reduced to a specific group of learners with (or without) a specific profile of 
prior knowledge. But are there also aspects that are not contained in direct 
mental modeling but in mental simulation – aspects that do not affect 
performance, but are learnt? Put another way, might the ‘load’ that mental 
simulators additionally bear, pay off in other situations not tested here? Both 
learners know that the vehicle can be lured to a given target by choosing a 
given stimulus position. But an obvious difference is that direct mental 
modelers do not consider how this happens, i.e. what the mechanism is that 
makes this possible. If a distinction between declarative and procedural 
components in the tasks is applied, it is the procedural component of the 
task that is much more pronounced in mental simulators. 
 
Any task that refers to mechanistic properties of the vehicle should elicit the 
specific skills of mental simulators. For example, the task of designing a 
vehicle that produces a given behavior should be better performed by mental 
simulators because they have ‘loaded’ constituent elements and contributing 
activities that direct mental modelers do not have. Also the prediction of a 
completely new behavior, such as a trajectory influenced by another 
(distracting) light source or an obstacle (casting a shadow), should be better 
performed by mental simulators because they can define intermediate points 
(e.g. the vehicle being in front of the obstacle) and ask themselves, which 
states the sensors will have, which activation of motors result etc. (These 
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tasks can be additionally presented for separating mental simulators from 
direct mental modelers in future work.) In sum, mental simulators should 
have the advantage over direct mental modelers in performing on new 
modifications of the task because they have the opportunity to generalize 
and to autonomously solve problems relating to the task. 
 
Beside the skills of mental simulators to solve generalized tasks, some meta-
skills (generic skills) are also trained and have to be taken into account for 
assessing the effort of mental simulation. One part of these meta-skills can 
be classified as “complexity competence”: for example, a complexity 
reduction in the sense of differentiating elements (sensors, motors) and 
activities (activations) has to be carried out. Systematic thinking in the form 
of defining and testing hypothesis is necessary: specific states have to be 
assigned to elements and their influence to behavior of the system has to be 
predicted. Repetitions of this procedure help to sample a given parameter 
space and might yield clues for detecting general rules in the system. 
Another part of meta-skills can be summarized as “dynamics competence”: 
the system can best be analyzed when starting and final states are defined. 
Sometimes defining intermediate states helps to find crucial moments in the 
systems. Serialization, i.e. ‘chopping’ the (temporal) course in phases and 
analyze these one after the other helps to handle dynamics. 
 
In conclusion, the comparison of direct mental modeler and mental simulator 
yields important conclusions for assessing the efficiency of mental 
simulation: simulation is expensive in terms of “cognitive load”, but should 
pay off when they are generalized or new versions of the problem are 
encountered. Thus, simulations are recommended in the following cases: 
 
1. Simulation is exclusive: there is no alternative learning strategy. This will 
apply for specific complex and dynamic problems. (The trivial case of using 
simulations for costly or dangerous devices such as airplanes and power 
plants is not discussed here.) 
 
2. Simulation is non-exclusive: there is a more parsimonious alternative that 
produces the same (or superior) performance in a given task, but … 
(a) it produces less stable or less general results or 
(b) the training of generic skills (meta-skills), e.g. complexity competence or 
dynamics competence (or even computer handling) is a goal of application. 
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Evidently, the benefits of mental simulation will only become present when 
the appropriate problems are posed. If simulation can be called exclusive or 
not is task-dependent: a learner using mental simulation to solve a problem 
that could also be solved by a simpler strategy wastes time and effort if the 
results of mental simulation can never again be applied. Thus, another 
conclusion is that, if only the task-specific skill is the goal in learning, it 





The programmatic experimental approach proposed here is designed to 
answer questions on mechanisms and efficiency of mental simulation 
empirically. In a first step, the experiments as described in the section on 
methods will prove the existence or non-existence of a general effect of the 
applied design. More precisely, the first phase will show if the instructional 
computer simulation provided for the experimental group will make them 
outperform the control group in difficult vehicle tasks. Subsequent variations 
of the task, in which the instructional computer simulation will be 
decomposed in the constituent elements, will be necessary to answer 
questions on the specific cause of differences found between the groups or 
will elicit the causes why no differences can be found. 
 
The experimental design makes clear that the task of assessing the value of a 
specific mental or artificial simulation (not to speak of a general assessment) 
is not trivial and bound to considerable effort. Even a simple system such as 
the vehicle used here offers a very large problem space as it becomes directly 
evident if all target positions of a single vehicle configuration are envisaged 
(see fig. 26 and fig. 27). If all possible vehicle configurations are taken into 
account, the problem space enlarges by orders of magnitude (the model 
simulations for determining the correct vehicle configurations took several 
                                                 
29 Whether or not mental simulation is efficient is presumably not interesting for a single learner because the choice 
of problem solving strategies is unlikely to be a controlled, voluntary process but rather the (spontaneous or 
automatic) result of situational and individual factors. But educators, for example, are in the situation to decide 
whether or not a problem solving strategy is recommended. For instance, when applying a computer simulation for 
triggering mental simulation – beside didactical and technical efforts etc. that have to be taken into account – 
educators should ask themselves if one of the above mentioned benefits apply. However, they should allow for a 
performance drop! Give learners time to test the new mental simulation. It is the educator’s responsibility to make 
sure that the initial confusion will come down to higher performance level. 
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days). But skilled users – whatever strategy they might apply –nimbly control 
almost any vehicle and lead it through it’s target. This shows what powers 
our cognitive systems offer – if we understand how to use it. 
 
Reading Advice 
The previous section demonstrated for a single case how the role of simulation in explaining 
(brains) could be assessed empirically. It illustrates the effort necessary to make simulation 
an objectively founded explanatory tool – and no longer a subjective choice of a researcher 
or an educator. Of course, in most of he cases it is not necessary to show the value of t
simulation explicitly because success of research and learning is justification enough. But it 
is desirable that there were more well known cases in order to make clear to critics why 
simulation is needed and why it is often time consuming and complicated. Even simple 
systems reveal considerable dynamics and complexity as the example of the Braitenberg 
vehicle revealed. If we wish to have another than monocausal understanding for dynamic and 
complex systems and a ‘feeling’ for their handling simulation is the way. If there were a  
simpler way, it would have prevailed long ago. But, essentially, there is no simple way for 
explaining non-simple phenomena. 
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EXPLAINING BRAINS BY SIMULATION – A SUMMARY 
 
The task of explaining brains is hampered by the dynamics and complexity of 
brains. Complexity results from the extraordinary processing power of brains 
that is reached by distributing the continuously incoming stream of sensory 
signals over myriads of nerve cells that all compute “bits and pieces” in 
parallel. Moreover, explanatory approaches to these computations are to be 
found on multiple levels of organizations, e.g. electric, molecular, synaptic, 
networks etc. Thus, the comprehension problem caused by complexity is to 
keep track where the relevant processes happen. Dynamics occur as the 
incoming sensory signals are not only processed straight “downstream” 
towards behavioral response, but are rather recurrently fed into the stream to 
be compared and computed with sensory signals that come in later. This mix 
forms an “ongoing brain activity” that cannot be understood as a simple 
stimulus-response behavior. Thus, the comprehension problem caused by 
dynamics is to keep track when the relevant processes happen. Explainers of 
brain phenomena (and their recipients) are permanently challenged to push 
the limits of their mental capacities in order to handle the dynamics and 
complexity they find in brains. 
 
Simulation is a key to dynamics and complexity. Scientists use it as a 
standard method to explain even highly dynamic and complex brain 
phenomena. But the question is: How exactly does simulation help to unlock 
hardly explainable brain phenomena from dynamics and complexity? For 
answering this question I propose to focus on mental simulation as a 
mechanism that generates explanations. A detailed account of mental 
simulation can reveal the specific problems caused by dynamics and 
complexity. Solutions to these problems are simultaneously the specific roles 
of simulation in explaining brains. 
 
Explanation as mental simulation 
 
A phenomenon is something that happens in a situation being observed by 
an explainer. An explanation is a possible answer to a question concerning a 
phenomenon. The situation is constituted by elements and activities. 
Phenomena show the characteristic that elements and activities change by 
themselves (‘autonomously’) from an initial state to a goal state – the 
situation has a ‘momentum’. (A typical example of a natural momentum 
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would be the generation of an action potential, which is reaching its goal 
state autonomously after being triggered.) The explainer observes changes 
of elements and activities, but the explainer does not directly observe the 
causal relations that determine the changes. The explainer has to 
hypothesize causal relations in order to obtain an explanation. Perceptual 
elements, activities and causal relations build a mental model of the 
situation. 
 
A mental model can be actively operated to analyze a situation ‘offline’, even 
without actual observation, i.e. in absence of a situation and, thus, in 
absence of an external perceptual input. The explainer has to apply 
operational rules to perceptual elements, activities and causal relations 
(“thinking” or “reasoning“) to change the mental model from an initial state to 
a goal state. Operating a mental model enables the explainer to mentally 
simulate a situation. When the explainer observes a situation, the momentum 
that causes elements and activities to change form an initial state to a goal 
state is provided externally by the situation. If the explainer mentally 
simulates the situation, the momentum is generated internally. The process 
that generates an internal momentum and causes elements and activities to 
change from an initial state to a goal state is the genuine simulation scheme. 
If an internal momentum occurs, a simulation is functional. A functional 
mental simulation can be an explanation of a phenomenon. Thus, an 
explanation is a specific configuration of elements, activities, causal relations 
and operational rules that yields a possible answer to a question. An 
evaluation of the answer confirms or falsifies the hypothesis. Different types 
of explanation can be distinguished. A mechanistic explanation is obtained if 
the question posed calls for specifying the causal relations within the 
participating elements and activities, a constitutive explanation yields an 
answer to questions concerning the overall function of the phenomenon and 
a reductive explanation breaks down elements and activities to constituent 
elements and activities and underlying mechanisms that determine their 
behavior. 
 
Since the mental capacity of explainers is limited, not every mental 
simulation is functional – it can also fail. If the mental model of a given brain 
phenomenon is complex and dynamic, the mass of elements and the massive 
activity result in a mass of possible causal relations to be hypothesized. The 
operational rules needed to ‘drive’ the mental model in order to make a 
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simulation functional cannot be defined: no specific configuration of 
elements, activities and causal relations is obtained and the mental model 
cannot be operated. The mental simulation obstructs and no momentum is 
generated that causes perceptual elements and activities to change from an 
initial state to a goal state. The causal relations within and between elements 
and activities cannot be extracted. The phenomenon stays unexplained. 
 
Scientific work and simulation 
 
Scientific work is a systematic approach to find explanations even for 
complex and dynamic phenomena. The general applicable strategy to handle 
dynamics and complexity is serialization and decomposition. In experimental 
work, for instance, the natural situation in which a phenomenon is originally 
observable is reduced to a natural preparation, i.e. decomposed until the 
minimum number of elements and activities is reached that is necessary to 
preserve the phenomenon. Additionally, operational rules are specified that 
cause the elements and activities to change from an initial state to a goal 
state thereby revealing the phenomenon. Decomposing a natural situation to 
a natural preparation and serializing it with appropriate operational rules 
yields an experiment. The procedure of experimental work is analogous to 
the procedure applied in mental simulation. Therefore, an experiment 
involving a natural preparation can be termed natural simulation. An 
experiment can answer a question, confirm or falsify a hypothesis and may 
provide an explanation of a phenomenon. An experimental procedure is an 
instruction of how to configure elements and activities in order to reveal 
causal relations and to obtain an explanation. By transferring the 
experimental procedure applied in the (external) experiment to the (internal) 
mental model, explainers can learn how to succeed in mentally simulating a 
phenomenon. Experiments are recipes for mental simulations. 
 
When decomposition or serialization of the natural situation is difficult or 
impossible and mental simulation fails, scientists can strive for the 
construction of an artificial preparation (e.g. a computer simulation or robot): 
elements, activities and causal relations that are supposed to be crucial for 
the phenomenon are defined as parts of a mental model and externalized as 
an artificial preparation. Artificial operational rules can cause the artificial 
preparation to change from an initial state to a goal state. A functional 
artificial simulation yields an artificial momentum that can be fed to the 
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mental simulation to make it functional. Thus, experiments with artificial 
preparations are performed in exactly the same way as experiments are 
performed with natural preparations. The principal difference between 
natural and artificial lies in the origin of the momentum – the former is 
designed by nature, while the latter is designed by cognition. Since cognitive 
design provides more degrees of freedom for artificial simulations, 
decomposition and serialization of the natural situation and therewith 
explanation of the phenomenon can be carried out more easily. Factors that 
cannot be controlled in the natural preparation can be eliminated and factors 
that cannot be applied in the natural preparation can be added. Dynamics 
and complexity can thereby be reduced or even increased but in any case 
better controlled. In this manner, artificial simulation can offer ways to 
handle dynamics and complexity that are locked up for experiments with 
natural preparations. However, with respect to their explanatory value there 
is no difference at all between natural and artificial preparations. Both 
support mental simulation in that the perceptual elements, activities and the 
momentum is caused externally and, consequently, the effort necessary to 
mentally simulate these does not have to be invested: cognitive capacity is 
saved and more capacity can be allocated to the analysis of possible causal 
relations that explain the phenomenon. Just as an experiment with a natural 
preparation, the artificial simulation results in an instruction of how to think 
about a phenomenon – how to explain it. Considering mental simulation 
clarifies why simulation is particularly important for explaining brains: 
dynamics and complexity of the brain prevent successful explanations and 
simulation offers remedies. Mental simulation is the most potent explanatory 
mechanism for complex and dynamic phenomena. 
 
The view proposed here differs substantially from the notion of simulation 
commonly found in the public and even in science. One common conception 
is that simulation is reduced to computer simulation. In the view proposed 
here, computer simulation is merely a specific extension of mental 
simulation in which external models are designed and operated. A second 
common conception is that simulation is a weak form of scientific work 
because it does not deal with the “real” system. True is that artificial 
simulation does not deal with the natural. But wrong is that dealing with the 
natural means to deal with reality, whereas dealing with the artificial means 
to deal with something unreal. The natural preparation is not the slightest bit 
more real than the artificial preparation. (The stone in the woods and the 
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coffee cup on my table are both perfectly real.) The difference is that the 
natural preparation shows a momentum that is designed by nature and the 
artificial preparation shows a momentum that was designed by cognition. Of 
course, the artificial preparation is a part of nature and builds a special case 
of natural phenomena, namely to be designed for feeding a mental 
simulation so that an explanation can be generated. Artificial simulations are 
explanatory tools in exactly the same sense experiments with natural 
preparations are explanatory tools. A third common conception about 
simulation comes from the pro-simulation fraction: they sometime hold the 
view that formal, mathematical descriptions of a phenomenon are the most 
elegant explanation of a natural phenomenon and a functional artificial 
simulation is the ultimate proof of its truth. True is that formal models are an 
optimal means for designing artificial simulations and therewith to generate 
explanations (of complex and dynamic phenomena). Wrong is that these 
explanations are in any way superior to explanations based on experiments 
with natural preparations. Both serve the purpose of mediating between 
natural situation and mental simulation. Both are inferior to mental 
simulation in that they depend on external preparations. (And the most 
versatile externalization of the mental simulation, however, still is a lingual 
explanation.) 
 
The view proposed here does not only re-evaluate common conceptions 
about simulation by placing simulation where it belongs – away from the 
computer back in the head of the explainer – it also provides a means for 
assessing the value of simulation. The question of whether or not it is 
sensible to use simulation can be clearly answered: if it helps to explain a 
phenomenon, it is justified (ethical issues left aside). The specific value of a 
simulation is determined by its explanatory power. This value can even be 
quantified empirically. Putting mental simulation to the center allows to 
naturalize explanation, i.e. to treat explanation as a cognitive phenomenon 
that can be traced experimentally, for instance by applying methodology of 
cognitive psychology. Mental simulation as an explanatory mechanism is 
closely related to the psychology of mental models, learning, memory and 
thinking. Thus, theoretical and experimental approaches to mental 
simulation already exist. When, additionally, education and instructional 
design are taken into account, prescriptions for designing ‘good’ 
explanations that can be understood by a wealth of people come within 
reach. This finally leads to a fourth common conception about simulation – 
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them being a very special and rare event that has a highly theoretical 
background. True is that simulation helps us to develop a theory of what is 
happening in the world. Wrong is that simulation is rare – it happens any 
time you think. 
 
Post Scriptum: Throughout the study, brains served as exemplars giving rise to complex and 
dynamic phenomena that can best be explained by simulation. But beyond that, brains 
themselves provide the causal powers that make possible mental simulation, experiments on 
brains and the design of artificial models of brains. Furthermore, learning has a well-
evidenced neural basis and can be regarded as the basis of scientific work. Considering the 
brain inevitably introduces such a causal density in the theme that I continuously felt 
tempted to construct references from any topic to any other topic. But, even though I have a 
neuroscientific background (or exactly because of that), I tried to resist this temptation for 
preventing things to become too self-referential, too complex and too dynamic – and in 
favor of an at least approximated serial and decomposed argumentation structure. But the 
reader is invited to autonomously extend the issue of explaining brains by simulation with 
further aspects such as “brains simulating explanation“, “brains explaining simulation“, 






Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications, 5 ed. Freeman, San 
Francisco. 
Anderson, J. R. (1993). Rules of the Mind Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Anderson, J. R., Greeno, J. G., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (2000). Perspectives on Learning, 
Thinking, and Activity. Educational Researcher 29, 11-13. 
Anderson, J. R., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Situated learning and education. 
Educational Researcher 25, 5-11. 
Anderson, J. R., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1997). Situative versus cognitive perspectives: 
Form versus substance. Educational Researcher 26, 18-21. 
Arbib, M. A. & et al. The Human Brain Project. http://www-hbp.usc.edu/, Access Date 2001.  
Arbib,M.A. (1998). The handbook of brain theory and neural networks. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press). 
Arbib,M.A., Érdi,P., and Szentágothai,J. (1997). Neural organization: structure, function, and 
dynamics. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
Atkinson, R. C. & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control 
processes., eds. Spence, K. W. & Spence, J. T., pp. 89-105. Academic Press, New York. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1993). Flexibility, structure, and linguistic vagary in concepts: Manifestations 
of acompositional system of perceptual symbols. In Theories of memories, eds. Collins, A. 
C., Gathercole, S. E., & Conway, M. A., pp. 29-101. Erlbaum, London. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 577-
609. 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: An Experimental and Social Study Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Bassok, M. (1997). Object-based reasoning. In The psychology of learning andmotivation 
(37), ed. Medin, D. L., pp. 1-39. Academic Press., San Diego. 
 259
REFERENCES 
Baudrillard, J. (1988). Selected Writings Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Bechtel,W. and Abrahamson,A. (2002). Connectionism and the Mind: Parallel Processing, 
Dynamics, and Evolution in networks. (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Bechtel, W. (2001a). Cognitive Neuroscience: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition. In 
Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, eds. Machamer, P. K., Grush, R., & McLaughlin, P., 
pp. 81-111. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Bechtel, W. (2001b). Representations: From neural systems to cognitive systems. In 
Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, eds. Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., & 
Stufflebeam, R. S., Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., Mundale, J., & Stufflebeam, R. S. (2001). Philosophy and the 
Neurosciences: A reader Basil Blackwell. 
Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R. C. (1993). Discovering complexity: Decomposition and 
localization as strategies in scientific research Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Bennett, M. V. (1997). Gap junctions as electrical synapses. Journal of Neurocytology 26, 
349-366. 
Berry, D. C. & Dienes, Z. (1993). Implicit Learning: Theoretical and Empirical Issues Erlbaum, 
Hillsdale, NJ. 
Berry, D. C. & Broadbent, D. E. (1988). Interactive tasks and the implicit/explicit distinction. 
British Journal of Psychology 79, 251-272. 
Best,J.B. (1999). Cognitive Psychology. West Wadsworth). 
BIOSIS. Current Zoological Record Subject Hierarchy. 
http://www.biosis.org/zrdocs/zr_thes/subjvoc/index.html, Access Date 2002. 
Blackwell Science Publishers. A Glossary of Psychological Terms. 
http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/psychol/Glossary.htm, Access Date 2002. 
Borst, A. & Egelhaaf, M. (1989). Principles of visual motion detection. Trends in 
Neurosciences 12, 297-306. 




Brewer, W. (1987). Schemas versus mental models in human reasoning. In Modelling 
Cognition, ed. Morris, P., pp. 187-197. John Wiley, New York. 
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and Communication Pergamon Press., London. 
Broadbent, D. E. (1975). The magic number seven after fifteen years. In Studies in Long-
Term Memory, eds. Kennedy, A. & Wilkes, A., pp. 3-18. Wiley, New York. 
Broadbent, D. E. (1977). Levels, hierarchies, and the locus of control. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 29, 181-201. 
Buckner, R. L., Petersen, S. E., Ojemann, J. G., Miezin, F. M., Squire, L. R., & Raichle, M. E. 
(1995). Functional anatomical studies of explicit and implicit memory retrieval tasks. Journal 
of Neuroscience 15, 12-29. 
Bush, G. (1990) “Decade of the Brain” Presidential Proclamation 6158. 
http://lcweb.loc.gov/loc/brain/proclaim.html, Access Date 2003. 
Carnap, R. (1995). An introduction to the philosophy of science, pp. 6-16. Dover 
Publications Inc., New York. 
Carruthers, P., Stich, S. P., & Siegal, M. (2002). The cognitive basis of science Chapman and 
Hall, London. 
Center for Naval Analyses. Nonlinear Dynamics and Complex Systems Theory: Glossary of 
Terms. http://www.cna.org/isaac/Glossb.htm, Access Date 2002. 
Chiel, H. D. & Beer, R. D. (1997). The brain has a body: Adaptive behavior emerges from 
interactions of nervous system. Trends in Neurosciences 20, 553-557. 
Chrucky, A. Meta-Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.ditext.com/encyc/frame.html, 
Access Date 2002. 
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of 
Philosophy 78, 67-90. 
Churchland, P. M. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of Mind/Brain MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 




Cleeremans, A., Destrebecqz, A., & Boyer, M. (1998). Implicit learning: News from the front. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2, 406-416. 
Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans 
reason? studies with the wason selection task. Cognition 31, 187-276. 
Craver, C. & Darden, L. (2001). Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial 
Memory. In Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, eds. Machamer, P. K., Grush, R., & & 
McLaughlin, P., pp. 112-138. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Crick, F. H. C. (1989). The recent excitement about neural networks. Nature 337, 129-132. 
Crookall, D. (2001). State of the art and science of simulation/gaming. Simulation & Gaming 
32, 449-450. 
Cruse, H. (1996). Neural networks as cybernetic systems Thieme, Stuttgart/New York. 
Cruse, H. (2001). The Explanatory Power and Limits of Simulation Models in the 
Neurosciences. In Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, eds. Machamer, P. K., Grush, R., 
& McLaughlin, P., pp. 138-154. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Cruse, H. (2003). The evolution of cognition -- a hypothesis. Cognitive Science 27, 135-155. 
Daugman, J. G. (1990). Brain Metaphor and Brain Theory. In Computational Neuroscience, ed. 
Schwartz, E. L., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Dawson, M. W. The University of Alberta’s Cognitive Science Dictionary. 
http://web.psych.ualberta.ca/~mike/Pearl_Street/Dictionary/entries.html#top, Access Date 
2002. 
Dienes, Z. & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 22, 735-755. 
Dörner, D. (1989). Die Logik des Mißlingens Rowohlt Verlag., Reinbek. 
Dörner, D. (1998). Bauplan für eine Seele Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek. 
Dörner, D. & Wearing, A. (1995). Complex problem solving: Toward a (computer-simulated) 
theory. In Complex problem solving: The European Perspective, eds. Frensch, P. A. & Funke, 
J., pp. 65-69. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. 
 262 
REFERENCES 
Dörner, D., Kreuzig, H. W., Reither, F., & Stäudel, T. (1983). Lohhausen: Vom Umgang mit 
Komplexität Huber, Bern. 
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Dudel,J., Menzel,R., and Schmidt,R.F. (2001). Neurowissenschaft: vom Molekül zur Kognition. 
(Berlin: Springer). 
Egelhaaf, M. & Borst, A. (1993). A look into the cockpit of the fly: Visual orientation, 
algorithms and identified neurons. Journal of Neuroscience 13, 4563-4574. 
Eliasmith, C. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. 
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/index.html, Access Date 2002. 
Elsevier Science Publishers. Thesaurus of neuroscientific terms. 
http://www.elsevier.com/.dejavu/Thesauri/NEUROSCI/show/, Access Date 2002. 
Fausett,L.V. (1994). Fundamentals of Neural Networks. Prentice Hall). 
Fishwick, P. A. (1995). A Taxonomy for Simulation Modelling Based on Programming 
Language Principles. IEEE-Transactions on IE Research 30, 811-820. 
Flake, G. W. The Computational Beauty of Nature: glossary. 
http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/FLAOH/cbnhtml/glossary-C.html, Access Date 2002. 
fMRI Data Center. fMRI Data Center. http://www.fmridc.org, Access Date 2003. 8-9-2003. 
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought Thomas Y. Crowell. 
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of Meaning in the philosophy of mind MIT 
Press, Cambrige, Mass. 
Forbus, K. D. (1983). Qualitative Reasoning about Space and Motion. In Mental Models, eds. 
Gentner, D. & Stevens, A., pp. 53-73. Erlbaum, Hillsdale. 
Frensch, P. A. & Funke, J. (1995). Complex problem solving: The European perspective 
Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Funke, J. (1991). Solving complex problems: Exploration and control of complex systems. In 
Complex problem solving: Principles and mechanisms, eds. Sternberg, R. J. & Frensch, P. A., 
pp. 185-222. Erlbaum., Hillsdale, NJ. 
 263
REFERENCES 
Funke, J. (1992). Wissen über dynamische Systeme: Erwerb, Repräsentation und Anwendung 
Heidelberg: Springer, Heidelberg. 
Galvani, L. (1791). De viribus electricitatis in moto musculari commentarius (German 
translation). In Ostwalds Klassiker der exakten Wissenschaften, ed. Oettingen, A. J. v., 
Engelmann, Leipzig. 
Gazzaniga,M.S. (2000). The new cognitive neurosciences. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
Gazzaniga, M. S. (2002). Cognitive neuroscience, 2 ed. WW Norton & Co. 
Gell-Mann, M. (1995). What is Complexity? Complexity 1 19. 
Gentner, D. (2001). Spatial metaphors in temporal reasoning. In Spatial schemas in abstract 
thought pp. 203-222. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Gentner, D. & Stevens, A. (1983). Mental Models Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Gentner.D & Gentner.D.R. (1983). Flowing Waters for Teeming Crowds: Mental Models of 
Electricity. In Mental Models, eds. Gentner, D. & Stevens, A., pp. 99. Lawrence Earlbaum 
Associates. 
Giere, R. N. (1992). Cognitive models of science University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Glenberg, A. M. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, 1-55. 
Golgi, C. (1906). The neuron doctrine - theory and facts. In Nobel Lectures, Physiology or 
Medicine 1901-1921 Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Gordon, R. (1986). Folk Psychology as Simulation. Mind and Language 1, 158-171. 
Greenberg, H. J. Mathematical Programming Glossary. 
http://carbon.cudenver.edu/~hgreenbe/glossary/glossary.html, Access Date 2002. 
Greeno, J. G. (1989). Situations,mental models,and generative knowledge. In Complex 
information processing, eds. Klahr, D. & Kotovsky, K., pp. 285-318. Lawrence Erlbaum, 
Hillsdale, NJ. 




Grethe,J.S. and Arbib,M.A. (2001). Computing the Brain: A Guide to Neuroinformatics. 
Academic Press Inc.). 
Grush, R. (1997). The architecture of representation. Philosophical Psychology 10, 5-25. 
Haag, J. & Vermeulen, A. B. A. (1999). The Intrinsic Electrophysiological Characteristics of Fly 
Lobula Plate Tangential Cells: III. Visual Response Properties. Journal of Computational 
Neuroscience 7, 213-234. 
Haider, H. (1992). Implizites Wissen und Lernen. Ein Artefakt? Zeitschrift für experimentelle 
und angewandte Psychologie 39, 68-100. 
Haider, H. & Frensch, P. A. (1996). The role of information reduction in skill acquisition. 
Cognitive Psychology 30, 304-337. 
Heitzmann, W. R. (1973). The validity of social science simulations: a review of research 
findings. Education  94, 170-175. 
Hertz,J.A., Krogh,A.S., and Palmer,R.G. (1991). Introduction to the Theory of Neural 
Computation. Addison Wesley Longman). 
Hesslow, G. (1994). Will Neuroscience Explain Consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 
171, 29-39. 
Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and perception. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences  6, 242-247. 
Heylighen, F. Principia Cybernetica Web: Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems. 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/indexASC.html, Access Date 2002. 
Hirschfeld, L. A. & Gelman, S. A. (1994). Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition 
and culture Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. 
Hodgkin, A. L. & Huxley, A. F. (1952). A quantitative description of membrane current and its 
application to conduction and excitation in nerve. Journal of Physiology 117, 500-544. 
Horstmann, W. (2002). Standardizing simulations -- uphill all the way. In Campus 2002, eds. 
Bachmann, G., Haefeli, O., & Kindt, M., pp. 218-230. Waxmann, Zürich. 
Howe, D. Free On-line Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC). 
http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/, Access Date 2002. 
 265
REFERENCES 
IEEE Consortium. Learning Object Metadata. http://ltsc.ieee.org, Access Date 2003. 2003. 
ISI. Web of Knowledge. http://www.isinet.com/isi/, Access Date 2002. 
ISO International Standards Organisation. Standard 5963: Methods for examining 
documents, determining their subjects, and selecting indexing terms. http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/iso/tc46sc9/standard/5963e.htm, Access Date 2002. 
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and 
imager. Behavioral and Brain Sciences  17, 187-245. 
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural Simulation of Action:A Unifying Mechanism for Motor 
Cognition. NeuroImage 14, 109. 
Jeannerod, M. & Victor, F. (1999). Mental imaging of motor activity in humans. Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology 9, 735-739. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1980). Mental models in cognitive science. Cognitive Science 4, 72-
115. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, 
Inference, and Consciousness Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Deductive reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology 50, 109-
135. 
Joslyn, C. & Turchin, V. The Modeling Relation. Heylighen, F. Joslyn C. and Turchin, V. 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MODEL.html, Access Date 1993.  Principia Cybernetica, Brussels. 
11-9-2003. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases, eds. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A., pp. 201-210. Cambridge 
University Press, NewYork. 
Kahng, J., Liao, W. K., & McLeod D. (1997). Mining generalized term associations: Count 
Propagation Algorithm. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining pp. 203-206. Newport Beach, CA. 
Kandel,E.R. and Schwartz,J.H. (1991). Principles of Neural Science. (New York: Elsevier). 
Kandel,E.R., Schwartz,J.H., and Jessell T.M. (1996). Essentials of Neural Science and Behavior. 
McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing). 
 266 
REFERENCES 
Kern, R., Lutterklas, M., Petereit, C., Lindemann, J. P., & Egelhaaf, M. (2001). Neuronal 
processing of behaviourally generated optic flow: experiments and model simulations. 
Network: Computational and Neural Systems 12, 351-369. 
Kieras, D. E. & Bovair, S. (1984). The role of a mental model in learning to operate a device. 
Cognitive Science 8, 255-273. 
Klahr, D. (2000). Exploring Science MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Koch,C. (1999). Biophysics of computation : information processing in single neurons. (New 
York: Oxford University Press). 
Koper, R. Educational Modeling Language. http://eml.ou.nl/, Access Date 2003. 
Koslow, J. H. The Human Brain Project, National Institute of Mental Health. 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/Neuroinformatics/index.cfm, Access Date 2001. 
Laird, J. E., Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1987). Soar: An architecture for general 
intelligence. Artificial Intelligence 33, 1-64. 
Lambrinos, D., Moller, R., Labhart, T., Pfeifer, R., & Wehner, R. (2000). A mobile robot 
employing insect strategies for navigation. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 30, 64. 
Leach, A. R. (2001). Molecular Modelling - Principles and Applications, 2 ed. Pearson 
Education Limited. 
Lee, F. J. & Anderson, J. R. (2001). Does Learning a Complex Task Have to be Complex? A 
study in learning decomposition. Cognitive Psychology 42, 267-316. 
Lemmon, E. J. (1987). Beginning Logic, 2 ed. Chapman and Hall, London. 
Library of Congress. Library of Congress Subject Headings. http://www.loc.gov, Access Date 
2002. 
Logan, G. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychological Review 95, 
492-527. 
Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., & CraverC. (2001). Thinking about Mechanisms. Philosophy of 
Science 67, 1-25. 
Magnani, L., Nercessian, N., & Thagard, P. (1999). Model-based reasoning in scientific 
discovery Plenum Press. 
 267
REFERENCES 
Malsburg, C. v. d. & Schneider, W. (1986). A neural cocktail-party processor. Biological 
Cybernetics 54, 29-40. 
Mandler, J. (1984). Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 
NJ. 
Markman, A. B. (1999). Knowledge Representation Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. 
Markman, A. B. & Gentner, D. (2001). Thinking. Annual Review of Psychology 52, 223-247. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: a computational investigation into the human representation and 
processing of visual information Freeman, San Francisco. 
Maynard Smith, J. (2000). The concept of information in biology. Philosophy of Science 67, 
177-194. 
McClelland, J. L. & Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in 
the microstructure of cognition. Vol. 2 Psychological and biological models MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Medin,D.L., Ross,B.H., and Markman,A.B. (2001). Cognitive Psychology. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc.). 
Medin, D. Cognitive Psychology: Glossary. 
http://www.psych.nwu.edu/psych/people/faculty/medin/book/glossary.html, Access Date 
2002. 
Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.m-w.com, Access Date 2003. 
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Millikan, R. G. (1989). Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy 86, 281-297. 
Minsky M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In The Psychology of Computer 
Vision, ed. Winston, P., pp. 211-277. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Mitchell, S. (1997). Pragmatic Laws. Philosophy of Science 64 Proceedings, 468-479. 
National Institute of Health. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Thesaurus. 
http://etoh.niaaa.nih.gov/AODVol1/Aodthome.htm, Access Date 2002a. 
 268 
REFERENCES 
National Institute of Health. Medical Subject Headings. 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/2002/MeSHtree.G.html, Access Date 2002b. 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York. 
Nernst, W. (1888). Zur Kinetik der in Loesung befindlichen Koerper, Theorie der Diffusion. 
Zeitschrift fuer physikalische Chemie 2, 613-637. 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Nicholls,J.G., Martin,A.R., and Wallace B.G. (2001). From neuron to brain: a cellular and 
molecular approach to the function of the nervous system. (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer). 
Nissen, M. J. & Bullemer, P. (1987). Attentional requirements of learning: Evidence from 
performance measures. Cognitive Psychology 19, 1-32. 
Online Computer Library Center. Dewey’s decimal classification. 
http://www.oclc.org/dewey/, Access Date 2002. 
O'Reilly,R.C. and Munakata,Y. (2000). Computational explorations in cognitive neuroscience: 
understanding the mind by simulating the brain. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
Pavlov, I. (1904). Physiology of Digestion -- Nobel Lecture. In Nobel Lectures, Physiology or 
Medicine 1901-1921 Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam. 
Payne, S. J. (1992). On Mental Models and Cognitive Artefacts. In Models in the Mind: Theory, 
Perspective & Application, eds. Rogers, Y., Rutherford, A., & Bibby, P., Academic Press, 
London. 
Platt, M. (2002). Neural correlates of decisions. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 12, 141-
148. 
Ploetzner, R. & VanLehn, K. (1997). The acquisition of qualitative physics knowledge during 
textbook-based physics training. Cognition-and-Instruction 15, 169-205. 
Principe,J.C., Euliano,N.R., and Lefebvre,W.C. (2000). Neural and adaptive systems: 
fundamentals through simulations. (New York: Wiley). 
Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of ‘Meaning’. In Mind, Language, and Reality pp. 215-271. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 269
REFERENCES 
Rall, W. (1989). Cable theory for dendritic neurons. In  Methods in Neuronal Modelling, 
Computational Neuroscience, eds. Koch, C. & Segev, I., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Ramón y Cajal, S. (1906). The structure and connexions of neurons. In Nobel Lectures, 
Physiology or Medicine 1901-1921 pp. 189-217. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Reber, A. S. (1967). Implicit learning of artificial grammars. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior  6, 855-863. 
Rescorla, R. A. & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the 
effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In Classical conditioning II: Current 
research and theory, eds. Black, A. H. & Prokasy, W. F., pp. 64-99. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
New York. 
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In Theoretical Issues in 
Reading and Comprehension, eds. Spiro, R. J., Bruce, B., & Brewer, W. F., pp. 33-58. Erlbaum, 
Hillsdale, NJ. 
Rumelhart, D. E. & Ortony, A. (1977). The representation of knowledge in memory. In 
Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge, eds. Anderson, Spiro, & Montague. 
Rumelhart, D. E., Hinton, G. E., & Williams, R. J. (1986). Learning representations by back-
propagating errors. Nature 323, 533-536. 
Sachs, L. (2003). Angewandte Statistik, 11 ed. Springer, Berlin. 
Schaffner, K. F. (2001). Extrapolation from Animal Models: Social Life, Sex and Super Models. 
In Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, eds. Machamer, P. K., Grush, R., & McLaughlin, 
P., pp. 200-230. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Schank R. & Abelson R. (1977). Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 
NJ. 
Schmucker, K. & Apple Computer Inc. (2000). A Taxonomy of Simulation Software. Learning 
Technology Review Fall 1999/Spring 2000. 
Schutter, E. d. European Union Thematic network: “Computational Neuroscience“. 
http://www.neuroinf.org, Access Date 2002. 
Schwartz, D. L. & Black, T. (1999). Inferences through imagined actions: knowing by 




Schwartz, E. L. (1990). Computational Neuroscience MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-457. 
Shadlen, M. N. & Newsome, W. T. (1994). Noise, neural codes and cortical organization. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 4, 569-579. 
Shepherd, G., Mirsky, J., Healy, M., Singer, M., Skoufos, E., Hines, M., Nadkarni, P., & Miller, 
P. (1998). The Human Brain Project: Neuroinformatics tools for integrating, searching and 
modeling multidisciplinary neuroscience data. Trends in Neurosciences 21. 
Sober, E. (1997). Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology. Philosophy 
of Science 64 Proceedings, 458-467. 
Thagard, P. (1992). Conceptual revolutions Princeton University Press., Princeton, NJ. 
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1989). Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Part 
I: Theoretical considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology 10, 29-49. 
Walker, A. (1997). Thesaurus of psychological index terms, 8 ed. American Psychological 
Assoc., Washington, DC. 
Walter, G. G. (1999). Compartmental Modeling With Networks Springer Verlag. 
Webb, B. (2001). Can robots make good models of biological behaviour? Behavioural and 
Brain Sciences 24, 1033-1050. 
Wehner, R. (1994). The polarization-vision project: championing organismic biology. In 
Neural Basis of Behavioural Adaptations, eds. Schildberger, K. & Elsner, N., pp. 103-143. 
Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart. 
 271
 CV – CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
13/02/1971 Born in Bielefeld, Germany  
 
1977 – 1981  Elementary School: Grundschule Werther, Westf. 
1981 – 1987  Intermediate Classes: Ev. Pro-Gymnasium Werther, Westf. 
1987 – 1990  Senior Classes: Max-Planck-Gymnasium Bielefeld. 
1990 – 1992  Community Service (environmental): Umweltzentrum Bielefeld, AKUT e.V. 
 
10/92 – 09/98 
 Studies: Biology (Diploma), Psychology & Philosophy (Courses) at Bielefeld University 
 
Since 06/96  
Department of Neurobiology (Prof. M. Egelhaaf), Faculty of Biology, Bielefeld University: 
  
06/96 – 09/98 Electrophysiological studies on motion vision in flies 
 
10/98 – 12/00 Author and coordinator in the project RUBIN – educational 
simulations for computational neuroscience; funded by the UVM-NRW (state 
government) 
  
01/01 – today Author and coordinator in the project MONIST – a platform for 
simulations in Brain Science education, developed by 9 Institutes at 6 Universities in 
Germany; funded by the BMB+F (federal government) 




I declare to be the only author of this work and have used only those sources 




Ich versichere, daß ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig verfaßt und keine 
anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. 
 
 
Bielefeld, 12/2003 
 
 
 
Wolfram Horstmann 
 272 
